Vox Popoli

I’ve got a trade opportunity here before the season gets going and with Marcus Robinson out/demoted and Keenan McCardell still holding out, I need a third receiver to go with Chad Johnson and Jerry Porter. I can probably get one of these two along with Thomas Jones, or possibly both. I’m leaning towards both, but I’m not sure which to prefer if I can only nab one.

Any suggestions?

MJ writes:

Hindsite is wonderful, aint it? Fact is Japan attacked America, end of story.

Let’s skip over the fact that this implies we should intern every Arab and Muslim American on the same basis. What irritates me most is the idea that the admirals and generals who won the war were also complete idiots who could not possibly have known the distance between Japan and California, would not have thought of getting their hands on the 1941 edition of JANES FIGHTING SHIPS, had no idea what Japan’s industrial capacity was, and that any discussion of simple and easily demonstrable facts such as these is simply hindsight and should therefore be dismissed.

The military strategists of the time knew more then than we know now. Furthermore, they were almost surely quite a bit more intelligent than most of those who are today impugning them and their ability to analyze the probabilities.

Once you move into the realm of “could potentially etc” you have left reason and probability behind. The Phillipines could release a nanotech weapon with the potential to destroy the USA tomorrow, but I don’t think that justifies locking up Michelle Malkin today. She could have ties to the Phillipines-based Muslim terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, but I don’t think that justifies relocating her either. It is troubling that Ms Malkin and her reason-challenged fans don’t agree.

—–Original Message—–

From: Mark A. McLemore [mailto:everettmclemore@hotmail.com]

Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 2:00 AM

To: letters@worldnetdaily.com

Cc: malkin@comcast.net

Subject: We’ve had it with Vox

It isn’t so much that we disagree with Vox Day, it’s just that we are getting tired of his Mensa, I’m-so-much-smarter-than-you, ad hominem, Bob Dole whatevers that he tries to pass off as reasoned debate. His rebuke of the Michelle Malkin internment thesis was a perfect example. Look, Roosevelt was afraid that what is happening now in Baghdad could have happened in Long Beach or Seattle, bombings, sabatoge, spying . . . If you examine America’s two biggest wars, the Civil War and WWII, both of our wartime presidents made civil rights decisions that are severely questioned in hindsight by Mensa Armchair Quarterbacks. Now, 140 and 60 years later, Vox is wiser than Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Malkin combined. Wow. I’m voting for Malkin. And some of us score pretty well on that test too, Vox Populi.

Could you can Vox, please? He is insufferable and not all that informative or interesting. He reminds me of Bill O’Reilly. And what’s with the haircut?

I wonder who is this “we” of whom Mr. McLemore speaks? And it’s interesting that “they” would send this to WND and Michelle Malkin, but not to me. This reminds me, one thing I learned pretty early in life is to never listen to a man who uses “we” in the place of “I” when he wants something.

And how does a long – tediously long, according to most of you – recitation and analysis of logistics, production statistics and expert military opinion both amount to an ad hominem Bob Dole whatever and fail to be informative? Uninteresting? Okay, sure, I’ll grant him that, but then, I write columns on dead Russian novelists too.

This is the aforementioned column I had originally written for yesterday. As it will not be timely next week, not to mention that nearly every other columnist has addressed the subject I prefer to post it here and write something else for next week.

I believe I have sufficiently established my lack of regard for either mainstream candidate over the last two weeks, but it occurred to me that as the two major factions have gone to such trouble to put on these shows for us, those who actually care which side wins this fall might be interested in knowing how the conventions looked to one whose indifference to the November winner borders on Olympian.

STYLE: REPUBLICANS. Although the Democrats didn’t pull a “hey, we’re the gay party,” salmon-and-teal theme like the last time they nominated a Massachusetts arch-liberal, the 9/11 vibe for which they were striving simply didn’t work. Parties that don’t believe in God should stay far away, very far away, from anything that smacks of the memorial service and the afterlife. In New York, the Republicans looked as if they meant it.

THEME: REPUBLICANS. Democrats United should be the minimum level of competence for a major faction; it’s not an actual electoral theme that holds appeal for the independent voter. Four More Years is boring, but tried and true and strangely fun to chant if you’ve downed six hurricanes before noon. (Yes, I’ve been to a Republican National Convention, and I could write the story that Stephen Glass faked. But I won’t.)

SPIRIT: REPUBLICANS. Having attended a convention that preceded a resounding victory, there’s a certain triumphal spirit that is readily identifiable. It’s as if the smell of victory is in the air. The Republicans had it this time around, the Democrats didn’t.

2008: DEMOCRATS. The Lizard Queen was her evil, formidable self, and John Edwards is still handsome. In contrast to this, the best Republican was Mr. Arnold Schwarzenegger, who isn’t eligible to run for the office. John McCain is barely a Republican and will never win the nomination no matter how much his friends in the media want him to, and a New York moderate, (otherwise known as a liberal to flyover country), like Giuliani is equally improbable. It’s odd that the Republicans didn’t do more to lay the groundwork for a potential Bush successor.

TRAITORS: REPUBLICANS. The Democrat’s favorite turncoat, John McCain, spurned his thirty pieces of silver. He stuck by his party with all the spirit of a robot, but he did it. Zell Miller, on the other hand, sounded ready to re-up with the Marines and dust some [insert politically incorrect term here] simply for the honor of serving under George [insert Oedipal adjective here] Bush!!!!

VICE-PRESIDENT: DEMOCRATS. Dick Cheney, despite all his flaws, is a terribly boring speaker. John Edwards has nothing meaningful to say, but he says it well and he looks good doing it. Sadly, that’s more than enough to win over 35 percent of the population.

PRESIDENT: REPUBLICANS. I very much appreciated that John Kerry wrote his own speech. A presidential candidate should be able to speak for himself. That being said, Kerry is rather like John Edwards in that he has nothing intelligent to say, only he doesn’t say it well. And looking like Lurch on Canthaxanthin doesn’t exactly help, either.

President Bush, on the other hand, delivered what was essentially a Clintonesque State of the Union laundry list, then reminded all those conservatives less than thrilled with his governance that they should support him because – all together now – there’s a war on! But he did make the case for himself and didn’t blunder by painting a massive target on his chest as Kerry did with his “reporting for duty”.

MEDIA: REPUBLICANS. The mainstream media’s left-wing tilt is quite useful, once you know how to read it. If, after a Democrat’s speech, an ABCNNBCBS commentator is not pretending to moan in ecstacy with one hand down his pants, you know it went over like Michelle Malkin at a reunion of Tule Lake internees. If, on the other hand, a cabal pundit is getting all bitchy and bitter after a Republican brings down the house, you know the speaker was all out of gum.

Let’s face it, when the mainstream cabal’s most damning critique is that the President’s daughters are, like, so ditsy, they’ve got nothing. And the fact that Fox News scored more convention viewers than any member of the cabal suggests Republicans are fired up to vote this year.

Add it all up, and I see no reason to modify my earlier statement that John Kerry will get beaten like a Vice City hooker this November.

Palooka pokes his head up:

You are full of bluster, and low on reason. Every one of your supposed keen insights is only formed from historical hindsight. This, again, does not tell us if they made the “right” decision then, it only tells us what looks like the right decision NOW. Yes, we now know that America had a decisive advantage in industrial capacity, an advantage known then as well, but the planners in World War 2 did not know for certain what was in store for the Pacific coast of the US. Full invasion seemed unlikely, though distantly possible nevertheless. Industrial and military sabotage were very real possibilities, despite your baseless protestations to the contrary.

Which of the facts I’ve cited are hindsight, Palooka? The distance between Japanese naval bases and the West Coast? The number of ships in the Japanese Navy? The IJN’s ocean transport capability? The delta in productive capability? You and I probably know less now than the war planners knew then. You have completely misunderstood the implication of the production statistics, which serve to demonstrate that even if Japanese raiders and saboteurs had been far, far more successful than is conceivable, it would not have slowed, much less crippled the war effort, as Malkin weirdly insists. They were very real possibilities; they were also irrelevant and therefore fail to justify the internment case.

Malkin’s work is probably full of holes, but what you and Eric Muller have offered is nothing but petty quibling here and there. Get to the subtance of her critique. The relative strengths of Japan’s army and navy means little in that debate. If the Japanese population posed a threat or an impedience to victory, then the logic stands.

Petty quibbling? My entire case consists of the assertion that the Japanese population posed zero threat to impeding or even slowing victory. To declare that the relative strength of the US and Japanese forces and industrial capacities have little relevance to that case defies logic.

I also think you blow the internment reality out of proportion. The sad thing is it was unnecessary, not that it happened. Many non Japanese were interned for little reason and I don’t see you comparing their plight to summary executions.

Clearly you understand Malkin’s case no better than you understand mine. Her entire defense of internment is that it was necessary. I have demonstrated that it was not, as you apparently accept.

Like America posed no threat to Japan and Germany in 1941? All of you seem to taken the conclusion of World War to for granted. I don’t.

Considering that Winston Churchill took the conclusion for granted as early as December 1941 – see his History of the Second World War – and as every modern military officer to whom I have spoken agrees that the end result was not only inevitable but known by their predecessors to have been inevitable, I’m very comfortable with the company I’m in. The only serious question was how the post-war situation would sort itself out vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Had the Brits and Americans been able to mount Overlord in early 1943, as originally planned, Eastern Europe might not have fallen behind the Iron Curtain. But that is truly hindsight, as the timing of the German retreat would have been very difficult to predict, even if the conclusion became inevitable once it was clear that the Germans had failed to capture Stalin or destroy the Soviets’ production facilities in 1941.

In every war, there is a turning point where the end is in sight. Sometimes, that point can only be seen in hindsight. In other cases, the inevitable is obvious from the start. WWII was not an inevitable Allied victory. Had Germany been true to its treaty with the Soviet Union, England might well have eventually fallen. But once the alliances were established, USA, USSR and the UK vs Nazi Germany and Japan, the end was clearly in sight.

I realize that this can’t possibly convince everyone, as there are even those who seriously believe that Islamic militants could defeat the USA, ignoring the fact that the entire Islamic world have not been able to defeat Israel despite six decades of trying. As with all great historical powers, America will eventually fall due to internal decay; the growing strength of its central government being a terminal cancer confused with muscle by the fatally unwise.

Another Malkin critic, Eric Muller, judges that Ms Malkin has painted herself into a corner:

With this morning’s concession that the concern along the West Coast was Japanese spot raids and not a Japanese assault, she blows up the case for distinguishing between the Japanese threat to the West Coast and the German threat to the East Coast. And along with it, she blows up her claim that military necessity caused the government to take action against American citizens of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast while imposing no restrictions of any sort on American citizens of German ancestry on the East Coast (except insofar as they were dependents of German enemy aliens).

Well, he does skate over the fact that Ms Malkin pointed out that the Germans were harmless because they didn’t have any aircraft carriers, whereas the Japanese had a few free to pester the West Coast. Because, of course, 9 aircraft carriers that managed to sink 6 ships between them on the West Coast are no doubt a much, much greater danger than the 1,170 U-boats that sank 327 ships off the East Coast.

Does she realize that her argument is completely hopeless? Perhaps someone else can explain this to her, because I don’t think I can make it any easier for her.

Unfortunately, Ms Malkin is proving to be a masochist, so we’ll have to go ahead with the spankings. The spankings, the spankings! Va bene. She writes:

Mr. Vox has got his facts wrong. There is no question that in early 1942 our military leaders believed the risk of a Japanese attack on the West Coast was substantial. Henry Stimson, President Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, stated in his autobiography that hit-and-run raids on the West Coast were “not only possible, but probable in the first months of the war, and it was quite impossible to be sure that the raiders would not receive important help from individuals of Japanese origin.” That is enough to knock down Mr. Vox’s argument, but if you are still not convinced, click below.

No, it isn’t enough to knock it down. It isn’t even close. She is either slow or disingenuous, and I’m beginning to suspect the former. First, notice how she’s already retreated from her earlier justifications of “invasion” and the potential “crippling” of the war effort. Now it’s spot raids. Remember, this debate is not over whether the Japanese could fire a torpedo at someone’s yacht at the San Francisco Bay Club, but over whether the Executive Order overriding the Constitution and depriving 112,000 people of their rights was justified by military necessity.

She’s also relying on the post-facto CYA opinion of a civilian appointee – how many troops do we need in Iraq, Mr. Rumsfeld? No need for armor, Mr. Cohen? – and blowing off that of a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who arguably knows more about amphibious invasions past and present than any man alive. Could the Japanese annoy us? Sure. Was the nation’s survival at stake? Never. Keep in mind that even at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese sunk only 6 out of 88 ships.

As I noted in my book and in an earlier blog entry, the concern among our military leaders about a Japanese attack on the West Coast was palpable even after Executive Order 9066 was signed in February 1942: After the daring Halsey-Doolittle raid in Tokyo in April, “[e]ight Japanese carriers had returned from their operations around southeastern Asia and the Japanese could release at least three of the eight for a retaliatory attack on the west coast without jeopardizing successes already achieved,” Army historian Stetson Conn recounted. Secretary of War Stimson “called in General Marshall and had a few earnest words with him about the danger of a Jap attack on the West Cst.” Stimson confessed that he was “very much impressed with the danger that the Japanese, having terribly lost face by this recent attack on them … , will make a counterattack on us with carriers.” General DeWitt’s superiors warned him to be on guard against a carrier attack at any time after May 10 and was informed that two more antiaircraft regiments were being sent to bolster the Los Angeles and San Francisco defenses.

Three whole carriers – that means depending on the carriers, they had between 91 and 255 planes, many of which were fighters, at their disposal. Not exactly the Battle of Britain. Malkin knows so little about military history that she doesn’t even realize that the Halsey-Doolittle raid was solely for psychological effect. It did zero damage to the Japanese war effort, and any retaliatory raid would have been for the same reasons and achieved the same miniscule effect. Two whole AA regiments? I wonder if Malkin knows that’s next to nothing. Somehow, I doubt it.

Preceding the pivotal Battle of Midway, which the U.S. was alerted to thanks to another extraordinary communications intelligence operation that partially cracked JN-25, the Japanese navy’s operational code, the West Coast again prepared for the worst. Gen. Marshall informed General DeWitt that a Japanese attack with a chemical weapon might be expected; in mid-May, 350,000 gas masks (the entire available supply), protective clothing, and decontamination supplies were hastily shipped to the west coast. MID concurred with the Navy that a strong Japanese attack on American territory was in the offing before the end of the month, but it forecast that the “first priority” target of the attack would be “hit and run raids on West Coast cities of the continental United States supported by heavy naval forces.” Army intelligence held that such action was entirely within Japanese capabilities, considering the weakness of American naval power, and urged the concentration on the Pacific coast of all available continental air power to meet the threat.

If “hit and run raids” were “the worst” and the “first priority”, then why does Malkin mention invasions and crippled war efforts? Again, she demonstrates her ignorance of military matters is nearly complete. The whole point of these efforts was about not letting the public become any more alarmed than they already were, which Malkin apparently is too blind to see.

The perception among our military leaders of risks to the West Coast in early 1942 is so well documented that I am surprised one of my critics would choose this line of attack. Did Mr. Vox even bother to read my book before slamming it? There was no analogous concern, by the way, about a major German or Italian attack on the East Coast. Neither Germany nor Italy had any aircraft carriers, whereas Japan’s surface fleet was the best in the world. I will agree with Mr. Vox about one thing. The risk of a full-blown invasion of the U.S. mainland was low. This was known at the time. As I made clear in my book, the principal concern was spot raids on the West Coast (such as the one that occurred at Pearl Harbor), not a major invasion.

I’ll bet she was surprised, considering that she does not appear to have given the matter a moment’s thought, preferring to rely instead on bureaucratic self-justifications. The best surface fleet in the world? Better than the Royal Navy, which was not only more than twice as large but had more of the aircraft carriers with which Ms Malkin is so obsessed. Low risk? Try nonexistent. While there was an awareness of the minor risk of petty raids among the military leaders, there were absolutely no concerns with regards to invasion or serious, much less “crippling”, damages to the war effort.

Furthermore, not only is she sidestepping the production issues that I’ve raised, she’s admitting that the ENTIRE PREMISE OF HER BOOK IS ABSURD! Does she truly believe that spot raids which could not possibly have slowed the war effort justify locking up over a hundred thousand people? If that’s true, then I suppose 9/11 and the threat of suitcase nukes justifies the preemptive execution of Arab-Americans. And 327 ships sunk off the East Coast are to be ignored, since carrier-launched aircraft weren’t used, but 6 sunk on the West Coast are cause for throwing out the Constitution? Not just pathetic, but bizarre stuff.

Since Ms Malkin clearly likes to try to play referee as well and declare herself the winner, she might benefit from hearing a more neutral opinion at malkin@comcast.net.

One of the most deeply disturbing things about Ms Malkin’s perpetration of a revisionist fraud is the way in which so many TV and radio hosts were unable to penetrate the fog of her flimsy case to see that it was based on an absurdity. Ms Malkin has inadvertantly done the nation a good service in revealing the astonishing level of military, historical and even geographical ignorance on the part of the national and local media.

I didn’t bother writing about Malkin’s book at first because it was so obviously ridiculous that I assumed the first person to ask her questions about it would explode her case like one of Terry Pratchett’s swamp dragons. But I realized that people were actually taking her case seriously when I appeared on the Northern Alliance Radio Show – yo Midwest – a week before her and one of the guys halfheartedly defended her case for invasion vis-a-vis Overlord because of the length of the California coast. (The problem is that the French coast is 2.4 times longer than the entire American West Coast, and all of it is a LOT closer.)

The Matthews-Malkin episode on Hardball was bizarre, because had Matthews not been so rude and focused on unfairly attacking her over something she didn’t say, he could have politely destroyed her over what she did write. But when you’re busy carrying water for John Kerry, I suppose it’s hard to pay attention to other, lesser matters.

I have nothing against Michelle Malkin, except for the fact that she has no freaking clue what she’s talking about. Well, I also regard her defense of internment as treason against the human race, and her claims of innocence in answer to charges of advocating the internment of Arab-Americans to be more than a little disingenuous. (Yes, I know she said she wasn’t advocating it, but then what’s the point of the book? And the cover? Sometimes, Virginia, people say things that aren’t true.)

So, on to the Internet sources which you can access yourself. Imperial Japanese Navy. Yamamoto’s invasion OOB. US naval production. Anzio. Anzio map that gives a pretty clear picture of the situation. Anzio ships. Overlord logistics – very useful. On the air umbrella issue. WWII armaments production. The economic data is compiled from a variety of sources and calculated independently.

If you’d like to check out a very different attack on Malkin’s case for internment, Eric Muller was the first to start picking it apart.

As for the mini-interview with the former member of the Joint Chiefs that concluded the column, well, I happen to know a few of them. And naturally, I rang up my favorite one, just as the Vox Popolisti assumed.

UPDATE: As there appear to be some recalcitrant “hindsight” theorists who don’t appear to be able to either reason their way out of a paper bag or bother to look at the links provided here, this should help spell things out. “In April [1942], the British accepted an American plan for a buildup of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom in preparation for a future return to the Continent. This plan, Operation BOLERO, included construction of airfields from which to launch the bombing offensive, a small contingent of ground troops, and a force of 750,000 to participate in a cross-Channel attack in early 1943. SOS, ETOUSA would participate in the BOLERO planning process and be the U.S. agent to carry out the plans for the reception and accommodation of U.S. forces. By early May, detailed planning was underway.”

So, the hindsight theory rests on the incredible notion that in the time between February 19, 142 and sometime prior to April 1942, US military strategists discovered the concept of logistics and found that 750,000 men would be required for a continental invasion. It also relies on the false premise that US planners did not know Japan’s transport capability, as a glance at the 1941 edition of Janes Fighting Ships should suffice to disprove. Ms Malkin can even buy a copy of the 1942 edition here for £30.

RM writes:

What would be interesting to review would be the various results of the war games played by the Naval War College in the 1920’s and 30’s which were used to develop Plan Orange (the contingency plans for war with Japan). Were the Naval planners of the that period projecting that the Japanese could invade the west coast of the USA?

As it turns out, there was a plan that concerned an invasion of the US West Coast by a foreign power – but by Great Britain in War Plan Red. War Plan Orange did not anticipate an invasion by Japan.

The U.S. military really did develop a “Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan–Red” in the 1920s and ’30s, and it really did include provisions for an invasion of Canada by the United States.

The document was declassified in 1974, so this isn’t really a new story, but there has been some hoopla about it lately. Concerns in some quarters notwithstanding, the whole thing was just a theoretical exercise in military planning. The brass would have made better use of their resources planning for a war with Germany, but that wasn’t politically expedient. They reasoned that planning for unlikely wars was better than no planning at all. War Plan Red was never intended to be put into action except in the event of a war with the United Kingdom, an eventuality that everyone would agree was highly unlikely after about 1900.

In the color codes used at that time, “Red” referred not to Canada (that was “Crimson”), but to the United Kingdom. The proposed invasion of Canada wasn’t an end in itself; it was just the easiest way to hurt the U.K. The plan called for quickly seizing the key port of Halifax to prevent British resupply; cutting communication between eastern and western Canada by capturing Winnipeg; securing bridgeheads near Buffalo, Detroit, and Sault Ste. Marie; and attacking Quebec overland from New England. If everything went according to plan, the U.S. military hoped to take the Great Lakes region and St. Lawrence valley before moving on the prairies and British Columbia. Later when U.S. naval forces were built up, they might be able to take Bermuda and Britain’s Caribbean possessions on the road toward victory.

But there would be a price to pay for any such war. Planners essentially wrote off the Philippines, Guam, and Samoa if the British tried to take them early in the war. Planners also anticipated a possible invasion of the U.S. Pacific coast by an allied force from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

Now, given that War Plan Orange did not anticipate an invasion of the West Coast by Japan, why would War Plan Red have anticipated one by the Commonwealth? The answer, as always, comes down to logistics. The Royal Navy had the ships to deliver a large force to US shores while the Japanese did not. You’ll note that both Orange and Red anticipated the loss of the Philippines; its actual fall could have come as no surprise. As I mentioned previously, the decision to defend the Philippines was primarily political and the Navy wisely opposed it from the start.

Needless to say, this should demonstrate the vast divergence that often exists between what the public believes and what the planners know. A good lesson for our times.

Dear Ms Malkin,

As you may or may not be aware, WorldNetDaily today published a column of mine which I believe conclusively proves that there was never any military necessity for Executive Order 9066 on the grounds of invasion, raids or sabotage, intelligence memos notwithstanding. The purpose of this email is to respectfully request from you a column publicly admitting that there was not, in fact, any military necessity for the internment and that your conclusions in “In Defense of Internment” were mistaken.

The likelihood of a Japanese invasion was never taken seriously by the military strategists of the time, as the logistics required for the 1944 Anzio and Overlord invasions should make very clear to you. As for the sabotage argument, that too is ludicrous, as the following figures indisputably demonstrate.

Shipping Tonnage Produced, 1942 to 1945

—————-1942———-1943————1944———-1945

USA—–6,252,300—15,153,000—14,580,000—8,804,900

Japan——511,100—-1,023,000——1,929,200—–626,300

delta——-1223%——–1481%————757%——-1406%

Because you appear to be unfamiliar with both military history and logistics, I note that the bulk of the shipping production for every belligerent power was not warships, but merchant shipping, 72.92 percent to be precise. And considering your interesting opinion that aircraft carriers are the only basis upon which threats to the two American coasts should be assessed, please be advised that Japan was only able to build nine carriers over the course of the war, some of which were never launched, while the US launched 120, many of which were surplus to requirements.

Aircraft produced, 1942 to 1945

———–1942——-1943——-1944——-1945

USA—-47,800—–85,900—–96,300—–46,000

Japan—8,900—–16,700—–28,200—–11,100

delta—–537%——-514%——-342%——-414%

I note here that even if every West Coast aircraft production facility had been destroyed in 1942 by “attack, invasion, spot raids, sabotage, and surveillance”, the USA would have still had essentially the same advantage over Japan that year that it did in 1945, when the war was all but over, 403 percent compared to 414 percent.

In the event that you find yourself inclined to argue that a significant percentage of American production was required for the European war in 1942, I recommend that you first examine the production statistics for Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Germany, then read Winston Churchill’s excellent six-volume History of the Second World War. You will find that the Allied leaders were well aware of the implications of their significant advantage in industrial capacity even before America’s entry into the war.

As I hope you are now able to understand, even if Japan’s military leaders had been so foolish as to risk the entire Imperial Japanese Navy on what would have necessarily been a suicide mission for the 42,000 troops that represented the IJN’s maximum transport capacity in 1942, no amount of fifth column activity, including spying, raiding and sabotage, could have significantly affected the American war effort, let alone crippled it.

If you find yourself unable to understand or accept the overwhelming evidence against your assertion of the military necessity for internment, I strongly recommend that you speak to an admiral or Marine general well-versed in amphibious assaults and WWII-era military history.

Sincerely,

Vox Day

Universal Press Syndicate

http://voxday.blogspot.com