Tag: war

The Ceasefire Holds

Most likely until June. But probably not much longer:

The Hajj is the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and is one of the Five Pillars of Islam — the core religious obligations that define Muslim practice. Every Muslim who is physically and financially able is required to perform the Hajj at least once in their lifetime. This obligation is drawn directly from the Quran and the example of the Prophet Muhammad. The pilgrimage takes place during the Islamic lunar month of Dhul Hijjah — specifically on the 8th through 13th days — meaning it falls on different dates each year in the Gregorian calendar. This year, it is May 24… Sunday next.

Hajj is the largest annual human gathering on earth. In a normal year, roughly 2–3 million pilgrims from approximately 180 countries converge on Mecca and its surrounding sites over a period of five days. Saudi Arabia issues Hajj visas and imposes quotas on each country to manage the crowds. While in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim pilgrims will engage in a number of observances that will end on 31 May.

On the other hand, it’s not impossible that the Epstein Alliance would regard the Hajj as protection against Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia, but that strikes me as excessively risky for the US decision-makers. And even though it might make for a spectacular false flag, the blowback on it would be too risky for even the desperate Netanyahu regime.

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Running Out of Steam

Peter Turchin calculates that the Ukraine war will be over later this year:

The Persian Gulf war of USA/Israel against Iran has largely displaced reporting on the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Reading the news on mainstream media one may think that this war, now in its fifth year, is still in stalemate; or even that the tide is turning against Russia (Washington Post: Putin remark on war ‘coming to a close’ points to exhaustion, not peace, analysts say; NYT: I’m the Foreign Minister of Sweden. Don’t Overestimate Russia).
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But quantitative models of attritional warfare say otherwise: Russia continues to dominate the battlefield and the eventual outcome, barring a Black Swan event, is inevitable defeat of Ukraine. My readers may know that three years ago I developed a an Attritional Warfare Model, AWM (based on the Lanchester equations) for forecasting this war’s outcome.

More recently a similar conclusion was reached by Warwick Powell (see Estimating Trajectories in Attritional Warfare: The Russia-Ukrainian Conflict Through a Quantitative Lens). Powell used a similar model, with the most important difference being the choice of the end point. My model assumes that the war ends when the level of casualties, as a percentage of population, exceeds a certain threshold, which I estimated via a sample of past attritional wars from the Correlates of War data.

Powell, alternatively, assumes that the beginning of the end for Ukraine will happen when its army size declines below a certain threshold (0.65-0.73 of the initial size of 550,000). From that point, Ukrainian losses will accelerate and the full collapse will happen once the army size is below 50% of the prior peak. Powell’s model predicts that the tipping point will happen in July-September (updated on May 14).

Naturally, this is only a model-based forecast, not a prophesy. There is a lot of uncertainty about the estimates of various parameters. Furthermore, the threshold at which collapse occurs is only imprecisely estimated. For example, it’s not clear whether the threshold of 0.65-0.73 above which the Ukrainian force can maintain its operational integrity still applies on a battlefield heavily dominated by drones. For example, a smaller force size may be sufficient to continue defending positions given an abundant supply of drones.

My model also doesn’t incorporate any possible effects of the shift to the drone warfare — simply because it hadn’t happen when I published its predictions. Determining how this technological shift affects the AWM’s predictions will have to wait until the post-mortem after the war is over and when estimates would become much more precise. However, I tried a few preliminary explorations and they suggest that the drone effect on the war trajectory is not quite as huge as might be imagined. What’s important is the casualty rate inflicted on the Ukrainian army by the Russians, and it doesn’t matter whether it’s a result of artillery, air bombing, or drones.

Is Ukraine reaching its recruitment limit? This is the key factor in both our models. There are some indications that this is the case. A week ago, Branko Marcetic (using Ukrainian sources) provided some relevant numbers in a Responsible Statecraft article, Ukraine’s conscription crisis is getting increasingly bloody; While outside voices insist the war can still be won on the battlefield, young men in the country are violently resisting recruiters to stay out of it. Here are some numbers supporting this conclusion.

The number of complaints over possible violations committed by enlistment officers, received by Ukraine’s Human Rights Ombudsman, Dmytro Lubinets:

2022 — 18
2023 — 514
2024 — 3312
2025 — 6127

The number of violent attacks against enlistment officers shows the same trend: from 5 in 2022 to 117 in just the first four months of this year.

One can hardly blame the young Ukrainians for attacking the “enlistment officers” who are really straight-up kidnappers. At the end of the day, the odds of surviving a violent encounter with these rear-echelon thugs is a lot higher than surviving one with frontline Russian troops.

Young European men have probably already figured that out, which is why I expect any attempt by any European country to enact a draft besides Russophobic Poland and Finland to meet with literally violent resistance. Why would any European man fight to defend against civilized Russia instead of rapey third-world invaders?

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Smells Like a False Flag

I kept seeing social media posts about how Iran had made a huge mistake by attacking a nuclear power plant in the UAE. Only there is no evidence that it was actually Iranian drones that targeted the plant:

The UAE said an unidentified drone struck the territory of its only nuclear power plant on Sunday amid ongoing tensions in the Middle East. According to the Emirati Defense Ministry, three drones entered the country “from the western border region.” While two UAVs were shot down, the third struck an electrical generator “outside the inner perimeter” of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the Al Dhafra region. No injuries or radioactive contamination were reported.

While the Emirati authorities stopped short of directly accusing Iran, the country’s Foreign Ministry condemned the “unprovoked terrorist attack,” saying it threatened national security and risked further escalation.

Saudi Arabia said it intercepted three drones on the same day after they entered its airspace from Iraq.

If Iran decides it wants to go after the UAE’s nuclear power plant, it’s not going to use just three drones when it has hypersonic missiles in its arsenal. This was almost certainly a false flag, and the most likely candidate for raising one is pretty obvious.

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The Strategic Cost of War

Everyone understands the opportunity costs of war. But few tend to grasp the potential strategic costs of a war that doesn’t go as expected:

The US-Israeli war against Iran has handed China a strategic opening to chip away at US influence on every major front, the Washington Post reported on Wednesday, citing a classified intelligence analysis. Two US officials familiar with the matter told the newspaper that the document was produced by the Joint Staff’s intelligence directorate for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine. It is said to focus on four main dimensions: Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.

Fortunately, the US military has so far avoided a complete catastrophe on the scale of the Athenian Sicilian expedition, but that doesn’t mean that it’s not going to experience serious negative consequences from having its ability to meaningfully project power around the globe exposed as a negligible threat.

Once the economy is hollowed out, the ability to fight wars is necessarily degraded. The USA is no longer the most powerful military on the planet, whether you are inclined to believe it or not, the US military is now third in terms of its ability to actually fight a war over a period of months, after the Chinese and Russian militaries.

US President Donald Trump’s China visit was an attempt to “save face” and seek relief after the Iran war destabilized the global economy, geopolitical analyst Danny Haiphong has told RT. According to Haiphong, the US is now in a “far weaker position” than China and is seeking closer ties with Beijing to stabilize its economy and global standing.

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Xi’s Delicate Warning

It’s always interesting to see how far ahead of US politicians the Chinese leaders are, particularly President Xi, who is fully cognizant on the discussions of Western intellectuals, while I doubt any US politicians, with the possible exception of JD Vance, have ever heard of Wang Hunin, much less Qiao Liang or Wang Xiangsui

Inside the Great Hall, Xi opened the talks with an ominous reference to the so-called Thucydides Trap, the ancient Greek historian’s account of Athens and Sparta, and the danger when an established power feels threatened by a rising civilization.

‘The world has come to a new crossroads. Can China and the US overcome the Thucydides Trap and create a new paradigm?’ Xi asked Trump across the table.

During their two-hour summit, Xi warned Trump that if Taiwan is ‘mishandled’ the US and China ‘will clash, or even come into conflict, pushing the entire relationship into a very dangerous situation,’ state media channel CCTV reported.

Now, the Thucydides Trap is a bit midwitty these days since it was popularized by Graham Allison in 2015; it’s the sort of history that journalists can understand and recognize, so it makes them feel smart and educated. But it’s not irrelevant, as the Tree of Woe pointed out back in 2021:

Point 10 of Xi Jinping Thought acknowledges that achieving all these other points puts China at risk from those who would prevents its rise (the unstated foe is, of course, the United States). The implacable tendency towards war that occurs anytime a new hegemon arises against an old is called a Thucydides Trap (named for the Greek historian Thucydides and his account of the Peloponnesian War between mighty Sparta and rising Athens). Xi here is codifying the need to prepare for this war to come.

So, it’s interesting that Xi is laying out the problem directly for Trump, as he’s making it very clear that China is the rising power and the USA is the fading one, which directly contradicts all of Trump’s bombastic rhetoric.

The problem, of course, is that there is an X factor involved, which is Clown World. The Thucydides Trap was avoided when the center of power was transferred from London to Washington DC because the same satanic powers remained in control. But Xi prevented the plans for a similar transfer from Washington to Beijing because the Chinese do not wish to be ruled by itinerant devil-worshippers; they had their fill of that following the Mongol invasion, to say nothing of the Century of Humiliation they recently endured at the hands of that very ruling elite.

So, there are two obvious paths, although there may be more. One, the USA accepts China’s rise embraces American nationalism, and throws off Clown World rule. That would be the desirable path, and most likely the one that Xi would support. Two, the USA continues being ridden by Clown World until it expires, defeated and bankrupt, and breaks apart, as I first publicly predicted in 2004.

I think we’ll have a pretty good idea which path has been chosen after Trump returns from China and we see if the USA continues fighting Israel’s war against Iran et al or if it withdraws from the Middle East and allows China to force a peace settlement in Iran’s favor.

UPDATE: Larry Johnson notes the US delegation is receiving second-class treatment. Perhaps because Xi knows he’s not meeting the real Donald Trump.

When Trump arrived in Beijing the plane was met at the airport by China’s Vice Premier and other senior Chinese officials rather than President Xi Jinping himself; U.S. and Chinese diplomatic representatives and an honor guard were also present. This was the same configuration that met Trump in November 2017 during his first trip to China. Compare that to the honors accorded to Vladimir Putin. Xi Jinping personally greeted him on arrival rather than leaving the welcome to lower‑level officials. Reports of Putin’s 2024 and other state visits say Xi received him with full ceremonial honors and met him on arrival in Beijing.

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The Neocon’s Despair

Even one of the leading neocons and chief architects of the war in Ukraine doesn’t believe the US military can defeat Iran.

The risk calculus that forced Trump to back down a month ago still holds. Even if Trump were to carry out his threat to destroy Iran’s “civilization” through more bombing, Iran would still be able to launch many missiles and drones before its regime went down—assuming it did go down. Just a few successful strikes could cripple the region’s oil and gas infrastructure for years if not decades, throwing the world, and the United States, into a prolonged economic crisis. Even if Trump wanted to bomb Iran as part of an exit strategy—looking tough as a way of masking his retreat—he can’t do that without risking this catastrophe.

If this isn’t checkmate, it’s close. In recent days, Trump has reportedly asked the U.S. intelligence community to assess the consequences of simply declaring victory and walking away. You can’t blame him. Hoping for regime collapse is not much of a strategy, especially when the regime has already survived repeated military and economic pummeling. It could fall tomorrow, or six months from now, or not at all. Trump doesn’t have that much time to wait, as oil climbs toward $150 or even $200 a barrel, inflation rises, and global food and other commodity shortages kick in. He needs a faster resolution.
But any resolution other than America’s effective surrender holds enormous risks that Trump has not so far been willing to take. Those who glibly call on Trump to “finish the job” rarely acknowledge the costs.

Unless the U.S. is prepared to engage in a full-scale ground and naval war to remove the current Iranian regime, and then to occupy Iran until a new government can take hold; unless it is prepared to risk the loss of warships convoying tankers through a contested strait; unless it is prepared to accept the devastating long-term damage to the region’s productive capacities likely to result from Iranian retaliation—walking away now could seem like the least bad option. As a political matter, Trump may well feel he has a better chance of riding out defeat than of surviving a much larger, longer, and more expensive war that could still end in failure.

Defeat for the United States, therefore, is not only possible but likely…

The American defeat in the Gulf will have broader global ramifications as well. The whole world can see that just a few weeks of war with a second-rank power have reduced American weapons stocks to perilously low levels, with no quick remedy in sight. The questions this raises about America’s readiness for another major conflict may or may not prompt Xi Jinping to launch an attack on Taiwan, or Vladimir Putin to step up his aggression against Europe. But at the very least America’s allies in East Asia and Europe must wonder about American staying power in the event of future conflicts.

The global adjustment to a post-American world is accelerating. America’s once-dominant position in the Gulf is just the first of many casualties.

Considering how Robert Kagan has been a major advocate of US military action all around “the jungle” of the globe, this is a fascinating, if long overdue, recognition of the limits of US military power.

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Iran to Trump: Surrender

Iran’s National Security Spokesman Ebrahim Rezaei to President Trump: As of today, our restraint is over. Any aggression against our vessels will be met with a heavy and decisive Iranian response against American vessels and bases. The clock is ticking against the Americans’ interests; it is to their benefit not to act foolishly and sink themselves deeper into the quagmire they have fallen into. The best course is to surrender and concede concessions. You must get used to the new regional order.

President Trump’s response: I have just read the response from Iran’s so-called “Representatives.” I don’t like it – TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE!

Apparently a comprehensive failure to achieve any of his war goals in a reasonable timeframe is only going to make him double-down. Which means the USA is not only losing this war, but may risk losing it in an even more costly and humiliating manner if the legislative branch doesn’t impeach him and remove him from office. If we’re lucky, he’s just blustering and will soon do the smart thing and accept the military realities of the untenable situation in which he has put himself and the US military.

The dangerous thing here is that to date, Iran has been fighting a predominantly reactive and defensive war. But now that they’ve survived the initial Zerg rushes, its strategists have the time to figure out how to go on the offensive, both in the theater and beyond.

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Israel Washes its Hands

The War of the Epstein Alliance can be safely regarded as lost now, as the Israelis are already trying to wash their hands of responsibility for the USA attacking Iran and defending Israel despite the war being observably against the interests of the American people.

US President Donald Trump made the decision to attack Iran after his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Mar-a-Lago in late December 2025, but the foundations for that decision had been laid long beforehand, and much of them had nothing to do with Israel or Netanyahu. Conversations with a long list of diplomatic and security officials, Israelis, Americans and diplomats from the region, reveal a clear picture: The man in the White House had a top-tier strategic goal, to topple or decisively weaken the regime in Iran.

Moreover, reports published, among others, in The New York Times and The Washington Post, claiming that Netanyahu had “dragged” Trump and the US into war, partly by arguing that the regime could be brought down, are plainly wrong. The conversations I held indicate that at least some senior Trump administration officials, and Trump himself, were the ones who assessed that the regime could be toppled, while the Israeli team presented a far more cautious assessment on this issue.

A note: Such reporting by the two newspapers mentioned above was not surprising. Both took an anti-war line, consistent with their unfavorable coverage of the Trump administration and Netanyahu’s policies. In this case, according to a US official, they were fed by sources in certain departments at the State Department and the War Department who dislike what they see as the overly close ties between Jerusalem and Washington, certainly when it comes to Middle East policy…

 The fall of the regime in Iran would greatly ease the disarming of Hezbollah and the dismantling of its status in Lebanon, leave Hamas and Islamic Jihad without financial backing, and most likely bring down the Houthi regime in Yemen as well. But even before the war, and especially now, it is clear that this is an overly ambitious goal, certainly in the short term. The current focus, on the one hand, is preventing an agreement that would allow the regime to recover militarily, certainly on the nuclear and missile issues. Without an agreement, Israel supports further intensification of sanctions and economic warfare against Iran until it is completely paralyzed, alongside readiness for the resumption of the war in the near term, this time with a focus on strategic targets such as power stations.

The pointing of the finger at Israel as the party that pushed the US into the strike is therefore only partially correct. In practice, this was a purely American decision, based on an understanding that the regime poses a threat to America and the entire West, and certainly to US interests in the Middle East. Israel assisted with precise intelligence, on the nuclear and missile programs, on Iranian attacks against American targets, and on what happened during and after the protests. The clear convergence of interests with the US is what brought about the joint war, even if its end remains unclear.

I find this version of events less interesting for its attempt at revising history and more useful for indicating that at least some of the parties responsible for the war are attempting to avoid being held culpable for it, which is a very reliable indicator that the war failed to accomplish their goals and is expected to be considered something that is worthy of blame rather than praise.

This, in turn, indicates that everyone involved in prosecuting it is going to be highly motivated to bring it to an end sooner rather than later. The last oil tankers have already delivered their loads. The economic bite of the failed war is only beginning to be felt, and the blame game hasn’t even truly begun yet. The political fallout from it will not be insignificant, as the massive turnover in UK politics very likely demonstrates.

UPDATE: Local National Guard HIMARS artillery unit deployed to ME for a year is home now – they literally fired off everything they could find, painted so many fire mission marks on their launchers that they’re no longer camouflage, and have now sent 90% of their people home. The 10% that remain are working on getting the broken-down launchers out of the desert and onto ships back to the US. This gives me confidence that the war is over by default, and we are out of ammunition.

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Iran Can Outlast the USA

Once more, the Douhetians are proven wrong about the strategic capabilities of airpower:

A confidential CIA analysis delivered to administration policymakers this week concludes that Iran can survive the U.S. naval blockade for at least three to four months before facing more severe economic hardship, four people familiar with the document said, a finding that appears to raise new questions about President Donald Trump’s optimism on ending the war.

The analysis by the U.S. intelligence community, whose secret assessments on Iran have often been more sober than the administration’s public statements, also found that Tehran retains significant ballistic missile capabilities despite weeks of intense U.S. and Israeli bombardment, three of the people familiar with it said.

Iran retains about 75 percent of its prewar inventories of mobile launchers and about 70 percent of its prewar stockpiles of missiles, a U.S. official said. The official said there is evidence that the regime has been able to recover and reopen almost all of its underground storage facilities, repair some damaged missiles and even assemble some new missiles that were nearly complete when the war began.

Airpower never accomplishes one-tenth of what its advocates say it will, because airpower never does even one-tenth the damage that the after-action assessors think it did. Desert Storm was the salient ultimate proof of this, as Col. Douglas Macgregor admitted that an Iraqi tank battalion that was bombed for 30 days in the desert was discovered after the war to have survived with 85 percent of its vehicles still operational.

The average US tank battalion couldn’t survive with 85 percent viability after thirty days of operation on the basis of its maintenance issues alone.

In case you haven’t noticed, despite their relative lack of air forces, both Hezbollah and the Ukrainian armed forces are still in the fight after years of war.

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The Naval Non-War

If a ship is hit by a missile in the Gulf of Oman, but the Department of War denies it, does it make a sound?

  • Reports are coming in indicating that at least four ships are on fire in the Gulf of Oman, near the Persian Gulf, after Iran fired missiles.The image above, from NASA FIRMS satellite data, shows fire ignition in the Strait of Hormuz off Oman’s Musandam province at 22:21 UTC, in roughly the same area where Iran’s IRGC Navy said three US destroyers were damaged and forced to “flee” toward the Sea of Oman.
  • Reports are beginning to surface saying that during yesterday’s battle with Iran, ten (10) U.S. Sailors were wounded and Five (5) others are “Missing.” How could five Sailors be “Missing” unless they got blown off a Destroyer by the Concussion Wave of missile(s) impacting? Yet we’ve been told by US Officials that none of the missiles fired by Iran hit any of our ships.

The gap between what we’re told and what actually happened would appear to be growing.

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