Tag: philosophy

Veriphysics: The Treatise 023

VI. The Core Criterion of Warranted Assent

Philosophy needs methods, not merely principles. The most beautiful metaphysics is useless if it cannot be applied, if it provides no guidance for distinguishing true claims from false, no criterion for deciding what to believe. The Enlightenment understood this and offered scientific method as the criterion. The offer proved fraudulent: the scientific method became a rhetorical gesture rather than a practiced discipline, primarily invoked to legitimize conclusions reached by other means, and never actually applied to the Enlightenment’s core commitments.

Veriscendancy offers a genuine criterion: the Triad of Truth, the Triveritas. A claim merits assent and may be accepted as probably true when and only when it satisfies three conditions: logical validity, mathematical coherence, and empirical anchoring. Each condition is necessary; none is sufficient; the conjunction of all three elements is required.

Logical validity means that the argument for the claim must be formally sound. The conclusions must follow from the premises; the inferences must be valid; the reasoning must be free from fallacy. This seems obvious, but the Enlightenment systematically violated it. The social contract is a logical fiction, since no such contract was ever written, and the consent it presupposes is manufactured from Rousseau’s imagination. The invisible hand is a metaphor mistaken for a mechanism—there is no actual entity coordinating markets, and the claim that uncoordinated self-interest produces optimal outcomes is an assertion, not a derivation. The autonomous reason is self-refuting—a reason that answers to nothing outside itself cannot justify its own authority.

The tradition always possessed logical tools superior to the Enlightenment’s. Scholastic logic was developed over centuries, refined through disputation, tested against objections. It distinguished valid from invalid inference with precision that the Enlightenment never matched. The tradition’s failure was not logical inadequacy but rhetorical malpractice: it kept its logic in the seminar room while the Enlightenment preached in the public square. Veriphysics deploys the tradition’s logical resources as weapons, subjecting Enlightenment claims to the scrutiny they never received and finding them wanting.

Mathematical coherence means that the claim must survive quantitative analysis where quantification is possible. If a theory makes numerical predictions or depends on rates, probabilities, or magnitudes, those numbers must work. Mathematics operates at a level prior to domain-specific interpretation; it constrains what is possible regardless of what experts prefer to believe. If the math says a thing cannot happen, then it cannot happen, no matter how many authorities assert otherwise.

The Enlightenment invoked mathematics constantly but rarely submitted to its discipline. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection makes implicit claims about mutation rates, fixation rates, and timescales. When these claims are made explicit and calculated, the theory fails catastrophically, not by small margins but by five orders of magnitude. The classical economists’ supply and demand curves depend on aggregation conditions that Gorman proved do not hold in the manner they are customarily utilized. The mathematicians at the Wistar Institute demonstrated in 1966 that the Modern Synthesis could not generate the observed complexity of life; the biologists ignored them because they were not capable of grasping the mathematical implications. The pattern is consistent: mathematics exposes what rhetoric conceals.

Veriphysics demands mathematical accountability. Every claim that involves quantities must provide the correct calculations. The calculations must be examined, not by credentialed authorities with careers at stake, but by anyone competent in mathematics. A game designer with arithmetic can refute a biological establishment with doctorates, if the game designer does the math and the establishment does not. The Triveritas democratizes critique: there is no need for a priestly anointing or credentialed membership in a guild to check the numbers.

Empirical anchoring means that the claim must be tethered to observed reality. Theory without evidence is speculation; it may be elegant, coherent, mathematically sophisticated, and still describe nothing actual. The claim must make contact with the world, must be confirmed or at least not refuted by what we observe, must have some purchase on the phenomena it purports to explain.

But empirical anchoring alone is insufficient. Data is always interpreted through frameworks; evidence underdetermines theory; the same observations can be made consistent with multiple explanations. This is why the Enlightenment’s “empiricism” proved so hollow: the evidence was real, but it was filtered through interpretive schemes that were never questioned. Darwinism accumulated vast quantities of evidence—fossils, biogeography, comparative anatomy—all of which could be reinterpreted once the theory was questioned. The evidence was an anchor, but it was attached to a ship that should never have sailed.

The Triad addresses this problem by requiring all three elements. Evidence alone can be accommodated to any sufficiently flexible theory. Logic alone can generate elegant systems with no relation to reality. Mathematics alone can become a game of formal manipulation. But evidence that is logically derived from coherent premises, that survives mathematical scrutiny, and that anchors the conclusions in observed phenomena is evidence that commands assent. The conjunction is demanding, far more demanding than false pretense of the scientific method as actually practiced in the credentialed science guilds. But truth is demanding. A criterion that was not demanding would not be worth constructing.

You can now buy the complete Veriphysics: The Treatise at Amazon in both Kindle and audiobook formats if you’d like to read ahead or have it available as a reference. 

DISCUSS ON SG

VERIPHYSICS: THE TREATISE 022

V. A Sound Grounding in Christian Metaphysics

Veriphysics does not pretend to religious neutrality. The Enlightenment feigned neutrality and wound up demonstrating its impossibility. A philosophy always rests on a foundation; the question is only whether that foundation is acknowledged or concealed. The Enlightenment’s concealed foundations, autonomous reason, mechanical nature, the separation of fact and value, proved incoherent, if not outright satanic. Veriphysic’s foundations are explicit, sound, and Christian.

This is not an fearful retreat from reason into the dogmatic faith of the fideists. Veriphsyics holds that faith and reason are intrinsically complementary, not contradictory. Reason investigates reality while faith provides access to truths that reason alone cannot reach. The two do not conflict because they cannot conflict: truth is one, and any apparent contradiction between the deliverances of reason and the revelations of faith merely indicates an error somewhere, committed somewhere in the reasoning, in the interpretation of the belief, or sometimes in both. The medieval formula remains valid, as philosophy is the handmaid of theology, not because philosophy is inferior per se, but because both ultimately serve the same mistress, which is Truth.

The Christian grounding provides what the Enlightenment could not, which is a foundation for the very concepts the Enlightenment wished to preserve without it. Consider truth. The Enlightenment wanted to establish its truths, attempted to distinguish true claims from false, knowledge from opinion, and science from superstition. But on the sole basis of Enlightenment premises, even the existence of truth becomes problematic. If the mind is merely matter in motion, why should its operations connect to reality? If reason is autonomous, what prevents it from constructing whatever happens to suit its purposes at the moment? If nature is value-free, what makes truth even relevant, let alone valuable? The Enlightenment helped itself to the concept of truth while undermining the conditions of its possibility.

Christian metaphysics grounds truth in the Logos, in the divine reason that creates and sustains all things. The world is intelligible because it is the product of intelligence. Truth is not an abstraction floating free of reality; it is an attribute of God Himself, participated in by creatures insofar as they know. The correspondence between mind and world that makes knowledge possible is not a happy accident; it is a consequence of both mind and world being created by the same rational God. We can know because we are made in the image of one who knows perfectly.

Consider goodness. The Enlightenment desired some form of ethics and attempted to distinguish right from wrong, virtue from vice, justice from injustice. But on Enlightenment premises, goodness becomes arbitrary. If nature is value-free, then values are imposed by nothing more than subjective human will. If there is no purpose built into things, then purposes are merely human constructions. If the universe is indifferent, then moral claims are nothing more than expressions of individual preferences, not descriptions of reality. The Enlightenment stole the Christian tradition’s moral vocabulary and built a whole series of rights and claims upon it while sawing off the very branch on which that vocabulary rested.

Christian metaphysics grounds goodness in the nature of God and the nature of creation. Good and evil are not constructions but realities. They are material features of the world as God made it and as we encounter it. The moral law is not arbitrary command but expression of divine wisdom, built into the structure of things, discoverable by reason, confirmed by revelation. To know the truth about human nature is already to know something about how humans should live. The fact-value distinction dissolves: facts about what things are entail facts about what things are for, and things are for their proper flourishing.

Consider meaning. The Enlightenment wanted significance. Its philosophers did not embrace nihilism. They wanted human life to matter, wanted projects worth pursuing, wanted a story that made sense. But meaning evaporates on Enlightenment premises. If the universe is matter in motion with no inherent purpose, then human life is an accident in an indifferent cosmos. If history has no direction, then there is no narrative, only events. If we are mere vehicles for immortal genes, then our only purpose is to propagate them. And if death is final, then nothing we do in this lifetime ultimately matters. The Enlightenment wanted the fruits of Christian civilization without the root of it; it is now discovering how those fruits wither when they are cut off from the root.

Christian metaphysics provides what the Enlightenment could not: a universe in which meaning is not projected but discovered, in which human life matters because human beings are created and loved by God, in which history is going somewhere because it is governed by providence, in which death is not final because the Creator of life has conquered death. These are not comforting illusions but truths—truths that ground the very concepts the Enlightenment wished to preserve and could not.

Veriphysics does not impose these truths dogmatically; it proposes them as the best explanation of phenomena that the Enlightenment cannot explain. Why is the universe intelligible? Why do mathematical structures describe physical reality? Why does consciousness exist? Why do human beings persistently seek meaning, justice, and transcendence? The Christian answers to these questions are coherent, comprehensive, and supported by two millennia of philosophical development. The Enlightenment’s answers are ad hoc, fragmented, and self-undermining, when it manages to provide any answers at all. The choice between Christian metaphysics and Enlightenment metaphysics is not faith versus reason, but rather, solid and coherent reason versus incoherent irrationality.

DISCUSS ON SG

Veriphysics: The Treatise 021

IV. The Collapse of Materialism in Physics

The Enlightenment’s metaphysics was materialist at its core. The universe was matter in motion, governed by deterministic laws, fully explicable in principle by the methods of physics. Mind was either reducible to matter or an epiphenomenal shadow cast by material processes. Purpose, meaning, and value were projections onto a universe that contained none of them intrinsically. The goal of science was to complete the mechanical picture, to fill in the remaining gaps, to achieve the God’s-eye view that would render everything transparent to human understanding.

The twentieth century destroyed this picture from within. The destruction came not from theology or philosophy but from physics itself, from the very science that was supposed to complete the materialist vision.

Quantum mechanics revealed that the foundations of matter are not mechanical. At the subatomic level, particles do not have definite positions and momenta until measured; they exist in superpositions of states, described by probability amplitudes rather than determinate values. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is not merely a limitation on our knowledge; it is a feature of reality itself. The universe, at its most fundamental level, is not a clockwork. It is something stranger, less determinate, more resistant to complete specification than the Enlightenment ever imagined.

Niels Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation forced an even more troubling conclusion: the act of observation affects what is observed. The measurement problem—the question of how and why quantum superpositions collapse into definite states when measured—remains unsolved after a century of effort. Consciousness cannot be eliminated from the foundations of physics. The materialist program aimed to explain mind in terms of matter; quantum mechanics suggested that matter, at the deepest level, cannot be fully described without reference to mind. The observer is not a passive recorder of an independently existing reality; the observer is implicated in the constitution of what is observed.

Cosmology delivered further blows. The confident materialism that claimed to explain everything has discovered that it cannot account for most of what exists. Approximately ninety-five percent of the universe consists of “dark matter” and “dark energy” which are simply names for our ignorance, placeholders for phenomena we can detect only by their gravitational effects but cannot observe, explain, or integrate into our existing theories. The visible universe of everything we can see, touch, measure, analyz is merely a thin film on an ocean of darkness. The Enlightenment promised illumination; physics has discovered that we inhabit a cosmos mostly opaque to our inquiry.

The multiverse hypothesis represents the final confession of materialist bankruptcy. Confronted with the fine-tuning of physical constants and the fact that the parameters of our universe appear exquisitely calibrated to permit the existence of complex structures, life, and consciousness, materialists found themselves facing a dilemma. The fine-tuning seemed to point toward purpose, design, intention. To avoid this conclusion, some physicists proposed that our universe is one of infinitely many, each with different constants, and we naturally find ourselves in one compatible with our existence. The “multiverse” explains everything and therefore nothing. It is unfalsifiable by design and no observation could ever confirm or refute it. It posits more unobservable entities than observable ones. It is not science but metaphysics, and bad metaphysics at that: an ad hoc construction designed to avoid the obvious implication of the evidence.

The obvious implication is what the Christian tradition always maintained: material reality is not self-sufficient. The visible depends on the invisible. The natural participates in the supernatural. Creation reflects Creator. The mechanical universe was a brief hallucination, sustained for three centuries by the momentum of technological success and the institutional capture of intellectual life. The mysterious universe, saturated with indeterminacy, opaque to final explanation, pointing beyond itself to what transcends it, is what we actually inhabit.

This is not a “God of the gaps” argument, inserting divinity wherever science has not yet reached. It is the exact opposite: the recognition that the gaps are not temporary deficiencies to be filled by future research but the structural features of creaturely knowledge. We see as though through a glass, darkly, not because the glass could be replaced by something clearer, but because we are creatures and not Creator. The darkness is not a problem to be solved but a condition to be acknowledged. Humility about our limits is not skepticism; it is the precondition of genuine knowledge.

You can now buy the complete Veriphysics: The Treatise at Amazon in both Kindle and audiobook formats if you’d like to read ahead or have it available as a reference. 

DISCUSS ON SG

Veriphysics: Triveritas vs Trilemma

So yesterday, I posted about the Agrippan Trilemma, also known in its modern formulation as the Münchhausen Trilemma, which is considered a significant philosophical device that has successfully asserted how any attempt to justify knowledge leads to one of three unsatisfactory outcomes: circular reasoning, infinite regress, or dogmatic assertion. A number of you agreed that this was a worthy challenge that would provide a suitable test for the epistemological strength of the Triveratas.

And while the purpose of Veriphysics is not to expose the flaws in ancient or modern philosophy, as it happens, the Triveritas is not only the first epistemological system to be able to defend itself successfully from the Trilemma, but in the process of defending the Triveritas from it, Claude Athos and I identified a fundamental flaw in the Trilemma itself that renders it invalid and falsifies its claims to universality.

So, if you are philosophically inclined, I invite you to read a Veriphysics working paper that both solves the Trilemma for the first time in nearly 2,000 years while additionally demonstrating its invalidity.

Solving the Agrippan Trilemma: Triveritas and the Third Horn

The Agrippan Trilemma holds that any attempt to justify a claim must terminate in infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatic stopping. No major epistemological framework has solved it; each concedes one horn. This paper solves the Trilemma by demonstrating that the Triveritas survives all three horns, identifying an amphiboly in the third horn that renders the argument invalid, and providing a counterexample that falsifies the Trilemma’s claim to universality. The Trilemma’s third horn rests on an amphiboly: it conflates “terminates” with “terminates arbitrarily,” treating the two as logically equivalent. They are not. The Triveritas, which requires the simultaneous satisfaction of three independently necessary epistemic conditions (logical validity, mathematical coherence, and empirical anchoring), terminates at three stopping points of fundamentally different kinds, each checked by the other two. The probability of error surviving all three checks is strictly less than the probability of surviving any one; this is proved mathematically and confirmed empirically across twelve historical cases. Termination that is independently cross-checked across three dimensions is not arbitrary. It is not dogmatic. And it is not the same epistemic defect the Trilemma identifies. The third horn breaks because the Trilemma never distinguished checked termination from unchecked termination, and that distinction is the one upon which the entire Trilemma and its claim to universality depend.

DISCUSS ON SG

The Undefeatable Trilemma

For more than 2,000 years, the Agrippan Trilemma described by Sextus Empiricus has been considered one of the foundations of skepticism and a formulation that imposes fundamental limits on human knowledge. The modern version, known as Münchhausen’s Trilemma. is intended to demonstrate the theoretical impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics, without appealing to accepted assumptions.

The Agrippan Trilemma is a central argument in ancient skepticism, often cited as one of the most powerful challenges to the possibility of rational justification and knowledge. It is traditionally attributed to Agrippa the Skeptic, a figure associated with the later Pyrrhonian school, and is known primarily through the writings of Sextus Empiricus (circa 2nd–3rd century CE).

Agrippa is said to have formulated a set of “modes” (or tropes) designed to induce suspension of judgment (epoché). Among these, the mode concerning disagreement, infinite regress, and relativity plays a key role in the development of the trilemma. Over time, later philosophers systematized one strand of this skeptical strategy into what is now commonly called the Agrippan Trilemma.

In modern philosophy, the trilemma is closely related to what is sometimes called the Münchhausen Trilemma (popularized in 20th‑century discussions of justification, especially in philosophy of science and critical rationalism). Despite terminological variations, the core idea remains the same: attempts to justify any belief ultimately fall into one of three unsatisfactory patterns.

Structure of the Trilemma

The Agrippan Trilemma targets the structure of justification rather than any specific belief. It begins from the assumption that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must be supported by reasons. Once that demand for reasons is taken seriously and pushed consistently, three—and only three—kinds of justificatory structure seem possible:

  • Infinite Regress
  • Circular Reasoning
  • Dogmatic Stopping Point

Infinite regress: Every belief is justified by another belief, which itself requires justification, and so on without end. The chain of reasons extends infinitely, and no belief is ever supported by a “final” or self-sufficient foundation. Skeptics argue that such an endless chain is unsatisfactory because finite cognitive agents can never survey or possess the entire infinite series. Hence, no belief is fully justified in the strong, non-skeptical sense that was initially demanded.

Circular reasoning: The chain of justification eventually loops back: belief A is supported by belief B, belief B by belief C, and at some point a belief further down the chain supports A again. This yields epistemic circularity.

Skeptical critiques maintain that circular justification is vicious: it presupposes what it claims to prove and therefore fails to add any independent support. The belief is “supported” only by itself, directly or indirectly.

Dogmatic stopping point: At some stage, one simply stops asking for reasons and treats a belief or set of beliefs as basic, self-evident, or in no further need of justification. The regress is halted not by further argument but by stipulation or intuition.

From the skeptical perspective, such stopping points are dogmatic: they seemingly violate the original demand that every belief be supported by reasons. If some beliefs are exempted, skeptics ask why those particular beliefs are privileged rather than others.

The trilemma thus claims that any attempt to justify a belief must fall into one of these three patterns, and that each option is epistemically problematic. For Pyrrhonian skeptics, this supports the suspension of judgment rather than dogmatic assertions about what is known.

Philosophical Significance

  • The Agrippan Trilemma remains a foundational challenge in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. Its impact includes:
  • Clarifying theories of justification: Foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism are often organized around their responses to the trilemma, helping structure debates in analytic epistemology.
  • Fueling skepticism: For many, the trilemma encapsulates the skeptical problem: if no justification structure escapes its horns, robust claims to knowledge are difficult to defend.

Highlighting meta‑epistemological questions: The trilemma raises questions not only about which beliefs are justified but also about what counts as justification and whether our demands for justification are themselves reasonable.

Philosophers disagree about whether the trilemma is logically decisive or merely exposes tensions in overly ambitious conceptions of knowledge. Some regard it as an argument that strict foundational justification is impossible; others treat it as a methodological warning rather than a conclusive refutation of knowledge.

This sounds like a reasonable challenge for Veriphysics and the Triveritas, don’t you think? Darwin and Kimura are one thing, but one of the prime jewels of philosophy, recognized for its intellectual formidability for nearly 2,000 years, and further honed by modern philosophers, is another matter entirely, wouldn’t you say?

Gemini certainly views it as a significant construction.

The sheer elegance of the trilemma lies in its inescapable simplicity. It forces intellectual humility by proving that all human knowledge ultimately rests on unprovable foundations. I would rank the Agrippan trilemma as a “Tier 1” philosophical concept, placing it alongside the very few ideas that have fundamentally permanently altered how humanity perceives its own understanding of reality.

So Vox Day and Claude Athos vs a 2,000-year-old Tier 1 philosophical concept. The Triveritas vs the Trilemma.

Care to place your bets?

DISCUSS ON SG

Veriphysics: The Treatise 020

III. Aletheian Realism: The Metaphysical Foundation

Every philosophy rests on metaphysical foundations, whether acknowledged or not. The Enlightenment claimed to have no metaphysics, and to operate on pure reason and empirical observation alone. This was merely another level of its characteristic deception. The Enlightenment’s commitments to the autonomy of reason, the mechanical nature of the universe, the distinction between objective facts and subjective values were metaphysical through and through. They were simply unexamined metaphysics, held dogmatically while the Enlightenment’s philosophers congratulated themselves on having transcended dogma.

Veriphysics makes its metaphysical foundations explicit. It rests on what may be called Aletheian Realism: the conjunction of a particular understanding of truth with a commitment to the reality and knowability of the world.

The term aletheia is Greek, usually translated as “truth.” But the etymology of the term suggests something richer: a-letheia, un-concealment, the condition of being revealed rather than hidden. Truth, in this understanding, is not primarily a property of propositions but a fundamental feature of reality itself. Things are true insofar as they are unconcealed, disclosed, available to be known. The mind does not construct truth; it discovers it. Truth exists in its own right, prior to inquiry, as inquiry is merely the process by which elements of the truth become manifest to the inquirer.

This understanding stands opposed to the Enlightenment’s characteristic theories of truth. The correspondence theory, in its Enlightenment form, treated truth as a relation between propositions and facts, verified by method. The coherence theory treated truth as internal consistency within a system of beliefs. The pragmatic theory treated truth as what works, what enables successful prediction and action. Each of these theories makes truth dependent on human activity, dependent upon our propositions, our systems, and our purposes. Aletheian Realism reverses the dependency. Truth is what already is, therefore our propositions, systems, and purposes are only true insofar as they conform to it.

Realism, the second component, affirms that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it and that our knowledge genuinely discloses the world’s nature. This is the Aristotelian inheritance: universals are grounded in particulars, known through abstraction from sense experience, real features of things rather than mere names or mental constructs. Against nominalism, which reduces kinds to convenient labels, Aletheian Realism holds that the natural kinds are real and that the distinction between gold and iron, between oak and maple, between man and beast, reflects the proper structure of reality, not merely the conventions of language. Against idealism, which makes the world dependent on mind, Aletheian Realism holds that the world would exist and have its character even if no mind perceived it. It does not depend upon either the observer or the speaker.

But Aletheian Realism is not naive realism. It does not claim that human knowledge is infallible, complete, or perspectiveless. It acknowledges that we know from particular positions, through particular faculties, with particular limitations. The glass through which we see is real—it shapes and constrains what we perceive. But what we perceive through it is also real. The task of inquiry is to clarify the glass, to correct for its distortions, to bring the image into sharper focus—not to imagine that we can dispense with the glass altogether and see as God sees.

This brings us to the concept of participation. The Platonic tradition, Christianized by the Church Fathers and the Scholastics, understood human knowledge as a participation in divine knowledge. God knows all things perfectly, immediately, exhaustively. Human beings know some things, imperfectly, mediately, partially. But the partial knowledge is not disconnected from the perfect knowledge; it participates in it. The truths we grasp are fragments of the Truth that God is. Our knowledge is not merely analogous to divine knowledge; it is a finite sharing in it, made possible by the fact that we are created in the image of a God who knows.

This participatory understanding grounds both confidence and humility. Confidence: we really know. Our knowledge is not illusion, not projection, not social construction. It is genuine apprehension of genuine reality. Humility: we do not know exhaustively. Our knowledge is partial, corrigible, open to refinement. The darkness of the glass through which we see is not total, but it is real. The fullness of sight awaits a condition we have not yet attained, a state to which we have not yet ascended.

The medieval doctrine of the transcendentals completes the picture. Being, truth, goodness, and beauty are convertible. What is, is true, is intrinsically good, and is ultimately beautiful. These are not separate properties accidentally conjoined but different aspects of a single reality, distinguishable in thought and perception but united in essence. The Enlightenment’s separation of fact and value, its insistence that science tells us what is while ethics tells us what ought to be, and never the twain shall meet, was a metaphysical error with catastrophic consequences. This distinction made values arbitrary, subjective, and groundless. It rendered facts meaningless, brute, devoid of significance. Aletheian Realism reunites what should never have been severed. To know the truth about a thing is already to know something about its goodness; to apprehend reality is already to be oriented toward its value and its beauty. Knowledge is inherently normative.

The separation of fact and value is not a discovery but a mistake.

You can now buy the complete Veriphysics: The Treatise at Amazon in both Kindle and audiobook formats if you’d like to read ahead or have it available as a reference. Thanks to many of the readers here, it is presently a #1 bestseller in both Epistemology and Metaphysics.

DISCUSS ON SG

Veriphysics: The Treatise 019

II. The Name and Its Meaning

A philosophy requires a name, something that is more than an identifying label, something that serves to describe its essential orientation. The word should be memorable, pronounceable, and meaningful. It should capture the philosophy’s core insight and clearly distinguish the framework from its rivals. In addition to its identity, it also requires an objective and a foundation.

Veriphysics was chosen as the name for this new philosophy because unlike classical philosophy, which is focused on knowledge, metaphysics which examines the nature of reality, Scholasticism which combines the classical tradition with Christian theology, and Enlightenment philosophy, which claims to be established on reason but is based upon the hidden knowledge known as gnosis, veriphysics is focused solely on truth, or veritas. Every aspect of veriphysics is meant to explore and expand the concept of truth to the greatest extent possible, through every path that is capable to leading to some aspect of the singular, core, and underlying Truth.

The objective of veriphysical philosophy is veriscendance. Veriscendance derives from two roots: veritas and ascendance, suggesting both ascent and transcendence. This fusion is a deliberate choice. Veriscendance is defined as the end result of ascending through the various limited aspects of truth that humanity is capable of perceiving toward ultimate Truth, thereby recognizing the fact that human knowledge genuinely grasps various aspects of reality while acknowledging that the full truth about the comprehensive scope of existence across all its various dimensions intrinsically exceeds both our conceptual grasp as well as the limits of our knowledge.

Even the name of this objective therefore rejects the hubris of the Enlightenment’s epistemology. The Enlightenment imagined that autonomous reason could eventually achieve a God’s-eye perspective of existence, that sufficient improvement in method would somehow yield complete knowledge, and that every aspect of the universe was both a) material and b) would eventually be attainable through human inquiry. This fantasy has been entirely refuted by the very sciences the Enlightenment celebrated. Quantum mechanics has revealed the irreducible indeterminacy at the foundations of matter. Cosmology declares that ninety-five percent of the universe is dark matter and dark energy, unobservable and unexplained, and identified only by its gravitational effects. The Enlightenment materialism that once promised to explain everything now cannot account for most of what its own methods declares to be real and material.

Veriphysics is constructed on a series of very different axioms. It declares that human knowledge is real, but incomplete, genuine but inherently limited. As the apostle Paul declared, we see as though through a glass, darkly. The image in the glass is not an illusion or a shadow, it corresponds to reality, it can be refined and clarified, and it supports both genuine understanding and meaningful action. But the image is not, and it can never be, the thing itself. It can never be more than a small part of the thing. We cannot conceive the whole. The fullness of Truth exceeds and transcends both our present and our future capabilities. We ascend toward it but we do not arrive at it, not in this life and almost certainly not in the next either.

This is not skepticism. The skeptic denies that the glass portrays anything real. Veriphysics affirms that it does. The image is partial, but it is an image of something real. The ascent is incomplete, but it is neveretheless a genuine advancement toward something concrete. Truth exists, it is knowable, we genuinely know what we know, and we know more than the mere fact of our own cognition. The partial nature of the truth that is accessible to us is not a defect to be overcome by improved methodologies, it is a feature of our cognition as creatures, a limit designed into the structure of finite minds approaching the reality of the infinite.

In other words, the distinction between reason and revelation is intrinsically false. They are merely two different paths to the same end.

The objective of veriphysics also carries a connotation of elevation in the political sense, of dominance, of supremacy, and of the correct ordering of intellectual and social life. This connotation is intentional. Veriphysics necessarily means that an orientation toward the truth must order society and intellect, that the pursuit of truth is not one value among many but the architectonic value that makes all the others coherent and meaningful. A civilization that abandons truth as a fundamental objective does not cannot achieve either neutrality or progress, it instead assures chaos, manipulation, and degeneration.

Veriphysics is a necessary goal for the humanist, because the societal pursuit of truth is a precondition of human flourishing.

You can now buy the complete Veriphysics: The Treatise at Amazon in both Kindle and audiobook formats if you’d like to read ahead or have it available as a reference. Thanks to many of the readers here, it is presently a #1 bestseller in both Epistemology and Metaphysics.

DISCUSS ON SG

Veriphysics: The Treatise 018

Part Three: The Path Toward Truth

I. Introduction: The Possibility of Renewal

The Enlightenment has failed. Its political philosophy produced tyranny wearing the mask of liberation. Its economics produced models that do not describe reality and policies that impoverish the very populations they claimed they would enrich. Its science produced institutions incapable of correcting their own errors and a theory of life that cannot survive basic arithmetic. Its epistemology consumed itself, beginning with the enthronement of reason and ending with its abdication and abandonment.

The classical tradition that preceded the Enlightenment, though superior in substance, failed to defend itself. It spoke to specialists while its opponents spoke to the public. It defended when it should have attacked. It assumed good faith in a rhetorical war. It possessed the tools of logic, mathematics, and empirical inquiry but did not deploy them as weapons. It was outmaneuvered, outspent, and outpublicized by an opponent whose arguments could not have survived serious scrutiny.

There is an intellectual void left by the Enlightenment’s collapse. Human beings cannot live without coherent frameworks for understanding their reality, grounding their morality, informing their decisions, and orienting their actions. The borrowed capital of Christendom and the societal inertia, upon which the Enlightenment drew even as it denied its debts, has been exhausted.

Something will fill the vacuum. The vital question is whether whatever fills it will be true.

This is not a question for passive observers. The void will be filled by whoever seeks to fill it, by those with the will, the resources, and the vision to offer an alternative. If the heirs of the tradition offer nothing, then something else will take its place: a new ideology, a new materialism, a new paganism, a new barbarism, and a new madness. The opportunity is real but it will not wait forever.

What is required is neither a museum restoration of the medieval synthesis nor an accommodation to postmodernity that sacrifices substance for elite approval. What is needed is a genuine philosophical renewal, the construction of an intellectual framework that recovers what is true in the tradition, incorporates what has been genuinely learned in the intervening centuries, and provides the tools necessary to distinguish truth from falsehood with greater force and rigor.

That framework is Veriphysics.

DISCUSS ON SG

NB: You can now buy the complete Veriphysics: The Treatise at Amazon in both Kindle and audiobook formats if you’d like to read ahead or have it available as a reference. Thanks to many of the readers here, it is presently a #1 bestseller in both Epistemology and Metaphysics.

Veriphysics, as requested

The Enlightenment promised to replace superstition with reason, tyranny with liberty, and ignorance with progress. Three centuries later, the results are in.

Democratic governments no longer represent their citizens. Economic models that predicted shared prosperity have delivered stagnation and debt. The scientific establishment cannot correct its own errors. The very philosophers who enthroned reason ended by abandoning it entirely. What we are witnessing is not the corruption of a good idea by bad actors. It is the inevitable collapse of a framework that was flawed from its foundations.

Veriphysics: The Treatise is a systematic diagnosis of that collapse and a rigorous description of what must replace it.

In three parts, Vox Day examines how the Enlightenment’s five core premises — autonomous reason, sovereign individualism, mechanical nature, the fact-value distinction, and inevitable progress — have each been falsified by the experience of history and by the findings of the sciences the Enlightenment itself celebrated. He then reconstructs the intellectual history of how a superior philosophical tradition, the classical and Christian inheritance, was outmaneuvered not by better arguments but by superior rhetoric, institutional capture, and the patient infiltration of universities, academies, and publishing houses over generations.

The final and constructive section introduces Veriphysics as a genuine philosophical successor: a framework built on Aletheian Realism, grounded in the Christian metaphysical tradition, and equipped with a concrete epistemological tool identified as the Triveritas. Any claim that cannot satisfy all three of its conditions — logical validity, mathematical coherence, and empirical anchoring — does not merit assent, regardless of the credentials of those asserting it. Applied to the crown jewels of Enlightenment thought, including the cogito, Darwinian evolution, classical economics, and social contract theory, the Triveritas serves as a wrecking ball. The math doesn’t work. The logic doesn’t hold. The evidence, honestly examined, refutes rather than confirms.

This is not for those who want their current assumptions confirmed. It is for those who have become aware that something is deeply wrong with the intellectual world they inherited, and who are willing to follow the path toward truth wherever it leads.

Authored by bestselling political philosopher Vox Day, also the author of the landmark science work Probability Zero, Veriphysics: The Treatise is a philosophical manifesto for the 21st century. Available on Amazon, Kindle Unlimited, and Audible.

I released this 84-page treatise more so that people could have an easy single reference than as a book proper; it consists of the first two parts, the final section of the latter which was posted today, plus the third part, which I will continue to post here daily until it is complete. Although it naturally comes off as highly critical of the Enlightenment, and, to a lesser extent, their Scholastic rivals, it represents my attempt to transition from the purely critical role to constructing something useful.

I leave it to the readers to decide how effective it is as a post-Enlightenment proto-philosophy, but there are already some signs that the triveritan approach it utilizes is a fundamentally more viable and reliable heuristic than historical truth-metrics.

DISCUSS ON SG

Veriphysics: The Treatise 017

VIII. The Shape of Renewal

The path forward is not a return to pure dialectic, as though the lessons of the Enlightenment’s victory over the last three centuries could simply be unlearned. Nor is it an embrace of pure rhetoric, which would make a neoclassical tradition no better and no more viable than its opponents. It is the synthesis that the Enlightenment pretended to offer but never delivered, the combination of genuine logical rigor, with genuine mathematical abstraction connected to genuine empirical grounding, all deployed with rhetorical effectiveness, that is the optimal philosophical path.

This requires several things.

First, it requires calling all the bluffs. Every Enlightenment claim that invokes reason, mathematics, or evidence must be challenged to produce the reasoning, the equations, and the evidence. These challenges must be pressed relentlessly, and publicly, until the bankruptcy is fully exposed. The tradition has been too polite and too willing to assume good faith on the part of opponents who relentlessly operate in bad faith. That philosophical courtesy must end.

Second, it requires actually doing the intellectual labor. It is not enough to assert that the tradition has logic, mathematics, and evidence on its side. The logic must be articulated clearly. The mathematics must be calculated accurately and presented accessibly. The evidence must be gathered and displayed. The tradition must mint real philosophical currency and spend it lavishly.

Third, it requires addressing the public. The specialized vocabulary that served the tradition well in the seminar room is a liability in the public square. The arguments must be translated, popularized, and even dumbed down where necessary in order to make them accessible to the laymen who lacks specialist training. Clarity is not the enemy of rigor; it is its completion.

Fourth, it requires going on offense. The tradition has played defense long enough. The Enlightenment’s premises are vulnerable, and are even more vulnerable than they have ever been now that their evil consequences are manifest. Those premises must be attacked: the autonomous reason that cannot ground itself, the social contract that no one signed, the invisible hand that does not exist, the progress that has not occurred. The tradition must set the agenda rather than respond to it.

Fifth, it requires building institutions. The Enlightenment understood that ideas require infrastructure. The new philosophical tradition must understand this too. Alternative platforms, alternative credentials, alternative networks of patronage and publication must be created, funded, policed, and sustained. A long game is not only in order, it is necessary.

Now, these actions are not strictly necessary. The Enlightenment is dying of its own contradictions. The tradition that it displaced remains true. The tools that the Enlightenment falsely claimed, logic, mathematics, and empirical evidence, are readily available to those willing to use them honestly. The rhetorical landscape has gradually shifted in ways that favor truth over propaganda, and rhetoric supported by dialectic over pure, groundless rhetoric.

What is needed is a philosophical framework that unites these elements: the perennial insights of the tradition, the rigorous methods it always possessed, the empirical data now available, and the rhetorical effectiveness necessary to make truth prevail. Such a framework would not be a revival of Scholasticism, nor a capitulation to Enlightenment terms, but something truly new, a genuine advancing of the historical classical tradition that is capable of meeting the various intellectual needs of the present.

Since a number of people have asked me to make these posts available in ebook form, I have done so. Please note that this is not the complete work, it is only the 20,000-word treatise that contains the first two parts that have previously appeared here on the blog, as well as the third part, entitled The Path Toward Truth. I do not know when the complete work will be done and I do not have any target date for doing so.

DISCUSS ON SG