Given the proclivity of both the USA and Israel to wage war through assassination and regime change, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that their enemies are now anticipating decapitation strikes, which was the section of this interview with a former Iranian general that caught my attention.
There’s the issue of the leadership vacuum the Zionist entity sought to create by assassinating leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, followed by subsequent operations. But what we witnessed instead was the strength of our armed forces: leadership positions were filled within just three to four hours, and the command structure was swiftly and efficiently reorganized. What did the people witness afterward? How do you assess the Zionist entity’s belief that creating a leadership vacuum would weaken you?
Mohsen Rezaei: I believe Israel made a grave military miscalculation. They assumed Iran was similar to Hezbollah, even though they themselves have failed to dismantle Hezbollah. They should have learned from that experience. Look at the leadership figures that have emerged within our armed forces. Major General Pakpour, for example, is an exceptionally strong field commander—courageous, with a remarkable operational vision.
Amir Hatami, who joined from the regular army, is a brave and seasoned officer. The same goes for Mr. Mousavi in the aerospace sector. And also for Mr. Mousavi who succeeded the martyred General Bagheri in the General Staff—he is a dedicated man, aligned with the resistance movement.
Though they come from the regular army, there is full coordination between them and the Revolutionary Guards. What the enemy did failed to create any structural void within the armed forces. In fact, it could be said that certain aspects have grown more effective, as recent events have shown. That’s one point.
Secondly, we now have no fewer than ten additional layers of trained commanders and officers—some from the generation that fought in the war, and others who gained valuable field experience in later years, particularly in the fight against ISIS. Many of our forces who fought in Iraq and Syria against ISIS have, through those field experiences, become akin to senior war commanders like Hussein Kharrazi and Ahmad Kazemi—young, capable leaders fully prepared to command the armed forces.
It was a profound error on the part of the Israeli military not to recognize the deep hierarchical structure and the robust bench of ready leadership within our ranks. This internal architecture and the organizational evolution of the armed forces entirely compensated for any potential gaps. In my view, this challenge has already been overcome. And in the near future, our dear people will see that those who have stepped into the shoes of our fallen leaders will ensure that no imbalance or vacuum arises in the management of the armed forces.
The high command—led by His Eminence, the Commander—is fully acquainted with each of these leaders. They have been selected with care and discernment. I am absolutely confident that there will be no void in leadership.
A very common mistake often seen throughout military history is projection, or analyzing the enemy as if it were a mirror image of one’s own forces. Both Israel and the USA have very thin strategic and command benches, which is why they assume that taking out the top layer or two of enemy leadership will lead to complete confusion and disarray.
Which, to be fair, would likely happen in the case of either country suffering the loss of its leadership. But it’s clear that Iran and China are both very well prepared in an institutional sense for rapid leadership transitions that will avoid the confusion and military paralysis that are the primary objective of decapitation strikes. Russia, perhaps not so much, which may account for the monomaniacal focus on President Putin’s well-being, although my suspicion is that his successor will be less patient with the West and more hardline.
Regime change works when you’ve got your candidate all ready and in position to assume command and negotiate a surrender. But it can’t when you don’t have a candidate, and worse, the enemy is already set up to make a series of orderly transitions if necessary.
