Yeah, but no

Ilana hasn’t given up yet:

UPDATE IV (Oct. 19): STILL ABOUT DEADBEATS. From all the reports so far, FBN’s Gerri Willis’ being the latest, it is as I said. The defaulters owe boatloads of money. The bankers bungled the paper work in a manner that verges on the criminal. The reality, in as much as property rights go, comports with my distillation on this post and the one linked to it, “Financial Paperwork Crisis (No Conspiracy Thinking, Please).”

Here is the evidence of a large-scale conspiracy that Ilana was requesting. Needless to say, there is plenty more that can be presented if necessary, since this doesn’t even involve Bank of America: “In mid-2006, I discovered that over 60 percent of these mortgages purchased and sold were defective,” [Richard M.] Bowen, former chief underwriter for Citigroup’s consumer-lending group testified on April 7 before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission created by Congress. “Defective mortgages increased during 2007 to over 80 percent of production.”

I’m still waiting for Ilana to explain how the defects in these “defective mortgages” which made up over 80% of the $1 trillion in mortgages being purchased and sold each year by Citi, have anything to do with “deadbeats”. And at what point does it become irrational to decry “conspiracy thinking” when more and more people within the banking industry are being forced to admit that both the law and the chain of title were intentionally broken literally millions of times? How many billions of dollars in put-back claims must be filed and/or settled before skeptics are compelled to admit that a) there was a large-scale conspiracy to break the law, and b) it is not about deadbeats and the foreclosure fraud is merely a consequence of the preceding mortgage transference fraud?

Moreover, I note that the definition of “conspiracy” is “a combination of persons for a secret, unlawful, or evil purpose.” Note that the conjunction is “or”, not “and”. There was nothing “secret” about what the banks did in creating MERS or securitizing the mortgages; these were matters that explicitly involved public filings as well as expensively tasteful brochures. We can set aside the question of whether what they did was “evil” or not; there is no need to dive into the tangential morass of a morality debate here. But there is no question that what a rather large combination of people in the banking industry are confirmed to have done was “unlawful”. So, to describe the mass mortgage fraud as a genuine and proven conspiracy is correct and it is logically incorrect to make a rhetorical appeal to “Conspiracy Thinking” in order to argue against the observable facts of the matter. There is nothing theoretical about this particular conspiracy when it is already a matter of public record.

One can quite reasonably argue about the eventual economic and political impact of the fallout from the exposure of the conspiracy. Karl Denninger and I think it will be serious and near-term, Mike Shedlock and Calculated Risk believe it will be moderate and play out over time. But at this point, no one informed on the situation can pretend that there was not a large conspiracy to illegally transfer mortgage titles and sell fraudulent securities that preceded the consequent foreclosure-related frauds.