Tag: war

How the US Navy Lost the High Seas

In fairness, the US Navy hasn’t actually lost its dominance over the bluewater oceans yet. But it will as soon as it is put to the test, as previous naval powers have before:

No matter what they say, armed forces prepare for the war they want to fight. Before Pearl Harbor, the United States and Imperial Japanese navies built mirrored fleets centered around lines of battleships that would someday meet in mortal combat, which in the space of a single event — a Pacific Clash of Titans — would decide the destiny of nations.

Yet when war came, the efforts of both fleets, try as they might, could not make this happen. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s prophecy of “Seapower” mesmerized the U.S. and Japanese navies with the mutual conviction that a Pacific War could be decided by a single event: Another Tsushima or Trafalgar. Yet even if there were no way to achieve such a choreographed final fantasy, the idée fixe of decisive battle had become a way of life for both USN and IJN. This obsession with almighty battleships locked in a last battle led to the destruction of America’s prewar fleet in the first year of war, and then eventually, Japan’s.

Today, the Navy still pines for a Pacific fleet showdown, this time with China. It is still obsessing over its capital ship idée fixe (with carriers in place of battleships) — when, like 1941, its fleet is simply too small, too old, and too out of shape.

In World War II, the U.S. Navy was saved only by America’s titanic industrial power, which in 1941 was building two backup fleets: A “two ocean” armada, to be followed by and an even bigger one. That second force, 5000+ ships, was built de novo — as though out of nothing — in just four years. The Navy was saved, not by its adaptable resilience, but by American Captains of Industry.

In tragic contrast, the Imperial Japanese Navy — the most powerful fleet in the world in 1941 — had no backup. When faced with a U.S. shipbuilding monster, it was literally ground down by those 5,000 brand spanking new American hulls. In this sense, the Nihon Kaigun is very much like the U.S. Navy today. War came, and it simply could not replace ships lost.

Frankly, the Japanese actually built quite a few new ships during the war — just not enough. Likewise, there are no Captains of Industry to save the U.S. Navy today. China has 200 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, and fabulous repair and maintenance that serves the entire maritime world. If America cannot build, repair, and maintain even its current, “incredibly shrinking” Navy, then it is no “maritime nation.”

What happens to the Navy that reaches the acme of power and success, and comes to believe that it will command the seas forever? That would be Great Britain from 1815-1914. For the Royal Navy, it meant atrophy, that invisible sclerosis hardening into an ossified way of life.

As it celebrates its always-triumphant orthodoxies, it also forgets how to think, it takes itself way too seriously, and it believes without a flicker of doubt that, to stay on top, the Fleet simply must keep doing what it has always done, in sufficient quantity and quality, of course. The Royal Navy may have survived on the basis of quantity and quality of ships.

Yet what about quality and originality of thought? A Navy Ethos that punishes new thinking, that throttles innovation, that cashiers criticism — all by the time proclaiming how it celebrates these things — is an ethos chained to its own “Rules of the Game.”

In this sort of culture, only the right people, who say the right things, and put on the right, bright face to the public can expect to move up. This is the sclerosis of success, and it is, for any society of war, the most dangerous disorder: For it cannot be cured from within. Thus, the strategic reckoning of the Royal Navy in World War I will be as nothing to what awaits its American Cousin, very soon.

There isn’t any material reason why a naval power with prodigious resources can’t completely reinvent itself in the new mode that is replacing the old one. And yet, it doesn’t happen, for much the same reason that very, very few business innovations come out of the leading corporations in the industries they dominate.

Too many people and too many organizational processes are too heavily invested in the current way of doing things to make the shift to the newer way before someone else proves its utility and thereby obtains a leading advantage that usually turns out to be conclusive. Unfortunately, unlike leading corporations, leading militaries can’t simply buy out the innovators and incorporate them into their own operations.

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You Just Thought of That NOW?

Remember when the jokers at NATO were telling everyone that Russia would be out of ammunition in two weeks and that it had no allies, so everyone should support the Kiev regime? Now they’re trying to scare everyone with a threat that was always obvious to more serious military analysts.

NATO chief Mark Rutte has chillingly warned that World War III will start with simultaneous invasions from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Secretary-general Rutte suggested the combined attacks from the Chinese and Russian leaders could trigger a World War nightmare and bring the planet to the brink of Armageddon.

According to the NATO chief, China would start by seeking to grab Taiwan – while ensuring the Kremlin dictator simultaneously attacks NATO territory, amid fears Putin is anyway eyeing the Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, formerly part of the USSR.

Now, suddenly, they’re aware that Russia has allies, that Russia and its allies significantly outnumber the US-EU-Israel alliance in terms of population, military power, and industrial capacity, and that the USA cannot possibly defeat either Russia or China, let alone both at once.

The fascinating thing is that their solution to the danger to which they are so newly awakened is exactly the same as their original call for everyone to support the Kiev regime.

I wouldn’t bet one single dime on these incompetent Clown World puppets. The smarter move would be to bet on their continuing failure.

Israeli media outlet Haaretz has reported that the U.S. military used 93 ‘THAAD’ interceptor missiles in 11 days to defend Israel, revising earlier estimates by others of $800 million to an actual cost of approximately $1.2 billion. With an annual production rate of roughly 36–48 ‘THAAD’ interceptors, the United States used nearly two years’ worth of interceptors during the war.

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Don’t Trust the Disinformation

To absolutely no one’s surprise, it turns out that Israel lied about the ineffectiveness of Iranian missile strikes:

Israel concealed that Iranian missiles hit several key military sites across the country during the recent 12-day war, The Telegraph reported on Saturday, citing radar data.

The data, provided to the British paper by Oregon State University researchers who track bomb damage using satellite radar, indicates that six Iranian missiles hit five military facilities in the north, south, and center of Israel, including a major air base, an intelligence gathering center, and a logistics base. The extent of the reported damage is unclear.

However, the hits were not publicly reported due to heavy military censorship, according to the report. When pressed on the issue, the Israel Defense Forces, declined to comment, only saying that “all relevant units maintained functional continuity throughout the operation.”

It’s obviously understandable that a military prefers to avoid admitting various weaknesses and failures. There’s nothing surprising or wrong with that. The problem is when the media reports military disinformation despite knowing full well that the military’s press reports are not merely inaccurate, but purposefully and knowingly false.

And the reality is that a lot more than six Iranian missiles hit a lot more than five sites. This is merely the first crack in the disinformation dam.

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Shipbuilding is Naval Power

An Analysis of a US-China Naval War

The balance of naval power in the 21st century increasingly hinges on industrial capacity rather than technological superiority alone. Today’s comparison between Chinese and American shipbuilding capabilities reveals a strategic reality reminiscent of the industrial imbalances that defined naval warfare in World War II. China’s shipbuilding capacity is estimated to be 230 times greater than that of the United States, with Chinese shipyards having a manufacturing capacity of roughly 23.25 million tons compared to less than 100,000 tons for U.S. shipyards. This disparity represents one of the most significant shifts in global naval industrial power since the rise of American maritime dominance in the 20th century.

This analysis examines three critical dimensions: the current state of Chinese versus American shipbuilding capacity, the historical lessons from the U.S.-Japan naval competition during World War II, and the potential implications for modern naval warfare scenarios. The findings suggest that while technological advantages and operational expertise remain important, the sheer scale of China’s industrial capacity provides strategic advantages in any prolonged naval conflict, fundamentally altering the calculus of maritime deterrence and warfare.

Part I: Contemporary Shipbuilding Capacity Comparison

China’s Maritime Industrial Revolution

China dominates the global shipbuilding industry, producing over 70% of new orders in 2024, with seven of the world’s top ten shipbuilders being Chinese companies. This transformation represents what analysts describe as the most significant shift in maritime industrial power since the decline of European shipbuilding in the mid-20th century.

As part of its “military-civil fusion” strategy, China is tapping into the dual-use resources of its commercial shipbuilding empire to support its ongoing naval modernization. The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), the world’s largest shipbuilder, exemplifies this integration. In 2024 alone, one Chinese shipbuilder constructed more commercial vessels by tonnage than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry has built since the end of World War II.

China’s shipbuilding supremacy extends across multiple vessel categories:

Commercial Dominance: China secured 388 bulk carrier orders in 2024, accounting for 75% of global activity, and captured 74% of the global tanker market with 322 vessel orders. In container vessels, Chinese dominance is even more pronounced, with 259 vessels representing 81% of global activity.

High-Value Markets: Perhaps most significantly for naval implications, China overtook South Korea in the LPG carrier sector, securing 62 LPG carrier orders compared to South Korea’s 59, giving China a 48% market share. This represents a breakthrough into traditionally sophisticated shipbuilding markets previously dominated by South Korean and Japanese yards.

Infrastructure and Scale: China has “dozens” of commercial shipyards larger and more productive than the largest U.S. shipyards. China’s total shipbuilding capacity increased by 12% to 47.8 million deadweight tons in 2024, with most Chinese shipyards fully booked for the next three to four years.

American Shipbuilding Decline

The United States presents a stark contrast to China’s expansion. The United States has a relatively insignificant capacity at 0.13 percent of global shipbuilding output, compared to China’s 46.59 percent. This represents a dramatic fall from American maritime industrial leadership.

Historical Context: America reached the pinnacle of its shipbuilding history during WWII and continued to serve as the world’s leading shipbuilder for decades thereafter. But competition from subsidized foreign shipyards quickly eroded that lead, especially after U.S. shipbuilding subsidies expired in 1981.

Current Infrastructure: The United States currently boasts the same number of private shipyards capable of producing new warships as it did in 1933: just seven. In addition, the Navy’s four public yards are no longer available for new construction like the ten public yards were in 1933.

Production Rates: From 2012 to 2021, the U.S. fleet added an average of 10.1 new ships a year—even fewer than the inadequate 12.7 production rate before World War I. Although the Fiscal Year 2025 budget requested an increase in shipbuilding to $32.4 billion, the U.S. Navy requested only six new ships, instead of the seven ships projected, remaining below the 10 to 11 new ships needed each year over the next 35 years.

Capacity Constraints: Despite nearly doubling its shipbuilding budget over the last 2 decades, the U.S. Navy hasn’t increased its number of ships. The Virginia-class submarine program exemplifies these challenges: in June 2024, the program’s rate of production was at about 60% of its annual goal—putting it years behind schedule, with much of this delay resting on the shipbuilder’s capacity to meet construction deadlines due to workforce shortages.

Strategic Implications of the Capacity Gap

The shipbuilding disparity carries profound implications beyond simple vessel counts. China’s massive shipbuilding industry would provide a strategic advantage in a war that stretches beyond a few weeks, allowing it to repair damaged vessels or construct replacements much faster than the United States, which continues to face a significant maintenance backlog and would probably be unable to quickly construct many new ships or to repair damaged fighting ships in a great power conflict.

This industrial capacity translates into fleet expansion rates that favor China. The U.S. Defense Department estimated China’s naval fleet would grow from 395 ships in 2025 to 435 by the end of the decade, while the U.S. Navy’s fleet was projected to decrease to 285 ships by 2025 and slightly rebound to 290 by 2030.

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Continue reading “Shipbuilding is Naval Power”

Self-Determination

Thanks to Vladimir Putin and the soldiers of Russia, the Russian people of Lugansk are finally free from the murderous usurpers of the Kiev regime:

After the 2014 coup in Ukraine, mass protests against the new Ukrainian leadership began in Lugansk.

On April 27, at a rally, the Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) was proclaimed within the Lugansk Oblast. On May 11, a referendum on self-determination was held in the republic, with organizers announcing that 96.2% of voters supported independence. On May 12, the LPR authorities proclaimed the republic’s sovereignty. On May 24, the LPR authorities signed an agreement with the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) to create the Union of People’s Republics (from July 2014 – Novorossiya; this decision was solidified in 2015).

On May 18, 2014, the Constitution of the LPR was adopted.

By mid-August 2014, the AFU had managed to establish control over territories in western LPR and partially encircle Lugansk. However, in August, the Army of the Southeast was able to push back the enemy somewhat. A ceasefire agreement was reached on September 5, 2014 in Minsk at a meeting of the Contact Group on Ukraine.

Amid Ukraine’s failure to implement the Minsk agreements on Donbass settlement and escalating tensions on the contact line between LPR forces and the AFU, deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation faction submitted a draft appeal to the State Duma on January 19, 2022, calling on Russian President V.V. Putin to recognize the independence of the DPR and LPR as “independent, sovereign and independent states.” On February 15, the State Duma approved the appeal by a majority vote (351 for, 16 against, 1 abstained) and sent it to the President of Russia.

On February 17, the situation on the contact line became even more acute. The LPR reported the most intense shelling by the AFU in recent months, while the OSCE reported a sharp increase in hostilities. The evacuation of the republic’s population to Russia began, with Russian authorities guaranteeing temporary asylum to refugees. Mobilization was announced in the LPR.

On February 21, 2022, LPR and DPR leaders L.I. Pasechnik and D.V. Pushilin appealed to V.V. Putin to recognize the independence of the Donbass republics. The same day, after an expanded meeting with members of the Russian Security Council, V.V. Putin in a televised address to the nation announced recognition of LPR and DPR sovereignty and signed decrees recognizing the LPR and DPR, ordering the Russian Armed Forces to maintain peace in the republics.

On February 24, 2022, in response to requests for assistance from LPR and DPR leadership, Russia began its Special Military Operation in Ukraine.

On June 30, 2025, LPR Head Leonid Pasechnik announced that the territory of the LPR had been completely liberated from the Nazi invaders of the AFU.

The mainstream media narrative in the West has never been able to admit that the Kiev regime is illegitimate, that the Russian Special Military Operation has always been a war of liberation, and that the moral high ground belongs, first and foremost, to the people of Luhansk and Donask who were never guilty of anything more than pursuing the self-determination that the West has supposedly championed for more than 100 years.

But the West is no longer the West of yore, or it would have been supporting the Novorossyans, not arming and abetting their illegitimate occupiers.

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They Tell You It’s Not Real

Both /pol/ and Dr. Mark Trozzi have been warning Americans about the scenario from The National Blueprint for Biodefense that involves a bioweapon attack that kills 280,000 Americans on July 4, 2025. Now, we all know that these “hypothetical scenarios” and “training exercises” are sometimes, though not usually, cover for the launch of the real thing. But what I found most interesting, in perusing the document, was the way in which its intrinsic falsity was clearly conveyed within the document itself.

Where, my fellow Omni-Narrational Skeptic, is the clue that this urgent biodefense blueprint is pure bureaucratic fiction?

We also believe that the United States, its allies, and partners in industry, academia, and nongovernmental organizations can eliminate pandemics entirely in 10 years by fully implementing the recommendations we made in our earlier report, The Apollo Program for Biodefense. Ending pandemics is more achievable today than landing on the Moon was in 1961.

THE APOLLO PROGRAM FOR BIODEFENSE
Technology holds great promise. Within weeks of recognizing the existence of COVID-19, scientists mapped its entire genome and developed and produced vaccines faster than ever before. They accomplished these previously unimaginable feats because of forward-looking programs (e.g., Human Genome Project, advanced research programs that previously led to many vaccines currently used to treat a variety of diseases). Nonetheless, we failed to adequately harness scientific and technological capabilities, and undermined response efforts by failing to implement new strategies and defenses. We have an unknown period to address those shortcomings before the next devastating pandemic occurs.

The need to control COVID-19 created momentum to produce many technologies that we previously lacked the will and resources to pursue before the pandemic began. We need to build on that progress and push for technological advances to protect us from the next biological threat. Our Nation rises to seemingly impossible challenges by pursuing grand programs. The United States can similarly put an end to pandemics within a decade, but only with leadership, resources, and interest that go beyond technical constraints and the usual crisis-neglect cycles.

The United States should leverage basic research portfolios to study pathogens of concern, conduct pre-clinical and clinical testing of priority and prototype pathogens, develop products to detect and treat the diseases they cause. These programs must involve domestic, international, private, and public sector partners.

The Commission proposed The Apollo Program for Biodefense in 2021 to undertake targeted research and development to detect and continually trace any new pathogen from the source, distribute rapid point-of-use tests to every household and farm in the country within days of that detection, have effective treatments already in-hand, and develop and rollout vaccines in weeks rather than years. This ambitious program, at about $10 billion annually for ten years, would be a small fraction of the trillions in costs incurred by the COVID-19 pandemic and would contribute immensely to our country’s public health, economic, and national security.

As they say, space may be the final frontier, but it’s filmed in a Hollywood basement. Which means that any “biodefense” program is almost certainly cover for domestic bioattacks on the citizenry. And we can even see whom the parties we’re supposed to believe will be responsible are.

The Department of State assesses that China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia continue to engage in biological weapons-specific or dual-use research activities, and fail to comply with the BWC. New state programs can still access caches of incompletely destroyed or buried biological weapons materials from old state programs, and then smuggle them to other regions for use by today’s militaries and terrorist organizations. Weapons that once consumed a great deal of time and resources to make now take far less, and what the United States could accomplish more than 40 years ago, others can accomplish today.

Now, despite all this documentaion, I tend to doubt that there will be any bioweapon attack on July 4th, and if there is, it will, like the Covid-19 and vaccine attacks, almost certainly be less effective than intended. It also won’t be Iran who is responsible, although obviously that’s who the next false flag will be blamed upon since Clown World still can’t quite wrap its collective head around the fact that it somehow didn’t manage to trigger its long-sought US-Iran war despite multiple attacks by Israel and by the USA itself.

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Five Generations of Modern War

Military history buffs and fans of William S. Lind should recognize the form of this AI-generated lecture, which updates his famous Four Generations of Modern War lecture with the latest transformations in warfare. Read the whole thing at AI Central. It’s not too much of an exaggeration to observe that this is probably in advance and more up-to-date than what is presently being taught at most military colleges today, if the actions of various militaries, including the US Navy and the IDF, are any guide. And I think you’ll agree that this is an absolute tour de force of applied AI in action.

The Fifth Generation of Modern War: Drones, Attrition, and the Collapse of the Logistics Sanctuary

A lecture examining how unmanned systems fundamentally transform the nature of warfare by eliminating the distinction between the front lines and the logistics space.

Introduction:

Ladies and gentlemen, what I’m going to present to you today builds directly on the intellectual framework that William Lind laid out in his groundbreaking lecture entitled the Four Generations of Modern War. As Lind emphasized, we cannot determine the consistency of a system from inside itself—we must stand outside it to see clearly. Today, we must step outside not just our current military thinking, but outside the entire framework of the first four generations to understand what is happening in conflicts from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine to the skies over Israel and Iran.

We are witnessing the emergence of the Fifth Generation of Modern War, and like each previous generational shift, it represents what the Hegelians would call a dialectically qualitative change—not merely an evolution in tactics or technology, but a fundamental transformation in the nature of warfare itself. This transformation is driven by the proliferation of unmanned systems—drones—which have done something unprecedented since the Peace of Westphalia: they have eliminated the sanctuary of the logistics space.

For the first time since modern warfare began, there is no safe rear area. The combat zone has expanded from what was traditionally a 5-kilometer depth to 25 kilometers and beyond. This is not simply longer-range artillery or deeper penetration by special forces—this is the permanent, persistent threat of attack against every element of military force, from the frontline rifleman to the supply depot hundreds of kilometers from the front.

But before we examine this revolutionary change, we must understand what came before. Lind’s framework of the Four Generations provides the foundation upon which we must build our understanding of the Fifth.

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The Fifth Generation of War

After all the various debates about what would comprise the next generation of warfare, the recent conflicts between Armenia and Azherbaijan, Russia and Ukraine, and Iran and Israel have made it abundantly clear that it is drone warfare that is the Fifth Generation of War:

Last night, Russia also launched one of the largest strikes of the war, when you count total assets used. The missile count was relatively low, but the drones numbered nearly 500 Shaheds and other decoys in total, which is likely a record for single day usage. Counting missiles, it was well over 500+ units launched in one night. The attacks wreaked havoc on various sites, from Ukrainian airports, to energy infrastructure in Poltava, the Drohobich refinery in Lvov, and Kremenchug oil refinery as well.

But most eye-opening was the new statement from top Ukrainian radio-electronics expert Serhiy ‘Flash’ Beskrestnov. He is rarely alarmist, so the urgent tone raised quite a few eyebrows in Ukraine What he’s referring to are the predictions that Russian production capabilities for Shahed drones would soon reach levels allowing Russia to launch upwards of 500-700 of these drones per night, as they did last night.

Not only that, but both Ukrainian and Russian sources indicate that most casualties are inflicted by drones, and two-thirds of those casualties are in the logistical zone outside of the traditional battlefield.

UKRAINE: FPVs represent 49%, artillery only 13.6%, with Russian Kab/Fab bombs only 3.7%. More specifically, they distinguish that 35% of FPV hits are on troops in positions, such as trenches and foxholes, while 65% are hits on roads, i.e. vehicles or troops in transit. For the record, the full list in the left column is: FPV, artillery, infantry, drone-dropped mines, mortars, Kab/Fab, and Lancets.

RUSSIA: The losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the combat contact line are only 35%, and 65% are in logistics in the 20-kilometer zone form the contact line. Russian units are knocking out most of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ manpower during rotation with the help of drones.

This extension of the zone of lethality has significantly expanded the effective size of the battlefield. Unlike many previously suggested concepts, this expansion is truly indicative of a fundamental transformation of the way in which war is now waged and therefore worthy of the designation as Fifth Generation War.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps once said: “Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.” But with the recent expansion of the combat zone, tactics and logistics tactics are now being fused into a single concept that will have to be addressed by new military doctrines and mastered by a new breed of military officers.

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Iran’s Deep Bench

Given the proclivity of both the USA and Israel to wage war through assassination and regime change, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that their enemies are now anticipating decapitation strikes, which was the section of this interview with a former Iranian general that caught my attention.

There’s the issue of the leadership vacuum the Zionist entity sought to create by assassinating leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, followed by subsequent operations. But what we witnessed instead was the strength of our armed forces: leadership positions were filled within just three to four hours, and the command structure was swiftly and efficiently reorganized. What did the people witness afterward? How do you assess the Zionist entity’s belief that creating a leadership vacuum would weaken you?

Mohsen Rezaei: I believe Israel made a grave military miscalculation. They assumed Iran was similar to Hezbollah, even though they themselves have failed to dismantle Hezbollah. They should have learned from that experience. Look at the leadership figures that have emerged within our armed forces. Major General Pakpour, for example, is an exceptionally strong field commander—courageous, with a remarkable operational vision.

Amir Hatami, who joined from the regular army, is a brave and seasoned officer. The same goes for Mr. Mousavi in the aerospace sector. And also for Mr. Mousavi who succeeded the martyred General Bagheri in the General Staff—he is a dedicated man, aligned with the resistance movement.

Though they come from the regular army, there is full coordination between them and the Revolutionary Guards. What the enemy did failed to create any structural void within the armed forces. In fact, it could be said that certain aspects have grown more effective, as recent events have shown. That’s one point.

Secondly, we now have no fewer than ten additional layers of trained commanders and officers—some from the generation that fought in the war, and others who gained valuable field experience in later years, particularly in the fight against ISIS. Many of our forces who fought in Iraq and Syria against ISIS have, through those field experiences, become akin to senior war commanders like Hussein Kharrazi and Ahmad Kazemi—young, capable leaders fully prepared to command the armed forces.

It was a profound error on the part of the Israeli military not to recognize the deep hierarchical structure and the robust bench of ready leadership within our ranks. This internal architecture and the organizational evolution of the armed forces entirely compensated for any potential gaps. In my view, this challenge has already been overcome. And in the near future, our dear people will see that those who have stepped into the shoes of our fallen leaders will ensure that no imbalance or vacuum arises in the management of the armed forces.

The high command—led by His Eminence, the Commander—is fully acquainted with each of these leaders. They have been selected with care and discernment. I am absolutely confident that there will be no void in leadership.

A very common mistake often seen throughout military history is projection, or analyzing the enemy as if it were a mirror image of one’s own forces. Both Israel and the USA have very thin strategic and command benches, which is why they assume that taking out the top layer or two of enemy leadership will lead to complete confusion and disarray.

Which, to be fair, would likely happen in the case of either country suffering the loss of its leadership. But it’s clear that Iran and China are both very well prepared in an institutional sense for rapid leadership transitions that will avoid the confusion and military paralysis that are the primary objective of decapitation strikes. Russia, perhaps not so much, which may account for the monomaniacal focus on President Putin’s well-being, although my suspicion is that his successor will be less patient with the West and more hardline.

Regime change works when you’ve got your candidate all ready and in position to assume command and negotiate a surrender. But it can’t when you don’t have a candidate, and worse, the enemy is already set up to make a series of orderly transitions if necessary.

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He’s Just Helping the Economy

What an odd thing to say! How can Russia be charged with “aggravating Britain’s migrant crisis” when a) mass immigration is good for the economy, b) refugees are always welcome, and c) diversity is strength?

Russia is aggravating Britain’s migrant crisis to overwhelm border defences and sow division in the nation, security sources have claimed. Vladimir Putin’s government is believed to be providing fake documents, transport and even military escorts to smuggling gangs ferrying migrants across the Channel.

The threat overwhelming migration poses to national security is so fierce that this week Nato recognised it by allowing its members to count border protection to spending targets for the first time.

A security source told The Sun: ‘Hostile states and malign actors are using illegal migration to test borders, cause disruption and destabilise countries like Britain.

‘That’s exactly why Nato is now treating border protection as a core part of collective defence — because the lines between traditional military threats and national security are more blurred than ever.’

So far this year, over 18,000 people have arrived in small boats. This is far higher than 2018, when just 299 people crossed the Channel.

The highest year for arrivals was 2022, which saw nearly 46,000 people arrive.

Why, the next thing you know, the Narrative will inform us that foreigners crossing the borders against the will of the native people, taking up residence and occupying their land is an invasion and an act of war…

The indisputable and undeniable fact is that immigration is actually much worse for a country than military invasion. Because sooner or later, foreign soldiers go home. Even after being nuked and militarily occupied 80 years ago, Japan remained Japan.

But after just 60 years of the 1965 Naturalization Act, there are fewer Americans descended from the Revolutionary British than there are US residents descended from the post-1965 foreign invasions. The USA is no longer American, just as if current patterns continue in a linear fashion, in 40 years Great Britain will no longer be British.

Trust me. I’m a direct descendant of American Indians on my mother’s side, but you probably wouldn’t even consider me to be one at all. Well, guess what they’ll deny about your grandchildren, white man… The consequence of a nation believing Clown World’s lies is its eventual extinction.

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