Tag: history

The Wrong Lesson

The grand strategery of Clown World is quite possibly going to get an enormous number of soldiers killed because their abject retardery knows no bounds. This is what purports to be a military history piece encouraging direct US and European intervention published a year ago by the director of something called “Lazard Geopolitical Advisory” which makes an excellent case for never taking the advice of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory:

Northern Russia must have felt bitterly cold to U.S. soldiers, even though nearly all were from Michigan. On Sept. 4, 1918, 4,800 U.S. troops landed in Arkhangelsk, Russia, only 140 miles from the Arctic Circle. Three weeks later, they were plunged into battle against the Red Army among towering pine forests and subarctic swamps, alongside the British and French. Ultimately, 244 U.S. soldiers died from the fighting over two years. Diaries of U.S. troops paint a harrowing picture of first contact:

We run into a nest of machine-guns, we retire. [Bolsheviks] still shelling heavily. Perry and Adamson of my squad wounded, bullet clips my shoulder on both sides. … Am terribly tired, hungry and all in, so are the rest of the boys. Casualties in this attack 4 killed and 10 wounded.

These unlucky souls represented just one prong of the sprawling and ill-fated Allied intervention in the Russian civil war. From 1918 to 1920, the United States, Britain, France, and Japan sent thousands of troops from the Baltics to northern Russia to Siberia to Crimea—and millions of dollars in aid and military supplies to the anti-communist White Russians—in an abortive attempt to strangle Bolshevism in its crib. It’s one of the most complicated and oft-forgot foreign-policy failures of the 20th century…

Despite the current pall of pessimism pervading Western capitals, today’s war in Ukraine presents some of the more propitious circumstances a policymaker could hope for—unlike those faced by the Allies during the Russian civil war. Ukraine is a worthy and competent ally, fighting to defend its territory with a highly motivated population behind it. The Ukrainian cause is a righteous one, with a Manichean quality to it easily explained to Western publics. While Putin’s personal will to win is strong, it’s clear by his actions and hesitancy to fully mobilize Russian society that he senses a ceiling on what he can ask from his population. Though Russia’s manpower and materiel are larger than Ukraine’s, the amount needed to keep Ukraine armed and in the fight is completely manageable. A $60 billion aid supplement from the United States—currently held up by far-right Republicans in the House of Representatives—is a pittance compared with the returns: holding the line on international norms; standing up for the Ukrainians and, in doing so, Western values; bogging down Russia in a strategic sinkhole and reducing its capacity to threaten the rest of NATO’s eastern flank; and fortifying the trans-Atlantic alliance. Today, Western capitals are much more united than they were in 1918, and defense coordination among them is strong. Though they can sharpen the shared sense of an endgame in Ukraine, everybody knows that the conflict will end in some sort of negotiated settlement—the questions will be on whose terms.

If the United States and its allies can avoid the pitfalls of the Western intervention in the Russian civil war—developing a clear long-term strategy, continuing to coordinate closely, and reinforcing domestic support by making the case to their own populations—then they have a real shot of prevailing over Putin. 

Despite the current pall of pessimism pervading Western capitals, today’s war in Ukraine presents some of the more propitious circumstances a policymaker could hope for—unlike those faced by the Allies during the Russian civil war. Ukraine is a worthy and competent ally, fighting to defend its territory with a highly motivated population behind it. The Ukrainian cause is a righteous one, with a Manichean quality to it easily explained to Western publics. While Putin’s personal will to win is strong, it’s clear by his actions and hesitancy to fully mobilize Russian society that he senses a ceiling on what he can ask from his population. Though Russia’s manpower and materiel are larger than Ukraine’s, the amount needed to keep Ukraine armed and in the fight is completely manageable. A $60 billion aid supplement from the United States—currently held up by far-right Republicans in the House of Representatives—is a pittance compared with the returns: holding the line on international norms; standing up for the Ukrainians and, in doing so, Western values; bogging down Russia in a strategic sinkhole and reducing its capacity to threaten the rest of NATO’s eastern flank; and fortifying the trans-Atlantic alliance. Today, Western capitals are much more united than they were in 1918, and defense coordination among them is strong. Though they can sharpen the shared sense of an endgame in Ukraine, everybody knows that the conflict will end in some sort of negotiated settlement—the questions will be on whose terms.

If the United States and its allies can avoid the pitfalls of the Western intervention in the Russian civil war—developing a clear long-term strategy, continuing to coordinate closely, and reinforcing domestic support by making the case to their own populations—then they have a real shot of prevailing over Putin. 

This is totally insane advice. In addition to the obvious fact that a) there is zero domestic support for war with Russia in any country outside of the Baltics and Finland, b) the Russian industrial advantage with regards to weaponry, vehicles, missiles, and ammunition is insurmountable, and c) Russia’s global allies outproduce, outnumber, and outgun the entire forces of the West, the historical invaders had one massive advantage that Russia’s current enemies lack.

The Western forces of 1918 had the ability to transport and stage their troops without fear of being attacked. In 2025, any trans-oceanic transports carrying men and materials to invade Russia will be sunk with hypersonic missiles long before they come anywhere close to the Russian coast. Not only that, but the entire logistics line leading all the way back to factories in Dusseldorf and Columbus, Ohio is similarly vulnerable to complete destruction.

The inability of Clown World’s elite to understand that it is no longer 1950, much less 1918, is truly remarkable. Andrei Martyanov is absolutely right to denigrate and disregard the military doctrine of the Western militaries, because their grasp on the history of warfare and how it applies to the present appears to be nonexistent.

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Russia Acknowledges WWIII

In my opinion, WWIII began in the spring of 2014 with the US-backed coup given the highly Orwellian name “the Revolution of Dignity” and the Russian occupation of Crimea. This is similar how WWII actually began eight years before most people realized with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. But regardless, it’s clear that the Russian intellectual elite are fully aware of the situation.

Many now speak of humanity’s drift towards World War III, imagining events similar to those of the 20th century. But war evolves. It will not begin with a June 1941 Barbarossa-style invasion or a Cuban Missile Crisis-style nuclear standoff. In fact, the new world war is already underway – it’s just that not everyone has recognized it yet.

For Russia, the pre-war period ended in 2014. For China, it was 2017. For Iran, 2023. Since then, war – in its modern, diffuse form – has intensified. This is not a new Cold War. Since 2022, the West’s campaign against Russia has grown more decisive. The risk of direct nuclear confrontation with NATO over the Ukraine conflict is rising. Donald Trump’s return to the White House created a temporary window in which such a clash could be avoided, but by mid-2025, hawks in the US and Western Europe had pushed us dangerously close again.

This war involves the world’s leading powers: the United States and its allies on one side, China and Russia on the other. It is global, not because of its scale, but because of the stakes: the future balance of power. The West sees the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia as existential threats. Its counteroffensive, economic and ideological, is meant to put a halt to that shift.

It is a war of survival for the West, not just geopolitically but ideologically. Western globalism – whether economic, political, or cultural – cannot tolerate alternative civilizational models. Post-national elites in the US and Western Europe are committed to preserving their dominance. A diversity of worldviews, civilizational autonomy, and national sovereignty are seen not as options, but as threats.

This explains the severity of the West’s response. When Joe Biden told Brazil’s President Lula that he wanted to “destroy” Russia, he revealed the truth behind euphemisms like “strategic defeat.” Western-backed Israel has shown how total this doctrine is – first in Gaza, then Lebanon, and finally Iran. In early June, a similar strategy was used in attacks on Russian airfields. Reports suggest US and British involvement in both cases. To Western planners, Russia, Iran, China and North Korea are part of a single axis. That belief shapes military planning.

Compromise is no longer part of the game. What we’re seeing are not temporary crises but rolling conflicts. Eastern Europe and the Middle East are the two current flashpoints. A third has long been identified: East Asia, particularly Taiwan. Russia is directly engaged in Ukraine, holds stakes in the Middle East, and may become involved in the Pacific.

The war is no longer about occupation, but destabilization. The new strategy focuses on sowing internal disorder: economic sabotage, social unrest, and psychological attrition. The West’s plan for Russia is not defeat on the battlefield, but gradual internal collapse.

The irony, of course, is that it is not Russia that is being destabilized, but all of the Western governments from France to the USA. Influence and subversion are no substitute for material power once the latter is aware of the situation.

But regardless, the author is correct. “The time for illusions is over.”

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It Might Not Survive to 2033

Martin Armstrong and his computer are predicting the collapse of the US government and the European governments by 2032:

When Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon during a major debt crisis, he didn’t have to fight to get to Rome—all the cities cheered and opened their gates. It was the Senate that fled to Asia. You know, unfortunately, a lot of people believed Cicero, but he was the fake news back then. He was one of the oligarchs.

“Oh, Caesar’s this dictator.” Well, then if he’s this dictator so against the people, why did the people cheer him and why did you flee? You know, it’s just—look at the facts. You know, that’s pretty much it.

You know, it was that whole civil war that was propagated by Cato, and they even named the Cato Institute after him. “Oh, he’s defending the republic.” Total nonsense.

But you know, this is where we’re going. By 2032, we’ll have a new form of government. All of them are going to collapse. Europe is really a basket case. And in all the interviews I do throughout Europe, they all are asking the same question: “When will it fall?” They’ve all had enough.

Clown World delenda est.

It has been absolutely fascinating to see how my 2004 prediction that the USA would collapse as a political entity by 2033 has gone from being regarded as insane and totally impossible to optimistic. And I fully anticipate that I won’t get any more credit for being correct than I did for my prediction of the 2008 financial crisis.

People really don’t want the truth until right before it becomes obvious to everyone. They certainly won’t pay anything for it. History suggests you’re fortunate if you don’t get crucified for it.

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The Bear Necessities

A UATV supporter explains the necessity of Big Bear on Instagram.

Et tu, Spacebunny? She added a comment there.

We have had this convo – your ability to make Vox comprehensible is legendary.

To be fair, it is a genuine problem. My idea of what is a sufficient explanation and pretty much everyone else’s don’t tend to have much in common. I see this coming and going, both in what apparently are popularly regarded as my insufficient explanations and everyone else’s determination to give me ten times more information than I need or want. What is so impressive about Big Bear in this regard is his ability to instantly grasp the various levels of detail required to explain a given concept to different people.

I still remember one time on a stream when he asked me to explain something, so I provided what I felt was the requisite explanation in what I thought was all the necessary detail. Big Bear just stared at me for a second, then said: “Yeah, you’re going to need to go two levels deeper for that to make any sense.”

Which was very helpful, because it’s not a problem to do that. The real challenge that most people don’t seem to grasp is that when you do understand something, you seldom know the precise point of another person’s failure to understand, except that it is somewhere between the complete absence of information and the comprehension of the whole. Compounding this problem is that it is quite normal for people to get offended if you begin at the beginning.

“What do you think I am, an idiot?”

Well, yes, at least in relative terms, given that you’ve already demonstrated that you don’t understand something despite being provided everything that is required for you to do so. But it only took a few beatings from fellow elementary school scholars and a lecture or three from teachers and parents to realize that it is never socially acceptable to say what you are actually thinking about anyone.

That’s why I always think it is outright comical whenever people say, in real life or on TV, that honesty is paramount in relationships. It quite obviously isn’t, in fact, I would go so far as to say that at least for the intelligent individual, relentless dishonesty is the basis for all human relationships, from the most casual to the most intimate. Because if there is one skill that is necessary for surviving the endless sea of retardery in which Man must daily swim, it is relentlessly concealing the truth of one’s thoughts, feelings, and opinions from absolutely everyone.

Marcus Aurelius, Roman emperor and Stoic philosopher, obviously understood that.

Begin each day by telling yourself: Today I shall be meeting with interference, ingratitude, insolence, disloyalty, ill-will, and selfishness – all of them due to the offenders’ ignorance…

Do you know what that is? That’s the rock-solid stoicism born of the despair that comes from 19 years of putting up with a son like Commodus and knowing he had no choice but to leave the whole empire in the care of the solipsistic lunatic.

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How the US Navy Lost the High Seas

In fairness, the US Navy hasn’t actually lost its dominance over the bluewater oceans yet. But it will as soon as it is put to the test, as previous naval powers have before:

No matter what they say, armed forces prepare for the war they want to fight. Before Pearl Harbor, the United States and Imperial Japanese navies built mirrored fleets centered around lines of battleships that would someday meet in mortal combat, which in the space of a single event — a Pacific Clash of Titans — would decide the destiny of nations.

Yet when war came, the efforts of both fleets, try as they might, could not make this happen. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s prophecy of “Seapower” mesmerized the U.S. and Japanese navies with the mutual conviction that a Pacific War could be decided by a single event: Another Tsushima or Trafalgar. Yet even if there were no way to achieve such a choreographed final fantasy, the idée fixe of decisive battle had become a way of life for both USN and IJN. This obsession with almighty battleships locked in a last battle led to the destruction of America’s prewar fleet in the first year of war, and then eventually, Japan’s.

Today, the Navy still pines for a Pacific fleet showdown, this time with China. It is still obsessing over its capital ship idée fixe (with carriers in place of battleships) — when, like 1941, its fleet is simply too small, too old, and too out of shape.

In World War II, the U.S. Navy was saved only by America’s titanic industrial power, which in 1941 was building two backup fleets: A “two ocean” armada, to be followed by and an even bigger one. That second force, 5000+ ships, was built de novo — as though out of nothing — in just four years. The Navy was saved, not by its adaptable resilience, but by American Captains of Industry.

In tragic contrast, the Imperial Japanese Navy — the most powerful fleet in the world in 1941 — had no backup. When faced with a U.S. shipbuilding monster, it was literally ground down by those 5,000 brand spanking new American hulls. In this sense, the Nihon Kaigun is very much like the U.S. Navy today. War came, and it simply could not replace ships lost.

Frankly, the Japanese actually built quite a few new ships during the war — just not enough. Likewise, there are no Captains of Industry to save the U.S. Navy today. China has 200 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, and fabulous repair and maintenance that serves the entire maritime world. If America cannot build, repair, and maintain even its current, “incredibly shrinking” Navy, then it is no “maritime nation.”

What happens to the Navy that reaches the acme of power and success, and comes to believe that it will command the seas forever? That would be Great Britain from 1815-1914. For the Royal Navy, it meant atrophy, that invisible sclerosis hardening into an ossified way of life.

As it celebrates its always-triumphant orthodoxies, it also forgets how to think, it takes itself way too seriously, and it believes without a flicker of doubt that, to stay on top, the Fleet simply must keep doing what it has always done, in sufficient quantity and quality, of course. The Royal Navy may have survived on the basis of quantity and quality of ships.

Yet what about quality and originality of thought? A Navy Ethos that punishes new thinking, that throttles innovation, that cashiers criticism — all by the time proclaiming how it celebrates these things — is an ethos chained to its own “Rules of the Game.”

In this sort of culture, only the right people, who say the right things, and put on the right, bright face to the public can expect to move up. This is the sclerosis of success, and it is, for any society of war, the most dangerous disorder: For it cannot be cured from within. Thus, the strategic reckoning of the Royal Navy in World War I will be as nothing to what awaits its American Cousin, very soon.

There isn’t any material reason why a naval power with prodigious resources can’t completely reinvent itself in the new mode that is replacing the old one. And yet, it doesn’t happen, for much the same reason that very, very few business innovations come out of the leading corporations in the industries they dominate.

Too many people and too many organizational processes are too heavily invested in the current way of doing things to make the shift to the newer way before someone else proves its utility and thereby obtains a leading advantage that usually turns out to be conclusive. Unfortunately, unlike leading corporations, leading militaries can’t simply buy out the innovators and incorporate them into their own operations.

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Lippman Gap = Imperial Overstretch

As Sorche Faal has observed, the Western media has rediscovered something called “the Lippman Gap”.

The University at Albany-State University of New York historical document “Imperial Evolution: Walter Lippmann And The Liberal Roots Of American Hegemony” reveals: “When Walter Lippmann became a founding editor of the New Republic in 1914, shortly after the outbreak of World War I, he began to advocate for heightened United States involvement in global affairs…Lippmann argued that the global power vacuum generated by the war presented the ideal opportunity for American values to spread to places like Eastern Europe and South America…Lippmann’s important role in America’s rise to global power becomes clear…Lippmann was a crucial ally in supporting the U.S. emergence as a contender for world power by extending democratic ideals in a non-democratic fashion, through both military intervention and economic domination”.

In 1922, this report details, Lippman released his book “Public Opinion”, which is the instructional manual for how the United States government and media can propagandize peaceful peoples into warring against each other without knowing why—and Lippman proudly proclaimed: “Ours is a problem in which deception has become organized and strong; where truth is poisoned at its source; one in which the skill of the shrewdest brains is devoted to misleading a bewildered people”.

While World War II was raging in 1943, this report notes, Lippman presented to the United States government his “Shield of the Republic” war doctrine that remains in force today, otherwise known as the “Lippmann Gap”—and about which is factually documented: “The Lippmann gap refers to the imbalance between a nation’s foreign policy commitments and its available power…Foreign policy should maintain a balance between a nation’s commitments and its power, with a surplus of power in reserve…If commitments exceed power, the foreign policy becomes insolvent”.

As President Trump confronts the “Lippmann Gap” commitment nightmare fast rendering American foreign policy insolvent, this report continues, world-renowned American historian Stephen Kotkin warned this week: “There’s unlimited demand for American power, but American power can’t fulfill all its current commitments”, and the leftist Washington Post worryingly observed today: “The central challenge in American foreign policy today is that Washington’s defense commitments around the world exceed its military power…This is known as the “Lippmann gap”…The Lippmann gap pressures presidents to make trade-offs between competing foreign policy priorities…If they don’t, the gap will grow…For Trump, backing Israel to the hilt while leaving Ukraine more exposed has a clear — if brutal — political and strategic appeal”.

This so-called Gap is the same thing that traditional historians more usefully describe as Imperial Overstretch. It is a common behavior by late-stage empires that usually precedes contraction, internal division, and collapse.

The US empire is already dominated by the foreign influence of AIPAC, which has no interests in common with the American people, and whose influence has proved reliably destructive since the fatal Naturalization Act of 1965 overturned 44 years of strict immigration limits that helped the USA become a strong and mostly homogeneous empire in the aftermath of the Civil War and WWI. This pernicious foreign influence was compounded by the hubris of being the sole major power to escape serious damage in WWII with its industrial capacity not only unscathed, but significantly enhanced.

Now the USA is facing imperial overstretch due to its overcommitments abroad and the internal weakening of the country by the mass post-1965 invasion. It is unfortunate that so many Americans, real and paper, would prefer to permit the country to collapse into chaos rather than even attempt to look into the causes of the US decline and probable fall. But this is part and parcel of the usual historical process; the American Indian did not recognize the problem and join forces to oppose the European settlers until it was far too late too.

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Self-Determination

Thanks to Vladimir Putin and the soldiers of Russia, the Russian people of Lugansk are finally free from the murderous usurpers of the Kiev regime:

After the 2014 coup in Ukraine, mass protests against the new Ukrainian leadership began in Lugansk.

On April 27, at a rally, the Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) was proclaimed within the Lugansk Oblast. On May 11, a referendum on self-determination was held in the republic, with organizers announcing that 96.2% of voters supported independence. On May 12, the LPR authorities proclaimed the republic’s sovereignty. On May 24, the LPR authorities signed an agreement with the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) to create the Union of People’s Republics (from July 2014 – Novorossiya; this decision was solidified in 2015).

On May 18, 2014, the Constitution of the LPR was adopted.

By mid-August 2014, the AFU had managed to establish control over territories in western LPR and partially encircle Lugansk. However, in August, the Army of the Southeast was able to push back the enemy somewhat. A ceasefire agreement was reached on September 5, 2014 in Minsk at a meeting of the Contact Group on Ukraine.

Amid Ukraine’s failure to implement the Minsk agreements on Donbass settlement and escalating tensions on the contact line between LPR forces and the AFU, deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation faction submitted a draft appeal to the State Duma on January 19, 2022, calling on Russian President V.V. Putin to recognize the independence of the DPR and LPR as “independent, sovereign and independent states.” On February 15, the State Duma approved the appeal by a majority vote (351 for, 16 against, 1 abstained) and sent it to the President of Russia.

On February 17, the situation on the contact line became even more acute. The LPR reported the most intense shelling by the AFU in recent months, while the OSCE reported a sharp increase in hostilities. The evacuation of the republic’s population to Russia began, with Russian authorities guaranteeing temporary asylum to refugees. Mobilization was announced in the LPR.

On February 21, 2022, LPR and DPR leaders L.I. Pasechnik and D.V. Pushilin appealed to V.V. Putin to recognize the independence of the Donbass republics. The same day, after an expanded meeting with members of the Russian Security Council, V.V. Putin in a televised address to the nation announced recognition of LPR and DPR sovereignty and signed decrees recognizing the LPR and DPR, ordering the Russian Armed Forces to maintain peace in the republics.

On February 24, 2022, in response to requests for assistance from LPR and DPR leadership, Russia began its Special Military Operation in Ukraine.

On June 30, 2025, LPR Head Leonid Pasechnik announced that the territory of the LPR had been completely liberated from the Nazi invaders of the AFU.

The mainstream media narrative in the West has never been able to admit that the Kiev regime is illegitimate, that the Russian Special Military Operation has always been a war of liberation, and that the moral high ground belongs, first and foremost, to the people of Luhansk and Donask who were never guilty of anything more than pursuing the self-determination that the West has supposedly championed for more than 100 years.

But the West is no longer the West of yore, or it would have been supporting the Novorossyans, not arming and abetting their illegitimate occupiers.

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Five Generations of Modern War

Military history buffs and fans of William S. Lind should recognize the form of this AI-generated lecture, which updates his famous Four Generations of Modern War lecture with the latest transformations in warfare. Read the whole thing at AI Central. It’s not too much of an exaggeration to observe that this is probably in advance and more up-to-date than what is presently being taught at most military colleges today, if the actions of various militaries, including the US Navy and the IDF, are any guide. And I think you’ll agree that this is an absolute tour de force of applied AI in action.

The Fifth Generation of Modern War: Drones, Attrition, and the Collapse of the Logistics Sanctuary

A lecture examining how unmanned systems fundamentally transform the nature of warfare by eliminating the distinction between the front lines and the logistics space.

Introduction:

Ladies and gentlemen, what I’m going to present to you today builds directly on the intellectual framework that William Lind laid out in his groundbreaking lecture entitled the Four Generations of Modern War. As Lind emphasized, we cannot determine the consistency of a system from inside itself—we must stand outside it to see clearly. Today, we must step outside not just our current military thinking, but outside the entire framework of the first four generations to understand what is happening in conflicts from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine to the skies over Israel and Iran.

We are witnessing the emergence of the Fifth Generation of Modern War, and like each previous generational shift, it represents what the Hegelians would call a dialectically qualitative change—not merely an evolution in tactics or technology, but a fundamental transformation in the nature of warfare itself. This transformation is driven by the proliferation of unmanned systems—drones—which have done something unprecedented since the Peace of Westphalia: they have eliminated the sanctuary of the logistics space.

For the first time since modern warfare began, there is no safe rear area. The combat zone has expanded from what was traditionally a 5-kilometer depth to 25 kilometers and beyond. This is not simply longer-range artillery or deeper penetration by special forces—this is the permanent, persistent threat of attack against every element of military force, from the frontline rifleman to the supply depot hundreds of kilometers from the front.

But before we examine this revolutionary change, we must understand what came before. Lind’s framework of the Four Generations provides the foundation upon which we must build our understanding of the Fifth.

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The Fifth Generation of War

After all the various debates about what would comprise the next generation of warfare, the recent conflicts between Armenia and Azherbaijan, Russia and Ukraine, and Iran and Israel have made it abundantly clear that it is drone warfare that is the Fifth Generation of War:

Last night, Russia also launched one of the largest strikes of the war, when you count total assets used. The missile count was relatively low, but the drones numbered nearly 500 Shaheds and other decoys in total, which is likely a record for single day usage. Counting missiles, it was well over 500+ units launched in one night. The attacks wreaked havoc on various sites, from Ukrainian airports, to energy infrastructure in Poltava, the Drohobich refinery in Lvov, and Kremenchug oil refinery as well.

But most eye-opening was the new statement from top Ukrainian radio-electronics expert Serhiy ‘Flash’ Beskrestnov. He is rarely alarmist, so the urgent tone raised quite a few eyebrows in Ukraine What he’s referring to are the predictions that Russian production capabilities for Shahed drones would soon reach levels allowing Russia to launch upwards of 500-700 of these drones per night, as they did last night.

Not only that, but both Ukrainian and Russian sources indicate that most casualties are inflicted by drones, and two-thirds of those casualties are in the logistical zone outside of the traditional battlefield.

UKRAINE: FPVs represent 49%, artillery only 13.6%, with Russian Kab/Fab bombs only 3.7%. More specifically, they distinguish that 35% of FPV hits are on troops in positions, such as trenches and foxholes, while 65% are hits on roads, i.e. vehicles or troops in transit. For the record, the full list in the left column is: FPV, artillery, infantry, drone-dropped mines, mortars, Kab/Fab, and Lancets.

RUSSIA: The losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the combat contact line are only 35%, and 65% are in logistics in the 20-kilometer zone form the contact line. Russian units are knocking out most of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ manpower during rotation with the help of drones.

This extension of the zone of lethality has significantly expanded the effective size of the battlefield. Unlike many previously suggested concepts, this expansion is truly indicative of a fundamental transformation of the way in which war is now waged and therefore worthy of the designation as Fifth Generation War.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps once said: “Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.” But with the recent expansion of the combat zone, tactics and logistics tactics are now being fused into a single concept that will have to be addressed by new military doctrines and mastered by a new breed of military officers.

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Iran’s Deep Bench

Given the proclivity of both the USA and Israel to wage war through assassination and regime change, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that their enemies are now anticipating decapitation strikes, which was the section of this interview with a former Iranian general that caught my attention.

There’s the issue of the leadership vacuum the Zionist entity sought to create by assassinating leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, followed by subsequent operations. But what we witnessed instead was the strength of our armed forces: leadership positions were filled within just three to four hours, and the command structure was swiftly and efficiently reorganized. What did the people witness afterward? How do you assess the Zionist entity’s belief that creating a leadership vacuum would weaken you?

Mohsen Rezaei: I believe Israel made a grave military miscalculation. They assumed Iran was similar to Hezbollah, even though they themselves have failed to dismantle Hezbollah. They should have learned from that experience. Look at the leadership figures that have emerged within our armed forces. Major General Pakpour, for example, is an exceptionally strong field commander—courageous, with a remarkable operational vision.

Amir Hatami, who joined from the regular army, is a brave and seasoned officer. The same goes for Mr. Mousavi in the aerospace sector. And also for Mr. Mousavi who succeeded the martyred General Bagheri in the General Staff—he is a dedicated man, aligned with the resistance movement.

Though they come from the regular army, there is full coordination between them and the Revolutionary Guards. What the enemy did failed to create any structural void within the armed forces. In fact, it could be said that certain aspects have grown more effective, as recent events have shown. That’s one point.

Secondly, we now have no fewer than ten additional layers of trained commanders and officers—some from the generation that fought in the war, and others who gained valuable field experience in later years, particularly in the fight against ISIS. Many of our forces who fought in Iraq and Syria against ISIS have, through those field experiences, become akin to senior war commanders like Hussein Kharrazi and Ahmad Kazemi—young, capable leaders fully prepared to command the armed forces.

It was a profound error on the part of the Israeli military not to recognize the deep hierarchical structure and the robust bench of ready leadership within our ranks. This internal architecture and the organizational evolution of the armed forces entirely compensated for any potential gaps. In my view, this challenge has already been overcome. And in the near future, our dear people will see that those who have stepped into the shoes of our fallen leaders will ensure that no imbalance or vacuum arises in the management of the armed forces.

The high command—led by His Eminence, the Commander—is fully acquainted with each of these leaders. They have been selected with care and discernment. I am absolutely confident that there will be no void in leadership.

A very common mistake often seen throughout military history is projection, or analyzing the enemy as if it were a mirror image of one’s own forces. Both Israel and the USA have very thin strategic and command benches, which is why they assume that taking out the top layer or two of enemy leadership will lead to complete confusion and disarray.

Which, to be fair, would likely happen in the case of either country suffering the loss of its leadership. But it’s clear that Iran and China are both very well prepared in an institutional sense for rapid leadership transitions that will avoid the confusion and military paralysis that are the primary objective of decapitation strikes. Russia, perhaps not so much, which may account for the monomaniacal focus on President Putin’s well-being, although my suspicion is that his successor will be less patient with the West and more hardline.

Regime change works when you’ve got your candidate all ready and in position to assume command and negotiate a surrender. But it can’t when you don’t have a candidate, and worse, the enemy is already set up to make a series of orderly transitions if necessary.

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