Vox Popoli

Wendy is working out:

Hi Vox and Spacebunny,

I hope the eye is feeling better and the recovery is a quick one. This probably isn’t the best time, but I had a few questions about lifting. I’d appreciate any input from you or Spacebunny. I’ve started doing some lifting workouts. I bought a pretty good book (Strength Training for Women) and some weights (3,5,and 10lbs and leg weights), bands and ball. (I know myself well enough that I won’t go to a gym to workout and don’t want the extra expense in the family budget.)

I’ve been doing the workouts for a while now. My questions are regarding frequency of working out. For light weight exercises, do I need a full day of rest between workouts? Ideally, how many times a week should each major muscle group be worked (upper, lower, core)? Should I alternate days working one group one day and another the next? How does aerobic/anaerobic exercises (hockey and tennis) affect the workout? Should there be planned rest/recovery for those? If I do a ball exercise video on a whim (they are pretty easy) will it matter what workout I do the next day?

For light exercises, no rest is necessary, but in general it’s best to give a muscle group a full day off before hitting it again. Heavy big-muscle groups, such as chest and legs, should only be done twice a week, although come to think of it that might not be true for women since they don’t lift as much. Back when I was only benching 135, I used to do chest three times a week, by the time I hit 325 I was going heavy once and light once per week… and half the time I was skipping the light workout.

You know what? I really have no clue. I have trained a number of women HOW to lift, but I’ve never paid much attention to what their programs are. And if it’s not free weights or a few particular machines, I just don’t use it. Spacebunny can give you much, much better information for what is likely to work out, so check back and I’m sure she’ll share her thoughts on the matter.

About the evils of soccer. I was playing indoor this evening and fired a hard shot from about five feet out that the goalie blocked. It rebounded directly into my face, striking me squarely in the eye, before bouncing back into the goal.

So, I scored, which was nice, unfortunately when I got up off the ground and opened my eye, there was blood in it and I could not see anything. I went to the hospital immediately, and fortunately, after about two hours my vision in that eye began to return.

Right now I’ve got about 30 percent vision in it, but the initial tests showed no apparent retinal or corneal damage and the probability is that everything will return to normal once the blood is reabsorbed. I’m quite confident everything will be fine, although right now I’m just happy to have depth perception back again.

UPDATE – The opthamologist did more detailed tests this morning. He confirmed no retinal or corneal damage, but saw an amount of damage to the pupil. Fortunately the muscle is still working, so there’s a decent chance it will recover fully. That would be nice since I’m already light sensitive as it is. The best thing is that I’ve got about 85 percent vision already; if it weren’t for the weird purple eyeliner i’m currently sporting, I’d just think my contact lens needed cleaning.

My sincere thanks to all the well-wishers.

From the Telegraph:

A 15-year-old schoolboy yesterday became the third teenager to be shot dead in south London within a fortnight. The latest shooting has led Sir Ian Blair, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, to call for an urgent meeting of commanders and murder squad detectives.

Oh, wait a minute…. Well, if a complete ban on firearms doesn’t do the trick, surely enough urgent meetings will!

Yesterday in the first part of our look at the applicability of Plato’s Euthyphro and the dilemma it supposedly poses to Christian claims about morality and its divine source, we concluded three things:

1. The Euthyphro “dilemma” is defeated by shifting the focus from “the pious” to “obedience”, therefore it is an inappropriate criticism of Christian morality.

2. The dilemma relies upon the false assumption that a fixed variable cannot be arbitrarily fixed.

3. The section about disagreement between gods regarding the pious and impious does not apply to a monotheistic god or a Supreme polytheistic God who rules over the other gods and defines their morality for them.

Note that no one, either here or on any other blog, has taken exception to any of these conclusions. Personally, I find it rather damning that atheists who are so quick to boast of their supposed intelligence and superior educations will only dare to leap in and criticize a short and obvious response to someone else’s question; when I write a lengthy post asserting my ability to prove the flawed nature of one of Mankind’s great philosophical dilemmas, there is only silence.

This is particularly strange considering the accusations that I am “stupid”, even “mindless”. But is my logic truly “laughable”? Is it not a simple matter for such intelligent and well-educated people to pick apart my reasoning? Or is it merely that they are afraid to find themselves in the position of being forced to confess that I might actually be capable of legitimately challenging some of Mankind’s greatest philosophers?

In any event, we have reached the weak point in Socrates’ argument, where he reveals the devious, intellectually dishonest aspect of his character:

Soc. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: “Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.” And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?

Euth. Why not, Socrates?

Soc. Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.

Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.

In order to narrow the definition for his egalitarian polytheist environment, Socrates first removes all individual preferences from the gods. This means that war cannot be pious and holy even though Ares and Athena love it since Aphrodite objects, while happiness and love cannot be either if grim Hades takes exception to it. This means that Plato’s definition of what is pious must be a vastly reduced subset of what any one particular god loves.

So, the idea of “the pious and the holy” being equated with what the Christian God loves is bait-and-switch even as Socrates and Euthyprho have defined the term. Whether we define piety or Socrates and Euthyphro do, in either case it cannot be applied to the Christian God.

More importantly, the equation of “pious” with “what all the gods love” is an entirely arbitrary assignation by Socrates, who even admits that he is “amending the definition”. To use one famous counterexample, David was loved by God although his actions in seducing Bathsheba and murdering Uriah were notoriously impious by our definition (obedience to God’s Will) or by Socrates’ definition (that which all the gods love). Either God ceased to love David, which we are informed was not the case, or Socrates’ amended definition is merely a subset of “the pious and holy”.

Now, the “dilemma” is that one cannot logically define “the pious and holy” in a circular manner, since that would not be a definition but rather a tautology. “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” But now that we recognize how Socrates has twice artificially narrowed the definition of “the pious”, all that is necessary to destroy the dilemma is to show that there is a reasonable definition of “loved by the gods” that is not defined by the narrowed definition of “the pious”.

Soc. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, that is the reason.

Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?

Euth. Certainly.

At no point does Socrates convincingly limit “what is loved by the gods” to “the pious”. Nor is it difficult to cite particular godly loves that were not limited to “the pious”. Zeus was reputed to fall in love on a regular basis, this love obviously fell outside Socrates’ narrow definition since Hera, being a jealous god, often took vengeance upon the Thunderer’s unfortunate beloveds. Poseidon and Athena hated Troy, while Ares and Aphrodite fought for the Trojans.

This is all quite applicable to the Christian dismissal of Euthyphro, but in order to smash the last remaining shards of the philosophical “dilemma” on its own terms, we must still find something that “all the gods love” which cannot reasonably be described as “the pious”. Therefore, I propose the following dialogue with Socrates.

Vox. My dear friend Socrates, do inform me, so that I might better understand the nature of man’s proper relation with the gods, what the nature of that relationship might be.

Soc. I believe the custom is for me to ask the questions, sport.

Vox. Humor me.

Soc. (squeezes bicep) Thundering Zeus, you must work out a lot. Um, you were saying?

Vox. I was asking you about the nature of our relations with the gods. But speaking of Zeus, would it be correct to say that Zeus might love a woman?

Soc. I am given to understand that he is most indiscriminate in this regard.

Vox. And would it likewise be correct to state that Zeus could also love a man?

Soc. Mount Olympos would be short one smashing young cup-bearer if he could not.

Vox. And is the Thunderer’s love limited to these carnal desires, or is he also capable of loving men and women in a platonic sense as well?

Soc. I should say he has been known to love those with whom he has no physical relations.

Vox. Tell me, Socrates, could that platonic love be said to stretch so far as to include all humanity?

Soc. I think it must, else he would surely have allowed Deucalion and Pyrrha to drown rather than cause the waters to recede and give them safe landing on Mount Parnossos. Moreover, he did ultimately free Prometheus once his ire over the fire had passed.

Vox. I would not dream of disputing your conclusion, Socrates. As for Aphrodite, does she love humanity any less than the Thunderer?

Soc. Surely you jest! Is she not the Goddess of Love?

Vox. But what of her red-handed lover, Ares? He glories in chaos
and war, surely he must hate humanity to bring such terrible suffering upon it?

Soc. Ah, but there you are wrong, my muscular young friend! Ares loves mankind most of all, for without it he would have no plaything. Does not a child love his toys?

Vox. Yes, to be sure.

Soc. Then so too does Ares love Man.

Vox. Thank you, Socrates, I see now the limits of my imagination. As for Athena, we know well that she loves the Athenians. But what of the rest of humanity? Did she not hate the Trojans? And what of the Lacedaemonians, whose arms caused the Long Walls to fall?

Soc. You are confusing anger at a specific offense with a general disdain for humanity. The grey-eyed one would have harbored no ill will for either Troy or Sparta had they only shown her proper reverence. Consider how she granted her favor to all the Hellenes, even the Spartans, at Ilium. Nor did she spurn the Syracusans, even when the Athenian forces were shattered against their walls.

Vox. You are wise even beyond your many years, Socrates. But surely Artemis, who loathes all men so much that she is known to hunt them, cannot be said to love humanity, but rather, to despise it!

Soc. Do you believe that men and women are a different species? Her loathing for men is but a reflection of her sexual sociopathy, and without men, there would be no women for her to love. As for her predilection for the chase, would you say that the hunter hates the deer her pursues?

Vox. I stand corrected, Socrates. But then, are there no gods that can be said to hate humanity?

Soc. Certainly not, or mortal man would perish before the force of an undying Olympian hatred, even were that god to act alone. Not even Zeus and Apollo could spare Troy from the wrath of Athena, Hera and Poseidon, you may recall. And those the gods hate, they destroy, as you may witness by the Titans imprisoned to this day in Tartarus.

Vox. So then, you would say that the gods love humanity.

Soc. Yes.

Vox. All the gods.

Soc. Yes, that is the point I have been endeavoring to eventually lead you towards. I must say, you are a bit slow at times.

Vox. I seem to recall hearing that before. But thank you, Socrates, you are most patient and kind. So then, as I have heard that with the assistance of Euthyphro, you have defined “the pious and holy” as “that which all the gods love”, may we therefore conclude that humanity is pious?

Soc. I should say we must.

Vox. And holy?

Soc. Indubitably.

Vox. And that every man and woman comprises a part of that humanity?

Soc. That is so, is it not?

Vox. I, too, am given to understand that, Socrates. So then, must we not conclude that every man and woman are pious and holy and loved by the gods?

Soc. It is certain, we must.

Vox. Including you and me?

Soc. Was there ever a doubt of it? Now, may I buy you a cup of wine?

Vox. Indeed you may, my learned friend. Let us drink to knowledge and our hopes of enjoying continued Divine favor.

Of course, it is as pointless to “prove” that every man is pious as it is to “prove” that the pious is wholly defined as being loved by all the gods. The ability to construct a tautological trap does not serve as proof of anything; in my dialogue the weak point is the agreement that that which applies to collective humanity transitively applies to an individual human, but this is still a much more defensible concept than several of the agreements in Euthyphro.

In his questioning, Socrates is constantly guiding Euthyphro towards the tautological trap, the form of which is perhaps more obvious in my stripped-down version of it. But since Socrates’ narrowed definition is as arbitrary as any that anyone else might devise, and since it manifestly fails to cover the vast majority of things that we are informed, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that the Greek gods loved, Eutyhphro’s “dilemma” is more an exercise in rhetorical manipulation than a genuine philosophical challenge.

I hope you will note that there was no need to resort to anything particularly religious, let alone Christian, in dismissing the “dilemma”, which cannot reasonably be applied to Christianity in the first place. And if you do not find this dismissal of Euthyphro to be convincing, please let me know why. As always, if I have made any errors, I invite everyone to point them out and shall certainly endeavor to correct them.

The amusing thing is that while he won’t believe in a god, he does believe he has a chance of successfully criticizing me. Needless to say, he makes exactly the same error that nearly every atheist except Brent Rasmussen has made, that my statement of a perfectly logical conclusion is somehow tantamount to evidence of being on psychologically perilous grounds:

“Are Atheists morally compromised?” Excuse me? Atheist don’t have to make excuses for priests that molest children, religious extremism, holy wars, or anything like that, but atheists are morally compromised?

True. Of course, neither do any non-Catholic Christians, Jews, Muslims are anyone else. Furthermore, the number of child-molesting teachers, janitors, principals in the secular schools where religion is banned surpasses the number of child-molesting priests in both absolute and percentage terms.

As has been previously discussed, the number of holy wars is a very small percentage of all wars and atheists, despite their relatively short amount of time in power anywhere, are responsible for more fatalities than all of the holy wars of history combined.

So, yes, even by this atheist’s reckoning, there’s a very strong case to be made for the case that atheists are morally compromised, assuming that we first posit that the very concept of a “moral atheist” is not an oxymoron.

His “retraction” notwithstanding, Pharyngurl still can’t read:

I had no idea that Vox was an adherent of the Arian heresy, but OK. It makes, of course, a huge difference in the moral status of the butchery of toddlers if it is done at God’s command (thumbs up!) vs. Jesus’s orders (no, no, no…although it does rather put a sinister twist on his command to “suffer the little children to come to me,” doesn’t it?). And getting an order to murder small children from God would never be a delusional or self-motivated act.

All clear on that, everyone? You have to get a note from God (not Jesus, that wimp) first, and then you can go on your killing spree.

The first point, as it’s clear that Pharyngurl understands and is now attempting to sweep beneath the rug, is that a response to a direct and unquestionable order is not the same as “killing in the name of”. But the good professor would rather demonstrate that he’s heard of the Arian heresy than admit to either misunderstanding or misrepresenting what I wrote yesterday.

Second, I am somewhat sympathetic to the Arian heresy. It’s clear there is at least some distinction between Jesus Christ and God, or else Jesus would not have lamented his abandonment on the Cross. The specific nature of that distinction is of no concern to me, however, as I am essentially agnostic on the question, let alone the specific nature, of the Trinity.

Unlike most atheists, I know full well just what I do not and cannot know. This is why, despite my Christianity, I tend to get along very well with agnostics and very poorly with atheists.

The silliness of Pharyngurl’s posting is highlighted by what Brent Rasmussen adroitly noted was a thought experiment, not a public confession of dark desires. Despite the histrionics of his fellow atheists and not being what you’d call one of my more enthusiastic fans, he correctly writes:

“But that’s not what this is about, really. I don’t believe for a second that Day wants to go out and murder two year olds. Like I said, this is a thought experiment, a way to examine belief, faith, and the claims made by Day and other Christians as to the existence or non-existence of a creator. It’s also a way to look at the nature of morality.”

I am myself skeptical that I could manage to obey God in this manner. I should like to think that I would, but given my track record of failure in significantly less challenging matters, the odds are certainly slim.

Pharyngurl’s commenters are arguably even more cognitively challenged than their blog host. Consider the following:

This guy’s attempt at logic is laughable… “direct and 100% confirmable” is pure poppycock.

That was the question as posed.

He’s claiming that the creator of the universe has the right to order the annihiliation of any portion of that universe. Spread the news! Microsoft can order the deletion of all copies of Windows off of your computers!

Yes. Read your EULA.

Vox isn’t saying anything new. And he obviously hasn’t put the thought into it that Kierkegaard did. Of course, Kierkegaard was a bit of a nut, but Vox certainly has him beat there, since he appears to be both mindless AND crazy. Very, very disturbing.

Vox never claimed it to be. In fact, he has specifically claimed precisely the opposite. And they call me mindless and crazy….

I don’t know what’s more disturbing about that place – the posts or the moronic following he has

I’d go with the latter, but only because of Jamie.

Vox Day is an immense moron. Does anyone even listen to him?

See above.

If there was a god and he told me to kill my worst enemy (whoever that is) I’d take great pleasure in telling god where to stick his commandment.

I very much doubt it.

I’d be willing to bet that Vox Day knows less about the Bible than many of us.

I very much doubt it.

I’m an atheist and I’ve got a degree in classical history. I guarantee your ass I know more about Biblical history than 99% of the Christians in this country.

Ooh, a history degree! And yet, I very much doubt it.

By the way, Mr. “Day” should know that calling ones self Vox Dei (homophonically or otherwise) is at best a flamboyant display of hubris; at worst, blasphemous and mortally risky.

How can one offend a nonexistent being? Anyhow, she’s managed to miss the point despite it being pointed out right on this page.

I’m not going to do the research, but are we to assume that Vox Day is no longer blaming terrorists for 9/11, but is now blaming their god for asking them to do it? Surely they must have had the proper proofs that it was their god, since they were willing to die.

No. The terrorists never claimed that their god asked them or told them to do it. Killing in the name of X is not the same as following X’s orders. This is not difficult. This is appallingly bad logic, given that there is no shortage of examples of people who were willing to die for reasons wholly unrelated to divine beliefs, let alone orders.

His political analysis is usually better than most, but this foray into human biology cracked me up:

Most observers assumed that Romney would fill the void. But he doesn’t seem to have been able to do so. It may be a racist refusal to vote for a Mormon or, more charitably, Romney’s flip-flop-flip from pro-life to pro-choice to pro-life, or it may have been his inconsistency on gay issues, but Mitt seems to be going the way of his father — out of contention.

Although considering that I have read complaints from people concerned about anti-Islamic “racism”, perhaps the definition expanded when I wasn’t looking. That actually might be rather handy, come to think of it, as theidiots, god-botherers and Bible-thumpers can now charge reasonably atheists with being racists on top of everything else.

And they think they’re unpopular now….

Presumed atheist Pete comments:

Um… Euthyphro, anyone? I know it’s only been 2500 years since this kind of idea was shown to be ridiculous, but maybe this guy’s just a little slow. In any case this shouldn’t be surprising, seeing as how the myth of Abraham’s attempted filicide is considered to be a good example..

By all means, let us consider Euthyphro, and in the process demonstrate the risibility of the modern American liberal’s notion that having once heard a professor mention something in a lecture is equivalent to possessing substantive knowledge of it.

But you think you’re an intellectual, don’t you, ape?

Apes don’t read philosophy.

Yes, they do, Otto. They just don’t understand it…. Aristotle was not Belgian. The central message of Buddhism is not every man for himself. The London Underground is not a political movement.

It’s the “um, Euthyphro, anyone?” that is the sophmoric giveaway. Pete’s indicating that he’s heard about Euthyphro and he even has some idea that it implies something negative about God and morality, but he doesn’t actually know what that might be. Thus he pretends that the matter has been completely settled once and for all, which is far from the truth or it would not have been so widely discussed by various philosophers.

While I like the Socratic method and have been known to make use of it on occasion, I’ve never been terribly impressed with the examples Socrates uses in the dialogues recorded by Plato. They tend to strike me as doing little more than setting up incompatible straw men, then asserting that the incompatibility therefore proves something it does not. Fortunately, this sort of argument is easy enough to pick apart as it merely requires demonstrating that the base assumptions are false.

The “dilemma“is constructed thusly: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” But simply substituting “obedience” for “piety” destroys the dilemma, (irreconciliable meanings of “moral” and “required by God”) since it eliminates the tautology posed.

It’s worth examining this in more detail, of course. Consider the first part, which is that “as Socrates presumes and Euthyphro agrees, the gods love the pious because it is pious (both parties agree on this, the first horn of the dilemma).”

Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.

Euth. I will tell you, if you like.

Soc. I should very much like.

Euth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

Here the Christian must immediately disagree, at least within the context of the modern meaning of the term piety. (We’ll get to Euthyphro and Socrates agreed-upon definition soon enough.) In this context, the Bible is clear on OBEDIENCE being God’s priority, not piety, as there are several examples of pious sacrifices to God being rejected due to their being rooted in disobedience one way or another.

“Is obedience loved by God because it is obedience, or is it obedient because it is loved by God” is only a dilemma to omniderigistes who reject free will and believe that God is controlling those who exhibit the behavior He loves. (As well, one is forced to assume, of those who exhibit the behavior He does not love.) So, unless one subscribes to the notion of an omniderigent god, there is no contradiction whatsoever in positing a God who loves obedience, who loves that which conforms to His will.

This is a known objection to the dilemma, in fact, which is described as being problematic only because “it implies that what is good is arbitrary, based merely upon God’s whim; if God had created the world to include the values that rape, murder, and torture were virtues, while mercy and charity were vices, then they would have been.”

But this can only be considered a genuine problem for those who insist that a fixed principle cannot be arbitrary, which is ridiculous. There are practically an infinity of fixed variables which, if they were different than they are, would radically alter the reality of our universe. If Moloch were the Creator God, then no doubt child-killing would be a virtue; this is hardly unthinkable let alone a logical impossibility considering how abortionettes here in the United States hold it to be just that.

The fundamental weakness of clinging to this “problem” as proof of the surviving applicability of the dilemma can be seen in the phrase “then they would have been”. But since they’re not, it’s not an issue in this particular universe we are inhabiting. In the universe next door, we can presume that given a different Creator God, there will also be a different morality just as a difference in the strength of the nuclear weak force would alter the amount of hydrogen and helium in that neighboring universe.

Why is it assumed that the universe next door WILL be different, but that the creator god next door CANNOT be? One suspects that this is the sort of rational blunder caused by today’s intellectual overspecialization.

But back to Euthyphro, as Socrates points out a problem with Euthyphro’s definition that doesn’t affect my case in the slightest:

Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?

Euth. Certainly they are.

Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences-would there now?

Euth. You are quite right.

Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?

Euth. Very true.

Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them.

Euth. Very true.

Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?

Euth. True.

Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?

Euth. So I should suppose.

Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.

Euth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that.

Needless to say, none of this is of any concern whatsoever to a monotheist or the Christian, who believes in multiple gods but worships only the One whose opinion on the matter happens to be relevant.

Part II of II

It seems Mount Olympus has broadband now, as I received an email:

Howdy Vox,

I just thought I’d let you know how much I enjoyed your post about killing children in My name. I’ll be in touch if I ever need one whacked.

I’ve blogged about your courageous volunteering here.

Cheers,
God

To which I responded:

Thanks very much indeed. I’ll just be sitting here, sharpening my knives in preparation.

Humbly,
Vox

Far be it from me to correct Heavenly reading comprehension, (after all, if God declares the grammatically correct contraction for “is not” to be “ain’t”, we have concluded that “ain’t” it shall henceforth be, have we not), but I respectfully offer a clarification pointing out that I did not write anything about killing anybody in anyone’s name, but rather affirmed the morality of a positive response to an incontrovertible Divine command.

There is a significant difference between the two concepts. If I molest a parakeet, I can claim that I am doing so in Pharyngurl’s name on the basis of his writings on the evolutionary relationship between homo sapiens and aprosmictus erythropterus without Pharyngurl having any idea that anyone is pestering the poultry, much less harboring responsibility for telling me to do it.

And this is very different than Pharyngurl appearing at my door, presenting me with three forms of identification, intentionally misunderstanding the friendly greeting given by the neighbor walking past and pretending to take great offense at it, then holding up a bird cage and saying “molest this parakeet”.

Two different things. One cannot reasonably conflate them.

No parakeets or two-year olds were harmed in the writing of this post.

The Quick and the Dead provides a useful lesson which Pharyngurl, to say nothing of many others, would do well to absorb:

Vox Day serves me crow

here,with a rich mole poblano, re my comments on Amanda Marcotte, late of the John Edwards campaign. As a blogger, I really should have known better than to take words at face value: Edwards is a politician, his lips were moving, therefore he was lying.

Too true. The Quick and the Dead goes on to offer some reasonable after-the-fact perspective on the debacle as well. Now look, there is nothing shameful with being wrong. Everyone screws up from time to time, there are certainly some particularly idiotic mistakes that I have made that I really don’t like to think about.

But one must face up to one’s mistakes if one is to avoid repeating them. Had Bush lost the election, had the Republicans gone from strength to strength instead of peaking and taking a dive like the 2000 NASDAQ, I would have cheerfully admitted that I was wrong. If the Lizard Queen is not elected President in 2008, (a prospect which is looking much more likely than it was when I first announced the inevitability of her victory), I will not only confess error but try to figure out where I went wrong.

It’s not that hard, really. For example, it is looking highly probable that my early surmise about Pataki serving as the 2008 fall guy was wrong. Now, I can pretend I never wrote that and blithely post future predictions two years prior to the next presidential nominations, or I can note my error, ascertain why I was wrong and attempt to use that information to do better next time.

Concealing error only increases the odds of future failure.