Tag: war

The Art of War in the Taiwan Strait

The USS Abraham Lincoln has been in the Arabian Sea since January 26. The Gerald R. Ford transited Gibraltar on February 20. Thirteen Aegis destroyers, 600-plus Tomahawks in single-salvo capacity, 500 aircraft spread across bases from Jordan to Qatar—the largest American force concentration in the Middle East since 2003. Every analyst in Washington is writing about the coming air campaign against Iran. None of them are writing about what matters, which is that Beijing is using this spectacular distraction to take Taiwan without an amphibious landing, without a naval engagement, and without a shot fired.

To understand why the Iran crisis is a feature and not a bug from the Chinese strategic perspective it is first, necessary to understand what actually happened in June 2025, as opposed to what the censors convinced the media happened.

The air superiority story was real. Israeli F-35s and F-15s operated with impunity over Iran. The IRIAF’s fleet of pre-1979 American hand-me-downs was irrelevant. Israel struck 1,480-plus targets and the B-2s hit Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz. This is not in dispute.

What is has mostly been suppressed is the cost of defending against Iran’s response. Iran launched roughly 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones during the Twelve-Day War. The official “90% interception rate” is a masterwork of selective statistics: it describes the success rate of attempted intercepts. Al Jazeera’s analysis found that of 574 missiles, only 257 were engaged at all. The remaining 317 were never intercepted. Of the 257 attempts, 201 succeeded, 20 partially, 36 failed.

The damage to Israel, the extent of which is still under military censorship, included a direct hit on the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv that rendered Netanyahu’s office unusable for four months, confirmed satellite imagery of structural damage at Tel Nof Airbase, devastation of the Beersheba cyberwarfare base, $150-200 million in damage to the Haifa oil refinery, and at least five military facilities directly struck according to the Telegraph. Israeli journalist Raviv Drucker reported that “many strikes went unreported” and that “we were also deterred.” So much for the clean victory.

But the damage to Israel is secondary. The primary problem is the damage to the interceptor stockpile. The United States expended approximately 150 THAAD missiles in twelve days—roughly 25% of total production since 2010. Eighty-odd SM-3s were consumed. Israel was running low on Arrow interceptors by war’s end. FY26 authorized procurement of 37 new THAAD rounds. Twelve days of defending against 500 missiles consumed years of production and a quarter of the cumulative stockpile.

Iran began the war with 2,500-3,000 missiles. They fired 550. This means Iran retained 1,950 to 2,450 missiles post-war. They’ve had eight months to build and otherwise acquire more missiles, disperse them, and harden their launch sites. The interceptor math does not work for a second round. This is not analysis. It is arithmetic. And the more significant danger is if either the Chinese or the Russians have helped them reduce their margin of error from 1 kilometer to 500 meters or less.

Just this week, something happened that the press mentioned in passing and clearly failed to understand the implications. The PLA and MizarVision published high-resolution satellite imagery pinpointing American military assets across the Middle East. Eighteen F-35s and six EA-18G Growlers at Muwaffaq Salti in Jordan. Patriot positions at Al Udeid. THAAD deployments in Jordan. The PLA produced a video titled “Siege of Iran” showing eight US bases under continuous satellite surveillance, with real-time maritime tracking of carrier groups via Yaogan satellites.

This was not an intelligence leak. It was a gift to Tehran, delivered publicly, with the PLA’s name on it.

The significance is not the obvious warning, but what it enables. Iran has completed its transition from GPS to BeiDou-3 for missile guidance, which means it is now encrypted, jam-resistant, and isn’t subject to American denial-of-service attacks. During the June war, GPS jamming was one of the most effective defensive measures against Iranian missiles using satellite terminal guidance. That vulnerability has been eliminated. Combined with Chinese satellite targeting data showing the exact coordinates of every defensive position, fuel depot, and aircraft shelter in the theater, Iran can shift from the saturation tactics of June to more accurate time-sensitive strikes against specific targets.

Former CENTCOM commander Votel dismissed the Chinese and Russian naval presence in the Strait of Hormuz as “an easy way to show support” that “doesn’t fundamentally change anything.” This is the kind of assessment that sounds reasonable if you think military support means destroyers, and sounds idiotic if you understand that ISR is the decisive enabler of modern precision warfare and that China is providing exactly that. The next Iranian missile will originate from Iranian soil. Its targeting data will have traversed Chinese satellites. No Chinese ship needs to fire a single missile for this to fundamentally change the equation.

The American analytical establishment is organized by regional command. CENTCOM watches the Middle East. EUCOM watches Europe. INDOPACOM watches the Pacific. Nobody’s job is to watch all three simultaneously, which is why nobody in Washington can see the obvious.

Iran: Two carrier strike groups committed, hundreds of aircraft, the largest Middle East deployment in two decades. Iran can’t fold because the regime’s survival calculus has inverted—6,000 protesters killed in December, the rial down 90% since 2018, senior officials telling Khamenei that fear is no longer a deterrent. The Libya precedent governs: Gaddafi disarmed and died in a ditch. Iran’s leaders would rather fight and die than capitulate and die, and they’re now better armed for the second round than they were for the first.

Ukraine: Russia is not “bogged down” and it never was. Russian forces are optimized for modern attrition drone warfare and are methodically advancing. Putin stated in December that “interest in withdrawal has been reduced to zero.” Ukrainian assessments give Russia a 12-18 month window for an Odessa operation, with the summer 2026 offensive already in preparation. Odessa’s fall makes Ukraine landlocked, which marks an end to maritime trade, an end to grain exports, and the end of the war. Every interceptor America fires in the Persian Gulf is one unavailable for European defense. The Russians have an obvious incentive to keep the US occupied in the Middle East during the Odessa push.

Taiwan: No carrier surge. No unusual PLA mobilization. No amphibious lift concentration. Nothing that triggers the satellite-watchers and wargamers.

That’s because the operation isn’t going to be a military one.

The CCP’s annual Taiwan Work Conference in February identified four priorities for 2026: unite “patriotic” forces in Taiwan; integrate PRC-Taiwanese supply chains while weakening US-Taiwanese ones; strengthen the legal basis for unification; and establish a task force using United Front work and cyberspace operations to damage the DPP in upcoming municipal elections.

The KMT isn’t being coerced into this. Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun has publicly and repeatedly sought engagement with Xi. PRC state media reported approvingly on her cross-strait policies. The CCP is transforming the KMT into a recognized party able to speak on Taiwan’s behalf, into a parallel diplomatic channel that bypasses the elected DPP government entirely.

Taiwan’s domestic politics just happen to be cooperating in harmony with this development. Constitutional crises, legislative paralysis, opposition attempts to remove President Lai and his cabinet, mass recall elections, and gridlock of the court system. The AEI/ISW assessment, from analysts who are actively unsympathetic to unification, recognize the instability of the situation: “The CCP can exploit this gridlock and general distrust in Taiwanese institutions to undermine the legitimacy of Taiwan’s government and present itself as a preferable alternative.”

The fishing militia exercises are relevant here, but not as the invasion rehearsal the military analysts believe them to be, but as economic coercion capability demonstration. Between 1,400 and 2,000 PRC fishing boats mobilized in blockade-like formations in December and January. Taiwan’s Coast Guard expanded its “suspicious vessel” list from 300 to 1,900 in response. This doesn’t signal D-Day. It signals the ability to strangle the island economically at will, and therefore the cost of resistance to any incoming government considering whether to cooperate with Beijing or not.

The path forward isn’t complicated. The KMT wins municipal elections. The DPP is discredited. A political crisis—manufactured or organic—produces a change of government. The new government invites dialogue, accepts a framework for integration, and stands the military down. What, precisely, is the US going to invade to prevent? It cannot defend a government that does not wish to be defended. It cannot maintain an alliance with a country whose leadership has chosen the other side.

The military analysts build their models of Taiwan as if Xi Jinping were a US president and someone who receives briefings about a faraway island he’s never visited and doesn’t know very well. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation and the Chinese president.

Xi spent seventeen years in Fujian Province, directly across the strait from Taiwan. Vice mayor of Xiamen, party secretary of Fuzhou, governor of the province, and simultaneously head of the Party Committee’s Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs. His specific job for nearly two decades was courting the top Taiwanese businessmen with tax incentives, land deals, and government support. Xiamen and Fuzhou became the primary hubs for Taiwanese investment on the mainland under his direct management. He opened the direct shipping routes between Xiamen and Kinmen. The cross-strait economic integration model that later became national policy was his personal creation, built from the ground up at the provincial level.

Then five years in Zhejiang, which is the other major destination for Taiwanese investment, followed by Shanghai. He staffed his government accordingly. Zheng Shanjie, now the NDRC chairman, started as a local official in Xiamen when Xi was deputy mayor. In a “surprise” career move, Zheng was appointed deputy director of the Taiwan Office. This should not surprise anyone who has been paying attention.

Xi doesn’t need intelligence briefings about the Taiwanese business elite. He’s known them for thirty years. He knows who’s leveraged, who owes him favors, who’s sympathetic to unification, and who can lean on others. A political transition doesn’t require tanks. It requires the right phone calls to the right people at the right moment, and Xi has spent his entire career assembling the right numbers.

Washington’s analytical failure on Taiwan isn’t an intelligence failure. It’s a cultural failure.

The entire American strategic establishment runs on Clausewitzian concepts: war as politics by other means, identify the center of gravity, mass force, achieve decisive battle. That’s how they think about Taiwan, in terms of carrier groups, kill chains, amphibious lift ratios. The analytical infrastructure is organized around “can China successfully invade?” as if that were the relevant question. But it’s not.

Sun Tzu’s hierarchy of strategic excellence ranks the highest achievement as defeating the enemy’s strategy, followed by disrupting his alliances, then attacking his army, with besieging walled cities at the bottom—the mark of failure, the option you resort to when everything else has gone wrong. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan is literally the lowest-ranked option in the strategic tradition Xi was educated in. Everything Beijing is actually doing—the economic integration, the KMT cultivation, the United Front work, the three-theater overextension of American forces—maps to the higher levels of the hierarchy. But the Pentagon keeps modeling the lowest one, because that’s the one they know how to wargame.

The entire PLA buildup may serve a dual purpose that the military analysts can’t see because they’re not trained to look for it: fixing Washington’s analytical attention on the invasion scenario, consuming defense budgets and strategic planning bandwidth on the wrong problem, while the actual operation proceeds through political channels. All warfare is based on deception, and the most elegant deception is one where the enemy sees exactly what you’re doing—building an invasion force—and draws exactly the wrong conclusion about what it’s for.

Xi Jinping is 72. He has broken every CCP institutional policy in order to remain in power. The 2027 Party Congress is where he has to either step down or pursue a fourth term. The centennial of the PLA’s founding falls the same year. Taiwan’s next presidential election is January 2028.

Mao founded the People’s Republic. Deng opened it to the world. Neither accomplished reunification with Taiwan island. I believe Xi intends unification to be his crowning legacy, and peaceful reunification would mark the superior achievement, not just in strategic and economic senses, but in the Chinese civilizational context. Military conquest would prove the PLA is strong. Peaceful reunification would prove that Chinese civilization’s gravitational pull is irresistible, that the Western model of strategic competition was defeated by patience and political art, and that the last holdout returned to the fold voluntarily. It would vindicate not just the CCP but the entire Sunzian tradition against the Clausewitzian one. The Americans spent trillions preparing for an invasion that never came while China won through asymmetric unrestricted warfare and 勢—the patient cultivation of positional advantage until the outcome becomes inevitable.

That would be a personal legacy that surpasses Mao, and Xi knows it.

The board is now set. Iran absorbs American attention and interceptor stocks. Russia pushes toward Odessa while the European governments begin to collapse under the weight of their impotence and corruption. The KMT builds its position inside Taiwan. Xi waits for the convergence, the right moment when US forces are committed, interceptors depleted, Europeans are helpless, Taiwan’s DPP is discredited, and the first quiet phone calls are made.

I don’t know the exact timeline. But I know the strategy, and I know about the man, and as an East Asian Studies major and armchair military historian, I know the tradition he operates in. From the Chinese perspective, the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting a battle. And while we’re watching Iran, I suspect that’s exactly what’s happening.

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The Pieces are in Place

109 refueling planes. 250 fighter-bombers. 50 percent of the C17 fleet. 40 anti-radar planes. Both carriers are in place. All the pieces are set.

Most of the analysts are expecting the war to begin anywhere from later tonight to Tuesday. And Larry Johnson reports that the US military is anticipating 10,000 casualties, which I would think indicates at least one carrier sunk.

None of this makes any sense with regards to the US national interest unless a) something entirely different is going on and the target isn’t Iran or b) Clown World is calling the shots.

Either way, we’ll find out soon.

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When History Rhymes

I don’t know if Big Serge intended this post about Japan’s general strategy in the lead-up to WWII, or rather, the obvious lack of it, to be a warning relevant to the current situation facing the United States, but it’s educational regardless.

This is not a history of the Second Sino-Japanese War. For our purposes, however, three vital threads emerge from the beginning of that conflict. First, that the Japanese incorrectly anticipated a quick victory in northern China, after which they would begin to digest the region’s economic resources. Secondly, the rapid and unexpected expansion of the fighting in China created an enormous drain on Japanese resources which led directly to the economic pressures which created the Pacific War. Third, that same resource crunch sparked and escalated the inter-service disagreements and factionalism which characterized Japanese leadership throughout the war.

In the context of Japan’s larger imperial ambitions and strategy, it is difficult to imagine a more severe backfire than the decision to launch into northern China in 1937. Japanese planners initially hoped for a quick and decisive victory using limited forces. In July 1937, Army operational plans sketched out an offensive using just three divisions which were expected to overrun the Beijing area and crush the enemy’s main forces, at which point Chiang Kai-shek was expected to sue for peace. The idea that Chiang might still be in the field, fighting, even after the loss of both Shanghai and his capital at Nanking was unthinkable, but that is precisely what happened.

The natural result, therefore, was rapid and massive escalation of Japanese resource commitments in China as the war spilled its banks. The optimistic initial estimates – three divisions, three months, and a total cost of just 100 million yen – were swept aside, and the Japanese General Staff found itself preparing to mobilize the entire army for action on an indefinite timetable. Three divisions became twenty; 100 million yen became 2.5 billion.

The ballooning demands of the field army in China pushed Japan into a bona fide economic crisis. Tokyo initially hoped that the field army could finish the fight on those materials that had already been stockpiled in the theater, but these had been exhausted by the end of 1937, with no end to the conflict in sight. Munition and fuel stocks in China were on empty, but that was not all. Even the munitions stocks in Japan were barely sufficient to supply ongoing operations in China, which meant that a Soviet attack on Manchuria – a longstanding and ever present Japanese fear – could quickly create a critical situation.

In short, the stubborn refusal by Chiang to simply collapse and sue for terms as expected had created an enormous resource sink which forced Japan into a full war economy in a state of near crisis. Most disconcertingly, the only way for Japan to make up the critical shortfalls in key materials – above all fuels of all types – was by massively increasing imports from the United States.

The USA has already engaged in one attack on Iran. It appears now about to engage in a second one, this time with Russian and Chinese ships at the other end of the gulf. At the same time, it also has a weakening economy and an excessive dependence upon imports as well as foreign debt.

And, as I’ve already pointed out, in industrial terms, the USA is to China what Japan was to the USA in 1940…

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Armchair Observations

Armchair Warlord contemplates the prospects for an imminent sequel to the 12-Day War between the USA, Israel, and Iran:

  1. Deployment prior to this week was, as I pointed out at the time, consistent with a show of force to underline a negotiating position rather than a serious operation. Although that has begun to change, US aerial forces in the Middle East remain inferior in strength to the Israeli Air Force that quickly ran out of steam in combat last year. Any air campaign would not be a step-change from that of the Twelve Days’ War.
  2. The departure of huge numbers of tankers to the Middle East, without concomitant massive fighter deployments, indicates that the USAF intends to base its strike aircraft out of the easy range of Iranian short-range missiles on the other side of the Middle East or even farther afield in Cyprus, Diego Garcia, etc. This will dramatically curtail sortie generation compared to aircraft flying out of Al Udied in Qatar and other bases on the Gulf – established for exactly this confrontation but now perfectly useless given the number of short-range missiles the Iranians have pointed at them.
  3. USN forces in the region have a realistic total throw-weight of 300 to 400 badly out of date Tomahawk missiles, which is grossly inadequate for a sustained strike campaign against Iran. Recall that the USN fired almost eighty in a single strike against Syrian WMD targets a decade ago and most were shot down. The USN task force realistically has two or three missile salvos against defended point targets before its magazines run dry.
  4. Iranian offensive and defensive capabilities are formidable and have been overtly bolstered by the Chinese in recent weeks. Any attacks on Iranian soil will need to be – as in the Twelve Days’ War – conducted from a limited pool of standoff munitions. The Israelis, who are expected to join any strikes, certainly have not replenished their own stockpiles. This dramatically curtails the combat endurance of the coalition forces.
  5. The Chinese and Russians are feeding intelligence to Iran. This likely allowed them to stymie a US bomber strike last month prior to latest force buildup. The Iranians can be expected to have an excellent picture of US and Israeli moves at the tactical level.
  6. In the aftermath of the Twelve Days’ War and the insurrection in Iran last month, Mossad’s attack network is likely a spent force and cannot be expected to contribute meaningfully to the war effort.
  7. Iran retains significant proxy capability across the region. Iranian proxies in Iraq and Yemen are practically untouched. Hezbollah in Lebanon sat out the Twelve Days’ War but can be expected to join in a regional Götterdämmerung.
  8. No significant US ground forces have deployed, and the Iranians killed or arrested all of their compradors two weeks ago. Ergo, there is no route to actual regime change in Iran. There’s no Delcy Rodriguez and Vladimir Padrino interested in a coup d’etat by proxy and able to elaborately set conditions for it to happen.
  9. US facilities in the Gulf and the VERY vulnerable US embassy in Iraq (and the somewhat less vulnerable US embassy in Beirut) remain un-evacuated at this time. Evacuation of those facilities is a short-notice indicator of war – as we saw last month when bombers were likely airborne before being called off.
  10. The TACO trade is real. Trump talks a big game until the markets start to believe him, whereupon he reliably beats a hasty retreat and pivots to a new distraction from the Epstein Files. The moral hazard here is that Trump has done this so many times that by this point global markets don’t actually take him seriously and so they’re reacting late and weak to what are objectively very concerning developments. With that said oil prices are – finally – starting to rise. US deployments to the Middle East thus far are to give Trump a credible military option if he decides to use force against Iran – prior deployments were non-credible and the Iranians would have taken them as such – but talk that war is necessarily imminent or that this force is actually adequate to the absolutely colossal task at hand (Iran is a country of 90 million and a geographic fortress) is irresponsible.

It’s certainly possible that Short Fake Trump is bluffing again. Or that he’s desperately trying to keep Netanyahu and his donors off his back a little longer before declaring victory and going home. But it will be a major faux pas and admission of military weakness to send such a comparatively large naval force to the region only to turn around and sail back home again.

Then again, Trump has declared bigger victories with even less in the way of results before, so we can’t count it out.

UPDATE: What goes around, comes around.

China has begun doing to the United States in the Middle East, what the United States has been doing to Russia in Ukraine: Providing imagery of US bases, planes, troop concentrations and more so Iran can use them against the United States, the same way Ukraine uses US-provided info against Russia. Not only is the satellite imagery clear, they overlaid identification tags showing “F-35” or “E-18 Growler” as seen in one image.

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Did Iran Miss its Chance?

It appears that Iran, like Russia, just managed to get suckered into “diplomacy” that was never anything more than a means of buying time in order to permit the US military to move its pieces into position for a series of decapitation and incapacitation strikes.

The rapid buildup of U.S. forces in the Middle East has progressed to the point that President Trump has the option to take military action against Iran as soon as this weekend, administration and Pentagon officials said, leaving the White House with high-stakes choices about pursuing diplomacy or war.

Mr. Trump has given no indication that he has made a decision about how to proceed. But the drive to assemble a military force capable of striking Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missiles and accompanying launch sites has continued this week despite indirect talks between the two nations on Tuesday, with Iran seeking two weeks to come back with fleshed out proposals for a diplomatic resolution.

Many administration officials have expressed skepticism about the prospects of reaching a diplomatic deal with Tehran. The indirect talks on Tuesday in Geneva ended with what Iran’s foreign minister said was agreement on a “set of guiding principles.” U.S. officials said the two sides made progress but added that big gaps remain.

It’s really rather remarkable that Clown World’s targets keep falling for this sort of thing, and they’ve been doing so since Desert Shield. The only chance Saddam Hussein had was launching his own ground offensive before all of his assets were systematically depreciated by 100,000 sorties flown over 36 days; by the time Desert Storm began his armies weren’t even in any shape to resist.

Russia, of course, has been able to overcome the challenges posed by its engagement with the deceitful Minsk agreements, but it has paid a higher price for its reluctance to accept the inevitable. Even now, it’s still trying to negotiate and bargain while resisting the need to admit that the only way it can end the war is to win it on the ground.

Iran stopped the 12-Day War eight months ago, and as a result, now finds itself facing a much more formidable US expeditionary force, and would probably have been much better off launching its attacks on the US bases in the region rather than waiting for its air defense systems to be attacked and its launch sites destroyed, then trying to hit back with its degraded capabilities.

Of course, we can’t necessarily assume that the Iranians are making the same mistake again. And there are some signs that Iran has been using the additional time to bring in support from Russia and China, to say nothing of arranging for the arrival of the Russian and Chinese ships for their “joint naval exercise”. But the US assumption is that Russia and China are going to stay out of this, and that whatever help they’ve been able to provide will be less significant than the arrangement of the US pieces.

So, I suppose as with most wars, we’ll just have to wait and see who underestimated whom. But the recent history has not tended to favor the side that is reluctant to respond to overt aggression, whether that is out of cowardice, ill-founded optimism, an unwillingness to abandon the status quo, or simple naivete.

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Extended Air War on Iran

It increasingly appears that the tail is in firm control of the dog, and that Netanyahu is going to get his Round 2 with Iran for which he has been working to enlist the US military.

A large wave of American airpower is heading toward the Middle East to bolster forces already there as U.S. President Donald Trump considers an attack against Iran. Online flight trackers are showing F-22 Raptors, F-16 Fighting Falcons, E-3 Sentry radar planes and a U-2 Dragon Lady spy plane either in transit across the Atlantic or newly arrived in Europe. In addition, a seventh Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer, the USS Pinckney, has recently deployed to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) as well, a U.S. Navy official told us.

While we don’t know whether Trump will decide to attack Iran, these are exactly the movements we’ve been expecting, but so far not seeing, in advance of a sustained operation, both defensive and offensive. The U.S. aircraft heading east represents the most intense phase of a force plus-up that began after Trump started threatening Iran over its harsh treatment of anti-regime protesters. Taken together, the force now assembling in the Middle East, combined with the Israel Air Force’s capabilities, including hundreds of fighter aircraft, as well as USAF ‘global airpower’ bomber flights, would be enough for a major operation that could last weeks not days. We will likely see additional assets deploy in the coming days.

A demonstration of unprecedented military might or the US Sicilian Expedition? I tend to assume the latter, as does Col. Douglas Macgregor. But the Russian and Chinese navies would appear to be a deterrent, only it’s very hard to deter irrational minds without the actual use of force.

And contra what the Christian Zionists are saying, if Israel fails, that doesn’t mean Jesus isn’t real. It means that Christian Zionism is false and has always been a satanic charade. The mere fact that they would even express such a thought tends to indicate the source of the concept.

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Russian Objectives are Expanding

When Russia launched its special military operation in 2022, the initial objective was the liberation of the Donbass from Clown World. Now that the initial objective has been largely achieved, but neither the Kiev regime nor the NATO clowns are willing to accept the situation and surrender, there is no reason for the Russians to refrain from expanding their objectives:

In his February 9, 2026, interview with TV BRICS (and echoed in related remarks), Lavrov reiterated Russia’s demands for a settlement: eradicating “Nazi foundations,” preventing weapons in Ukraine that threaten Russia, and protecting rights of Russian/Russian-speaking people in Crimea, Donbas, and Novorossiya (who the Kyiv regime has labeled as “subhuman” and launched a civil war against them early in 2014).

In a February 10, 2026, speech/ceremony marking Diplomatic Workers’ Day (reported by TASS and mid.ru), Lavrov stated that Russia will “complete the process of returning” Crimea, Donbas, and Novorossiya to their “native harbor” (i.e., full integration with Russia), in line with the “will” expressed in the 2022 referendums. He added that linguistic, cultural, and religious rights of Russians/Russian-speakers in areas remaining under Kyiv’s control must be restored, alongside eliminating military threats from Ukraine to Russia’s security.

Similar phrasing appeared in his February 11, 2026, remarks during the Government Hour in the State Duma, where he criticized Western “double standards” (e.g., supporting self-determination for Greenland while denying it for Crimea, Donbas, and Novorossiya) and vowed to defend Russia’s position diplomatically.

Novorossiya (Russian: Новороссия, meaning “New Russia”) is a historical term that originated in the 18th century during the era of the Russian Empire. It referred to a large administrative and colonial region in what is now southern and southeastern mainland Ukraine, along the northern coast of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

The term entered official use in 1764, when Empress Catherine the Great established the Novorossiya Governorate (Novorossiyskaya guberniya). This was part of Russia’s southward expansion during the late 18th century, driven by a series of Russo-Turkish Wars (notably 1768–1774 and 1787–1792).

I believe that when Putin and Lavrov speak of Novorossiya today they are signaling maximalist goals… Not just holding annexed territories (Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia) but laying a claim to adjacent regions, which include Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Mykolaiv where Russian speakers live or there are historical ties.

I tend to agree. While I always felt that Russia would insist on reclaiming Odessa for strategic reasons, the fact that it’s now clear that they will have to impose terms on Kiev and Clown World rather than reach an accommodation, it makes more sense to simply acquire the four additional regions that would complete the liberation of Novorossiya in its entirety.

Which probably explains the way in which Russian military activity will be increasing as the US ties itself up in Israel’s Middle East conflict with Iran and potentially a number of other countries, including Turkey.

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Pure Satanism

The Russians are now openly and publicly calling out the wicked elite that presently rule over Christendom:

The Epstein case has revealed the real face of the Western elites who are seeking to rule the entire world, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said.

“This topic has exposed the real face of what is called the collective West and the deep state, or rather, an alliance that controls the entire West and is seeking to rule the whole world,” he said in an interview with Itogi Nedely weekly news roundup on the NTV television channel.

“It is unnecessary to explain to any normal person that this is pure Satanism and is beyond human comprehension,” he added.

Epstein is just the tip of the iceberg. It’s a glimpse of the material evil that itself is just a small portion of the much-larger spiritual war.

And remember, the Russians have all the records of the WWII-era death camps. They have all the evidence that they’ve gathered in the parts of Ukraine that have been freed from Clown World rule. Given the way in which their rhetoric is getting stronger in line with the prospects of military victory, they obviously know a lot more than they are now saying publicly or showing the world.

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US-Iran Talks Cancelled

It’s being reported that the talks were cancelled because it was very, very important to the USA to expand the talks to include ballistic missiles. Which tends to lend an amount of credence to the belief that the last exchange of ballistic missiles between Israel and Iran hurt the former a lot more than the media indicated.

I understand that Israel is a lot more eager for war than the media tends to be indicating, which tends to indicate that there will be another round soon whether the USA elects to participate or not.

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Diversity Will Hunt You Down

This is what it making the coming demographic repairs both inevitable and unavoidable. Because Clown World is aggressively attempting to not only eliminate the right to free association, but every last vestige of the ability of white people to live amongst themselves in the style they prefer:

The British countryside is in the midst of a diversity drive after a government-commissioned report found it was too ‘white’ and ‘middle-class’.

Officials charged with managing some of the country’s best known beauty spots have laid out a series of proposals aimed at attracting minorities.

The plans follow a review, ordered by the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra), which warned the countryside was seen as ‘very much a white environment’ and risked becoming ‘irrelevant’ in a multicultural society.

In the wake of the report, officials representing National Landscapes – including the Cotswolds and Chilterns – have now published a series of management plans that detail their proposals to attract more minority communities. 

The Chiltern National Landscape will launch an outreach programme in Luton and High Wycombe targeted at Muslims.

One factor stopping ethnic minorities visiting was said to be ‘anxiety over unleashed dogs’.

Translation: they’re eventually going to try to ban dogs. I had no idea that leash laws were actually about imposing diversity on people.

The extremists of the younger generations are going to be a bit much for those of us who grew up comfortably indoctrinated in It’s a Small World Disney propaganda. For Generation X, our role is largely going to be to shut up, stay out of their way, and let them get on with fixing the problem as they see fit. Because we all know who their patron saint is going to be, and it isn’t St. George.

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