As I previously wrote in The Fifth Generation of Modern War: Drones, Attrition, and the Collapse of the Logistics Sanctuary, the advent of drone warfare, combined with the digital elements that make it uniquely lethal, genuinely represents a new generation of modern war. It is clear that the Russians understand this much more clearly, and are able to describe it and articulate the issues much better than Western military historians and strategists, because they are actively engaged in it.
Simplicius quotes the retired General Yuri Baluyevsky, Russia’s Chief of General Staff from 2004-2008, from his recent article on the current revolution in military affairs, as well as a Russian source working in logistics on the Pokrovsk front, that explain and underline how this really is a new generation of war, the chief aspect of which is the massive extension of the battlespace well beyond the traditional battlefield.
The piece urges for Russia to adapt to this ‘new reality’ as soon as possible. The urgency stems from the stated thesis that drone tech capabilities will increase faster than the effective means of countering them:
It is unlikely that there will be an expert who denies the revolutionary changes in military affairs – the “unmanned revolution” or the “drone war revolution.” Perhaps, in a broader sense, it could be called the “digital war.” There is every reason to believe that this process will continue to expand and deepen, as the potential for increasing the “drone war” exceeds the ability to effectively counter this type of weapon.
The authors go on to elaborate that drones are getting progressively cheaper and smaller while increasing their range. In the near future, they note, the tactical rear will become a total “zone of extermination”—which it has essentially already become according to many frontline reports.
The tactical battlefield and the rear, tens of kilometers away from the line of contact, will essentially become a “zone of extermination.” Naturally, countering these threats will be a top priority. As a result, the armed struggle will primarily focus on gaining “drone supremacy” in the air. Consequently, the organization of military forces must align with the goals and objectives of achieving such supremacy in the air and space.
In light of the above, here is an interesting breakdown from a Russian channel on the Pokrovsk direction, describing just how the situation has evolved in terms of logistics and putting units in positions.
We continue our difficult work to supply our assault units in the Pokrovsk direction. This month, the main focus was on the assault units and their communication and survival on the battlefield.
First, we need to explain what the line of contact looks like in this direction, and in general, in general, now-on the entire front. First, military personnel assembled and ready to perform their combat tasks are brought to the assembly point 20-25 km from the front line. Then they wait for the command. They are loaded at the beginning of the next segment and dropped off at a point approximately 10-13 km from the LBS (line of contact), where they can stay for some time – from several hours to several days. This is a nearby evacuation point from which you can almost guarantee to escape and survive.
Then there is the next drop-off at a point 5-7 km from the LBS – it is not possible to drive any further. All drops-offs and movements across the terrain among minefields and open areas are carried out by guides.
Then, on foot, they reach the point from which the assault may begin. From there, they approach the positions. As a rule, only half of them reach the positions, while the rest are injured or killed by drone strikes.
A pair of stormtroopers who have reached the ruins of a house usually travel in pairs, hiding in the ruins and basements. They do not venture outside unnecessarily. From there, they must maintain communication with their commander to stay informed about what is happening outside, coordinate their actions with their neighbors, provide assistance, and engage in assaults. They may spend a week, a month, or two in the ruins.
If the weather is bad: fog, rain, snowfall, then losses are sharply reduced. FPV drones almost do not fly in the rain – droplets stick to the camera. The water curtain strongly jams the signal at 5.8 Ghz. However, the enemy artillery begins to work more actively.
The wiring of any armored group is usually noticed by the enemy 10-15 km before the LBS. By the time it reaches the initial positions for the attack, there are already dozens of enemy FPV drones in the sky and dozens more ready to launch. All of this then falls on the armored group and the paratroopers. Yes, it’s difficult for our troops, and there are casualties, but we are still able to drop paratroopers and advance. Our main losses are in the form of wounded soldiers.
As per the description above, the 25km-from-LoC zone has already become extremely dicey, where dispersion is necessary for survival. Then from 5-7km onward, it essentially becomes the ‘death zone’, to borrow mountaineering terminology.
Baluyevsky and his co-author state that the chief development of the modern battlefield is the total doing-away with the ‘fog of war’, initiating an era of complete battlefield transparency.
War has fundamentally changed and these changes don’t just change and expand the tactical battlefield, it indicates tremendous changes to the logistical art, the operational art, the strategic art, and even the geostrategic balance of power.
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