Tag: war

First, I will note that the IDF estimates concerning the difficulty of conquering and de-militarizing Gaza were not dissimilar to my own observations:

The Cabinet was reportedly shown a presentation in the course of the war, outlining the IDF’s prediction of what taking control of Gaza would involve. According to the military’s estimates, conquering Gaza would take months and ridding it of all weapons would take five years. The cost would be hundreds of soldiers killed and 10 billion shekels.

That’s why the Hama model, where speed is of the essence, was never a serious option for Israel. That leaves the de-escalation model. The problem? How to de-escalate with a seemingly implacable enemy mixed in amongst a hostile population.

1. Stop providing the non-combatants with more reasons to fight. I don’t know the exact ratio, but every single time a civilian is killed, that generates between one and ten new enemy combatants. Israel says it has killed 453 Hamas militants out of 1,498 Palestinian fatalities; that ratio means it is almost certainly creating more future combatants than it is killing current ones. That means no more airstrikes or artillery. They are counterproductive.
2. Outsource the occupation. Egypt desperately needs food and money, and it has no shortage of Arab soldiers who are not in the least bit sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas. That’s where some of those 10 billion shekels should be spent. Establish a number of outposts with well-paid Egyptian soldiers to provide basic policing and human intelligence. Support those outposts with rapid response IDF teams who will go in at night to act on the operable intelligence gathered in a manner essentially invisible to the local population. Immediately send those soldiers who are corrupt or show an inclination for violence, indiscipline, or being subverted back to Egypt and a big reduction in pay.
3. Flood the civilian population with food and consumer goods, preferably distributed by the Egyptians and Fatah.
4. Bring the civilian wounded to Israeli hospitals, give them first-rate care, and financially compensate the families of all civilian casualties.
5. End the siege. Yes, Hamas will claim victory. See #7.
6. Convince Egypt to accept small groups of families of those who are working with them the right to settle in an area of Egypt for which Israel will pay for the development. Deputy Speaker Feiglin wants to build another Jaffa, and his instincts are right, but it cannot be within Gaza itself. A place of refuge from Hamas will be needed, and it must be outside Israel. Protect it with Iron Dome.
7. Ignore the militants. Don’t seek to talk to them, don’t pay any attention to their ceasefires or requests, don’t complain about their actions, and don’t respond to their PR salvos. The war at the moral level is won by actions, not words.

Remember, the idea of the de-escalation model is not to defeat the enemy, but rather to convince the bulk of the population it has no reason to fight and thereby isolate the militants, who can then be gradually picked off and made weaker over time. Due to the Israeli-Arab issue, the IDF probably can’t ever hope to win over the population by itself, but its Arab proxies could reasonably expect to do so. Israel probably can’t ever “win” in the medium term without resorting to measures the world would deem absolutely unacceptable, but it can hope to achieve relative safety and security for both sides.

It may sound counterintuitive, but Israel cannot achieve this relative peace as long as it is unwilling to accept more casualties than it causes. There are admittedly numerous flaws with this plan, chief among them the ability of the Egyptian soldiers to remain calm and disciplined in the face of the inevitable provocation. But it is much more likely to lead to success than the futile 2GW pound-and-ground approach.

Because 4GW is a process that resists conclusive engagements, 4GW counterinsurgency tactics must accept that reality and abandon any notion of seeking them. Such efforts are not only doomed to failure, but will usually make the situation worse in the long term. 4GW is based on the death-by-a-thousand-cuts model, so the correct way to fight back is to increase your ability to cut the other guy while reducing his ability to cut you.

Anyhow, those are just some thoughts from a complete military non-expert. And I think that’s enough about Zion for the time being. It’s time to turn our attention to the more serious conflict brewing in Eastern Europe.

I’ve been editing a book on Fourth Generation War theory, so it has been fascinating to see how some of the principles it expounds are being put into action, while others are ignored, by both sides in the Gaza Tunnel War. Before offering my requested take on the situation, I think it would be useful to first look at the current IDF strategy:

After withdrawing the bulk of its ground troops from the Gaza Strip in a “new phase” of its counter-terror operation, Israel declared a unilateral humanitarian ceasefire for seven hours starting 10 a.m. Monday, Aug. 4 to facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid and for displaced Palestinians to return to their homes. Eastern Rafah was not included. The IDF would respond to any attacks during that time.

But on the quiet, the IDF was on the process of conducting a major strategic operation, carving out a buffer strip or cordon sanitaire just inside the Gaza border, designed to be controlled from outside by special forces and armored units on round-the-clock alert, to bar hostile infiltrations. They are equipped with a battery of firing posts, sensors and drones.

This sterile strip runs 65km from Beit Hanoun in the north to Khan Younis in the south, roughly following one of Gaza’s only motorways, Highway 6 (see map). All the territory east of this line up to the Israeli border has been cleared of buildings and vegetation to a depth of 1 km in the north and center of Gaza and 2-3 km deep in such areas as Khan Younis.

Retreat and fortify. This is a classic 2GW response by a state actor to a non-state actor. Build fortresses, isolate your troops from the enemy, and prepare for massive responses of steel-on-target when incursions take place. It’s based on the same principle as the USA’s Green Zone strategy used in Baghdad and other places. The problem is that while the response is perfectly sensible and psychologically comforting to the troops, it is not going to work against a 4GW opponent who is attacking on the moral and mental levels as well as the conventional Clausewitzian levels. As Debka has noted, this means the Gaza war has now entered an attrition phase. Meanwhile, the Washington Post describes the new tactics of Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS:

We see these newly formed pseudo-armies emerging across the Levant as well. The Darwinian process of wartime immersion has forced them to either get better or die.

Some observers of the transformation admit that Hezbollah now is among the most skilled light infantry on the planet. And now there is Hamas. Gone are the loose and fleeting groups of fighters seen during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. In Gaza they have been fighting in well-organized, tightly bound teams under the authority of connected, well-informed commanders. Units stand and fight from building hideouts and tunnel entrances. They wait for the Israelis to pass by before ambushing them from the rear. Like Hezbollah and the Islamic State, they are getting good with second-generation weapons such as the Russian RPG-29 and, according to as-yet-unconfirmed reports from the fighting in Gaza, wire-guided anti-tank missiles.

These fighters are now well-armed, well-trained and well-led and are often flush with cash to buy or bribe their way out of difficulties. 

Until you read the Handbook, you can’t understand how hair-raisingly familiar the words such as “light infantry”, “flush with cash”, “ambush”, and “tightly bound teams” are. These new “pseudo-armies” have not only clearly read van Creveld and Lind, they are actively putting the military principles those strategists have outlined into action. And since we know that newer generation warfare reliably defeats older generation warfare, the Israeli defeat in Gaza, (or, if you prefer, the IDF’s inability to achieve its stated objectives) was predictable, if not inevitable.

What struck me most from the most recent round of fighting is that the 4GW Hama model is not really an option for Israel. Gaza is simply too big, Hamas is too prepared, and the IDF is too small and casualty-averse. Keep in mind that the Germans threw 270,000 troops at Stalingrad, 100,000 more than exist in the entire IDF, and still couldn’t take it in five months. In nearly one month of action, the IDF ground offensive went no further than three kilometers into Gaza. That’s not to say that it couldn’t have gone deeper, or that Hamas has even a fraction of the 187,000 troops at its disposal that the Red Army did at Stalingrad, but it is obvious that doing so would have cost a lot more than the 63 lives already lost and caused even more civilian casualties.

That leaves the 4GW de-escalation model. But how do you de-escalate in the face of a seemingly implacable enemy who is often actively seeking escalation? That is a matter for the next post on the subject.

Netanyahu not only doesn’t know how to run a 4GW war, he apparently doesn’t understand that Americans don’t give a damn about his expectations:

In a phone call with U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro, Netanyahu vented his anger, according to people familiar with the call. Netanyahu told Shapiro the Obama administration was “not to ever second-guess me again” and that Washington should trust his judgment on how to deal with Hamas, according to the people. Netanyahu added that he now “expected” the U.S. and other countries to fully support Israel’s offensive in Gaza, according to those familiar with the call.

Yeah, I don’t think that’s likely to happen. Not when articles like this have appeared in The Times of Israel before being belatedly retracted:

When Genocide Is Permissible

Judging by the numbers of casualties on both sides in this almost one-month old war one would be led to the conclusion that Israel has resorted to disproportionate means in fighting a far less- capable enemy. That is as far as what meets the eye. But, it’s now obvious that the US and the UN are completely out of touch with the nature of this foe and are therefore not qualified to dictate or enforce the rules of this war – because when it comes to terror there is much more than meets the eye.

I wasn’t aware of this, but it seems that the nature of warfare has undergone a major shift over the years. Where wars were usually waged to defeat the opposing side, today it seems – and judging by the number of foul calls it would indicate – that today’s wars are fought to a draw. I mean, whoever heard of a timeout in war? An NBA Basketball game allows six timeouts for each team during the course of a game, but last I checked this is a war! We are at war with an enemy whose charter calls for the annihilation of our people. Nothing, then, can be considered disproportionate when we are fighting for our very right to live.

The sad reality is that Israel gets it, but its hands are being tied by world leaders who over the past six years have insisted they are such good friends with the Jewish state, that they know more regarding its interests than even they do. But there’s going to have to come a time where Israel feels threatened enough where it has no other choice but to defy international warnings – because this is life or death.

Most of the reports coming from Gazan officials and leaders since the start of this operation have been either largely exaggerated or patently false. The truth is, it’s not their fault, falsehood and deceit is part of the very fabric of who they are and that will never change. Still however, despite their propensity to lie, when your enemy tells you that they are bent on your destruction you believe them. Similarly, when Khaled Meshal declares that no physical damage to Gaza will dampen their morale or weaken their resolve – they have to be believed. Our sage Gedalia the son of Achikam was given intelligence that Yishmael Ben Nesanyah was plotting to kill him. However, in his piety or rather naiveté Gedalia dismissed the report as a random act of gossip and paid no attention to it. To this day, the day following Rosh Hashana is commemorated as a fast day in the memory of Gedalia who was killed in cold blood on the second day of Rosh Hashana during the meal. They say the definition of insanity is repeating the same mistakes over and over. History is there to teach us lessons and the lesson here is that when your enemy swears to destroy you – you take him seriously.

Hamas has stated forthrightly that it idealizes death as much as Israel celebrates life. What other way then is there to deal with an enemy of this nature other than obliterate them completely?

News anchors such as those from CNN, BBC and Al-Jazeera have not missed an opportunity to point out the majority of innocent civilians who have lost their lives as a result of this war. But anyone who lives with rocket launchers installed or terror tunnels burrowed in or around the vicinity of their home cannot be considered an innocent civilian. If you’ll counter, that Hamas has been seen abusing civilians who have attempted to leave their homes in response to Israeli warnings to leave – well then, your beginning to come to terms with the nature of this enemy which should automatically cause the rules of standard warfare to be suspended.

Everyone agrees that Israel has the right to defend itself as well as the right to exercise that right. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has declared it, Obama and Kerry have clearly stated that no one could be expected to sit idle as thousands of rockets rain down on the heads of its citizens, placing them in clear and present danger. It seems then that the only point of contention is regarding the measure of punishment meted out in this situation. I will conclude with a question for all the humanitarians out there. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu clearly stated at the outset of this incursion that his objective is to restore a sustainable quiet for the citizens of Israel. We have already established that it is the responsibility of every government to ensure the safety and security of its people. If political leaders and military experts determine that the only way to achieve its goal of sustaining quiet is through genocide is it then permissible to achieve those responsible goals?

It’s not a hard question to answer. The answer is no. Genocide is not permissible. If genocide is permissible for the Israelis, then it was every bit as permissible for the National Socialists, who also believed they were fighting a war that was “life or death” against world Jewry. As well as for the Khmer Rouge, and the Soviets, and the Hutus, and the Chinese Communists, and everyone else who believes that total war on civilian populations is acceptable.

That Israeli journalist isn’t the only one speaking in genocidal terms. A rabbi in New York City actually declared that anyone who even participated in the political process in Gaza was “not a civilian casualty“.

When you are part of an election process that asks for a terrorist
organization which proclaims in word and in deed that their primary
objective is to destroy their neighboring country and not to build
schools or commerce or jobs, you are complicit and you are not a
civilian casualty.

I used to wonder how on Earth the first-century Judeans could possibly have been crazy enough to decide that taking on the legions of Rome was somehow going to end well for them. Not so much anymore. Deciding that because your military is capable of defeating a few fifth-rate Arab militaries and inflicting a 23-1 kill ratio on Palestinian civilians, you are the world’s premier military power is beyond delusional. I am beginning to suspect this Jewish supremacy complex, especially vis-a-vis the Arabs, may render the adoption of 4GW tactics very difficult for the IDF.

Especially if more members of the Israeli Knesset start speaking out in the same vein as Ayelet Shaked:

Behind every terrorist stand dozens of men and women, without whom he could not engage in terrorism. They are all enemy combatants, and their blood shall be on all their heads. Now this also includes the mothers of the martyrs, who send them to hell with flowers and kisses. They should follow their sons, nothing would be more just. They should go, as should the physical homes in which they raised the snakes. Otherwise, more little snakes will be raised there.”

Strange, I don’t recall the Jews accepting the Nazi’s idea that every Jew was an enemy combatant and therefore a legitimate target. Israel has a right to exist. She also has a right to defend herself. Those rights do not encompass the genocide of the Palestinian people.

And when one looks at its objectives, it is apparent that Israel is losing the Gaza Tunnel War, both in 4GW and tactical terms:

As frustration grows in Israel over the military’s limited success so far in trying to neutralize Hamas, the militant Islamic group that governs Gaza, some military experts say it is increasingly evident that the Israel Defense Forces have been operating from an old playbook and are not fully prepared for a more sophisticated, battle-ready adversary. The issue is not specifically the tunnels — which Israel knew about — but the way Hamas fighters trained to use them to create what experts in Israel are calling a “360-degree front.”

“Hamas has changed its doctrine and is using the tunnels as a main
method of operation,” said Israel Ziv, a retired general who headed the
military’s Gaza division and its operations directorate. “This is
something we learned amid the fighting.”

In the Gaza war that began in late 2008, 10 Israeli soldiers were
killed, four of them from friendly fire. This time, 63 soldiers have
been killed, mostly in combat, and one is now a prisoner. “The military has been playing it by ear,” said Amos Harel, a military affairs analyst for the newspaper Haaretz, who added that despite the Israeli military’s knowledge of the tunnels, its planners did not draft a new doctrine for prosecuting a land invasion. “But it is pretty good at doing that, and has done it many times.”

In this latest asymmetrical war with Hamas, the third in five years, Israel thought it was prepared. It had built up an integrated communications systems able to transfer intelligence in real time to air and ground forces, an advancement that military officials called a “force multiplier.”

Precision-guided missiles have destroyed up to a third of Hamas’s rocket stocks, according to Israeli officials, as well as hundreds of houses or apartments that the military described as militant command-and-control centers and many other weapons production sites and stores. In 24 days of intense bombing, 4,300 targets have been hit….

What Israel was apparently less ready for was Hamas fighters who are
willing to engage and are trained to use tunnels, a tool of war whose
roots go back to antiquity. During Israel’s last ground incursion in the
winter of 2008-9, Hamas fighters largely avoided clashes, melting into
the crowded urban landscape. This time, they were prepared for combat.

War is not sport. Body counts are not a relevant means of keeping score; the fact that the IDF has killed more Hamas fighters than Hamas has killed IDF soldiers is entirely expected. That is one reason why the war is referred to as “asymmetric”. As always, air power is overrated, as the fact that 24 days of intense bombing hasn’t prevented Hamas from killing more than six times as many ground troops as in 2008. It seems the lessons of Tarawa and Iwo Jima still have not been learned by the descendants of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell.

War is about using military force to achieve one’s objectives. Israel’s objectives are:

• End the rocket attacks
• Demilitarize Gaza
• Deterrence
• Eliminate Hamas’s senior military command and political leadership
• Prevent Hamas from being able to rearm

Debka notes: “That nine of the 10 Israeli servicemen who died in the counter-terror
operation against Hamas Monday, July 28, were killed on Israeli soil was
a wake-up call for Israel’s war leaders. It meant that Hamas had used
the 22 days of combat to carry the contest from its own home ground into
Israel by grabbing the tactical advantage of surprise.”

After a month of war and considerable collateral damage among the civilian population of Gaza, it does not appear that Israel will be able to meet any of its objectives in this war. This is why it is so vital for Israel to learn to adopt 4GW tactics in asymmetric conflicts like these, as another 2GW victory and 4GW loss will only encourage Hamas and Israel’s other enemies. In another post, I will address what tactics I think should be adopted in preference to this 2GW pound-and-ground.