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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 43

USSBS NO. 192

JAPANESE NAVAL PLANNING

Interrogation of: Captain OHMAE, Toshikazu, IJN; an officer of 25 years service. In June 1942 he was transferred from the Bureau of Military Affairs to the Staff of the Southeast Area Fleet, in which capacity he planned and directed the First Battle of SAVO ISLAND. From December 1943 he was on the Staff of the First Mobile Fleet and took part in the planning and execution of the operations for the defense of the MARIANAS and of the PHILIPPINES as Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral OZAWA, CinC First Mobile Fleet and Third Fleet. From January 1945 he has been attached to the Naval General Staff. He was also Staff Officer 11th Air Fleet and 3rd Mobile Fleet.

Interrogated by: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN.

SUMMARY

The chief objective of this interrogation was to clarify and amplify the answers to NAV MEMORANDUM O on Japanese Naval Planning. Captain OHMAE is probably the most intelligent and well informed Japanese Naval Officer that has been interrogated by this section. His background of assignments in this war have given him exceptional qualifications on this subject. He participate din many of the important campaigns and completed his duties as Chief of the First Section of the Naval General Staff. It is considered that the opinions expressed by Captain OHMAE are indicative of the opinions of responsible and informed Naval Officers.

Q. In regard to the answers submitted by the Historical Research Department of the Naval General Staff on the subject of Japanese Naval Planning, is the basis factual, are the opinions expressed your own and do you consider these opinions represent the opinions of the Naval General Staff?

A. That pertaining to specific operational plans and the descriptions of these plans are factual; they are based on records. The opinions expressed are my own, and I feel that they do represent in general the opinions of the members of the Naval General Staff.

Q. You have stated that there was a plan to attack HAWAII in March 1942 by shore-based aircraft. From what bases were these attacks to be launched?

A. After the occupation of MIDWAY, attacks would be launched from there.

Q. Was the failure military or economic?

A. I believe the economic failure was more important. The failure of air power was the reason for the military failure. I believe too much emphasis was put on the offensive in our naval thinking and in our War College training.

It is highly significant that there are no questions asked regarding any potential invasion or series of raids on the West Coast. Both parties, being naval officers, not only knew the improbability and ineffectiveness of such ideas, but would have also known if such plans existed or not.

On 3 January [1942] President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of munitions, with a directive that he achieve the schedules contained therein and consult with the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between the using services. No relative priorities were suggested. Aircraft goals were as follows:

Aircraft Types 1942 1943

Long-range, heavy, and medium bombers 11,300 30,000

Light, dive, and scout bombers 11,000 17,000

Pursuits 16,000 38,000

Observation and transports 6,700 15,000

Total combat: 45,000 100,000

Trainers 15,000 31,000

GRAND TOTALS: 60,000 131,000

For 1942, this meant increasing existing schedules from about 46,000 to 60,000. The figures for 1943 differed slightly from those sent to Congress by the President on 6 January, which called for 25,000 rather than 31,000 trainers.51 In either case they seemed prodigious, especially in view of equally impressive requirements for ground and naval warfare. With any reasonably calculated rate of wastage, the annual production schedules of 60,000 and 131,000 aircraft should easily meet the requirements agreed on at London–about 60,000 combat and 37,000 raining planes for the AAF and 21,000 for the U.S. Navy, plus the British deficit of 13,553.

AAF Historical Study, Logistical Plans and Problems, 1941-42, with Special Reference to Buildup of the Eighth Air Force.

Yes, clearly FDR had no idea about the significance of US production superiority. Furthermore, that post Pearl Harbor revision of AWPD is characterized as follows:

“Within the Air Staff there was an immediate, though momentary, reaction in favor of deploying all available air strength for defense of the Western Hemisphere and, if practicable, of Hawaii and the Philippines. Within a week, however, AAF planners returned to a more familiar theme with a new long-term design for offensive war. This plan, called AWPD/4 (15 December 1941) was hardly more than a restatement of the salient features of AWPD/1, with requirements somewhat inflated under the stimulus of war. It called for an air force of some 3,000,000 men and 90,000 planes….

The British chiefs of staff early presented their views in a memorandum which, with slight revisions by the Americans, was approved on 31 December [1941]. The strategy thus accepted was, “in spite of recent events,” essentially a reaffirmation of the principles of ABC-1. Again Germany was declared the chief enemy, the Atlantic and Europe the areas in which the principal efforts should be applied. The nature of the contemplated efforts was unchanged: defense of production areas in North American and the United Kingdom to insure realization of the Victory Program of munitions; maintenance of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes; forging and tightening a ring around Germany; weakening the Reich by indirect methods and by a concentrated bomber attack; and preparation for the eventual invasion of Germany. Meanwhile, in the Pacific only such positions should be defended as would “safeguard vital interests and deny Japan access to needed raw materials.”

It’s becoming ever more clear, ridiculously so, that Malkin didn’t spend 30 seconds looking into the military necessity of internment. Furthermore, it’s also clear that FDR and his strategists spent a tremendous amount of time examining the very issues that many are falsely claiming to have been matters of hindsight.

In August 1941, four men, all former instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama, reported to the Air War Plans Division (AWPD) in Washington, D.C., to lay the foundation for a comprehensive, strategic air war plan. Lt Col Hal George called upon Maj Laurence Kuter, Maj Ken Walker, and Maj Haywood S. Hansell Jr. to answer a request from President Franklin D. Roosevelt for a “production plan to defeat our enemies”–one that would outline specific air requirements for industrial mobilization should the United States become embroiled in a war. After nine days, the team delivered a briefing to Gen Henry Arnold and Gen George C. Marshall that specified production requirements for 13,083 bombers; 8,775 fighters; 2,043 observation and photographic aircraft; 2,560 transports; and 37,051 trainers–an astounding total of 63,512 aircraft. Although these numbers were impressive, the planners exceeded Roosevelt’s tasking by recommending a strategy for prosecuting the war against the Axis powers. That strategy assumed that airpower could achieve strategic and political objectives in a fundamentally new way.

As for the question of whether the strategists were paying attention to the enemy’s production capacities:

The German combat estimate of 1 September 1939 did not present exact figures on the production capacity of aircraft industries in Germany, but estimates based on the previous year’s output established that Germany could produce between 9,000 and 10,000 military and commercial airplanes in 1939.

I don’t have figures for 1939, but these planners obviously knew what they were doing. Germany produced 10,200 warplanes in 1940. Not bad at all. The goals of AWPD-1 were clear – Japan was not a serious threat, so a defensive war could be fought in the Pacific until Germany was crushed, at which point the Japanese would be dealt with. The plan remained largely unchanged even after Pearl Harbor.

Following the guidelines established in ABC-1, we broke down the strategic problem into the following divisions:

First: To conduct air operations in defense of the Western Hemisphere.

Second: To prosecute as soon as possible, after the commencement of war, an “unremitting and sustained air offensive against Germany.”

Third: To support a strategic defense in the Pacific Theater.

Fourth: To provide air support for the invasion of the European Continent if that should be necessary, and to continue to conduct strategic air operations thereafter against the foundations of German military power and the German state until its collapse.

Fifth: After victory over Germany, to concentrate maximum air power for a strategic air offensive against the home islands of Japan….

The Impact of Pearl Harbor

At first the loss of the capital ships at Pearl Harbor seemed to strengthen rather than weaken the relative merits of AWPD-1. While AWPD-1 did remain basic, however, the disaster at Pearl Harbor provoked a new and hard look at overall U.S. strategic thinking. The war was now truly “global.” The Russians had temporarily stopped the Germans outside Moscow with their December counter-offensive, but the outlook in that theater was still so bleak that Russia’s demise was still expected by the following spring. The situation, in short, was desperate the world over. Britain still faced the possibility of an invasion by Germany after the fall of Russia, and with the U. S. fleet out of action, a period of rapid and vast Japanese expansion was inevitable in the Far East. Thus, while “defeat of Germany first” still seemed the logical approach, there was much public opposition to it. Moreover, it was no comfort that even with the war in Europe won, the Pacific presented vast logistical problems, and territory, now lost with ease, would have to be regained by long and bloody fighting.

These considerations led the Air War Plans Division to take a hard look at its own plan and consider what revisions, if any, might be desirable. The same planning team (although Colonel Orvil Anderson had since replaced Larry Kuter) went to work and, on 15 December, only eight days after Pearl Harbor, came up with a new “Air Estimate of the Situation and Recommendation for the Conduct of the War.”

The new estimate proposed a general increase in combat units and aircraft, and a marked increased in air transports. The increase in bomber strength reflected the loss of sea power in the Pacific and our apprehension that the bombers consigned to the strategic air war in Europe might be reassigned–or diluted in number–to meet emergency demands from the Pacific. The increase in transports reflected the loss of control of sea lanes and the growing dependency upon air transportation.

Meanwhile, almost immediately after Pearl Harbor, Winston Churchill asked to meet with the President along with their respective military advisors to determine a united grand strategy. The first meeting of the heads of government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff took place in Washington. Called the Arcadia Conference, it lasted from 22 December 1941 through 14 January 1942.

At this conference, the growth and ultimate size of the armed forces were considered. Naturally the air strategy and requirements were discussed. The Combined Chiefs did not favor such an overriding priority for the Army Air Forces as that proposed in the most recent estimate. The Combined Staff did, however, accept AWPD-1, with some modifications, as a guide for the development of the air forces of the U.S. Army.

And how did FDR handle the public opposition to what the strategists considered to be the logical way to handle the war? Quite simply, he pandered to public fears by interning and relocating the ethnic Japanese. But there was no genuine military necessity for it, none whatsoever, according to the actual war plans written by FDR’s top military strategists. As Malkin is probably too shameless to cave even before this evidence, I’ll see if I can dig up the post-Pearl document mentioned to complete the canisescasation of her deceased pony.

Okay, I’ve skimmed through the OECD report – it’s 456 pages and it’s not even close to being interesting enough to compel a close read – and the data relevant to the points raised by Jamie’s presumably evil stalking horse are as follows:

Primary education, $ per student

USA: $7,560

AUS: $5,052

AVG: $4,819

Secondary education, $ per student

USA: $8,779

AUS: $7,239

AVG: $6,688

Tertiary education, $ per student

USA: $22,234

AUS: $12,688

AVG: $12,319

Only Denmark spent more on primary education, only Switzerland and Luxembourg spent more on secondary education, and no one else was even close on tertiary education.

In terms of literacy, 39 percent of the USA’s 15-year olds performed at level 2 or below, while only 31 percent of Australia’s did so. Level 2 was defined as being “capable of basic reading tasks” but being incapable of “locating multiple pieces of information” and “drawing links between different parts of the texts”.

Source: Education at a Glance, OECD Indicators 2004

B-17s produced prior to 1942: 632

B-17s destroyed at Pearl Harbor: 4

B-17s produced throughout war: 12,731

Total taken by Royal Air Force: 200 (20 pre-1943)

Total B-17 and B-25 bombers available prior to 1942: 892

As the B-17 Flying Fortress had the range and the payload to destroy Japanese carriers – I’m informed that the Japanese greatly feared them, their ineffectiveness at Midway notwithstanding – it seems the height of absurdity to argue that with 608 Flying Fortresses plus another 284 B-25s at its disposal USA did not possess the wherewithal to patrol and defend the West Coast against naval raids. The fact that the President and his military advisors made the decision to send most of these planes to Europe to be used in a future strategic bombing campaign indicates the extent to which they were not genuinely concerned about the West Coast’s vulnerability.

Nor can one argue that the USA’s production capacity was a mystery to the President. “In May 1940, President Roosevelt stated that he wanted the U.S. aircraft industry able to turn out at least 50,000 planes a year. This involved expanding from little more than 2,000 planes per year to 4,000 per month.” That number had already reached about 2,000/month by January 1942, and FDR’s target was reached by the end of 1942, hitting 7,150/month in 1943 while many Japanese-Americans still languished in internment.

Okay, this might not be a real priority where most people are concerned. I understand that. But one of my first orders of action would be to make full-season DVD wrapups available for every team’s past seasons, not just with highlights but abbreviated broadcasts of every game they played that season. Talk about a license to print money! There are few things I’d like better than to curl up with Space Bunny and watch an old Purple People Eaters’ season or see the 1972 Dolphins’ perfect year.

I don’t know how she’d manage to fall asleep during all the third quarters, but I’m sure she’d cope somehow.

Safesex wanted to know how I could explain Australia’s better educational results despite the fact that his country spent more money on education than the USA, which I have asserted is counterproductive where literacy is concerned. I haven’t looked up literacy rates and I’ll have more complete information soon, but I think I can answer his question about the apparent dichotomy now: there isn’t one. Australia spends less money per student.

According to the recently released OECD Education at a Glance 2004 report, the four countries which spend the most per student on education are:

1. The United States

2. Denmark

3. Norway

4. Switzerland

More later.

The Elder (of Fraters Libertas) draws our attention to the following post by JB Doubtless

:

Ooo life’s sweet right here in the passenger seat

yeah life’s so sweet

When I look to the left see his suntanned hands

His muddy river hair and his thousand acre plans

I’m all shook up like a quarter in a can

Ain’t life sweet?

In the passenger seat

The first time I heard this song, I didn’t think I was hearing properly. “Life’s so sweet from the passenger’s seat.” The passenger’s seat. Here we have three stunningly attractive lasses telling us that they prefer being in the passenger’s seat–letting their man run the show?

Hold on a minute. What about the triumph of feminism? Of “equality”? Of women wanting to act like men?

If we’re very, very lucky, in another 40 years we’ll hear songs by female pop stars demanding the limiting of suffrage to productive, property-owning men of a certain age. Of course, the depths to which we’ll have to sink in order for most people to realize how disastrous universal “democracy” has been for the nation will probably be more than a little unpleasant, and the chances that the masses will turn towards a dictatorial demagogue instead are probably, oh, around 666 to 1, but it’s still nice to contemplate a potential silver lining in the massive black cumulonimbus looming in our collective (and collectivist) future.

Number of Allied air sorties over Germany before June 6, 1944: 98,400

German aircraft production increase, 1942-1944: 279 percent

Japanese aircraft available for naval-based air raids in early 1942: 265

(That’s assuming the Kaga, Akagi and the Shokaku were available. Otherwise, if Malkin was referring to the Taiyo, the Unyo and the Ryujo, that number falls to 92, less than one-one thousandth the number required to utterly fail to reduce German aircraft production at all.)

The 8th Air Force during last week of February 1944 staged “Big Week”. For 7 days the 8th Air Force struck at Germany with its 3,800 B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers. They dropped nearly 10,000 t of bombs. The primary target was Germany’s aircraft industry. P-47 Thunderbolts using drop tanks flew escort. The Germans were able to rebuild damaged plants more quickly than anticipated…. The actual impact of the campaign was disappointing.

Big Week was estimated to have destroyed between 600 and 1,000 Luftwaffe planes. If it took 26,600 bombing sorties with heavy bombers to destroy 1,000 planes, how many could the Japanese have destroyed, if one assumes that fighters and carrier-launched dive-bombers are the equivalent of B-17s and B-24s? Rounding up, we can estimate that in a single raid from their three largest carriers, the Japanese could have been expected to destroy about 10 planes. Assuming they lost only the same number of planes in each raid that they did at Pearl Harbor – where they had the benefit of surprise – this Japanese raiding force could have been expected to destroy about 100 planes before running out of planes themselves. At 1942 production rates, it would have taken all of 18 hours for the USA to replace the planes lost.

UPDATE – Please keep in mind that the plans for the USA’s strategic bombing campaign were drawn up in June, 1941. The total ineffectiveness of this massive campaign could not have been known in early 1942, but the requirement for repeated sorties by a thousand-plus heavy bombers to have any noticeable effect on industrial production certainly was, as the small-scale British strategic campaign of 1939 was judged to have been “disastrous”.

JS copies me on an email to the FDR apologist:

As a fourth generation Japanese American I cry at the very thought that you would still try to box my family into this defenseless position.

I served in the USMC and am now part of the Republican Party. My grandfather died in Normandy. My uncles served in the 442nd. My family, having been in the US since 1905, was honored in our

community even after the attacks of P.H. and found it impossible to assume we should be imprisoned. My little old great-grandmother was as loyal an American as you could have asked for.

I sit here at my desk and weep at the thoughts of hatred that must run through you to say such things. If you can’t face the fact that it was done for two reasons: A) racism and B) money… you have lost touch with reality.

Look in the mirror. They would have happily have put you in the same camps… if they had a choice. Not because of your heart… but because of your skin. Shame will be in your heart/soul forever! Forever! Shame…..

If you have any honor you will answer Vox Day’s questions!!!!

Malkin has been content to ignore my questions, although they would appear to be simple to answer if I am as uninformed as she claims. It will be interesting to see if she’ll be able to continue ignoring them when they are posed to her by the descendants of those scapegoated and victimized by FDR. By the way, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team to which JS refers, was one of the most decorated American military units of WWII.

On November 17 when the 442nd was finally relieved, the dead and the wounded outnumbered the living. The 442nd ended up at less than half its usual strength. K Company, which started out with 186 men had 17 left. I Company started out with 185. At the end, there were only 8.

During the six days the 442nd fought to rescue the Lost Battalion, 54 men were killed and many, many more were wounded and sent to hospitals. During the entire Vosges Campaign, 34 days of almost non-stop combat – liberating Bruyeres and Biffontaine, rescuing the 211 Texans, and nine more days of driving the Germans through the forest – the 442nd’s total casualties were 216 men dead and more than 856 wounded.