This article by a professor of economics at Dublin College is easily the most informative summary of the disaster presently facing Ireland, and by extension, the financial world.
The one thing you need to understand about the Irish bailout is that it had nothing to do with repairing Ireland’s finances enough to allow the Irish Government to start borrowing again in the bond markets at reasonable rates: what people ordinarily think of a bailout as doing.
The finances of the Irish Government are like a bucket with a large hole in the form of the banking system. While any half-serious rescue would have focused on plugging this hole, the agreed bailout ostentatiously ignored the banks, except for reiterating the ECB-Honohan view that their losses would be borne by Irish taxpayers. Try to imagine the Bank of England’s insisting that Northern Rock be rescued by Newcastle City Council and you have some idea of how seriously the ECB expects the Irish bailout to work.
Instead, the sole purpose of the Irish bailout was to frighten the Spanish into line with a vivid demonstration that EU rescues are not for the faint-hearted. And the ECB plan, so far anyway, has worked. Given a choice between being strung up like Ireland – an object of international ridicule, paying exorbitant rates on bailout funds, its government ministers answerable to a Hungarian university lecturer – or mending their ways, the Spanish have understandably chosen the latter.
I didn’t realize that Geithner, the ex-NY Fed Secretary of the Treasury, was so directly involved in saddling the Irish taxpayer with the losses that would have otherwise been taken by the banks that were bailed out. I don’t see how it is possible to read this and still convince oneself that the world’s economic and financial problems of 2008 are in the past it’s perfectly clear that the global financial system hasn’t been fixed in any way, shape, or form, it is only that extend-and-pretend has gone from the national to the intercontinental level.
As I noted yesterday, despite my very contrarian predictions of a continued decline in housing prices, I actually appear to have underestimated the speed, and likely the eventual extent, of the collapse. In the same way, my predictions that the banks and governments of the world would reinforce their failure by taking it to the next level appears to have somewhat on the conservative side as well.
Ireland and Greece are already toast. They are almost guaranteed to default sometime within the next two years. What sort of domino effect this will kick off can’t be accurately predicted, but it seems reasonable to assume that the bankruptcy of an entire nation or three will be more calamitous than the mere failure of a single Austrian Creditanstalt.