Ethnic cleansing in Chicago

Chicago is going the way of Compton:

New census statistics show the Hispanic population grew by 17,000 in a one-year period. For the first time, Hispanics are the second-largest racial group in the city. Meanwhile, the African-American population is shrinking, with 42,000 moving out.

In Little Village, it’s not hard to spot the influence and heritage. At Dulcelandia, a candy store, sales and the number of customers have increased since the business opened in 1995. This would seem to reflect new U.S. Census data showing the Hispanic population in Chicago jumping from 786,000 to 803,000 between 2015 and 2016.

This means about 30 percent of the Windy City’s population is now of Hispanic or Latino descent.

In another decade, Chicago will be majority Hispanic/Latino. Americans can posture and preen about racial and ethnic equality all they like. But identity politics are rapidly replacing ideology politics, just as new ethnicities are rapidly replacing America’s blacks and whites alike. The pattern is pretty straightforward: blacks chase whites in order to live in white-dominated societies. Then the more ruthless Hispanics and Asians move in to the white-abandoned locations to chase the blacks out. It’s all fun and games until the whites run out of places to retreat.

This isn’t going to end well. Sooner or later, the 100-year retreat is going to end. The only question is whether it will end in a manner more akin to South Africa and Rhodesia or Yugoslavia. I tend to suspect the latter, but I could be wrong. White Americans aren’t showing any more fight than the white South Africans did. The South Africans had guns and nukes too, but what they lacked was the moral confidence to use them.

And moral confidence is one thing that White America does not possess today.


Gab belatedly files suit

It would appear the additional discussions that delayed yesterday’s expected filing were not fruitful.

Free speech social media site Gab AI, Inc. filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Google for violations of the Clayton Act and Sherman Act. The lawsuit stems from Google removing Gab from its Google Play Android app store on spurious grounds of “hate speech” arising from posts by users.

Google did not accuse Gab of hate speech, but used third party content as a pretext to justify its own business ends. Gab, a startup, aims to bring “folks together of all races, religions, and creeds who share in the common ideals of Western values, individual liberty and the free exchange and flow of information.”

According to Gab’s attorney, Marc Randazza, Google’s conduct is a straightforward violation of the antitrust laws “Google Play and Android have monopoly power in the app store market, and Google’s apps YouTube and Google+ compete directly against Gab. Google’s intimate partnership with Twitter, which also competes against Gab, makes Google’s control of all Android apps available through the Play Store a serious restraint of trade issue.”

Randazza noted, “regardless of Google’s pretextual justification for removing Gab, the effect is that they used their monopoly power in the app store to block an upstart competitor it in the social media app market, to the detriment of millions of consumers who value free speech.”

The monopoly issue may work for Gab. But I don’t like their chances for two reasons. First, Google’s resources. Second, the Gab team really seems to be flying blind on the moderation issue. Now, I obviously disagree with their position, which is why I have filed a petition against them. And considering that I had to do so due to their complete refusal to moderate their posts, I don’t see that they have any ability to claim they are abiding by Google’s terms of service. Which, of course, means they have handed Google a perfect excuse to stonewall them.

Oh, the irony…. This is mildly amusing.

Well, we’ve collected a whole lot of examples of defamation and defamation per se, but I don’t think Andrew is going to find them very useful to his case. The point is not that the other social networks don’t moderate effectively, the point is that Gab openly refuses to moderate at all. It is not up to Gab, or even the court, to define what Google considers to be “a sufficient level of moderation” when all Google has to do is demonstrate that Gab does not provide ANY moderation, even upon request.

UPDATE: Andrew Torba claims that Gab does moderate posts. That is likely true, to a very limited extent. The question is, is whatever level of moderation they presently provide sufficient when Gab’s management openly brags that they do not moderate for defamation or defamation per se as defined by their registrar, or by Texas law and the Texas courts, and that they will harass users who pursue legal means of redress.

Andrew TorbaPRO · @a
If our registrar requires us to remove something again we will publish it here and let everyone know that you whined to them because someone hurt your feelings with mean words on the internet.

Andrew TorbaPRO · @a
Note that these are recorded. Keep going. Please this will be fun. I am more alpha than you will ever be. Try me.

Andrew TorbaPRO · @a
Vox I’ll publish every email you ever sent us and phone calls which have been recorded, Please try me. You can destroy your personal brand all you want, but you’re not going to drag down Gab with it. Mark my words.

It seems to me that he’s doing an efficient job of dragging down Gab without any help from me. Here is a partial list of the posts being sent to Asia Registry for review by the LLoE. It demonstrates, rather conclusively, that Gab simply does not moderate to the standard set by Facebook and Twitter, and, more importantly, Google.

  • https://gab.ai/tdawg911/posts/12090691
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12065490
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12065748
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12107799
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12125780
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12126457
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12127469
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12127738
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12128833
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12129102
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12130342
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12128833
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12129450
  • https://gab.ai/FreeinTX/posts/12186103
  • https://gab.ai/Fashdaddey/posts/11862161
  • https://gab.ai/Fashdaddey/posts/11839913
  • https://gab.ai/roonyroo/posts/12180125
  • https://gab.ai/Valaranumenoriano/posts/12160268
  • https://gab.ai/Deacon_Jim/posts/12156043
  • https://gab.ai/GTKRWN/posts/12147100
  • https://gab.ai/gaystapo/posts/12112801
  • https://gab.ai/WilhelmL/posts/12090962
  • https://gab.ai/Ungern/posts/12086315
  • https://gab.ai/Pepe_Memes/posts/12077259
  • https://gab.ai/MorbiousStone/posts/12076537
  • https://gab.ai/Whiteknight007/posts/12071038
  • https://gab.ai/Pepe_Memes/posts/12067941
  • https://gab.ai/GTKRWN/posts/12067637
  • https://gab.ai/h4rdm0us/posts/12063396
  • https://gab.ai/h4rdm0us/posts/12062548
  • https://gab.ai/Pepe_Memes/posts/12061817
  • https://gab.ai/Pepe_Memes/posts/12060233
  • https://gab.ai/Pepe_Memes/posts/12046728
  • https://gab.ai/Pepe_Memes/posts/12041396
Regardless, to quote John Derbyshire’s recent column, fiat justitia ruat cælum.

Defiance will be answered

The Trump administration cancels visas from countries attempting to nullify deportation of their nationals:

The Trump administration announced Wednesday it has ordered the State Department to limit certain visas for Cambodia, Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra Leone because those countries have refused to accept the return of its nationals who are deported from the United States.

“International law obligates each country to accept the return of its nationals ordered removed from the United States,” Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke said in a statement. “Cambodia, Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra Leone have failed in that responsibility. The United States itself routinely cooperates with foreign governments in documenting and accepting its citizens when asked, as do the majority of countries in the world. However, these countries have failed to do so, and that one-way street ends with these sanctions.”

“American citizens have been harmed because foreign governments refuse to take back their citizens. These sanctions will ensure that the problem these countries pose will get no worse as ICE continues its work to remove dangerous criminals from the United States,” said U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Acting Director Thomas Homan.

And if that’s not enough, up the ante and start taxing their corporations active in the USA. That is the one thing that terrifies every country; being blocked from access to the US market. This is smart. No foreign country should be permitted a veto over US domestic policy.


Justice’s casino

This is why it is a fool’s game to assume that any legal case is a certainty of any kind, no matter what the law says, and no matter how much legal precedent you can cite.

Recently retired federal appeals court Judge Richard Posner said he rarely looked to legal rules when deciding cases and often sought to skirt Supreme Court precedent.

“I pay very little attention to legal rules, statutes, constitutional provisions,” Posner told the New York Times in an interview published Monday. “A case is just a dispute. The first thing you do is ask yourself — forget about the law — what is a sensible resolution of this dispute?”

When confronting a case with some form of legal obstacle in the way, the former 7th Circuit Court of Appeals judge said he would look to circumvent whatever prevented him from reaching his desired result.

Any good lawyer will tell you that the law is whatever the presiding judge tells you it is. I was once the only witness in a civil case in which the documentary evidence precisely supported my testimony. It was as black-and-white, as open-and-shut, as a case could be. There was simply no way around the obvious conclusion. None at all.

But instead of simply deciding for the plaintiff, the judge offered a settlement of a coin toss. Heads and the plaintiff won the total amount sought. Tails and he only won half. Knowing that he had no case, the defendant’s attorney accepted the settlement and won the coin toss. The plaintiff received only half of what he was rightfully owed.

And that is why I have never had one single iota of confidence in the U.S. legal system ever since. Nothing that I have seen happen in it ever since has surprised me. Literally anything can happen; justice has nothing to do with it. The Italians call the legal system “un casino” and I think they are entirely right to do so.


Jerry Pournelle Week V

25 years after the end of the Cold War and the publication of the ninth volume, Dr. Pournelle has revived his classic science fiction series with Castalia House. THERE WILL BE WAR Volume X continues the tradition of combining top-notch military science fiction with first-rate real-world analysis by military experts. The Cold War may have ended, but as recent events everywhere from Paris to Syria have demonstrated, war has not.
THERE WILL BE WAR Volume X is edited by Jerry Pournelle and features 18 stories, articles, and poems. Of particular note are “Battle Station” by Ben Bova, “Flashpoint: Titan” by Cheah Kai Wai, “What Price Humanity?” by David VanDyke, and the eerily prescient “The Man Who Wasn’t There” by Gregory Benford. Volume X also includes timely essays on “War and Migration” by Martin van Creveld, “The 4GW Counterforce” by William S. Lind and LtCol Gregory A. Thiele, USMC, and “The Deadly Future of Littoral Sea Control” by CDR Phillip E. Pournelle, USN, which was awarded the 2015 Literary Award by the Surface Navy Association for “the best professional article in any publication addressing Surface Navy or surface warfare issues.”

THERE WILL BE WAR Volume X is free today and tomorrow. The following is an excerpt from “The Deadly Future of Littoral Sea Control” by CDR Phillip Pournelle. The introduction was written by his father, Jerry Pournelle.

Editor’s Introduction to:

THE DEADLY FUTURE OF LITTORAL SEA CONTROL

by Commander Phillip E. Pournelle, U.S. Navy

The United States has always been a maritime power, and freedom of the seas has been our policy since the founding of the Republic. We have known since President Thomas Jefferson refused to pay tribute to the Barbary Coast pirates that blockade might not be enough. Sometime you must control the coastal areas and send the Marines to the shores of Tripoli.

The control of littoral areas generates different fleet requirements than controlling the high seas. Commander Phillip Pournelle has been involved with the future of naval requirements, including fleet structure, for years. This article was recently published by the United States Naval Institute and is reprinted here by permission of the institute. The opinions in the article are, of course, his own.

There is a lively debate about the future of the Navy, and how the Fleet should be structured, in Naval circles. Those interested in it should consult the Naval Institute Proceedings, where the various features of the force, including submarines, carriers, surface vessels, information warfare, and the Marines, are discussed. This essay concentrates on an important part of the debate.

When I was in the aerospace industry, I used to say that “the opinions expressed here are my own, and not necessarily those of the Aerospace Corporation or the United States Air Force, and I think that’s a damn shame.” The opinions expressed here are those of Commander Pournelle, and not necessarily those of the United States Navy.

And I think that’s a damn shame.

THE DEADLY FUTURE OF LITTORAL SEA CONTROL

by Commander Phillip E. Pournelle, U.S. Navy

In an age of precision-strike weapon proliferation, a big-ship navy equals a brittle fleet. What is needed is a revamped force structure based on smaller surface combatants.

The U.S. Navy is building a fleet that is not adapted to either the future mission set or rising threats. It is being built centered around aircraft carriers and submarines. Surface ships are being constructed either as escorts for the carriers or as ballistic-missile-defense platforms. While the littoral combat ship (LCS) was originally intended for sea-control operations in the littoral environment, its current design is best employed as a mother ship for other platforms to enter the littorals. The result of all this is a brittle—and thus risk-adverse—fleet that will not give us influence, may increase the likelihood of conflict, and will reduce the range of mission options available to the national command authority.

This trend is not unique to the Navy. Like other services, it has been operating since the end of the Cold War in unchallenged environments. For the last 12 years in particular, the United States has been operating against opponents who do not have the means to seriously challenge it in multiple arenas such as the air, sea, cyber, space, and other domains. However, due to the proliferation of precision-strike-regime (PSR) weapons and sensors, these domains are increasingly being contested, and the sea, particularly in the littorals, may become one of the most threatened of all these domains.

Sea control is the raison d’être for a navy. The littorals have become, and will increasingly be, critical to the global economy and joint operations. To be relevant a fleet must have the ability to secure the littorals, dispute them, or just as importantly, exercise in them, in the face of an enemy who will contest them. Different platforms perform each of these tasks, some more effectively than others, which should drive fleet architectures. As the proliferation of weapons changes the littoral environment, the U.S. Navy will be forced to reexamine fleet architectures and make some significant changes to remain viable. This is due to the poor staying power of surface vessels in relation to their signature in the face of these rising threats. This new deadly environment will have tactical, operational, and strategic implications for the fleet, and will require significant changes if the fleet wishes to remain effective.

Sir Julian’s Three Elements

What is sea control? As the Royal Navy puts it, it is “the condition in which one has freedom of action to use the sea for one’s own purposes in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control includes the airspace above the surface and the water volume and seabed below.”

Without sea control, all other attributions and capabilities for a fleet are irrelevant. As noted by the classic naval strategist Sir Julian Corbett, control (he used the word “command”) of the sea is fleeting and “the only positive value which the high seas have for national life is as a means of communication.” Given the fleeting status of command/control then, accomplishing it must be in support of further goals. Corbett breaks down his concept of control of the sea into three distinct areas: securing command, disputing command, and exercising command. Where securing enables exercising command, disputing may deny, or at least reduce, the ability of an opponent to use the sea for his own purposes.

So it would appear a navy unable to accomplish Corbett’s three elements is unbalanced, particularly if it cannot do so in the critical littorals. Execution of Corbett’s three areas can roughly be translated into three current mission areas: scouting, maritime-interception operations (MIO), and destruction. Enemy forces, and merchant ships, must be located through scouting. While ships and merchants could be simply swept from the sea, more often than not there is a need to be present to shape events and conduct visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) or MIO in support of sanctions, proliferation reduction, or other operations short of unrestricted warfare. VBSS/MIO is critical when there is a need to confirm the identity or contents of a vessel.

The characteristics of different platforms drive their strengths and weaknesses within these three mission areas. In the past, aircraft carriers were the best platforms to secure command of the sea. That role is being contested in anti-access/area-denial environments created by competitors. The air wing provided excellent scouting capabilities, but the U.S. Navy has determined land-based maritime-patrol aircraft (MPA) are best capable of searching large volumes of water, as long as the airspace is not being contested. The carrier is an inefficient vessel for VBSS. It is only used in the most extreme circumstances and limited in capacity. Further, because so many other mission capacities are tied up in one platform, using the carrier for VBSS (or humanitarian aid/disaster relief, for that matter) denies these capabilities to other missions during the duration of the operation. The carrier air wing is currently the best platform for destruction thanks to the volume of fire it can produce, and the mobility of the carrier as a home base, though it can be argued surface ships could be more cost-effective in this role. MPA can be effective in destruction but are limited by the fixed operating location of their airfield.

Submarines are poor scouting platforms with limited perception of the area around them, but they can enter anti-access areas often denied to surface ships and carriers. While they are poor VBSS/MIO platforms and have not been used in that role, submarines have an oversized impact on destruction. Their weapon of choice, as seen in the Falklands War, can be extremely deadly, and the psychological shock of an unlocated submarine can neutralize an enemy fleet.

Surface ships are good scouting platforms, particularly if equipped with helicopters and/or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). They are good platforms for destruction if armed with appropriate weapons. The U.S. Navy has long vacillated back and forth regarding arming them with Harpoon or other antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) mostly because of target-identification challenges. Surface ships are the best platform for conducting VBSS/MIO, if there are sufficient numbers of ships. Today Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are conducting VBSS/MIO off the coast of Africa and other locations.

Given the cost and other mission capabilities, does it really make sense for these air-defense destroyers or other large capital ships to conduct VBSS/MIO?


Stop encouraging young writers!

A heartfelt plea from a woman writer over 40 to stop recognizing people who are not her:

A few years ago I wrote an article for the Guardian on ageism in the literary world, about the predilection of publications like Granta, the New Yorker and Buzzfeed for authors under the age of 40. The problem hasn’t gone away and on Tuesday I wrote an open letter to the Royal Society of Literature, after it called for nominations for 40 new fellows under 40.

Encouraging young writers is laudable. After all, it’s increasingly difficult to get started. Publishers’ advances are low and getting lower; arts degrees are more expensive than Stem subjects; social security is fiercely tested. Which must mean that those most able to pay for a writing course, or those most able to take time off work to write while still young, are those most likely to have money, security, contacts, confidence. There’s a correlation between setting an age bar and encouraging the already privileged.

All writers were young once, and many start writing young, but not all begin their careers as published authors at that point. Leaving aside the fact that some only decide to start writing later in life, many factors affect one’s ability to commit to writing seriously. Besides income issues, age bars can lead an organisation into worrying territory. Authors from outside the perceived cultural mainstream who do not already see their voices represented – LGBTQ writers, writers of colour – are sometimes slow to recognise the contribution they can make, or to feel like their voices will be valued.

Age is a feminist issue. Carers, delayed by years looking after children or other dependents, are mostly women; residencies that offer no childcare or require long stays are an easy way to sift female candidates out of contention. Older women are already told every day, in ways ranging from the subtle to the blatant, that they are irrelevant and should shut up. Multiply this by, say, race or gender, and the courage required to put work out is even greater. Or the potential writer might not be the carer, but the cared-for. Writers who live with a disability or ill-health may not start out until they have found a way to write with their condition – which may take longer than this 40-years-old rule allows for.

Since writing to the RSL, I’ve been sent heartrending accounts from well-published writers, several of whom specified that it wasn’t until their late 30s that they were finally able to take the time to write, making age bar of 40 not only arbitrary, but a particularly cruel irony.

Wow just wow! First, I am, of course, appalled by the writer’s unpersoning and excision from the social justice movement of so many sexualities. It’s fine to defend Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer writers, but what about those who are Genderqueer, Demisexual, Transsexual, Twospirit, Intersex, Questioning, Asexual, Allies, Pansexual, and Polyamorous? If she doesn’t support LGGBDTTTIQQAAPP in its entirety, she is clearly a bigot, a hater, and she should never be published by any socially responsible publisher.

Second, what, exactly, is the point of her article? Should we not recognize young writers at all and attempt to identify the most promising? Actually, that’s not a bad idea, since the convergence of most writing awards and institutions means that they’re only promoting callow SJW droppings anyhow.

But I suspect that she wants to make elderly female and diversity writers eligible for young author awards, never mind the fact that first-time novelists of any age are honored by awards such as the  John W. Campbell Award for Best New Writer. What we have here is merely a literary spin on Sailer’s Law of Female Journalism: The most heartfelt articles by female journalists tend to be demands that social values be overturned in order that, Come the Revolution, the journalist herself will be considered hotter-looking.

Or, as in this case, an award-winning writer.

I have to admit it, I’m going to be genuinely sorry when The Guardian finally finishes burning through its once-massive endowment and goes out of business. It’s genuinely funnier than The Onion.


Jerry Pournelle Week IV

This is an excellent article on wargame design, “Simulating the Art of War”, that Jerry Pournelle originally published in The General, and which he graciously permitted us to reprint four decades later in Riding the Red Horse. It is perhaps worth noting that Castalia House will be publishing the book mentioned below, The Strategy of Technology, in a new hardcover edition this winter.

SIMULATING THE ART OF WAR
by Jerry Pournelle

The title of this article is a misnomer. Although I have had some experience simulating the art of war, nothing would be duller for a game; so far as I can tell, the closer the simulation, the less playable the result. The best simulation of land warfare I have ever seen takes place at Research Analysis Corporation (RAC). an Army-related think tank in Virginia. At RAC, they have three enormous war-rooms, each equipped with a wargames table some twenty feet square, each table having elaborate terrain features at a scale of about one inch to the kilometer. ln the Blue room, only Blue units and the Red units located by reconaissance are shown; in the Red room, the opposite, while the only complete record of all units in the game is in the Control room.

Each team consists of an array of talent including logistics and supply officers. intelligence officers, subordinate unit commanders, etc. Orders are given to a computer, which then sends the orders to the actual units, while members of the Control team move them rather than the players Both teams send in orders simultaneously, so that the computer is needed to find which units actually get to move and which are interfered with. The last time I was involved with a RAC game, as a consultant to feed in data about how to simulate strategic and tactical air strikes, it took six months playing time to finish a forty-eight hour simulation—and that was with about ten players on each side, a staff of twenty referees, and a large computer to help. The game, incidentally was one which eventually resulted in the US Army’s evolving the Air Assault Divisions, now known as Air Cav.

The point is that although an accurate simulation—it had to be. since procurement and real-world organization decisions were based in part on the results—the “war game” at RAC was unplayable, and, one suspects, even the most fanatical wargames buff would have found it dull after working at it full time for months.

Yet. What makes a wargame different from some other form of combat game like chess? What is there about the wargame that can generate such enthusiasm? Obviously, it is the similarity to war; the element of simulation which is lacking from other games. Consequently, the game designer must know something about simulation. and must make realism his second goal in design.

There are two ways of making a wargame realistic. The first, which by and large has been exploited well, is “face-realism”. That is, the game designer attempts to employ terrain features similar to a real world battle or war; designates units that either really were in a battle, or might have been; calls the playing pieces “armor” and “infantry”, or “CCA”, or “42nd Infantry Regiment” and the like. He tries, in other words, to give the appearance of reality. He may also, as is often done, make the rules complex, usually by adding optional rules to bring in such factors as “air power” or “supply”, or “weather”

The second way of making a wargame realistic is much more difficult, and has seldom been tried. This method is as follows: the designer abstracts the principles of war as we know them, and designs a game in which only the correct application of those principles brings success. There are, as I said, few of those games. I am tempted to say none, but this would be incorrect; many Avalon Hill games partially meet this goal.

The second kind of simulation is admittedly far more difficult. To some extent it may even interfere with the “realism” of the first kind, in that some rather unusual moves may be required. In this and succeeding articles I shall attempt to analyze the principles of war which should be simulated, and the rules which may introduce “functional simulation” to the art of wargaming.

Tactics or Strategy?

The first decision is a key one: do we simulate tactics or strategy? This is compounded by the problem that no really satisfactory definitions of strategy and tactics exist, and neither is very well understood in the United States. For example, there is nowhere in this country a good work on modern tactics, and the study of tactics has largely been neglected for the study of something which we call strategy, but which is often not that either. This is a large subject, and not one to be settled in a single essay; the interested reader might refer to The Strategy of Technology, by S. T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, University Press of Cambridge, Mass. for a fuller exposition on what I mean by that statement.

The average game of strategy, in any event, would be too complex, and simulation is extremely difficult because strategy operates against the will of the opponent rather than his means. Because there is no more penalty to a wargamer for losing utterly than there is for losing at all, it is difficult to make him surrender until his means of combat have been eliminated. I suppose rules could be devised in which a point system is employed, with a penalty to be paid for the number of points lost by the loser less those which he has gained against the winner, but then another difficulty arises: in the real world there are usually factors operating which make the victor anxious to accept the surrender of his enemy, in war games there is almost none, and consequently a player who is winning would be most reluctant to allow the loser to stop the war until the maximum number of points had been extracted. It is all a very difficult matter. and one which deserves more thought than we have time for in this article.

Consequently, we will discuss tactics more than grand tactics, and grand tactics more than strategy. The subject is, I think, large enough for our purposes.

Which Principles of War?

The next problem is, which principles of war do we wish to emphasize? For that matter, which list of principles will we accept? Every serious student has his own set of “the” principles of war, and few lists are alike. Again, for our purposes, we will have to be satisifed with an arbitrary set of principles which seem appropriate for gaming, leaving the question of which are the correct principles of war to another discussion.

It seems to me that the most important principle of war neglected in popular games is the Principle of Surprise. Surprise has probably won more battles than all the other factors combined. Certainly it has provided most clear wins by a side which should reasonably be expected to lose. Consequently, let us examine the characteristics of surprise as it operates in real battles, and how it might be simulated in games.

Surprise consists of doing what the opponent is certain you will not or cannot do. Classical examples are: night marches, attacks by inferior forces, the use of equipment, troops, or weapons in totally unexpected ways, attacks through “impassable” terrain, and “secret weapons” which quite often have not been secret in the sense of being unknown, but secret in the sense of a capability previously unexpected, such as when infantry has been trained to make forced marches at speeds not thought possible.

Many of these kinds of surprise are impossible in gaming. There is no way, at least none known to me, in which we can unexpectedly increase the striking radius of the gaming pieces, or change the terrain rules in the middle of the game, or combine forces in such a way that together they have a higher combat factor than they do separately. Certainly we could do any of these things, possibly by some kind of card drawing or random number system; but the resultant would not be the mind-numbing shock of the totally unexpected, because the opponent would know from the rules that such things were possible. The true effect of surprise goes beyond the immediate effect to a paralysis of the opponent’s will; if he could do that, then what else might he be able to do? Wars have been won by exploiting that kind of surprise.

We can, however, introduce surprise by imperfect intelligence; allow a player to do, if not the totally unexpected, then at least something which the opponent has dismissed as highly unlikely. The best way to achieve this at the game board, in my judgment, is through the matchbox system. In this system, each player has a certain number of headquarters-type pieces, and for each such piece a matchbox or envelope. At any time a player may move a certain number of combat pieces up to the headquarters and take them off the board to be placed in the corresponding matchbox. The HQ then moves on the board, and the combat pieces are considered to be stacked on top of it, or, in non-stacking games, in the squares through which the headquarters has last moved. Obviously, by judicious moving of the headquarters units together and then apart, a player can create confusion as to just what units are in any given formation containing headquarters pieces, so much so that what appears to be a minor raid might well be a full armored army, while what seems to be a major attack might be a reconaissance in force. The matchboxes are used to keep the players honest; only those pieces in the matchbox can be claimed to be with the on-board HQ.

This rule alone can produce a major effect on wargames; I have seen the emergence of an army in a totally unexpected place bring about a paralysis of will that brought defeat to an otherwise winning player. I have also seen the fear of surprise attack stop an advance even though there was in fact no real strength opposing it. In my judgment the rule should become a standard rule in all board-type wargames.

The second most neglected factor in wargaming is the principle of Economy of Forces, the judicious combination of units of different types to bring about a force sufficient for the objective set. Again, the really great exploitations of this principle are denied the gamer. We cannot change the rules in the middle of the game, or discover a new use for infantry-cavalry combinations unknown to the opponent. We can, however, provide a rich variety of really different units, each with a special capability. This was discussed at great length in my previous article on “The Decisive Arm” and cannot be repeated here. Therefore, we will only examine some possibilities open to the wargamer.

First, it seems to me, we will need complexity, and complexity is generally the enemy of playability. ln this case there is no help for it and what we must do is strive to make our complexities such that we do not lose ourselves in them. What we need is a variety of kinds of units which have some really fundamental differences between them, not merely differences in strength and mobility.

For example: in Waterloo, the artillery should be allowed to stack without limit. This means that a player who has husbanded his artillery can bring an enormous concentration of force against a single point-much as Napoleon was able to do. The P-A-A player, on the other hand, should be prevented from stacking dissimilar units, and in particular forbidden to place Prussians with Allies. Adding this rule and the matchbox rule produces a game of Waterloo entirely different from the standard game, and one which I think is more interesting. It automatically provides a role for cavalry as well—reconnaissance becomes absolutely necessary, with cavalry making sweeps to locate the enemy artillery prior to setting up a defensive position or mounting a major attack. Without such knowledge, the player is nearly blinded and can be surprised. In modern games, armor can have unique stacking capabilities, as infantry, or infantry-armor combinations, can stack.

The last principle we shall examine in this article is the Principle of Uncertainty: No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy. It is the first maxim that the aspiring commander must learn.
This was, to some extent, brilliantly incorporated into the original Avalon Hill combat results tables. It has been less and less so as time went on, and I fear the results when the new non-random combat results rules become universal as they seem destined to do.

In simulation, you can never eliminate uncertainties. There is always a chance that a small unit, ordered to die to a man, will in fact repulse a much larger unit ordered to attack without quarter. The chance may be small, but it is there, and the really great generals have been those who understood this and made contingency plans for unlikely events. If we are to keep realism in our wargames, we must have uncertainty.

At the same time, there is no question but that the old, rigid combat tables were wrong. The defense should have the option of bugging out to save his forces, and the attacker should have the option of making feints rather than full-scale attacks. On the other hand, the uncertainties need to be preserved. A withdrawal in the face of a cavalry attack, for example, can be very difficult and might even result in greater losses than an attempt to hold the position. The possibilities are easy to speculate on. harder to simulate.

Still, simulation is not impossible. Better combat tables could be devised by spending a lot more time analyzing what happens in particular situations and adjusting the probabilities accordingly. Other future articles will analyse the Principle of Pursuit, the Principle of the Objective, the Principle of Unity of Command, Logistics and Supply, and the Center of Gravity, a European concept almost totally neglected in U.S. military analyses.


Demographics is destiny

Adam Carolla is right. LA is now Mexico.

Attendance:

Los Angeles Chargers: 21,054
Los Angeles Galaxy: 25,667

It’s all about the demographics. Even so, an MLS team outdrawing an NFL team at home? The NFL has no idea how much trouble lies ahead thanks to the diversity it has supported over the years. It’s not an accident that every major league sport was invented by white Americans… or white Canadians. Other peoples simply aren’t as interested in them.


Catalonia’s case for independence

A summary of the conclusion of European legal experts on Catalonia’s case for independence:

As   a   result   of   their   research   and reflections,   the   authors   come   to   the  following conclusions and recommendations on the Right to Decide and the Catalan Government’s call for an independence referendum in October the 1st:

1. The   evolution   of   the   negotiating   process   between   the   Catalan   and   Spanish governments since the re-establishment of democracy in 1977 through time has allowed us to   identify   key   moments   of   a   deteriorating   political   relationship   where   the Spanish government has  gradually  renounced  the  accommodation  of  Catalan  territorial  demands. The evolution of this relationship sheds a new light on the tortuous path towards the legally binding referendum on political independence to be held on the 1st October 2017.

2. The upsurge  in territorial  demands  towards  political independencewas  put on the political  agenda  by  organized  Catalan  civil  society  immediately after  the  passing  of  the Constitutional  Tribunal  ruling  in  2010. Additionally,  there  has  been  a  clear  shift  in  popularterritorial  preferences, moving  from  preferences  asking  for  the  maintenance  of  the  current “status quo” to demands of “political independence,” irrespective of people’s age.

3. Catalan popular demand for a referendum on political independence has been largely justified by the democratic “Right  to  Decide”, which has evolved from the more traditional and  long-standing legal framework to the “national right to self-determination”. In other words, demands   for   political   independence   have   been   legitimized   by   a   democratic principle invested in the Catalan people, reinforced by the repeated denial to accommodate Catalonia’s demands by the Spanish government.

4. From   an   international   law   perspective,   it   appears   clearly that   there   is   no international legal prohibition barring a sub-state entity from deciding its political destiny by assessing the will of its people. Both case law and state practice support this conclusion. State  practice  demonstrates  that  numerous  geographically  diverse  sub-state  entities  have expressed  the  will  of  their  people  regarding  independence.  The  practice  occurs  both  with and  without  the  consent  of  the  national  state.  Many  sub-state  entities  have  achieved independence  after  assessing  the  political  will  of  their  people. EU  member  states  have recognized  many  former  sub-state entities that assessed their people’s political will and decided to pursue independence.

5. As  regards European  Law,  in  the  absence of  specific  Treaty provision  on the right  of Self-determination for a European people without a Statein the territory of the EU, EU law does  not  forbid  the  exercise  of  its  Right  to  Decide  for  a  European  people  within  the  EU. There  are  even  numerous  Treaty  provisions  that  indicate  that  if  such  Right  were  to  be exercised,  EU  and  its  member  States  would  react  positively  to  a  new  European  State candidacy  to  join  the  EU.  Recent  and  consistent  practice  clearly  points  that  way.  Further, both  as  a  collectively  exercised  human  right  and  as  a  fundamental  norm  of  international Law, EU recognizes the Right to Decide.

6. As  regard  the  constitutionality  of  the  claim  for  the  Right  to  Decide, it  is  necessaryfrom  an  empirical  viewpoint,  and  fruitful  from  a  normative  one, togive  up  the  quest  for  a supreme  constitutional  interpreter. What  is  crucialin  a  constitutional  state that  is  faithful to the ambitions of constitutionalism isthe ongoing dialogue about, and engagement with, constitutional values and principles. Only this will make the constitution a living document, infused by the competing interpretations of values and principles that, by their very nature, admit various readings and conceptions. The quest for the final word is useless, illusory and possibly lethal from the political viewpoint of a healthy deliberative community.

7. In  that  respect,  the  debate  is  much  more open  than  what  one  might  think  at  first sight   by   examining   too   rapidly   the   basic   features   of   contemporary   constitutionalism, especially as it is illustrated by the Spanish constitutional system. Far from being disruptive of  the  constitutional  project  that was  adopted  in  1978,  the  Catalan  claim  to  the  Right  to Decide  on  its  political  future  precisely  testifies  to  a  genuine  commitment  to  the  ongoing constitutional dialogue that is legitimate in an open society.That is why simply dismissing this claim as “unconstitutional” cannot be an attitude that lives up to the high standard of political morality that is imposed by the ideal of constitutionalism.

8. Democratic  legitimacy  at  Catalan  and  Spanish  levels  may  both  be  legitimate,  even though  the  principle  of  external  preference  limits  the  capacity  of  Spain  to  permanently oppose the democratic choice of Catalonia. However, when conflicting political legitimacies compete,  there  is  a  duty  for  democratic  authorities  to  negotiate.  This  is  confirmed  by  the observation  ofinternational  practice  that  in  almost  all  instances,  the  sub-state  entity  and national state negotiate the contours of the assessment of political will.

9. Further,  in  a  genuine  liberal  democracy,  rule  of  law  may  not  trump  democratic legitimacy, nor the other way around; therefore, in a modern democratic State, rule of law and  democratic  legitimacy  need  to  be  reconciled and  cannot  in  the  long  term  remain opposed.  In  the  context  of  a  vote  of  self-determination,  as  is  the  case,  the  national framework  will  inevitably  be  inappropriate  because  the  existing  democratic  processes  to address the issue did not allow for a solution or a process to emerge. A change of scale thus appears necessary by justifying either locally or internationally(or both)the organization of a  referendum. If  Spanish  national  Authorities  deny  the  right  to  Catalonia  to  negotiate  its Right  to  Decide  within  the  Spanish  political  framework,  then  the  only  path  left  for Catalonia’s Authorities is the call for a self-determination referendum.

10.Thus, whatever the conflicting claims of legitimacy put forward by the political actors, international   practice   and   transconstitutional   jurisprudence   show   that   successful   self-determination  processes  always  rely  at  some  point  on  a  negotiation  procedure.  In  that perspective, the experts recommend the exploration of an earned sovereignty negotiating process  within  the  framework  of  the  EU.  This  would  imply  involvement  by  EU  institutions; we consider it possible in the perspective of a negotiation within the EU, fully implying Spain in seeking for Catalonia a constrained sovereignty solution, as a full member of the EU.

It’s a strong point to say that a democratic State cannot simultaneously declare its legitimacy is based on democracy while attempting to deny democratic self-determination to a secession-minded part of its populace. Post-Brexit, the EU is much more likely to support this political fragmentation on the part of its member-states, since smaller microstates are far less likely to believe they can survive without being subject to the EU.


Black privilege

Black privilege is when you can say things that would get white people fired and your employer doesn’t even bother to slap your wrist.

ESPN host Jemele Hill has apologized for painting the sports network in an ‘unfair light’ with her controversial remarks about President Donald Trump. She said in a statement that comments in which she called Trump a ‘white supremacist’ and ‘bigot’ were her ‘personal beliefs’, and apologized for bringing ESPN into the issue.

‘My comments on Twitter expressed my personal beliefs,’ she said in a statement she posted on Twitter on Wednesday. ‘My regret is that my comments and the public way I made them painted ESPN in an unfair light. My respect for the company and my colleagues remains unconditional.’

On Wednesday, during a White House briefing on hurricane relief, Sanders said she thought Hill’s ‘outrageous’ remarks should be a ‘fireable offense’.

Hill had tweeted on Monday that Trump is a ‘bigot’ and a ‘white supremacist who has largely surrounded himself w/other white supremacists.’ She also called him ‘unqualified and unfit to be president’ and said that ‘if he were not white, he would never have been elected’.

This is just the Third Law of Social Justice in action. Hill is projecting. She knows that if she wasn’t a black woman, she would never have gotten a job at ESPN.

But it’s good to know that the next time a white Christian man says something that offends someone, he has only to apologize for bringing his employer into the issue and point out that he was merely expressing his personal beliefs in order to settle the matter.