Mailvox: debate responses

We had a nice turnout for the Day-Murphy debate on free trade last Friday, and most of the 250+ registrants showed up for it. It generated more than a few questions, and here are some that later showed up in my email. NC wonders about the role of the state:

I greatly enjoyed the debate. Thank you broadcasting the debate and the work you put into the arguments.  I found the debate valuable as I mull over my own thoughts.

I’m curious if you have thoughts on this:  I think that your arguments depend on the existence of the state.  I compare your arguments to a similar case of discriminately acting on relationship principles; that is, if one is interacting with a sociopath, one would not act on relationship principles of openness and honesty, for the sociopath would not conform to those principles, exploiting them for advantage.  I think Trump emphasizes “good deals” over free trade because of the realities of coercive government institutions–nation-states which would violate principles of free trade like a sociopath would violate principles in a relationship.

If, after a generation of peaceful parenting, the nation-state dissolves, would not a free trade environment be the principled and logical environment of such a society?

No, my arguments depend upon the existence of the nation, not the state. If there is no coherent group of self-identified people sharing traditions, characteristics, and values, then there is no need to concern ourselves with their collective fate, as we owe nothing to them, share nothing with them, and can abandon them and ignore their interests without a thought. This, of course, is one reason why the globalist elite wants to destroy cohesive, coherent nations, for much the same reason they want to destroy the family. The individual is easily corrupted or destroyed, the nation, not so readily.

The dissolution of the nation-state on the basis of peaceful parenting does not logically lead to a free trade environment, moreover, it is about as credible as a monetary system that relies upon leprechauns distributing gold harvested at the rainbow’s end. That is pure libertarian fantasy babble, which is even less coherent than the Marxian withering away of the state leading to the worker’s paradise.

GO also thought rather well of the debate, a transcript of which will be provided to Brainstorm members:

I thoroughly enjoyed the debate. I have enjoyed Mr. Murphy’s writings over the years. I thought he mildly tried to take you on personally. You didn’t do that and stuck to the debate issue making excellent points. I also like Tom Woods. I think they both learned a lot by getting involved with you. I have begin to wonder about the rigidness of some of the Austrians. I am happy to see a challenge to them from a non-communist or socialist perspective.

I was actually quite pleased that Bob was sufficiently concerned by the arguments I presented in the Miller debate to view me as a potential threat to the conceptual status quo. This is extremely unusual, as for the most part, free traders consider their position to be utterly unassailable. As for Tom, he was not only an excellent moderator – I was very impressed by him and think he would make a great talk radio guy – but he made a very interesting comment when we met the day before the debate to make sure everyone’s system was working correctly.

He commented that the free traders had not helped strengthen their own position by failing to seriously consider the arguments on the other side. This is understandable, as for two centuries, their underlying assumptions more or less held. And it was easy to dismiss the impact of the Japanese mass-immigrating to Australia, as Mises did, so long as they weren’t actually doing it.

So, I think that even if I’m not able to convince either Bob Murphy or Tom Woods of the inimical nature of free trade, I suspect this debate may mark a step towards stronger Austrian arguments in defense of free trade. Unless, of course, I am able to convince the entire Austrian School that a rethink of its core position on the subject is required.

JK saw the same flaw in one of Bob’s arguments that I did:

Great brainstorm yet again! I was annoyed by Bob’s use of a country giving a bunch of free SUVs to the US as a reductio ad absurdum, but a country might use that strategy to destroy another country’s infrastructure, and that would definitely not enrich the country who receives the goods.

But  I would have loved to have asked him this, had I thought of it: if the receiving country is enriched by cheaper imports then surely if the other country produces all things and therefore the receiving country nothing, then that country should be infinitely enriched, no?

Well done Vox.

I wasn’t annoyed by the argument, I was amused by it. There is a very good reason dumping, or selling goods below their cost, is legally prohibited by most countries, and that is because it is correctly seen as harmful to the recipient. As I mentioned in the debate, I don’t think Bob quite grasped how damaging the welfare analogy is to his neo-Bastiat “free sunlight” argument. Free goods damage an economy in much the same way free welfare checks damage an individual; in neither case do they make the economy or the individual wealthier in the long term. Quite to the contrary, they make them dependent.

Are tropical countries where everything grows easily and the fruit just drops from the trees generally more wealthy than others? No, because the effect on the populace is not wealth-generating, but enervating.

Over the next week, I’ll attempt to respond in detail to some of the questions that were addressed to me during the debate that Tom did not pass on to me because we did not have time to address them.


Economics as religion

Steve Keen explained why the mainstream economists have completely failed to learn from their past failures at Brainstorm:

VOX: Why do you think the mainstream economists failed to learn anything from the 2008 crisis, given the fact that these minor school economists, the post-Keynesians and the Austrians in particular, have been correct about the crisis coming? Generally speaking, isn’t the idea that if the predictive model works, maybe we should pay attention to it?

KEEN: The reality is that economics is basically a set of competing religious schools. The case of the post-Keynesians predicting a crisis and some Austrians getting their heads around it as well and the Neoclassicals not predicting it is like saying the Muslims had discovered the body of Jesus Christ. The apt reply back from the Vatican is, no, you haven’t, because it isn’t here, it’s in heaven. So, in that sense, the religious side of it came out and they have their own interpretation of the crisis. It was an exogenous shock.

VOX: From where, Mars?

KEEN: Yeah, they were looking for the meteor right now to see where it landed. It was an exogenous shock from outside the solar system! So this idea of an exogenous shock became their explanation. There’s a classic paper over it by a guy who I think is named Peter Ireland, he’s actually from Boston College, and he began a paperback in 2010 saying that we failed to see the crisis coming but it doesn’t mean our models are useless. He dismissed the type of dynamic modeling that I do while simultaneously showing that he didn’t understand my modeling. He wasn’t reading a paper of mine, he was just saying that you can’t make a deterministic model of this sort of phenomenon, showing he knew nothing about complex systems. But he then said what actually caused the crisis was an exogenous shock just like those that caused the 1992 crisis. However, the shocks lasted longer and they got bigger. Which means, of course, that a randomly distributed variable, which is what the exogenous shocks have to be, remained permanently negative and got bigger while still remaining randomly distributed.

So therefore there has to be, at some point, a really big shock in the opposite direction which hasn’t arrived yet. So they just went back into saying that – and I have seen this happen so many times – that you can’t predict the crisis because in our model a crisis can only occur if there’s a large exogenous shock. Which, by definition can’t be predicted, therefore, you can’t predict it.

Now it really reminds me of one of the little questions I had in my mind. I said, how did Ptolemic astronomers explain comets? And it finally was explained to me that in that era, comets were considered an astronomic phenomenon because of course comets couldn’t occur in the heavens because the heavens are perfect. It’s the same thing with neoclassicals.

VOX: Yeah, it’s interesting to me how in any field of science or even quasi-science, you can almost always tell whose models are ineffective and who really doesn’t know what they’re talking about because they always have to bring in some sort of bizarre epicycle to explain things away. The more epicycles and explanations that they have to come up with, the more certain you can be, even if you have no idea what they’re talking about, the mere fact that they are engaging in the circles and epicycles means that you can be pretty confident that they’re going to be wrong.

I thought this was an unusually good event, even by the high standards of Brainstorm. We’ll try to get the transcript cleaned up and out to the members within the next two weeks or so.


Decline of household debt

The Federal Reserve is up to its customary statistical obfuscations. It no longer releases the L.1 Credit Market Debt Outstanding report; Q1 2015 was the last one available. Instead, it’s releasing something called D.3 Debt Outstanding by Sector, however, under this new accounting, Federal debt somehow dropped to $2,959.2 billion from $13,086.7 under the old report for the very same quarter.

That’s a neat trick. Hey, presto! And $10 trillion in debt vanishes. I’ll have to figure out how the two definitions differ. At first glance, it looks like they simply redefined it as State & Local debt, as that is nearly $10 trillion higher than before.

What is interesting, though, is that D.3 now provides a Household Home Mortgage line. As Steve Keen suggested, this actually peaked BEFORE the crisis began, sometime in 2007, at $10,613.0 billion. It’s now at $9,490.6, and has been flat for the last three years, bottoming in Q3 2014.

Household Consumer Credit, on the other hand, is doing better. It peaked in 2007 as well, at 2,615 but has risen to 3,533.1 since. So overall, Household debt has been flat for nine years, but $1 trillion in debt that was previously backed by real estate is now sans collateral. Corporates have $1.5 trillion in additional debt since 2008, but Financials have $2.8 trillion less. The end result is debt disinflation.

This is the problem Steve Keen was describing, which is an insufficient amount of credit money being created to permit any economic growth. We can certainly argue about whether to take the concept of GDP seriously or not, and about whether the government can, or should, create more credit money, but regardless, the available evidence does appear to fit his Minsky model.


Book of the Week + Brainstorm

As I mentioned previously, tomorrow night will be the much-anticipated Brainstorm with Dr. Steve Keen, one of, if not the most, significant economists working today. The event is open, it will take place on May 06, 2016 at 7:00 PM  Eastern, and you can register for it here.

As I was going over the second edition of his book, Debunking Economics, (which is also this week’s Book of the Week) in order to prepare a few questions, I was struck by the way in which his key observation, that demand is not stackable, completely demolishes the foundation of modern economics. I’m not entirely sure even Dr. Keen fully grasps the consequences of his revolutionary mathematical – and logical – observations. From the section entitled Don’t tell the children:

For many years, the leading text for Honors, Master’s and PhD programs was Hal Varian’s Microeconomic Analysis (Varian 1992). Varian ‘summarized’ this research so opaquely that it’s no surprise that most PhD students – including those who later went on to write the next generation of undergraduate textbooks – didn’t grasp how profoundly it challenged the foundations of neoclassical theory.

Varian started with the vaguest possible statement of the result: ‘Unfortunately […] The aggregate demand function will in general possess no interesting properties […] Hence, the theory of the consumer places no restrictions on aggregate behavior in general.’

The statement ‘no interesting properties’ could imply to the average student that the market demand curve didn’t differ in any substantive way from the individual demand curve – the exact opposite of the theoretical result. The next sentence was more honest, but rather than admitting outright that this meant that the ‘Law of Demand’ didn’t apply at the market level, he immediately reassured students that there was a way to get around this problem, which was to: ‘Suppose that all individual consumers’ indirect utility functions take the Gorman form [… where] the marginal propensity to consume good j is independent of the level of income of any consumer and also constant across consumers […] This demand function can in fact be generated by a representative consumer’ (ibid.: 153–4; emphases added. Curiously the innocuous word ‘generated’ in this edition replaced the more loaded word ‘rationalized’ in the 1984 edition.)

Finally, when discussing aggregate demand, he made a vague and reassuring reference to more technical work: ‘it is sometimes convenient to think of the aggregate demand as the demand of some “representative consumer” […] The conditions under which this can be done are rather stringent, but a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this book […]’ (Varian 1984: 268).

It’s little wonder that PhD students didn’t realize that these conditions, rather than merely being ‘rather stringent,’ undermined the very foundations of neoclassical economics. They then went on to build ‘representative agent’ models of the macroeconomy in which the entire economy is modeled as a single consumer, believing that these models have been shown to be valid. In fact, the exact opposite is the case.
The modern replacement for Varian is Andreu Mas-Colell’s hyper-mathematical – but utterly non-empirical – Microeconomic Theory (Mas-Colell, Whinston et al. 1995). At one level, this text is much more honest about the impact of the SMD conditions than was Varian’s. In a section accurately described as ‘Anything goes: the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem,’ Mas-Colell concludes that a market demand curve can have any shape at all, even when derived from consumers whose individual demand curves are downward-sloping:

Can [… an arbitrary function] coincide with the excess demand function of an economy for every p [price …] Of course [… the arbitrary function] must be continuous, it must be homogeneous of degree zero, and it must satisfy Walras’ law. But for any [arbitrary function] satisfying these three conditions, it turns out that the answer is, again, ‘yes.’ (Ibid.: 602)

But still, the import of this result is buried in what appear to the student to be difficult problems in mathematics, rather than a fundamental reason to abandon supply and demand analysis. Earlier, when considering whether a market demand curve can be derived, Mas-Colell begins with the question: ‘When can we compute meaningful measures of aggregate welfare using […] the welfare measurement techniques […] for individual consumers? (ibid.: 116).

He then proves that this can be done when there is ‘a fictional individual whose utility maximization problem when facing society’s budget set would generate the economy’s aggregate demand function’ (ibid.: 116). However, for this to be possible, there must also exist a ‘social welfare function’ which: ‘accurately expresses society’s judgments on how individual utilities have to be compared to produce an ordering of possible social outcomes. We also assume that social welfare functions are increasing, concave, and whenever convenient, differentiable’ (ibid.: 117).

This is already a case of assuming what you wish to prove – any form of social conflict is assumed away – but it’s still not sufficient to generate the result Mas-Colell wants to arrive at. The problem is that the actual distribution of wealth and income in society will determine ‘how individual utilities are compared’ in the economy, and there is no guarantee that this will correspond to this ‘social welfare function.’

The next step in his ‘logic’ should make the truly logical – and the true believers in economic freedom – recoil in horror, but it is in fact typical of the sorts of assumptions that neoclassical economists routinely make to try to keep their vision of a perfectly functioning market economy together. To ensure that the actual distribution of wealth and income matches the social welfare function, Mas-Colell assumes the existence of a benevolent dictator who redistributes wealth and income prior to commerce taking place: ‘Let us now hypothesize that there is a process, a benevolent central authority perhaps, that, for any given prices p and aggregate wealth function w, redistributes wealth in order to maximize social welfare’ (ibid.: 117; emphases added).

So free market capitalism will maximize social welfare if, and only if, there is a benevolent dictator who redistributes wealth prior to trade??? Why don’t students in courses on advanced microeconomics simply walk out at this point?

I surmise that there are three main reasons, the first of which is banal. Mas-Colell’s book is huge – just short of 1,000 pages – and lecturers would cherry-pick the sections they teach. I doubt that most students are exposed to this statement by their instructors, and few are likely to read parts that aren’t required reading for pleasure alone.

Secondly, the entire text is presented as difficult exercises in applied mathematics. Students are probably so consumed with deriving the required answers that they gloss over English-language statements of these assumptions which make it blatantly obvious how insane they are.

Thirdly, by the time students get to this level – normally in PhD programs – they are so locked into the neoclassical ‘assumptions don’t matter’ mindset that I discuss in Chapter 8 that they don’t even worry if an assumption is insane.

If you followed that, then you can understand why this is critically fascinating material that is almost shockingly ignored by nearly everyone who should know better.


Brainstorm with Steve Keen

I am very pleased to be able to say that on Friday, May 6th, at 7 PM Eastern, we will be holding an Open Brainstorm with the most important economist working today, Dr. Steve Keen. Dr. Keen is the author of Debunking Economics, which is a work so fundamentally revolutionary that its implications will probably not be fully understood for at least another century.

He is the leading Post-Keynesian economist and he is one of the very few economists to have correctly anticipated both the 2008 financial crisis as well as what he describes as the Second Great Depression. (He is, of course, completely wrong; the correct term is Great Depression 2.0.) I will post an open registration link tomorrow after the Brainstorm members have had the chance to get their seats first, as I expect this will be a well-attended event. Invites to members will go out this evening along with a transcript of the recent William S. Lind event.

For those who attended the Lind event, I spoke with my ISP and it turned out there was a software-related problem in my connection on their end; they have fixed it and I don’t anticipate any further problems. But we will have a backup plan in place just in case similar problems present themselves.

Below is my 2012 review of Debunking Economics.

Stalking the Undead Economist

Since being presented with a copy of Milton Friedman’s “Free To Choose” as a schoolboy, I have read a considerable quantity of books devoted to economics. Unlike most socialists, I have read Marx, Veblen and Bakunin. Unlike most monetarists, I have read more than Friedman’s pop books focused on the mass audience, but his more scholarly works, too, as well as his massive ode to monetary policy, coauthored with Anna Jacobson Schwartz, titled, “A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.” Unlike most neo-Keynesians, I have read both “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” as well as Paul Samuelson’s landmark textbook, “Economics,” in its original 1948 edition. Unlike most free traders, I have read David Ricardo’s “The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,” and while unlike most Austrians, I cannot quote chapter and verse of Ludwig von Mises’ “Human Action” from memory, I have read it.

I have no doubt this reading list would have astonished the late professor of my macroeconomics class, who was less bothered by my usual failure to attend class than by the fact that I never bothered to buy the textbook.

After nearly three decades of reading across a broad spectrum of economic thought, the two books on the subject I would most recommend are Joseph Schumpeter’s “History of Economic Analysis” and Murray Rothbard’s “An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought.” But now there is a third. After finishing “Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor Dethroned?” I have to assert that Keen’s book is not only an absolute masterpiece, but may, in fact, represent the most important intellectual development in economics since “The General Theory” was published in 1936. And if some of Keen’s more controversial assertions hold up over time, it will be the most important contribution to the literature since “The Wealth of Nations.”

The title of the book is an appropriate one because Keen calls into very serious question some of the most basic assumptions that economists of all ideological strains have shared since 1776. This is not a book for the faint of heart, not due to the relatively sophisticated mathematics he utilizes in support of his arguments, but because it will be hard for anyone with even a modicum of education in economics to accept intrinsically revolutionary ideas such as the non-linear shape of a market demand curve or to believe that conventional economic models are absolutely reliant upon absurdities such as markets that consist of one solitary customer for a single commodity. And while it is one thing to notice that the conventional models don’t take into account factors such as time and debt (for I have written about these things myself), it is still eye-opening to witness Keen methodically explore the significance of such omissions and explicate the consequences of how these structural errors render the entire mainstream discipline fundamentally incapable of coherently describing, let alone predicting, economic activity in the real world.

Perhaps the most revelatory section of the book deals with the way the General Theory of John Maynard Keynes was converted into the practical neoclassical form that presently dominates mainstream economics in its two halves, Monetarist and Neo-Keynesian, by Paul Samuelson and J.R. Hicks. While it is no secret that Samuelson quantified many of the concepts introduced by Keynes, as one will search “The General Theory” in vain for gross domestic product or any of the macroeconomic terms that are so familiar today, I had always wondered about the basis for the IS/LM model that played such a central role in my macroeconomic class could be found in Keynes; none of my economics professors ever pointed out that it was provided in what was essentially a book review of Keynes’s magnum opus or admitted how this core function of “Keynesian” economics inherently contradicted what Keynes himself wrote.

Throughout the book, Keen proves himself to be an engaging writer who is able to break down and explain the most complex concepts in a manner that most interested readers will be able to follow without too much trouble. He wisely structures his arguments in such a way that if one does not wish to wrestle with the math or the more esoteric aspects of the subject, one can still understand the significance of the point that he is making and move on to the next issue.

One need not agree with all of Keen’s arguments or his conclusions to admire the serious and substantive challenge that he has posed here to neoclassical economics. The neoclassicals cannot ignore the divergence between their theories and the real world forever, and no amount of revisionist history from the likes of Brad DeLong will permit them to do so much longer in a world that is drowning in excessive public and private debt. If Keen convinces the reader of just one thing, it is that there is a dire need for a better economics. Consider the following statement in which he compares five alternative schools of economics, Austrian, Post-Keynesian, Sraffian, Econophysics and Evolutionary economics prior to describing the strengths and weaknesses of each:

“None of these is at present strong enough or complete enough to declare itself a contender for the title of ‘the’ economic theory of the twenty-first century. However, they all have strengths in areas where neoclassical economics is fundamentally flawed, and there is also a substantial degree of overlap and cross-fertilization between schools. It is possible that this century could finally see the development of a dominant economic theory which actually has some relevance to the dynamics of a modern capitalist economy. I would probably be regarded as partisan to the post-Keynesian approach. However, I can see varying degrees of merit in all five schools of thought, and I can imagine that a twenty-first-century economics could be a melange of all five.”

As can be seen by this quote, Keen is not a polemicist bent on defending his perspective, but a fair-minded inquirer after the truth. He may never be known as the father of whatever the future mainstream of economics turns out to be, but in driving this stake of a book through the heart of what can be reasonably characterized as the undead theory of neoclassical economics, he could rightly merit being described as its midwife.


On the Question of Free Trade

For more than 200 years, the question of free trade has been considered
settled by economists. However, advancements in technology have
considerably changed the world since David Ricardo popularized the
concept of Comparative Advantage in the early 19th century, and the rise
of economic populism around the world is increasingly calling long-held
assumptions into question.

On the Question of Free Trade is a public debate between Dr. James
D. Miller, Associate Professor of Economics at Smith College, and Vox
Day, the author of The Return of the Great Depression, in which they
address the vital question of whether free trade is intrinsically
beneficial or detrimental to a national economy. Both participants are
well-versed in economic history and economic theory, which permits them
to bypass the political side issues that so often cloud such debates and
focus on the core issues involved. The post-debate Q&A session is
also included.

On the Question of Free Trade is 46 pages, DRM-free, and $2.99. It is available only on Amazon. Brainstorm members should have already received their free copy via email. If you are a Brainstorm member who needs to convert the .epub file to Kindle-friendly .mobi format, please download Calibre.


Anacyclosis and the problem of productivity

Economics, free trade, the minimum wage, technological advancement, immigration, and the Singularity are all pointing towards the same problem, as Fred Reed notes:

People of IQ 130 and up tend to assume unconsciously–important word: “unconsciously”–that you can do anything just by doing it. If they wanted to learn Sanskrit, they would get a textbook and go for it. It would take time and effort but the outcome would never be in doubt. Yes, of course they understand that some people are smarter than others, but they often seem not to grasp how much smarter, or what the consequences are. A large part of the population can’t learn-much of anything. Not won’t. Can’t. Displaced auto workers cannot be retrained as IT professionals.

Few of the very bright have have ever had to make the unhappy calculation: Forty times a low minimum wage minus bus fare to work, rent, food, medical care, and cable. They have never had to choose between a winter coat and cable, their only entertainment. They don’t really know that many people do. Out of sight, out of mind.

Cognitive stratification has political consequences. It leads liberals to think that their client groups can go to college. It leads conservatives to think that with hard work and determination…..

It ain’t so. An economic system that works reasonably well when there are lots of simple jobs doesn’t when there aren’t. In particular, the large number of people at IQ 90 and below will increasingly be simply unnecessary. If you are, say, a decent, honest young woman of IQ 85, you probably read poorly, learn slowly and only simple things,. Being promoted, or even hired, requires abilities that you do not have. This, plus high (and federally concealed) unemployment allows employers to pay you barely enough to stay alive. Here is the wondrous working of the market.

The Polybian system of anacyclosis proceeds in the following order:
1. Monarchy, 2. Kingship, 3. Tyranny, 4. Aristocracy, 5. Oligarchy, 6. Democracy, and 7. Ochlocracy.

Some would say that we are living under a democracy, but this is observably not true. Rather, it appears we are somewhere between (4) and (5), even though the Aristocracy is not readily apparent. In reality, the theory probably needs to be updated, but regardless, the observable fact is that the transnational cognitive elite has no regard for the common masses, and more importantly, no longer requires them in order to maintain its standard of living. The logical conclusion is that the increased irrelevance of the competent white middle and working classes is why the former is entirely willing to replace them with an even more irrelevant, and less intelligent population who can be much more easily subdued and eliminated in time.

That sounds diabolical, but logic suggests that it is the purpose and the intended consequence of Cultural Marxism. It seems woefully short-sighted to me, but if one thinks only in terms of one’s own lifetime, I suppose it might be of some appeal.

The feudalism of the Middle Ages required peasants for agriculture. But the technofeudalism of the future doesn’t appear likely to require peasants for anything. So what will be done with them? What will be done with us? The long and bloody history of Man does not suggest an optimistic answer.


Intel and labor mobility

Two points concerning labor mobility.

  •  Intel will lay off 11% of its global workforce, up to 12,000 employees, a painful downsizing aimed at accelerating its shift away from the waning PC market to one more focused on cloud computing and connected devices. In an email to employees, CEO Brian Krzanich said that after the restructuring, “I am confident that we’ll emerge as a more productive company with broader reach and sharper execution.” Intel CFO Stacy Smith said that half the workforce reduction, 6,000 people, will be accomplished by the end of this year.
  • Intel Corporation has filed 6147 labor condition applications for H1B visa and 4238 labor certifications for green card from fiscal year 2013 to 2015. Intel was ranked 14 among all visa sponsors. Please note that 602 LCA for H1B Visa and 689 LC for green card have been denied or withdrawn during the same period. Intel had filed 8065 LCA and 3423 LC from fiscal year 2001 to 2010

Interesting how those numbers are so similar, is it not? It would be informative to know how many of the 12,000 are in the USA.


Steve Keen educates a Nobel laureate

The inability to account for debt and the total failure to understand the relationship between banks and loan creation are two of the reason mainstream economics is so hapless with regards to producing functional models. The world’s most important economist explains that his professional colleagues are simply ignoring one of capitalism’s most pressing problems:

I like Joe Stiglitz, both professionally and personally. His Globalization and its Discontents was virtually the only work by a Nobel Laureate economist that I cited favourably in my Debunking Economics, because he had the courage to challenge the professional orthodoxy on the “Washington Consensus”. Far more than most in the economics mainstream—like Ken Rogoff for example—Joe is capable of thinking outside its box.

But Joe’s latest public contribution—“The Great Malaise Continues” on Project Syndicate—simply echoes the mainstream on a crucial point that explains why the US economy is at stall speed, which the mainstream simply doesn’t get.

Joe correctly notes that “the world faces a deficiency of aggregate demand”, and attributes this to both “growing inequality and a mindless wave of fiscal austerity”, neither of which I dispute. But then he adds that part of the problem is that “our banks … are not fit to fulfill their purpose” because “they have failed in their essential function of intermediation”:

    Between long-term savers (for example, sovereign wealth funds and those saving for retirement) and long-term investment in infrastructure stands our short-sighted and dysfunctional financial sector…

    Former US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke once said that the world is suffering from a “savings glut.” That might have been the case had the best use of the world’s savings been investing in shoddy homes in the Nevada desert. But in the real world, there is a shortage of funds; even projects with high social returns often can’t get financing.

I’m the last one to defend banks, but here Joe is quite wrong: the banks have very good reasons not to “fulfill their purpose” today, because that purpose is not what Joe thinks it is. Banks don’t “intermediate loans”, they “originate loans”, and they have every reason not to originate right now.

In effect, Joe is complaining that banks aren’t doing what economics textbooks say they should do. But those textbooks are profoundly wrong about the actual functioning of banks, and until the economics profession gets its head around this and why it matters, then the economy will be stuck in the Great Malaise that Joe is hoping to lift us out of.

The argument that banks merely intermediate between savers and investors leads the mainstream to a manifestly false conclusion: that the level of private debt today is too low, because too little private debt is being created right now. In reality, the level of private debt is way too high, and that’s why so little lending is occurring.

I don’t agree with Keen on everything, but he is the most important, most revolutionary economist in the world today. And he is dead-on with regards to both the problem of private debt as well as the way in which banks originate, not only loans, but credit money itself.


Interview with The Right Stuff

The Death Panel are joined by special guest Vox Day.Topics include free trade vs. protectionism, The Dissolution of the US, Trump.

    0:00 Intro- Vox Interview
    1:30 Free Trade/Protectionism
    44:45 The US Breakup
    1:25:00 Sad Puppies/Rabid Puppies
    1:47:25 The SJW List

I was impressed with how well these guys know their economics. It was also interesting to see how they clearly understood the difference between the various European nationalisms and white nationalism.