Author: VD

One of the personal benefits of the end of the Kobe Bryant trial for me is the end of a long and seemingly endless stream of emails from a psychotic woman who has been emailing me nonstop ever since I mentioned the well-established fact that women constantly lie about being raped. With literally every twist-and-turn of the case, she would email me the latest update, always punctuated with the usual idiot’s commentary of the all-dismissive “LOL” and whatnot.

I had no opinion about Kobe one way or the other, but after months of these stupid emails – I finally nuked her after a while, but I checked my killfile a few weeks ago and they were still coming – I found myself ready to pop open a bottle of champagne myself when the prosecution dropped the charges. The knowledge that somewhere out there, this pest is completely beside herself, choking with helpless outrage, doesn’t quite make me laugh out loud, but my lips may have twitched a little.

The female tendency to lie about rape is quite easy to establish, as one has only to compare the percentage difference between arrests and convictions for rape with those of other crimes. The fact that it’s easier to convict someone when the victim is actually dead and cannot possibly, short of courtroom necromancy, testify, demonstrates the extent of the problem.

According to a nine-year study conducted by former Purdue sociologist Eugene J. Kanin, in over 40 percent of the cases reviewed, the complainants eventually admitted that no rape had occurred (Archives of Sexual Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1994). Kanin also studied rape allegations in two large Midwestern universities and found that 50 percent of the allegations were recanted by the accuser.

Kanin found that most of the false accusers were motivated by a need for an alibi or a desire for revenge. Kanin was once well known and lauded by the feminist movement for his groundbreaking research on male sexual aggression. His studies on false rape accusations, however, received very little attention.

Kanin’s findings are hardly unique. In 1985 the Air Force conducted a study of 556 rape accusations. Over one quarter of the accusers admitted, either just before they took a lie detector test of after they had failed it, that no rape occurred. A further investigation by independent reviewers found that 60 percent of the original rape allegations were false.

Girls crying rape will continue to be a problem until intentionally making a false allegation of a crime is punished as severely as committing the crime itself. No doubt the fastest way to reduce the incidence of American “rape” will be to lock up a few of these lying hussies as an example to the Sisterhood. Then arm the rest of the girls against the real rapists.

But, as Fred has so eloquently said, America isn’t actually interested in solving its problems.

From NRO’s Corner:

Until I saw this headline, I had completely forgotten my first journalism class at the Univ. of Montana. It was titled “Introduction to Journalism”, but we ONLY read Dan Rather’s book, as if it were the Bible. It was all we studied for the entire quarter. I changed my major after that class.

Holy wasted tuition, Batman! They would have been better off reading The Hobbit.

As those few whose interest in the NFL is entirely too active may recall, the Grim Reaper is a label that Chokechain stuck me with. This is due to my tendency to draft one or two of the better backups to some of the league’s more fragile running backs, such as Stephen Jackson (Marshall Faulk), and DeShaun Foster (Stephen Davis). Imagine my chagrin when I saw the following headline, considering that I’d dropped Foster just prior to the start of the season:

Panthers may lose Davis for up to five weeks

But then I remembered that my foe for the upcoming week had picked up Foster and dropped him again! Ha! I quickly zoomed over to our league site and welcomed Foster back to the squad – I’d also had him and Davis last year – and will take great pleasure in unleashing him against a weak KC run defense on the wretched Wallabies this Sunday.

I was just wondering what percentage of the voting public is either hopelessly a) stupid or b) self-centered. I’d like to see someone propose a referendum requiring the government to pay everyone over the age of 18 one million dollars on January 1 every year. What percentage of people would vote for that? I’m guessing at least 25 percent, although you might see higher turnout than normal as you have to imagine that the complete morons would turn out in force for that one.

“Hey, man, check it out! A million dollars?”

– hits bong – “Dude, we so gotta vote!”

I have to admit, I’m getting a little tired of the right-wing blog world getting into an uproar everytime something minor happens in Podunksville or when the left dares to run an ad. The Dan Rather stuff is major, but someone tearing down signs isn’t. Sure, a crying little girl makes for good theatre, but what does it tell you? That left-wing activists are boorish? Hardly news. These are the same people who advocated killing her three years ago, so she’s lucky she got away with merely losing her little sign.

And the Move-On ad with the American soldier trapped in quicksand is not outrageous either. The present situation does resemble that to a certain extent, although I think that Brer Rabbit and the Tar Baby are probably a more accurate one. It seems that as we gain more influence, the more we behave like those about whom we have complained about for years. I find that troubling.

There’s enough real outrage in the world; no need to generate the fake stuff.

1. Direct foul language or undeserved insults at another commenter.

2. Continue to repeat a question after it’s been answered.

3. Post trollish comments on every post regardless of whether they are relevant to the post or not.

4. Immediately leap to a tangential objection after your initial objection has been shown to be irrelevant.

5. Show a disingenuous inability to comprehend what you’re reading.

6. Annoy Space Bunny.

7. Defend Nate or Bane. (I’m just kidding, everyone knows there is no defense for those two.)

8. Refuse to answer a specific question when I demand it of you.

9. Constantly asking questions while refusing to answer any.

When DK convinced me that this blog would be much better if, unlike most media commentators, I allowed comments, I was dubious, but I figured it was a worthwhile experiment. I’ve been delighted with the results, and to be honest, I’m shocked that I’ve only had to ban three people in 11 months, as when I first turned comments on, I expected I’d have to ban that many every week.

People can disagree with me all they want, as long as they’re civil Regulars here know that happens all the time. I don’t even mind being mocked and taunted when I deserve it, especially if it’s by those who have earned the right to do so through familiarity and friendship. But if you’re going to challenge me directly, you’d better have a coherent point and be able to back it up. If you don’t actually have a specific case, and all you can fall back on is vague generalities and things that “everybody knows”, then I strongly prefer that you go pester someone else, somewhere else.

I don’t have any problem admitting when I’m wrong. I’ve done it before and I’m sure I’ll do it again in the future. There are plenty of very smart people here and I found myself having to do it twice last week, as a matter of fact. So, if you’re going to comment here, you had better be prepared to do likewise from time to time.

Amid mounting accusations he trumpeted forged memos to bring down a sitting president, CBS’ Dan Rather is finally acknowledging doubts over the documents’ authenticity, while new revelations show they were faxed to CBS from a Kinko’s in Abilene, Texas.

“If the documents are not what we were led to believe, I’d like to break that story,” Rather said last night, according to the Washington Post. “Any time I’m wrong, I want to be right out front and say, ‘Folks, this is what went wrong and how it went wrong.'”

It’s a little late to break that story, Dan. You’re wrong, moreover, CBS’s behavior in this incident will eventually be found in the dictionary, listed under “defense, hopeless”. Congratulations to the Powerline gang for collecting such an eminent scalp.

I don’t know why, but the Kinko’s aspect just strikes me as hilarious. If the perpetrator was dumb enough to think this would fly, perhaps he was dumb enough to save it on a hard drive there too.

Darling Nikki practices oral-podiatral autoeroticism:

Oh, yeah it’s the indefensible assertion that espionage, sabotage, and spot raids posed no threat to the war effort. Interesting how you try to avoid saying this now that you realize it was so stupid.”

I’m not avoiding it in the least. I’ll repeat it again for you if you like. Invasion, espionage, sabotage and spot raids posed zero threat to slow or cripple the American war effort in the Pacific. That’s what I asserted in my original column and I haven’t moved one iota from that position.

Moreover, I’ll now add with complete confidence that this was known to every single member of both the American and Japanese high commands at the time.

Malkin asserted that those four factors had the potential to cripple the war effort without any basis at all; it seems strange that some should try to place the complete burden of proof on her opponents. But so be it. First, the amount of damage required to have such an effect is a finite figure. 100 percent would certainly suffice to do so, one percent certainly would not, given an estimated wastage rate of 7 percent.

Considering that the amount of damage done at Pearl Harbor only amounted to .63 percent of our 1940/41 aircraft production and 9.1 percent of our 1940/41 shipping production in terms of tonnage, (none of which was actually lost, as the destroyer Cassin was the most recently built vessel destroyed, having been commissioned in 1936), it is obvious to any rational observer that the cumulative effect of any smaller raids or attempts at sabotage would have been completely negligible, and in terms of potential effect on the war effort, zero.

Nikki, you’re done asking questions until you answer this one specifically and unevasively. Explain how invasion, sabotage, espionage and spot raids on the part of the Japanese military or ethnic Japanese civilians resident in America could have had any effect on the war effort. Play evasive games and you’re off to Palookaville.

UPDATE – Unsurprisingly, Nikki didn’t even attempt to answer the question, but instead responded with a barrage of tangential and irrelevant questions. So, s/he is off to join the two trolls previously banned. I am perfectly willing to engage in reasonable debate with anyone on anything, but if one refuses to answer direct questions, repeatedly demonstrates disingenuous problems with reading comprehension or plays evasive semantic games, one will soon find oneself riding the ejection seat. Unlike nearly every other commentator on the political scene, I permit comments and enjoy participating in substantive debate here, but I have zero interest in wasting any more time on foolish trolls than is necessary to establish their petty nature.

I’m sure pretty much everyone will be relieved that I don’t see any need to further post on the absence of military necessity for internment. Considering that my 20-20 hindsight view is completely supported by military experts past and present, including some of the principle figures involved on the Japanese side, the only thing left is to dig up hard figures on projected wastage vs. potential sabotage. I already know which way they’ll fall, I just don’t have them yet. Now, this isn’t the end of it, but until Malkin quits hiding in her corner – which I don’t see happening until she has no choice – there’s nothing left to address.

We now return you to your regular programming….

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 115

USSBS NO. 503

TOKYO 9-12 December 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral FUKUDOME, Shigeru, IJN; Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from 1940 to April 1941; Chief First Section, Naval General Staff, TOKYO, April 1941 to May 1943; Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from May 1943 to March 1944; Commander, Second Air Fleet, July 1944 to 15 January 1945; Commander, 10th Area Fleet, 15 January 1945 to present date.

Interrogator: Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, USN. Allied Officers Present: Colonel R.H. Terrill, USAAF.

Q. Admiral, you mentioned earlier the ALEUTIAN Operation at KISKA; what was the decision with respect to the ALEUTIANS, and the reason for it?

A. There appears to have been considerable difference of opinion between the Army and Navy as regards future policy for the ALEUTIANS, the Navy favoring fighting to the last man while the Army felt that this would be a waste of manpower if there was no prospect of ultimate success of the Northern Operations. The final decision as rendered by the Imperial General Headquarters was that it would serve no useful purpose to fight on, and, hence, it was decided to withdraw. When Admiral KOGA came to TOKYO, it was his hope that with KISKA and the rest of the ALEUTIANS as a base he might get a chance for a decisive engagement with your naval forces somewhere in the northern waters; but by the time he reached TOKYO the situation had already gone too far for him to undertake execution of any such plan.

Q. What had been the object of the Northern Operation? Was it to obtain a base for the purpose just mentioned?

A. My memory on this point is somewhat hazy, but I believe that our object in occupying the area of natural resources in the south was not a strategic one. The purpose was to get the materials necessary for existence and our war effort. But the Navy felt that in order to hold this very expansive area it would be necessary to get far outlying lookout points, and while we might not be able to hold on to such outlying points, we must at least get them once, even if we were to lose them to the enemy again later. It was in pursuance of that policy that we occupied or tried to occupy such distant bases as the ALEUTIANS, RABAUL, and MIDWAY.

Q. Was this particular objective–that is, the Western ALEUTIANS–included in the plan over the objections of the Army? That is, was it primarily sponsored by the Navy?

A. No, it was not against Army opposition that the ALEUTIAN bases were included in this plan. The idea originated with YAMAMOTO who, when laying down a plan of Naval operations, felt that the holding of such outlying bases was essential to an overall success of the Navy’s plans. When that idea was transferred to Imperial General Headquarters, the Army took the view that if the Navy fleet that such a policy is essential then wee give it support. They fell in readily with the Navy’s proposal, the difference of opinion arose only when the time came for the withdrawal from KISKA. The reason for the Navy favoring defense to the last man was that since they had gone there in the first place with the expectation of having at some future time to lose it, why not fight it out to the last man? Against that, there was considerable Army objection.

Q. In the original concept at the beginning of the war, were the various forces given definite final objectives or merely limited objectives, with a view to subsequent orders depending on the progress of the campaign?

A. The original order given to Admiral YAMAMOTO by the Imperial General Headquarters contained two main parts: one, destruction of the enemy fleet; two, coordination with the Army in capturing, and gaining control of the southern areas. With regard to the first pint, as in the case of the RUSSO-JAPANESE War when Admiral TOGO was ordered to destroy the RUSSIAN Fleet without any detailed instructions as to how or where that was to be done, steps and methods to be employed for the destruction of the enemy fleet were left to Admiral YAMAMOTO’s discretion. He was to draw up the plan of operation by estimating the enemy strength in the light of the strength which he had available himself. As regards the second point, the Army, of course, was to carry out the work of occupation. The purpose of that was less strategic than economic and political, the object being principally to gain control of the raw materials in the south. The duty of the Navy in that connection was to support the Army effort both with its fleet and its land-based air force. lest there be misunderstanding on the point, I wish to say that though Admiral YAMAMOTO was assigned this specific duty of planning and executing the destruction of the enemy fleet according to his own discretion, he could not activate any plan without the approval of the Imperial General Headquarters. I cannot recall that any line was fixed to designate the limits of ocean surface to be secured; I do recall, however, that lands to be occupied were definitely fixed.

Q. Initially, what was the farthest fixed position to which the advance in the north was limited?

A. In the north, the ALEUTIANS, including ATTU and KISKA, but I believe that DUTCH HARBOR was left to fleet discretion. In the south RABAUL was designated from the beginning; and the SOLOMONS and MIDWAY were added later.

Q. This would then be called the first established line–ATTU and KISKA (possibly DUTCH HARBOR), WAKE, RABAUL and so on west? We might accept that as a first line?

A. Yes, include the GILBERTS in that line. That was the first line for occupation but this did not restrict naval activity.

Q. Then the move into the Western ALEUTIANS in June 1942 was actually in completion of this initial plan, even though delayed somewhat?

A. I wish to make a correction, the question of including KISKA and ATTU in the original program was only considered, but it was not adopted at that time. It was added at the same time MIDWAY was brought into this line.

Q. When was the decision reached to expand the perimeter to include MIDWAY, and what were the reasons therefor?

A. The taking of MIDWAY was a part of the fleet desire. From the outset, the fleet wanted to take MIDWAY even if subsequent developments caused its loss. I believe the idea originated with Admiral YAMAMOTO that the fleet wished to take it even if subsequent developments should necessitate giving it up again. The Imperial General STaff, however, was opposed to the idea at first because the disadvantages of holding MIDWAY, especially in the way of supply, would outweigh the advantages. It had always been a policy of the Japanese Navy to hold the fleet in waters relatively close to home to meet the enemy there in surface interception operations, the object being to engage the enemy in areas most advantageous for us. But as the operations in the first stage of the war were so successful as to even exceed expectations and as the fleet again submitted its plan for taking MIDWAY with details of the plan, especially with regard to the reasons for the necessity of taking it and the chances of success of the operation, the Imperial Staff at this time gave its support. The Army also fell in line and offered to send troops for occupation. As this was an addition to the original plan of operations it was issued as a new Imperial General Headquarters order. By way of summary, it might be stated the purpose of this operation for taking MIDWAY was to utilize it as a base for future advances, and at the same time to prevent its being used by the enemy as a base. The Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO, had full confidence in Admiral YAMAMOTO’s judgment, and was always willing to trust his judgment in respect to fleet operations. he appeared to have the feeling that if Admiral YAMAMOTO said that a certain plan promised success he would be willing to let Admiral YAMAMOTO proceed with its execution. While there was discussion of this plan between the fleet and authorities in the General STaff, what really led to Admiral NAGANO giving his final consent to the carrying out of this plan was the fact he always had full confidence in the CinC of the Fleet.

Q. About what date was the additional order issued?

A. I don’t remember the exact date but believe it was just prior to commencement of the operation. Since the fleet had studied this operation very closely, they were in a position to put the plan into operation immediately once it was issued.

Q. You made a suggestion of further forward advances. Did the Naval General Staff act on its own initiative or did it receive from Admiral YAMAMOTO plans to go on beyond MIDWAY? If so, what was the nature of those plans?

A. It would probably be more accurate to say that one of the purposes for taking MIDWAY was to use it as a base for subsequent operations rather than for further advance. No doubt the fleet had been studying the possibility for further advances even to HAWAII, but doesn’t appear to have been able to draw up a plan that would promise success, and the Imperial General Staff had been opposed from the beginning to extending the line too far. I am certain that there was no definite adoption of a plan, at that time, to go beyond MIDWAY. From some time prior to this, the Naval General Staff had been considering the question of operations toward HAWAII as a problem reserved for a subsequent time, a time when our fleet should have destroyed the American Fleet. However, the General Staff had not transmitted this idea to the fleet yet.

Q. What were the effects of the Battle of MIDWAY, 406 June 1942, and what new plans, if any, were evolved directly as a result of that action?

A. The result of the MIDWAY engagement was a most serious blow to our Navy. Admiral YAMAMOTO’s basic policy had been to engage the enemy in a decisive fleet engagement. He was at the same time an advocate of using air power, including the use of land-based air forces. In undertaking the capture of MIDWAY, he, no doubt, planned to use MIDWAY as a base for just such a fleet engagement; but as a result of this serious set-back at MIDWAY, he was probably forced to give up the hope of holding such a fleet engagement a great distance from home. The effect of the MIDWAY Battle was to greatly restrict the area in which such a fleet engagement could be carried out….

Q. You have several times mentioned phases of the war. How do you divide the war into phases?

A. This division into phases was an arbitrary one adopted merely for sake of convenience. However, such a division had always been contemplated and was always in the minds of the Navy General Staff from earlier years. The first phase operation was the occupation of the raw materials area to the south. The second phase was after the change from offensive in taking this area to the defensive of the occupied area. In addition, the fleet attempted a third phase which covered the period between the two already mentioned; namely, the period of stabilization of the occupied area immediately after occupation and prior to the beginning of the defensive operations. So the actual order became: first phase–occupation, second phase–stabilization, third phase–defensive. Admiral YAMAMOTO commanded the fleet through the first phase and the early part of the second phase, Admiral KOGA was in command through the latter part of the second phase and the early part of the third phase, and Admiral TOYODA followed through the last part of the third phase.

As I said before, Malkin is incorrect in saying there was a “low” chance of an invasion of the West Coast. There was NO chance of an invasion of the West Coast, as even an invasion of Hawaii was untenable for the many reasons I have mentioned. One thing these Japanese admirals – like the former Commandant to whom I spoke – understand that Malkin does not, is that carrier-launched airplanes were no substitute for land-based aircraft during WWII, hence Yamamoto’s desire to use Midway as a base for a fleet engagement, and the IJN General Staff’s awareness that further attempts to raid or invade Hawaii and the West Coast would be both costly and foolish.