Category: Uncategorized

From NRO’s Corner:

Until I saw this headline, I had completely forgotten my first journalism class at the Univ. of Montana. It was titled “Introduction to Journalism”, but we ONLY read Dan Rather’s book, as if it were the Bible. It was all we studied for the entire quarter. I changed my major after that class.

Holy wasted tuition, Batman! They would have been better off reading The Hobbit.

As those few whose interest in the NFL is entirely too active may recall, the Grim Reaper is a label that Chokechain stuck me with. This is due to my tendency to draft one or two of the better backups to some of the league’s more fragile running backs, such as Stephen Jackson (Marshall Faulk), and DeShaun Foster (Stephen Davis). Imagine my chagrin when I saw the following headline, considering that I’d dropped Foster just prior to the start of the season:

Panthers may lose Davis for up to five weeks

But then I remembered that my foe for the upcoming week had picked up Foster and dropped him again! Ha! I quickly zoomed over to our league site and welcomed Foster back to the squad – I’d also had him and Davis last year – and will take great pleasure in unleashing him against a weak KC run defense on the wretched Wallabies this Sunday.

I was just wondering what percentage of the voting public is either hopelessly a) stupid or b) self-centered. I’d like to see someone propose a referendum requiring the government to pay everyone over the age of 18 one million dollars on January 1 every year. What percentage of people would vote for that? I’m guessing at least 25 percent, although you might see higher turnout than normal as you have to imagine that the complete morons would turn out in force for that one.

“Hey, man, check it out! A million dollars?”

– hits bong – “Dude, we so gotta vote!”

I have to admit, I’m getting a little tired of the right-wing blog world getting into an uproar everytime something minor happens in Podunksville or when the left dares to run an ad. The Dan Rather stuff is major, but someone tearing down signs isn’t. Sure, a crying little girl makes for good theatre, but what does it tell you? That left-wing activists are boorish? Hardly news. These are the same people who advocated killing her three years ago, so she’s lucky she got away with merely losing her little sign.

And the Move-On ad with the American soldier trapped in quicksand is not outrageous either. The present situation does resemble that to a certain extent, although I think that Brer Rabbit and the Tar Baby are probably a more accurate one. It seems that as we gain more influence, the more we behave like those about whom we have complained about for years. I find that troubling.

There’s enough real outrage in the world; no need to generate the fake stuff.

1. Direct foul language or undeserved insults at another commenter.

2. Continue to repeat a question after it’s been answered.

3. Post trollish comments on every post regardless of whether they are relevant to the post or not.

4. Immediately leap to a tangential objection after your initial objection has been shown to be irrelevant.

5. Show a disingenuous inability to comprehend what you’re reading.

6. Annoy Space Bunny.

7. Defend Nate or Bane. (I’m just kidding, everyone knows there is no defense for those two.)

8. Refuse to answer a specific question when I demand it of you.

9. Constantly asking questions while refusing to answer any.

When DK convinced me that this blog would be much better if, unlike most media commentators, I allowed comments, I was dubious, but I figured it was a worthwhile experiment. I’ve been delighted with the results, and to be honest, I’m shocked that I’ve only had to ban three people in 11 months, as when I first turned comments on, I expected I’d have to ban that many every week.

People can disagree with me all they want, as long as they’re civil Regulars here know that happens all the time. I don’t even mind being mocked and taunted when I deserve it, especially if it’s by those who have earned the right to do so through familiarity and friendship. But if you’re going to challenge me directly, you’d better have a coherent point and be able to back it up. If you don’t actually have a specific case, and all you can fall back on is vague generalities and things that “everybody knows”, then I strongly prefer that you go pester someone else, somewhere else.

I don’t have any problem admitting when I’m wrong. I’ve done it before and I’m sure I’ll do it again in the future. There are plenty of very smart people here and I found myself having to do it twice last week, as a matter of fact. So, if you’re going to comment here, you had better be prepared to do likewise from time to time.

Amid mounting accusations he trumpeted forged memos to bring down a sitting president, CBS’ Dan Rather is finally acknowledging doubts over the documents’ authenticity, while new revelations show they were faxed to CBS from a Kinko’s in Abilene, Texas.

“If the documents are not what we were led to believe, I’d like to break that story,” Rather said last night, according to the Washington Post. “Any time I’m wrong, I want to be right out front and say, ‘Folks, this is what went wrong and how it went wrong.'”

It’s a little late to break that story, Dan. You’re wrong, moreover, CBS’s behavior in this incident will eventually be found in the dictionary, listed under “defense, hopeless”. Congratulations to the Powerline gang for collecting such an eminent scalp.

I don’t know why, but the Kinko’s aspect just strikes me as hilarious. If the perpetrator was dumb enough to think this would fly, perhaps he was dumb enough to save it on a hard drive there too.

Darling Nikki practices oral-podiatral autoeroticism:

Oh, yeah it’s the indefensible assertion that espionage, sabotage, and spot raids posed no threat to the war effort. Interesting how you try to avoid saying this now that you realize it was so stupid.”

I’m not avoiding it in the least. I’ll repeat it again for you if you like. Invasion, espionage, sabotage and spot raids posed zero threat to slow or cripple the American war effort in the Pacific. That’s what I asserted in my original column and I haven’t moved one iota from that position.

Moreover, I’ll now add with complete confidence that this was known to every single member of both the American and Japanese high commands at the time.

Malkin asserted that those four factors had the potential to cripple the war effort without any basis at all; it seems strange that some should try to place the complete burden of proof on her opponents. But so be it. First, the amount of damage required to have such an effect is a finite figure. 100 percent would certainly suffice to do so, one percent certainly would not, given an estimated wastage rate of 7 percent.

Considering that the amount of damage done at Pearl Harbor only amounted to .63 percent of our 1940/41 aircraft production and 9.1 percent of our 1940/41 shipping production in terms of tonnage, (none of which was actually lost, as the destroyer Cassin was the most recently built vessel destroyed, having been commissioned in 1936), it is obvious to any rational observer that the cumulative effect of any smaller raids or attempts at sabotage would have been completely negligible, and in terms of potential effect on the war effort, zero.

Nikki, you’re done asking questions until you answer this one specifically and unevasively. Explain how invasion, sabotage, espionage and spot raids on the part of the Japanese military or ethnic Japanese civilians resident in America could have had any effect on the war effort. Play evasive games and you’re off to Palookaville.

UPDATE – Unsurprisingly, Nikki didn’t even attempt to answer the question, but instead responded with a barrage of tangential and irrelevant questions. So, s/he is off to join the two trolls previously banned. I am perfectly willing to engage in reasonable debate with anyone on anything, but if one refuses to answer direct questions, repeatedly demonstrates disingenuous problems with reading comprehension or plays evasive semantic games, one will soon find oneself riding the ejection seat. Unlike nearly every other commentator on the political scene, I permit comments and enjoy participating in substantive debate here, but I have zero interest in wasting any more time on foolish trolls than is necessary to establish their petty nature.

I’m sure pretty much everyone will be relieved that I don’t see any need to further post on the absence of military necessity for internment. Considering that my 20-20 hindsight view is completely supported by military experts past and present, including some of the principle figures involved on the Japanese side, the only thing left is to dig up hard figures on projected wastage vs. potential sabotage. I already know which way they’ll fall, I just don’t have them yet. Now, this isn’t the end of it, but until Malkin quits hiding in her corner – which I don’t see happening until she has no choice – there’s nothing left to address.

We now return you to your regular programming….

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 115

USSBS NO. 503

TOKYO 9-12 December 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral FUKUDOME, Shigeru, IJN; Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from 1940 to April 1941; Chief First Section, Naval General Staff, TOKYO, April 1941 to May 1943; Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from May 1943 to March 1944; Commander, Second Air Fleet, July 1944 to 15 January 1945; Commander, 10th Area Fleet, 15 January 1945 to present date.

Interrogator: Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, USN. Allied Officers Present: Colonel R.H. Terrill, USAAF.

Q. Admiral, you mentioned earlier the ALEUTIAN Operation at KISKA; what was the decision with respect to the ALEUTIANS, and the reason for it?

A. There appears to have been considerable difference of opinion between the Army and Navy as regards future policy for the ALEUTIANS, the Navy favoring fighting to the last man while the Army felt that this would be a waste of manpower if there was no prospect of ultimate success of the Northern Operations. The final decision as rendered by the Imperial General Headquarters was that it would serve no useful purpose to fight on, and, hence, it was decided to withdraw. When Admiral KOGA came to TOKYO, it was his hope that with KISKA and the rest of the ALEUTIANS as a base he might get a chance for a decisive engagement with your naval forces somewhere in the northern waters; but by the time he reached TOKYO the situation had already gone too far for him to undertake execution of any such plan.

Q. What had been the object of the Northern Operation? Was it to obtain a base for the purpose just mentioned?

A. My memory on this point is somewhat hazy, but I believe that our object in occupying the area of natural resources in the south was not a strategic one. The purpose was to get the materials necessary for existence and our war effort. But the Navy felt that in order to hold this very expansive area it would be necessary to get far outlying lookout points, and while we might not be able to hold on to such outlying points, we must at least get them once, even if we were to lose them to the enemy again later. It was in pursuance of that policy that we occupied or tried to occupy such distant bases as the ALEUTIANS, RABAUL, and MIDWAY.

Q. Was this particular objective–that is, the Western ALEUTIANS–included in the plan over the objections of the Army? That is, was it primarily sponsored by the Navy?

A. No, it was not against Army opposition that the ALEUTIAN bases were included in this plan. The idea originated with YAMAMOTO who, when laying down a plan of Naval operations, felt that the holding of such outlying bases was essential to an overall success of the Navy’s plans. When that idea was transferred to Imperial General Headquarters, the Army took the view that if the Navy fleet that such a policy is essential then wee give it support. They fell in readily with the Navy’s proposal, the difference of opinion arose only when the time came for the withdrawal from KISKA. The reason for the Navy favoring defense to the last man was that since they had gone there in the first place with the expectation of having at some future time to lose it, why not fight it out to the last man? Against that, there was considerable Army objection.

Q. In the original concept at the beginning of the war, were the various forces given definite final objectives or merely limited objectives, with a view to subsequent orders depending on the progress of the campaign?

A. The original order given to Admiral YAMAMOTO by the Imperial General Headquarters contained two main parts: one, destruction of the enemy fleet; two, coordination with the Army in capturing, and gaining control of the southern areas. With regard to the first pint, as in the case of the RUSSO-JAPANESE War when Admiral TOGO was ordered to destroy the RUSSIAN Fleet without any detailed instructions as to how or where that was to be done, steps and methods to be employed for the destruction of the enemy fleet were left to Admiral YAMAMOTO’s discretion. He was to draw up the plan of operation by estimating the enemy strength in the light of the strength which he had available himself. As regards the second point, the Army, of course, was to carry out the work of occupation. The purpose of that was less strategic than economic and political, the object being principally to gain control of the raw materials in the south. The duty of the Navy in that connection was to support the Army effort both with its fleet and its land-based air force. lest there be misunderstanding on the point, I wish to say that though Admiral YAMAMOTO was assigned this specific duty of planning and executing the destruction of the enemy fleet according to his own discretion, he could not activate any plan without the approval of the Imperial General Headquarters. I cannot recall that any line was fixed to designate the limits of ocean surface to be secured; I do recall, however, that lands to be occupied were definitely fixed.

Q. Initially, what was the farthest fixed position to which the advance in the north was limited?

A. In the north, the ALEUTIANS, including ATTU and KISKA, but I believe that DUTCH HARBOR was left to fleet discretion. In the south RABAUL was designated from the beginning; and the SOLOMONS and MIDWAY were added later.

Q. This would then be called the first established line–ATTU and KISKA (possibly DUTCH HARBOR), WAKE, RABAUL and so on west? We might accept that as a first line?

A. Yes, include the GILBERTS in that line. That was the first line for occupation but this did not restrict naval activity.

Q. Then the move into the Western ALEUTIANS in June 1942 was actually in completion of this initial plan, even though delayed somewhat?

A. I wish to make a correction, the question of including KISKA and ATTU in the original program was only considered, but it was not adopted at that time. It was added at the same time MIDWAY was brought into this line.

Q. When was the decision reached to expand the perimeter to include MIDWAY, and what were the reasons therefor?

A. The taking of MIDWAY was a part of the fleet desire. From the outset, the fleet wanted to take MIDWAY even if subsequent developments caused its loss. I believe the idea originated with Admiral YAMAMOTO that the fleet wished to take it even if subsequent developments should necessitate giving it up again. The Imperial General STaff, however, was opposed to the idea at first because the disadvantages of holding MIDWAY, especially in the way of supply, would outweigh the advantages. It had always been a policy of the Japanese Navy to hold the fleet in waters relatively close to home to meet the enemy there in surface interception operations, the object being to engage the enemy in areas most advantageous for us. But as the operations in the first stage of the war were so successful as to even exceed expectations and as the fleet again submitted its plan for taking MIDWAY with details of the plan, especially with regard to the reasons for the necessity of taking it and the chances of success of the operation, the Imperial Staff at this time gave its support. The Army also fell in line and offered to send troops for occupation. As this was an addition to the original plan of operations it was issued as a new Imperial General Headquarters order. By way of summary, it might be stated the purpose of this operation for taking MIDWAY was to utilize it as a base for future advances, and at the same time to prevent its being used by the enemy as a base. The Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO, had full confidence in Admiral YAMAMOTO’s judgment, and was always willing to trust his judgment in respect to fleet operations. he appeared to have the feeling that if Admiral YAMAMOTO said that a certain plan promised success he would be willing to let Admiral YAMAMOTO proceed with its execution. While there was discussion of this plan between the fleet and authorities in the General STaff, what really led to Admiral NAGANO giving his final consent to the carrying out of this plan was the fact he always had full confidence in the CinC of the Fleet.

Q. About what date was the additional order issued?

A. I don’t remember the exact date but believe it was just prior to commencement of the operation. Since the fleet had studied this operation very closely, they were in a position to put the plan into operation immediately once it was issued.

Q. You made a suggestion of further forward advances. Did the Naval General Staff act on its own initiative or did it receive from Admiral YAMAMOTO plans to go on beyond MIDWAY? If so, what was the nature of those plans?

A. It would probably be more accurate to say that one of the purposes for taking MIDWAY was to use it as a base for subsequent operations rather than for further advance. No doubt the fleet had been studying the possibility for further advances even to HAWAII, but doesn’t appear to have been able to draw up a plan that would promise success, and the Imperial General Staff had been opposed from the beginning to extending the line too far. I am certain that there was no definite adoption of a plan, at that time, to go beyond MIDWAY. From some time prior to this, the Naval General Staff had been considering the question of operations toward HAWAII as a problem reserved for a subsequent time, a time when our fleet should have destroyed the American Fleet. However, the General Staff had not transmitted this idea to the fleet yet.

Q. What were the effects of the Battle of MIDWAY, 406 June 1942, and what new plans, if any, were evolved directly as a result of that action?

A. The result of the MIDWAY engagement was a most serious blow to our Navy. Admiral YAMAMOTO’s basic policy had been to engage the enemy in a decisive fleet engagement. He was at the same time an advocate of using air power, including the use of land-based air forces. In undertaking the capture of MIDWAY, he, no doubt, planned to use MIDWAY as a base for just such a fleet engagement; but as a result of this serious set-back at MIDWAY, he was probably forced to give up the hope of holding such a fleet engagement a great distance from home. The effect of the MIDWAY Battle was to greatly restrict the area in which such a fleet engagement could be carried out….

Q. You have several times mentioned phases of the war. How do you divide the war into phases?

A. This division into phases was an arbitrary one adopted merely for sake of convenience. However, such a division had always been contemplated and was always in the minds of the Navy General Staff from earlier years. The first phase operation was the occupation of the raw materials area to the south. The second phase was after the change from offensive in taking this area to the defensive of the occupied area. In addition, the fleet attempted a third phase which covered the period between the two already mentioned; namely, the period of stabilization of the occupied area immediately after occupation and prior to the beginning of the defensive operations. So the actual order became: first phase–occupation, second phase–stabilization, third phase–defensive. Admiral YAMAMOTO commanded the fleet through the first phase and the early part of the second phase, Admiral KOGA was in command through the latter part of the second phase and the early part of the third phase, and Admiral TOYODA followed through the last part of the third phase.

As I said before, Malkin is incorrect in saying there was a “low” chance of an invasion of the West Coast. There was NO chance of an invasion of the West Coast, as even an invasion of Hawaii was untenable for the many reasons I have mentioned. One thing these Japanese admirals – like the former Commandant to whom I spoke – understand that Malkin does not, is that carrier-launched airplanes were no substitute for land-based aircraft during WWII, hence Yamamoto’s desire to use Midway as a base for a fleet engagement, and the IJN General Staff’s awareness that further attempts to raid or invade Hawaii and the West Coast would be both costly and foolish.

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 75

USSBS NO. 378

JAPANESE WAR PLANS AND PEACE MOVES

TOKYO 13-14 November 1945

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Interrogation of: Admiral TOYODA , Soemu; September 1941, CinC KURE NavSta; November 1942 appointed Supreme Military Counsellor, residing in TOKYO. May 1943 became CinC YOKOSUKA NavSta. May 1944 became CinC Combined Fleet succeeding Admiral KOGA when latter was killed. May 1945 appointed Chief of Naval General Staff; later post superseded by position of Chief, Naval Combined Forces, September 1945 which he held until dissolution of that organization 15 October 1945.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN; Maj. Gen. O.A. ANDERSON, USA; Lt. Comdr. W. WILDS, USNR. Allied Personnel Present: Mr. P.H. NITZE, Vice Chairman, USSBS; Captain T.J. HEDDING, USN; Lt. Comdr. J.A. FIELD, Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

Admiral TOYODA discusses the influence of the Japanese Army in politics and the implications of this influence in the history of Japanese expansion, the strategy and economics of the basic Japanese plan for war against the UNITED STATES, the question of implication of the armed forces, and the consideration of the surrender question at Imperial Conferences in the summer of 1945.

Q. (Admiral Ofstie) Throughout the war were your positions such that you were fully informed on the progress of the war, on the plans and policies under discussion in the Supreme Council, Imperial Headquarters, by the General Staffs, etc.?

A. In the Japanese Navy, the commandants of the various fleets and the various Naval Stations, while they received instructions from Central Headquarters regarding operations, are not consulted on matters of fundamental policy; and, therefore, from the beginning of the war I was not consulted on those matters by the TOKYO headquarters.

Q. I assume, however, that you were thoroughly familiar with the Japanese War Plan, their National War policy for the Greater East ASIA War; is that correct?

A. I may be wrong as to the exact date, but I believe it was on 5 November 1941 that the Commander-in-Chiefs of the various Naval Stations and minor Naval Stations were brought together in TOKYO and were given an explanation regarding our plans for operations in the event of war against the UNITED STATES. No opportunity was given us, however, to make any comments on those plans or to suggest modifications.

Q. Admiral, would you say that in the preparation of the basic war plans there appeared to be full understanding and agreement on the part of the Army as well as the Navy?

A. No. I regret to say that such was not the situation. Because the Army had great political power, if the Navy were to endeavor to get all that it desired, it would encounter certain difficulties. Such was the situation not only during the war but prior to the beginning of the war.

Q. To go slightly further–as an example, when the basic war plan was changed and it was decided to somewhat expand the immediate objective by going into the ALEUTIANS, SOLOMONS, MIDWAY, was that change agreed to or given consideration by the Army and a satisfactory accord reached?

A. Having been in KURE at the time, I was not in a position to have knowledge as to the Navy’s basic policy or the question of cooperation with the Army upon such points.

Q. But still, when a major change, such as the decision to go into the ALEUTIANS, to go into the SOLOMONS and to PORT MORESBY, to land on MIDWAY, was made, surely such a matter would have been rather widely discussed between the services, wouldn’t it?

A. Of course, I think that discussion between the services on points of such importance took place as a matter of course, but as I was not in TOKYO at the time, but in KURE, I do not know how those discussions took place or were carried out. of course I had definite personal opinions of my own regarding these questions when they were made known to me, but no chance was given to me to forward such opinions to Central Headquarters.

Q. In following the progress of the war as you saw it, what would you say, in just a few words if it can so be done, were the chief causes for the inability of JAPAN to carry out her war aims?

A. On the material side, the fact that our country was woefully weak, lacking resources. On the spiritual side, I should say that the biggest hindrance was the fact that people were not told what this war was actually for, and for that reason they were not able to really put themselves into the war effort.

Q. From the standpoint of the UNITED STATES, what was the principal force you might say that resulted in Japan’s inability to carry out her war aims?

A. On the American side I should say that it was the fact that you had adequate raw materials, bountiful resources, and tremendous production capacity, and the fact that production plans were carried out very much according to schedule. I recall that when I left TOKYO to take over command of the Combined Fleet I made one request of the Navy Minister, and that was the fact that he should promise that all the ships, all the planes, and other supplies which were promised to the Combined Fleet under the Naval Plan should be carried out to the letter; that if he felt that it was impossible to go through with the number designated in the plan, to change the plan. For instance, if he thought it was going to be difficult to let the Combined Fleet have ten planes, don’t put ten planes down but reduce that to five, but be sure to come through with the five planes. But as it turned out, the Navy Minister was not able to carry out that promise, not because of lack of will to do so but because production simply did not keep up with the plan.

Q. Then to go a little further along the same line, lack of production has many causes. What would you ascribe the principle reason for the lack of that production?

A. It is difficult to point to any one thing as the reason for failure in production because there are many and each, I think operates to affect the others in more or less of a vicious circle, but if I have to name one, I would point out lack of raw materials and natural resources. It was, of course, impossible to supply our production plants with raw materials from JAPAN proper, CHINA and MANCHURIA. That was evident from the first, and it was for that reason that our Army and Navy extended their insufficient force over such a broad area, along battle lines all out of proportion to our strength in men, in order to obtain raw materials from the south, but as it turned out, that was simply taking in too much territory with the strength that we had in that area.

Q. What was the principal reason why you couldn’t get those raw materials to your country from the south?

A. The main reason, I think was that we did not have a sufficient number of ships to begin with, and such as we had, we suffered heavy damage owing to your submarines and air action.

Q. As major items in the position that you came to, what would you say were the primary causes? Was it the loss of shipping, was it the severe damage to the fleet strength, was it loss of air power, was it blockade by air and submarines, or was it bombing of the homeland?

A. Beginning this year, [1945] I think the biggest cause of fall in production, especially in aircraft and air material, was the effect of your bombing on the domestic plants–factories–in JAPAN proper; but as regards the effects on our war strength on the whole, I think the greatest effect was felt after all by the lack of ships and consequent inability to bring material from the south. Along that line also there were periods in the war when there was not a lack of material in JAPAN, but they could not be moved from one place to another owing to lack of transportation facilities. In other words, various causes affected one another to bring down the general fall in production level.

Q. (Lt. Comdr. Wilds) You referred early in the conversation to the threat which you considered our Navy represented from the east early in the war, after JAPAN had filled in her perimeter. How would you evaluate that threat as between carriers, or surface fleet, or amphibious operations?

A. Early in the war I think the submarines were the part of the UNITED STATES Navy which I considered the greatest threat.

Q. Will you, then, elaborate as to the relative threat in your opinion that the carrier force and the surface fleet and our potential amphibious capabilities represented?

A. In positive offensive operations, I agree that aircraft carriers are indispensable, and in landing operations, even land-based air force is not sufficient without the cooperation of the surface Task Force units; so in that sense, I evaluate surface Task Forces very highly, especially where the landing is to be made beyond the range of land-based air units. So we felt that if we could deal a serious blow to your surface Task Force, that would widen the gap between your landing attempts and also shorten the distance between the stepping stones by which you made the advance toward JAPAN.

Q. In considering JAPAN’s inability to stabilize and hold the perimeter which had been almost achieved in the first six months of the war, what factors would you say were accountable? That is, was it a lack of bases of sufficient size to build up necessary strength or was it inability to supply the bases? Was it a logistics problem, in other words?

A. I think there was a mistake at the top from the very beginning as to the nature of modern warfare. It a little closer study had been made of the Second World War as it started in EUROPE, especially in the fighting going on between ENGLAND and GERMANY around the MEDITERRANEAN, the fighting that meant so much consumption of material, and if we had laid our plans from the beginning with some sounder ideas as to the nature of modern war in mind, it might have been different. We had at the beginning only 6,000,000 tons of ship bottom, and once the war started, the plan adopted was to build a million tons annually. That was a puny figure as compared to the amount actually needed, and the same applied as to the other consumption materials, armaments, etc.; entirely too small a scale.

Q. Would you say then that the plan executed by JAPAN was in excess of her capability?

A. As already stated, even the plans that were laid could not be carried out; but the plans to begin with, I think were not accordance with the need of the war.

Q. I want to get from you the naval estimate of their capabilities prior to the opening of the war; that is, the Japanese Navy’s capabilities in terms of American capabilities.

A. As a result of the WASHINGTON-LONDON Naval Disarmament Treaties, Japanese Naval strength had been restricted to around 60% of UNITED STATES strength. After those treaties were abdicted it was, of course, no longer incumbent upon us to maintain that ratio, so we devoted our efforts to the building up of the Navy, quantitatively and qualitatively so that in no case would our relative strength fall below 60% of yours. I do not remember by figures what the relative strength of our Navy was categorically. When we faced the necessity of taking on both the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND in this war, the question of our relative strength with the UNITED STATES became relatively a small question. Never in the history of our Navy were plans ever drafted which envisaged a war with GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES as allied enemies. Consequently it may safely be said that this was not a war in which the Japanese Navy laid down plans which had even a fair chance of success.

Q. Captain OHMAE has outlined from either records or from personal knowledge a basic plan for this war which went about as follows:

To obtain certain areas in the south and to establish a perimeter to protect these resource areas, the perimeter being roughly from the KURILES, the MARSHALLS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and south of SUMATRA, MALAY, BURMA. Do you feel that the naval resources were sufficient to carry out this broad plan?

A. I believe that this was one of numerous plans which was too big to be carried out by the resources at our command. Even with the forces which we had to start with, the carrying out of this plan would have been difficult, much more so later when you consider that naval force after all, is consumption goods. As war progresses we suffer losses, and sufficient measures had not been taken, could not be taken in view of shortage of material and manpower, to continually replenish those losses. I felt at the outset that we had over-extended our line when we took in the ALEUTIANS and MIDWAY. I always felt that the line should be made compact and to concentrate the forces that we did have in a relatively narrow area. Because of the necessity of obtaining resources from the south, it was of course inevitable that our lines should be extended as far as JAVA and SUMATRA but not beyond that, down south. It would have been wiser had we kept ourselves to Central PACIFIC, not going further east than TRUK. That is not to say that I would have favored giving up the MARSHALLS to being with, but I would have put in there only sufficient force so as to have delayed your offensive from that region a sufficiently long time to enable us to strengthen the inner line.

Q. We had heard opinions expressed by some of the senior Japanese naval officers that, prior to the war, they felt that the Japanese navy could only operate successfully for perhaps a year or perhaps a year and a half. Would you affirm or deny that opinion?

A. I believe that such was the feeling among high officers, although I know of no changes or expressions of opinion to that effect; each man kept it to himself. I have heard, not directly but through a third person, that Admiral YAMAMOTO expressed as his opinion that “we can carry through for one year some way, but after that I don’t know.”

Q. Do you think similarly now?

A. Yes, I more or less shared the view that while we might do well enough in the early part of the war for a year or so, after that it would become extremely difficult.

It so happened that for two years prior to the beginning of the war I was Chief of the Naval Technical Department at Kenzai Hombu and there was in a position of responsibility regarding the Navy’s equipment and ships, and I noticed that there was not always unanimity of opinion regarding the types to be constructed, regarding specifications of ships, difficulty in material. The principal cause of our difficulty in material was our shortage in steel. Our annual supply was about 6,000,000 tons which, as compared with anywhere from 80,000,000 to 100,000,000 tons annually for your country, was an almost negligible quantity, and the difference in our fuel supply wsa even greater. Our fuel supply was almost out of the question as compared with yours, we being able to produce only around 10% of our annual needs.

Going back to shipbuilding, the difference in opinion regarding categories and specifications arose from the fact that under the WASHINGTON and LONDON treaties we were subject to quantitative limitations. Emphasis had been laid upon quantity so that during the time that I was head of the Naval Technical Department although we were then no longer under treaty restrictions as to tonnage, the same idea of improving quality remained in the minds of our shipbuilding experts, and we used to receive orders from different sections of the Navy for ships of higher efficiency. I felt at the time that now that we were no longer held down by a quantitative ceiling, we should redirect our attention from quality back to quantity and to increase the number of ships, because we could see from experiences of the Second European War, which had already started, that one could not expect to keep ships safely for any length of time. In other words, ships were consumption goods and would have to be replaced rapidly to maintain a standard of strength.

No plans to invade the West Coast, no plans to raid the West Coast, and even the plans laid could not be carried out due to production shortages. Submarines and their threat to Japanese material imports were a greater threat than aircraft carriers, because the production delta is the key, precisely as I have stated all along. Admiral Toyoda also demonstrates a knowledge of America’s great production and even schedules. It’s particularly interesting to note that while that famous military expert, Michelle Malkin, says that Japan was uniquely dangerous because of its 9 carriers, the Chief of Japan’s Naval Combined Forces states that submarines – of which Germany had 1,170 – are actually more dangerous to a war effort due to their far greater effect on shipping and therefore both production (imported materials) and transportation (finished armaments).

Most significant is that two years before the war began, Admiral Toyoda knew that Japan did not produce enough steel (6 percent of US production) or fuel in comparison to what he knew the USA was producing. It would take a truly low-functioning mind to fail to note the connection between this production delta and the resultant production delta in armaments.

Interestingly enough, two of Malkin’s supposedly all-conquering carriers were stripped of planes and used to transport materials in the south because trying to make up for the production gap was judged to be more important than the ability to launch a few feeble planes in a useless attack.