Debt-deflation continues apace

Although it has been drowned out by all the excited reports of massive GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2009, the economic situation continues to worsen in the eyes of those who are focused on much more important variables, such as the amount of credit in the system. The most recent Fed report, for the week of January 20th, shows that commercial bank loans and leases have reached a new low since 2008, $37.6 billion less than the revised October 21, 2009 low. Bank loans have contracted nearly 9% from the October 2008 peak and are already down 0.42% in the first three weeks of 2010. At the present rate, bank loans will contract another 7.67% in 2010, exceeding last year’s record credit contraction of 7.05%.

To put this in perspective, the only reason the chart goes back to 1973 rather than 1947 is that the lowest rate of credit growth from 1947 through 1972 was 2.65% in 1949.  It’s not just that two straight years of credit contraction has only happened once before in the post-war era, it’s that the magnitude of it is completely without precedent.  And this is all without the banks being forced to take write-downs for the bad loans that they made and securitized off their books.   As the Market Ticker has been pointing out since April 2007, selling on bad loans to investors does not take a bank off the hook when, as was very often the case with subprime and Alt-A loans, there is a fraudulent element in the mortgage such as overstated income.

S&P put out a report the other day in which it essentially said “if the banks have to eat the reduced value now they’re all insolvent.” We in fact have fixed none of the underlying issues that brought down Fannie, Freddie, AIG, Bear and Lehman. The only reason we have seen supposed “improvement” in the markets is that the government has given permission to lie to financial institutions in the exact same form and fashion (that is, hiding actual liabilities and probable losses) that brought down ENRON. But the underlying loss is still real, still present, and still out there. Refusing to recognize it doesn’t make it go away. It just sweeps it under the carpet with the hope (wish really) that the institution will be able to screw you, the consumer, out of enough money to cover the shortfalls before they’re forced to recognize the already-occurred losses and thus declare bankruptcy.

If the mortgage security put-back issue comes to the fore, my linear projection of 7.67% bank loan contraction almost surely be overly optimistic, just as my forecast for 2009 deposit failures in RGD was. If we are still in the early stages of debt-deflation, then we must still be in the early stages of economic contraction. Paul Krugman likes to write about demand gaps, but even his most negative calculations are dwarfed by the size of the credit gap between the pre-2009 8.37% average annual credit growth and the 2009-2010 -7.5% annual contraction.

Debt is always the core of the problem. Witness how the imminent debt implosion in Greece makes the previously unthinkable prospect of sovereign defaults and the eventual disintegration of the Euro and the European Union look increasingly more likely:

The EC has no data on public debt beyond 2008, when the figure was €237bn, or 99.2pc of GDP. A surging budget deficit of 13pc of GDP has pushed the figure much higher since then. Brussels expects the debt to reach 125pc this year, and 135pc in 2011 unless spending is slashed. If auditors discover a fresh chunk of hidden debts, this would test Greek financial credibility to the limits. “If there is anything too this, it is the final straw,” said one banker.


GDP grows 5.7 percent!

The BEA’s Q4-2009 Advance report:

Real gross domestic product — the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States — increased at an annual rate of 5.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009, (that is, from the third quarter to the fourth quarter), according to the “advance” estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the third quarter, real GDP increased 2.2 percent.

Given that the last report went from 3.5 percent down to 2.2 percent, what are the chances that this impressive number – more than double the average rate of economic growth over the last 50 years – will hold up? Even Wall Street isn’t pretending to take the GDP reports seriously any longer. Note that at $14,463.4, US GDP is now reported to be larger than it ever has been before.

Apparently the 89.7 percent of workers who still have jobs are exceedingly productive. As far as I’m concerned, this claim of economic growth at a 5.7% annual rate does nothing but demonstrate the increasing disconnect between the macroeconomic statistics and the actual economy.


And the academy trembled

I have no serious academic credentials and I see little value in them, given the vast quantities of demonstrable nonsense produced on a regular basis by the credentialed. Which tends to make this particular syllabus rather amusing:

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

I. Course Overview

This course examines the relations between international politics and international economics. It provides an overview of the main international political economy approaches. We begin with a theoretical introduction to political economy in the first part of the course, then we explore the evolution of the international economic system and its political implications. A particular focus is devoted to the so-called ‘globalization debate’ and its evaluation, with a specific focus on trade and finance issues, as well as development and inequality. Also part of the course is dedicated to the interaction of economic issues and security.

The following books are required for the class and are available for purchase at the bookstore:

* Gilpin, Robert. 2002. The Challenge of Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press.
▪ Day, Vox. 2009. The Return of the Great Depression. WND Books.
▪ Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2007. In Defense of Globalization. Oxford University Press.
▪ Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2003 (2nd Edition). Globalization and its Discontents. Norton

I suppose I should be pleased, but mostly I just hope the professor doesn’t find himself in too much trouble.


Mailvox: curiouser and curiouser

A professional energy analyst shares his professional perspective, which is an excerpt from a note he sends to their clients:

Have you seen the report today? All the media sees out of this is that the economy is expanding. Two minutes of gazing at the stats shows the opposite. Manufacturing should rally from September through February as part of the seasonal cycle. To have December choke is a very negative indicator.

Here’s an excerpt of my daily note to clients: Our longer-term bearish outlook on industrial natural gas demand continues after the Federal Reserve release today of industrial capacity utilization. The number rose from 71.5 in November (revised down) to 72. The optimists out there will tell you that 72% is the highest in a year. We’ll tell you that seasonality plays a part in that, manufacturing usually increases through February’s end. We’re also quick to point out that we were at 72.7 in December a year ago… and the economy was abysmal a year ago — we’re currently trailing even that. Even more disappointing is the fact that some industrial plants have permanently shuttered. That creates a smaller denominator in the capacity calculation and an appearance of greater growth than was really there. A 7% annualized growth rate for Q409? That’s great. But annual output dropped 9.7%, the worst slide since 1946 when the WWII defense machine relaxed.

The real kicker to the report comes from the Fed itself: Industrial production increased 0.6 percent in December. The gain primarily resulted from an increase of 5.9 percent in electric and gas utilities due to unseasonably cold weather. Manufacturing production edged down 0.1 percent, while the output of mines rose 0.2 percent. That’s right. They’re telling you that manufacturing was down, but the number went up on utility output of energy. What does the media take away from this? An actual headline: “Industrial output rises for 6th month in a row.” That is a fact. A fact that smells like horse manure when you consider the implications on present industrial natural gas consumption.

Being a complete amateur when it comes to this sort of sector analysis, I find it very interesting that the professional opinion happens to coincide rather closely with my take on the overall economy. The numbers just seem to keep getting curiouser and curiouser….


The statistical game expands

The Market Ticker suspects shenanigans beyond the usual chicanery:

On January 5th the durables report for November was ‘released’. It showed a 0.2% increase. I didn’t write on it at the time, as it didn’t appear to be particularly consequential. The report, of course, came in the middle of the first-week January market rally. But now, in the dark of night, the number has been revised – to a decrease of 0.7%. The reason is a claimed “statistical error.” This, by the way, should have been obvious from the retail sales report, which I did write on.

Here’s the ugly – the Census’ link to the report is now listed as missing (that is, intentionally removed!) and what’s worse the link they refer you to, the “Historical M3 Releases” does not have the corrected November data – it only has releases through October on it.

That is, November’s report has disappeared.

I demonstrated the fictitious nature of government statistics in the chapter of RGD entitled “No One Knows Anything”. I suppose it’s easier to simply not bother making anything up, though. Since so few people even understand what the numbers are supposed to represent, why not just periodically shout “The Dow is at 12,000 and all is well!”

It would probably be more convincing anyhow.


Prediction 3 is looking good

“3. The Federal budget deficit for 2010 will exceed the projected $1.17 trillion.”
– December 28, 2009

It’s nine months too soon to declare victory, of course, but that prediction isn’t looking too bad as of January 13th.

The December figures bring to $388.5 billion the deficit for the first three months of Washington’s 2010 fiscal year. That’s on top of a staggering $1.4 trillion budget shortfall for fiscal 2009, more than three times the size of the deficit that the government ran in 2008.

In other words, the federal deficit is on a pace to hit $1.554 trillion in FY2010. Which is remarkably strange considering that we’re now six months into an economic recovery featuring 3.5 2.8 2.2% GDP growth. Say, doesn’t the GDP formula include government spending….


Animals spirits sink

The Market Ticker notes that consumer confidence is sinking:

There’s no good news embedded in here. Personal finances and the buying climate dropped by amounts matching their largest one-week change ever, possibly spurred by people getting their credit-card statements from Christmas (or simply reflecting on what they spent – and determining it was too much.)

Only nine percent rate the economy positively.

Shockingly, the news of the Federal Reserve printing massive profits for itself and bankers paying themselves huge bonuses hasn’t convinced people fearing for their jobs and cutting back on their expenses that all is well. And the whole “stock market advance as leading indicator” isn’t exactly the most convincing argument on offer in light of the fact that everyone can still remember what all the cheerleaders were saying when the Dow was over 14,000.

UPDATE – Speaking of animal spirits, Beau offers his services: “Against the backdrop of economic Götterdämmerung, I have some cheerful news that might pick up some animal spirits. beau.matchmakingservice -at- yahoo.com is ready to assist ilk wishing to discreetly make their intentions known to other ilk. Some of the more prolific posters certainly need no introductions, but in uncertain times animal spirits could perhaps use a boost. beau.matchmakingservice is available for regulars, irregulars and lurking ilk.”

Breeding Ilk… that’s all the world needs now.


Krugman gets it wrong… again

Imagine that:

Paul Krugman has weighed in to an ongoing debate sparked by Jonathan Chait’s criticism of a passage in my essay “Keeping America’s Edge.” I believe that I have responded to Mr. Chait’s assertions comprehensively. Unlike Chait, Professor Krugman has argued that I have presented incorrect data.

Krugman says this:

But I went back to Manzi’s source of data, and it turns out that it’s even worse than that. If you use the broad definition of Europe, which includes the USSR, it did indeed have 40 percent of world output in the early 1970s. But that share has not fallen to 25 percent — it’s still above 30 percent.

His assertion is flatly false.

First, Krugman has incorrectly identified my source of data. I have never corresponded with Krugman concerning data sources and analysis for the passage in question (unlike Chait, who was careful to contact me prior to publishing his blog post, and to whom I sent data sources and calculation details), so I cannot know on what basis Krugman asserts that the dataset to which he links is my “source of data.” It is not. As per the blog post in which I reviewed multiple data sources for the analysis in question, I averaged multiple sources of data. Krugman has selected only one of these sources, presented it as if it were my sole source, and therefore (obviously) failed to replicate the published result. The error is his.

Second, Krugman incorrectly interpreted the economic dataset that he did identify.

I know I’m shocked that A NOBEL-WINNING ECONOMIST could get it so wrong. And speaking of errors and Krugman, a recent reviewer of RGD managed to impressively cock things up in “correcting” my explanation of the loan multiplier in a fractional reserve system. Amusingly, he seizes upon this “error”, combined with the fact that I dared to criticize A NOBEL-WINNING ECONOMIST, to claim that the book “Should Never Have Been Published”. While I have to take responsibility for failing to distinguish between “the bank” and “the banking system”, our intrepid reviewer nevertheless managed to completely miss both the obvious context (the fractional reserve system) as well as the point (the increase in the money supply created by the loans). I’ll explain this in more detail later this week for the six regulars who are actually interested in this sort of thing as well as any anklebiters who would like to revel in the possibility that I am wrong about something, but if you’d like to verify this for yourself, I would encourage you to plug a 0.75% reserve ratio into the table in the Wikpedia example – note that I was completely unaware of this table until about two weeks ago – and compare it to the Loan Multiplier of 133.33x to determine for yourself whether Mr. Eskildson’s “correction” is on target or not.

It should be noted, that this method only provides an estimate for the amount of interest collected over the course of the year, since this completely depends upon the number of loan-and-deposit cycles that occur over the course of the year as well as the three caveats mentioned in the book. Using the 10x example from Wikipedia would mean that $4.80 in annual interest is collected, which is neither the maximum $6.67 mentioned in RGD nor the $0.0599 which the reviewer claims is the correct amount.


Economics and evolution

Scott Hatfield of Monkey Trials brings an interesting series of posts by David Sloan Wilson to our attention:

One important theme that emerged was the yawning gap between economic theory and evolutionary theory. Economists are very smart people, but when smart people take off in the wrong direction, they go a very long way. As Eric Beinhocker (one of the participants) recounts in his book The Origin of Wealth, neoclassical economics was originally inspired by physics and led to an enormous body of formal theory based on assumptions that are required for mathematical tractability but that make no sense from an evolutionary perspective…. If economics and evolution are different paradigms with a yawning gap between them, then it will be very difficult to get from one to another in an incremental fashion. Every time we try to make one assumption in economic theory more realistic from an evolutionary perspective, it will conflict with the other assumptions and will be resisted by those accustomed to the economic paradigm. Scientific progress will require comparing the two paradigms as package deals and accepting or rejecting them on that basis.

I have to say that it is refreshing to see an evolutionist admitting that perhaps economists may actually be intelligent, (their recent performance notwithstanding), and simply have a different way of looking at things. This is much preferable to the defensive shrieking and finger pointing we have come to expect from biologists forced to confront basic economic concepts. Unfortunately, the response to perfectly reasonable questions like “what is the average rate of evolution?” tends to be some variant of “You know nothing about evolution or science and the reason I can’t answer any of your questions is because you’re stupid!”

Well, that’s helpful. I’m much more convinced that you know what you’re talking about now….

Now, the Walrasian-Keynesian neoclassical formalist paradigm to which Wilson refers was a detour from the earlier and in many ways superior economics of Turgot and the School of Salamanca and it certainly has many weaknesses. Since I favor the Austrian School, I am by no means wedded to the mathematical assumptions and artificial equilibria which Wilson implicitly questions. However, despite the gaps, I also see many similarities between what has now evolved into a Samuelsonite Neo-Keynesian macroeconomic orthodoxy and the Neo-Darwinian orthodoxy of the evolutionists. Both scientific consensuses are highly intolerant of criticism, produce predictive models that are reliably wrong, and take an approach that should be labeled “Kuhn’s Ostrich” toward anything that might threaten their current dogma.

Unfortunately for the sake of evolutionists who are actually interested in improving their theories rather than defending their dogma, the time scale on which they operate prevents their theoretical flaws from being exposed as rapidly as is the case with illegitimate economic orthdoxies. Pure Keynesian general theory was vanquished during the recession of the 1970s, the two Japanese Lost Decades eviscerated the monetarist heretics of the Chicago School, and the current contraction should cause the collapse of the SNK synthesis over the next decade. The false dichotomy of monetarism vs Neo-Keynesianism has already been exposed; whether the successor is some Minskyite Post-Keynesian doctrine, the Austrian school, or, as I expect, a blending of the two with a strong dash of behavioral economics, economics will be greatly transformed.

While I have hopes for genetics eventually putting the final stake through the tattered remnants of TENS that still survive the modern synthesis, it’s quite clear that in the absence of an unexpected Kuhnian crisis, biology will continue to be handicapped by its reliance on what is at its core nothing more than a quasi-medieval philosophical foundation rather than a properly scientific one. But Wilson’s perspective is an unusual one and I expect to follow his Paradigm series with interest.

I am, however, more than a little dubious of Wilson’s attempt to construct an analogy fitting paradigms into evolutionary stable strategy. “Intriguingly, paradigms can be regarded as the intellectual equivalent of local stable equilibria in complexity theory and adaptive peaks in evolutionary theory.” This sounds suspiciously like Dawkins’s “meme” nonsense to me, especially in light of Wilson’s obvious awareness of the risks inherently involved in adapting concepts from one discipline into another.


Bernanke and the housing bubble

In which Ben Bernanke throws Barney Frank under the bus. Even if you’re not an economist, Ben Bernanke’s attempt to excuse the Federal Reserve for any responsibility in creating the housing bubble really has to be read to be believed. Here’s the one of the more damning paragraphs in the 36-page PDF:

First, the cumulative increase in housing prices shown in Slide 5 is quite large. Can accommodative monetary policies during this period reasonably account for the magnitude of the increase in house prices that we observed? If not, what does account for it? Second, house prices rose significantly during this period in many industrialized countries, not just in the United States. If monetary policy was an important source of house price appreciation in the United States, it seems reasonable to expect that, in an international comparison, countries with easier monetary policies should have been more likely to have significant rises in house prices as well. Is that the case?

With respect to the magnitude of house-price increases: Economists who have investigated the issue have generally found that, based on historical relationships, only a small portion of the increase in house prices earlier this decade can be attributed to the stance of U.S. monetary policy. This conclusion has been reached using both econometric models and purely statistical analyses that make no use of economic theory.

This is extraordinarily deceptive on several levels. Bernanke is first leaving out the fact that regulation of the banks is the specific responsibility of the Federal Reserve and is an inherent part of monetary policy given the fact that most of the money in the system is created by bank loans under the fractional-reserve system. He is, of course, limiting his implicit definition of “monetary policy” to interest rate targets, which is acceptable in general economic discussions but not in a specific one of this sort.

Second, it should be no surprise that Bernanke feels justified by the use of econometric models based on the Taylor Rule because the Taylor Rule is the very rule that was used to justify the Fed’s actions in the first place. As Mike Shedlock shows using Case-Shiller housing prices in the place of Owner-Equivalent Rent to calculate CPI-U, the Taylor Rule is fundamentally flawed because it is based on CPI-U. In RGD, I demonstrate a few of the many ways CPI-U considerably underestimates the real rate of price changes; the fact that it doesn’t even take real housing prices into account renders it entirely useless as a basis for defending the Federal Reserve’s actions or comparing the U.S. housing market with international housing markets.

No doubt there will be a lot of detailed critiques of this paper in the coming month. I may even write one myself. But in summary, “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble” is a shameless and deceptive attempt by a failed economist to justify his spectacular failure by using the very models that failed him in the first place.

I recognized the housing bubble in 2002; that is a matter of public record. Bernanke, on the other hand, was still denying it existed in October 2005, less than a year prior to its 2006 peak! “House prices have risen by nearly 25 percent over the past two years. Although speculative activity has increased in some areas, at a national level these price increases largely reflect strong economic fundamentals, including robust growth in jobs and incomes, low mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit the expansion of housing supply in some areas.”

Calculated Risk points out two more things that Bernanke conveniently avoided mentioning:

“Bernanke used data from other countries to suggest monetary policy was not a huge contributor to the bubble … however, Bernanke didn’t discuss if non-traditional mortgage products contributed to housing bubbles in other countries. This would seem like a key missing part of the speech.

Bernanke didn’t discuss how the current regulatory structure missed this “protracted deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards” (even though many people were pointing it out in real time). And Bernanke didn’t discuss specifically how the new regulatory structure would catch this deterioration in standards.”

The truth is that the Fed knew about the “protracted deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards” prior to the start: “Even before economic prophets of doom such as Marc Faber, Nouriel Roubini, and Peter Schiff became famous for their correct warnings of imminent crisis, Edward Gramlich, a governor at the Federal Reserve, told Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan that making home mortgages available to low income borrowers would lead to widespread loan defaults having extremely negative effects on the national economy. This extraordinarily specific warning was given in 2000, amidst the wreckage of the dot-com bomb and before the housing bubble even began. Those possessed of a mordant sense of humor may appreciate how Greenspan rejected Gramlich’s recommendation to audit consumer finance companies on the basis of his fear that it might undermine the availability of subprime credit.”
– Vox Day, The Return of the Great Depression, x.