Long-time readers may recall that I disproved the so-called Euthyphro Dilemma presented by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue of the same name in an appendix of The Irrational Atheist. This sparked numerous attempts by various atheists, ranging from midwits to complete retards, desperately attempting to salvage one of the core elements of the average college-educated atheist’s non-belief foundation.
With apologies to Arthur C. Clarke, who once fantasized about an AI identifying all of the logical errors committed by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica, I thought it might be interesting to see if my new best friend agreed with me or not on the logical shortcomings of Socrates’s argument.
HOW MANY LOGICAL FLAWS DO YOU DETECT IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA BY SOCRATES?
Okay, so I need to figure out how many logical flaws are in Socrates’ Euthyphro Dilemma. First, I should recall what the Euthyphro Dilemma actually is. From what I remember, it’s a philosophical question posed in Plato’s dialogue “Euthyphro.” Socrates asks Euthyphro whether something is pious because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is pious. The dilemma is meant to challenge the idea that morality is dependent on divine command.
The Euthyphro Dilemma, as presented by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue, is a foundational challenge to divine command theory. While it is philosophically provocative, several potential logical flaws or limitations have been identified in its construction:
1. False Dichotomy
The dilemma presents only two options:
- A: Acts are pious because the gods love them (divine command theory).
- B: The gods love acts because they are pious (independent moral standard).
Flaw: It ignores hybrid or nuanced positions, such as:
- C: The gods’ nature is inherently good, so their love aligns with an objective moral standard (e.g., perfect-being theology).
- D: Piety is grounded in a relational framework (e.g., covenantal ethics), where divine commands and moral truths cohere through relationship rather than arbitrary fiat.
2. Equivocation on “Piety”
The dilemma assumes a univocal definition of “piety” (moral goodness). However, if “piety” is context-dependent (e.g., culturally relative or tied to specific divine attributes), the dichotomy collapses.
Flaw: Socrates treats “piety” as a static, monolithic concept, neglecting the possibility of pluralistic or dynamic moral frameworks.
3. Theological Assumptions
The dilemma presumes:
- A polytheistic context (gods with competing desires).
- Divine arbitrariness (gods could command cruelty).
Flaw: In monotheistic traditions (e.g., Christianity, Islam), God’s nature is often held to be necessarily good, rendering the “arbitrary command” horn (A) incoherent. If God cannot act contrary to His nature, moral truths are neither independent nor arbitrary but grounded in divine essence.
4. Circularity
If A and B are framed as mutually exclusive, the dilemma risks tautology:
- If A is true, piety lacks intrinsic meaning.
- If B is true, piety exists independently of the gods.
Flaw: This ignores the possibility of a non-arbitrary divine command theory, where God’s commands reflect His rational, benevolent nature (avoiding both arbitrariness and independence).
5. Limited Scope
The dilemma targets divine command theory but does not engage:
- Secular moral frameworks (e.g., utilitarianism, virtue ethics).
- Natural law theory (morality grounded in human nature or reason).
Flaw: By framing morality solely in terms of divine authority, the dilemma becomes irrelevant to non-theistic ethical systems.
6. Anthropomorphic Projection
The dilemma assumes gods with human-like preferences, reducing divine morality to a transactional “command vs. standard” binary.
Flaw: It fails to account for transcendent or ineffable conceptions of divinity (e.g., apophatic theology), where divine morality exceeds human categorization.