Dear Ms Malkin,
As you may or may not be aware, WorldNetDaily today published a column of mine which I believe conclusively proves that there was never any military necessity for Executive Order 9066 on the grounds of invasion, raids or sabotage, intelligence memos notwithstanding. The purpose of this email is to respectfully request from you a column publicly admitting that there was not, in fact, any military necessity for the internment and that your conclusions in “In Defense of Internment” were mistaken.
The likelihood of a Japanese invasion was never taken seriously by the military strategists of the time, as the logistics required for the 1944 Anzio and Overlord invasions should make very clear to you. As for the sabotage argument, that too is ludicrous, as the following figures indisputably demonstrate.
Shipping Tonnage Produced, 1942 to 1945
Because you appear to be unfamiliar with both military history and logistics, I note that the bulk of the shipping production for every belligerent power was not warships, but merchant shipping, 72.92 percent to be precise. And considering your interesting opinion that aircraft carriers are the only basis upon which threats to the two American coasts should be assessed, please be advised that Japan was only able to build nine carriers over the course of the war, some of which were never launched, while the US launched 120, many of which were surplus to requirements.
Aircraft produced, 1942 to 1945
I note here that even if every West Coast aircraft production facility had been destroyed in 1942 by “attack, invasion, spot raids, sabotage, and surveillance”, the USA would have still had essentially the same advantage over Japan that year that it did in 1945, when the war was all but over, 403 percent compared to 414 percent.
In the event that you find yourself inclined to argue that a significant percentage of American production was required for the European war in 1942, I recommend that you first examine the production statistics for Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Germany, then read Winston Churchill’s excellent six-volume History of the Second World War. You will find that the Allied leaders were well aware of the implications of their significant advantage in industrial capacity even before America’s entry into the war.
As I hope you are now able to understand, even if Japan’s military leaders had been so foolish as to risk the entire Imperial Japanese Navy on what would have necessarily been a suicide mission for the 42,000 troops that represented the IJN’s maximum transport capacity in 1942, no amount of fifth column activity, including spying, raiding and sabotage, could have significantly affected the American war effort, let alone crippled it.
If you find yourself unable to understand or accept the overwhelming evidence against your assertion of the military necessity for internment, I strongly recommend that you speak to an admiral or Marine general well-versed in amphibious assaults and WWII-era military history.
Universal Press Syndicate