Addressing an RGD “review”

Jonathan Birge commits several errors in what he attempts to pass off as a “review” of The Return of the Great Depression, but they all stem from a single source. This is his inability to understand Paul Krugman’s purpose in writing the “Hangover” essay or connect that purpose to Krugman’s statement that total income is equal to total spending. This failure is the foundation of his bizarre attack on both my character and RGD; as he writes: “I’m simply pointing out that if Vox can’t even understand what Krugman is talking about, on simple matters like this, how can one trust his dismissal of Krugman? One can be right for the wrong reasons, and if Vox is right about Krugman being an idiot, it’s certainly not because Vox grasps what Krugman is trying to say.”

So, Jonathan’s “review” can be summarized as three basic claims:

1. Paul Krugman had no substantive reason to declare that total spending equals total income.
2. I misread what Krugman had written when he declared total spending equals total income.
3. This single “misreading” justifies the complete dismissal of RGD.

I will now proceed to demonstrate the falsity of all three of these claims. When I read his review, it was immediately obvious to me that Jonathan did not understand what Krugman was saying about income and spending, much less why he said it, but Jonathan helpfully proceeded to admit as much in his subsequent comments. “Krugman wasn’t making a big point: he was saying that whenever you get a dollar, some other entity gave it to you and had to consider that spending…. Why the hell Krugman brings it up is beyond me.” And yet, even when his erroneous assumptions were pointed out to him, Jonathan insisted that this supposedly inexplicable statement of Krugman’s was not merely true, but a downright tautology “because it’s simply a statement that when money changes hands, it’s a debit for somebody and a credit for someone else. Debt doesn’t change this, and time-preference isn’t even germane to the debate. The fact that Vox brings up time-preference proves he had no idea what Krugman was trying to say.”

This is incorrect on several levels. Unlike Jonathan, I not only understand what Krugman was saying, I also understand why he was saying it. Far from being an irrelevant tautology, Krugman’s statement that total spending necessarily equals total income is the basis of his erroneous argument against the Austrian concept of the business cycle. It is so important, in fact, that it was the only part of the essay that I deemed necessary to quote directly and in full. Although Krugman has since modified the position he took in his 1998 essay and admitted that perhaps investment bubbles do lead to economic contractions after all, the entire point of the essay was to prove that the Austrian school theory is wrong and that recessions are not a consequence of economic booms. Hence the title “The Hangover Theory”.

But before I explain why the assertion that total spending equals total income was both a) integral to Krugman’s case and b) incorrect, it’s worth pointing out that Krugman doesn’t even believe that the assertion is intrinsically true, let alone tautologically obvious as Jonathan insists. When asked in October if the dichotomy between statistical reports of rising consumer spending and higher unemployment numbers contradicted “the economic maxim that expenditures are equal to income” Krugman replied: “That ‘economic maxim’ is deeply misleading. Consumers can and do spend either more or less than their income. And even for the economy as a whole, in the short run income adjusts to match spending, not the other way around.”

Krugman admits what I originally stated: total spending does NOT necessarily equal total income. It cannot, obviously, since income has to adjust in order to match spending. Now, why does income have to adjust to spending and why doesn’t it work the other way around? We can only surmise that there must be some additional factor that would allow spending to take place without income… whatever could that be? Finally, why would Krugman declare something that he later states to be misleading? In this case, it is not an example of his occasional inconsistency or because he changed his mind since 1998, but because he needed to make the income-spending equivalence in order to attack a specific point of Austrian business cycle theory. While Krugman doesn’t know much about Austrian theory and mistakes malinvestment for “overinvestment” in “investment goods” (capital goods is the Austrian term), he knows just enough about it to understand that the Austrians place great theoretical importance on the shift from investment in the production of consumer goods to investment in the production of capital goods. However, because he has not actually read much, if any, Austrian theory, he does not understand the mechanism of that shift, which in its conventional formulation is the result of expanded bank credit producing false signals that encourage businesses to invest in producing higher-order capital goods rather than lower-order consumer goods. Since he doesn’t understand the mechanism, he wrongly concludes that a converse shift in investment from consumer goods to capital goods will have an equal but inverse effect as the shift from capital goods to consumer goods. If the former can cause a recession, he decides, then the latter should too.

This is why he wrote: “So if people decide to spend less on investment goods, doesn’t that mean that they must be deciding to spend more on consumption goods—implying that an investment slump should always be accompanied by a corresponding consumption boom?” This is a major sticking point for Krugman; earlier this year he wrote: “you ask why, say, a housing boom — which requires shifting resources into housing — doesn’t produce the same kind of unemployment as a housing bust that shifts resources out of housing.” He derives this false equivalence from the very statement for which Jonathan sees no point, the statement that is the foundation of his argument against Austrian business cycle theory.

“Here’s the problem: As a matter of simple arithmetic, total spending in the economy is necessarily equal to total income (every sale is also a purchase, and vice versa). So if people decide to spend less on investment goods….”

It should now be clear that Jonathan is incorrect, that Krugman’s statement is not a tautology and that Krugman was using it to make a big point, the central point of his argument. It should also be clear that I understand what Krugman is saying and why he is saying it. But, even if I didn’t misread Krugman, did I make a mistake in referring to individual decisions about equities and cars? Was it an error to highlight the facts that not every dollar of income must be spent today, and not every dollar that is spent today is earned? No, of course not. Here is why.

Let’s start with Jonathan’s assertion about the first point. “In no case would the actions of a single person possibly illuminate or refute the point Krugman was making (which is that each transaction requires two parties where each take the opposite side of the trade).” But, as I’ve already demonstrated, Jonathan failed to understand the point Krugman was using that statement to make. The actions of single person serve very well to illuminate the fact a failure to invest in capital goods does not require an investment in consumer goods, for the obvious reason that what is being considered is the sum total of all the actions of individuals. Krugman himself refers to precisely such individual actions when he writes that “if people decide to spend less on investment goods, doesn’t that mean that they must be deciding to spend more on consumption goods…?” These are individual decisions, nor can Jonathan claim they are not thanks to Krugman’s more recent distinction between “consumers” who can and do spend either more or less than their income and “the economy as a whole.” While there are a few areas that Keynesian theory insists on making a distinction between that which benefits an individual and that which benefits the aggregate, such as Keynes’s Paradox of Thrift, that does not apply to this example where the individual’s investment decisions will have a directly quantifiable effect on the aggregate.

Now to my two statements about the observable facts that puncture Krugman’s dilemma. Because Jonathan did not read the book, he is unaware that a great deal of attention is given to the nature of money, central banking and the fractional-reserve system. By his own admission, he does not understand how a modern monetary system works; he says: “I don’t know how the accounting works for things like Fed operations….” More importantly, his subsequent comments reveal that he doesn’t even know what money in a modern economy actually is, as after being given a hint of the magnitude of his error by Steveo, he attempts to equivocate by creating a false distinction between bank-created debt and money.

that makes it sound like banks can print money, which they can’t. they issue debt that, in our system of fractional reserve banking, is legally declared equivalent to money. when a bank issues a loan, the bank is not spending money any more than you’re getting income when using your credit card.

Had Jonathan actually read RGD, he would know that in the U.S. and most modern financial systems, money is debt, which is why the politicians around the world are so desperate to force the banks to increase their lending. This is the heart of the very important debate over inflation vs debt-deflation that has been going on for the past five years between economists who foresaw the crisis and actually understand what is taking place right now. But for the purposes of this explanation, it is sufficient to point out that when a bank issues a loan, it is not spending money, it is creating money. In fact, this fractional reserve-created money is by far the larger portion of the money supply; Jonathan’s knowledge doesn’t even rise to the level of Wikipedia, which states: “The different forms of money in government money supply statistics arise from the practice of fractional-reserve banking. Whenever a bank gives out a loan in a fractional-reserve banking system, a new sum of money is created. This new type of money is what makes up the non-M0 components in the M1-M3 statistics… central bank money is M0 while the commercial bank money is divided up into the M1-M3 components”

Now, where does M1-M3 come from? From savings deposited in the banks, or in other words, “every dollar of income that is not spent today.” So, far from being equal to income, spending in a fractional-reserve system is always a multiple of income, the process which Paul Samuelson laid out in detail in the table entitled Multiple Expansion of Bank Deposits through the Banking System in his influential textbook. Jonathan’s mistake here is to assume that the mere fact of money changing hands causes it to be regarded as both income and spending. He writes: “You don’t need to know much about economics to grasp the simple idea that every buy involves a sell. It’s as simple as that. Your income is somebody else’s expenditure.”

Therein lies his fundamental mistake. Every buy does involve a sell and your income may be somebody else’s expenditure, but that does not mean your income is somebody else’s expenditure derived from their own income. In claiming that spending equals income, Jonathan has erroneously assumed a closed loop. If a company borrows money from a bank in order to pay me for my services, its expenditure was not derived from its income and only a fraction of it was derived from anyone else’s income. Spending can come from income, but it does not have to do so. And, as I have shown in past posts, the larger part of the growth in aggregate spending has come from this very bank-created non-income that Jonathan claims does not exist.

Perhaps it might have been easier on economic novices like Jonathan had I troubled to go into detail explaining that the existence of savings in a fractional-reserve banking system is sufficient to explode the false equivalency of spending and income. Perhaps it was too much to expect that the average reader would be able to correctly grasp the consequential implications of a failure to spend 100 percent of one’s income. Nevertheless, my failure to spell things out for the reader does not change the accuracy of my observation that unless every dollar of income is spent rather than saved, deposited, and loaned out, total spending will never equal total income in a modern economy with fractional-reserve banking. Nor would additional explanation alter in the slightest the correctness of my statement that not every dollar that is spent today has been earned. Because debt is not income and some spending is funded by debt, total spending does not equal total income, but rather, exceeds it. This is, of course, the very first thing I pointed out in addressing Krugman’s fallacious attack on the business cycle.

So, Jonathan’s first two points fail, which thereby causes his third point to fail as well. It makes no sense to dismiss a book for a nonexistent error and the only misreading of Krugman that took place was Jonathan’s. These were not his only errors, but this demonstration of the falsehood of his three primary claims will suffice to prove that his “review” of RGD is flawed to the point of utter irrelevance. And I will also take strong exception to his assertion that an error, even an egregious error, renders the entirety of a book useless. For example, if we were to accept Jonathan’s specious logic, we would have to conclude that Paul Krugman’s most recent book, The Return of Depression Economics, should be junked due to Krugman’s statement that “about half the banks in the United States failed” in 1931. The correct number was about 11 percent. Contra Jonathan, I assert that ignoring Krugman’s book would be a mistake and that despite his failure to account for debt or time preferences, Krugman is not an idiot, but is merely crippled by his past success, his stubborn dedication to an erroneous and outmoded economic model, and his willful refusal to consider other, more reliable economic theories.

As to the questions, credit yourself if you spotted Jonathan’s errors:

5 points: I did not interpret Krugman’s income-spending equivalence “to mean that every dollar of one’s income one must spend.”

10 points: Krugman’s income-spending equivalence was not an obvious tautology. Nor was it a pointless statement.

25 points: Fractional-reserve banking.

It is not my habit to copy and paste complete texts from other sites, but since Jonathan elected to question my “balls” for merely quoting the most relevant part and providing a direct link to it, here it is in its entirety:

Vox Day, for those who don’t know, is a libertarian Christian blogger, known more for his penchant for hyperbole than reasoned argument. However, he’s intelligent and well-read enough that it takes a little while to realize that he’s all bluster and little substance, and this, coupled with his supreme confidence in his own intelligence, has resulted in him attracting a moderately large legion of sycophantic followers to his website. No doubt it is such people who have given glowing reviews to this book.

However, anybody with a capacity for independent thought ned only peruse a few sample pages from this book to see what a charlatan Vox is, at least when it comes to economics. His prose is so self-consciously academic, that it almost lulls one into complacently following along. But where he is right, he is regurgitating the work of others. Where he strays from this, however, close inspection reveals profound mistakes. Styling himself an Austrian economist, a reading of his criticism against Krugman makes it clear that Vox is well out of his depth, so embarrassingly so that one need read no further. On pages 163-164, he make an ludicrous strawman rebuttal of an argument of Krugman’s. To be specific, he misreads Krugman’s statement that all income is spending (and vice versa) to mean that every dollar of one’s income one must spend. He then spends the next several paragraphs ackwardly informing us of the obvious, such as that when one doesn’t buy a factory, that doesn’t mean they must buy something else. I almost feel bad for Vox, as he gloats in his victory over an argument nobody would ever be dumb enough to make. (And I would think nobody would be dumb enough to think somebody with a Nobel Prize would make it, either.) He accuses Krugman of not understanding simple things like time-preference or the effects of debt, of essentially being a base moron.

Of course, what Krugman means is that one person’s income must come from somebody else’s spending, an obvious tautology. Sadly, I don’t think Vox was trying to pull anything. I think Vox really believes he understands this stuff enough to write about it, when it’s seems all he knows how to do is reference other works in a pseudo-academic tone and parrot the names of concepts he’s read.

It takes some serious guts to write a book insulting a Nobel Prize winning economist when you never worked a day as an economist, but if this book makes one thing clear (and it would be the only accomplishment of this book) it would be that Vox Day is a pathological narcissist. In fact, I’m sure if Vox ever comes across this review, he’ll make equally shoddy strawman arguments against it, skewer it to the front page of his website, and sooth his ego with the reassurances of those who are greater fools than he.

(For the record, I’m not defending Krugman or Keynesian economics. I’m a libertarian myself, and subscribe to Austrian economics to the limited extent I understand it. I actually came to this book thinking I’d like it and learn a lot from it. Unfortunately, I’m compelled to review it poorly. I’ve never written a review on a book I didn’t read completely, but sometimes it’s justified when the author makes such egregious errors in the first chapter one peruses. You don’t need to finish an entire turd sandwich to know the last bite is going to taste as bad as the first.)


A note to Paul Krugman

Paul Krugman writes on his blog:

Hmm. I’m fairly accustomed to having speaking events disrupted by Larouchies (when I was in Cambridge a while back we had a guy yelling about banana fungus, among other things, who had to be shouted down by the audience).

But last night at Baruch the problem was Austrian economics/Ron Paul people who just wouldn’t stop talking.

On the whole, I might prefer the banana fungus.

I wrote the following reply and much to my surprise, it passed NYT moderation:

Dr. Krugman, I own all your books and have quite enjoyed several of them, particularly “The Accidental Theorist”. You are an engaging writer and have done some fascinating and genuinely ground-breaking work in the area of currency attacks.

Unfortunately, you literally do not know what you are talking about whenever you attempt to discuss Austrian economics. In your 1998 Slate essay entitled “The Hangover Theory”, it is perfectly clear that you have never read any Austrian economic theory because you are demonstrably unfamiliar with both the relevant economists and Austrian terminology. (For example, Schumpeter was an Austrian national and an economist, but he was not an Austrian economist.) What you have been criticizing and belittling is nothing more a strawman of your own concoction.

When even The Economist is describing the global financial crisis and the developing Great Depression 2.0 as a failure of academic economics, it should be clear to everyone that your appeal to academic authority is nonsensical. Your refusal to learn from the school of Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, Mises, Hayek, and Rothbard is precisely why your policy prescriptions for the Japanese and U.S. economies have reliably failed for more than ten years.

The biggest problem is your theory-based inability to understand that debt not only matters, it is the single most important variable in the modern economic equation. The fact that Keynes left it out of his general theory and Samuelson subsequently left it out of his practical application has badly crippled your ability to understand the present situation. It does not behoove an intellectual to dismiss what he does not know, so therefore I encourage you to give Austrian business cycle theory a sincere shot before casually dismissing it again.

UPDATE: We have our first one-star Amazon review by someone who admits he didn’t read the book! It took longer than I thought, but one Jonathan Birge has produced a beauty that really has to be read to be believed. The astounding thing is that the guy read my criticism of Krugman’s critique of what he imagines Austrian economics might be, and somehow managed to reach this conclusion:

Styling himself an Austrian economist, a reading of his criticism against Krugman makes it clear that Vox is well out of his depth, so embarrassingly so that one need read no further. On pages 163-164, he make an ludicrous strawman rebuttal of an argument of Krugman’s. To be specific, he misreads Krugman’s statement that all income is spending (and vice versa) to mean that every dollar of one’s income one must spend. He then spends the next several paragraphs ackwardly informing us of the obvious, such as that when one doesn’t buy a factory, that doesn’t mean they must buy something else. I almost feel bad for Vox, as he gloats in his victory over an argument nobody would ever be dumb enough to make. (And I would think nobody would be dumb enough to think somebody with a Nobel Prize would make it, either.) He accuses Krugman of not understanding simple things like time-preference or the effects of debt, of essentially being a base moron.

Of course, what Krugman means is that one person’s income must come from somebody else’s spending, an obvious tautology. Sadly, I don’t think Vox was trying to pull anything. I think Vox really believes he understands this stuff enough to write about it, when it’s seems all he knows how to do is reference other works in a pseudo-academic tone and parrot the names of concepts he’s read….

(For the record, I’m not defending Krugman or Keynesian economics. I’m a libertarian myself, and subscribe to Austrian economics to the limited extent I understand it. I actually came to this book thinking I’d like it and learn a lot from it. Unfortunately, I’m compelled to review it poorly. I’ve never written a review on a book I didn’t read completely, but sometimes it’s justified when the author makes such egregious errors in the first chapter one peruses. You don’t need to finish an entire turd sandwich to know the last bite is going to taste as bad as the first.)

By “limited” Jonathan clearly means “not even a little”. Now, Five points if you can spot what the kid got hopelessly wrong about what I wrote. Ten points if you can spot what he got completely wrong about what Krugman wrote. And twenty-five points if you can spot what major aspect of a modern economy, besides debt and time-preferences, Krugman revealed his theoretical model is not taking into account.


The time-preferences of criticism

Swamp Rat is more than a little impatient:

I know you’re not an ordinary boob, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that you’re not a boob. I’m willing to concede the possibility that I don’t understand your criticism. Perhaps you can spell it out for me and those like me more clearly.

The vast majority of people either do not grasp the concept of CA or reject it as counter-intuitive, but all schools of economic thought (save Marxian) embrace it. That doesn’t mean it’s valid of course, but you need to do more than express vague doubts if you want to be taken seriously by anyone outside of your fan club.

Specifically where do these economists go wrong and why do you think so?

It’s true that the vast majority of people don’t understand Comparative Advantage, but that’s mostly because so few people have ever read Ricardo. I have to point out how tiresome and ridiculous it is when people nonsensically assert that relatively simple and straightforward concepts, such as science, evolution by natural selection, or comparative advantage, are somehow beyond the capacity of anyone known to possess both the relevant information and the sufficient intelligence to understand them due to some ineffable magic qualities that no one is ever able to identify. Now, I suppose it is theoretically possible that I don’t understand Ricardo despite having proved my grasp of Smith, Marx, Keynes, Friedman, Mises, and Hayek beyond any reasonable doubt, but I doubt even my most vehement critics would consider it to be likely.

That being said, I don’t expect anyone to take my criticism of Comparative Advantage seriously at this point, due to the fact that I have not yet articulated it in any substantive manner. I know Swamp Rat can’t possibly understand it because he doesn’t know what it is. I am quite confident that he will understand it when I publish it; whether he agrees or not will depend upon how convincing a case I am able to present. The extent of what I have only described as my “increasing skepticism” and “budding criticism” of free trade is a single column in which I described some of growing doubts about a concept I have never seriously questioned in 25 years of reading about economics. (It’s in the archives, written sometime last year.)

In the meantime, there is no shortage of economic data to demonstrate that free trade is not strongly correlated with either economic growth or higher incomes for U.S. workers. (It has clearly benefited Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese workers, but therein lies one seed of my criticism.) The U.S. indubitably engages in freer trade now than it did in the 1960s, and yet GDP growth rates are lower and average wages have been declining since 1973. There are certainly other factors involved, but the obvious indication is that whatever the positive aspects of CA might be, they are being observably outweighed by these other factors. I had hoped to write a fourth appendix addressing Ricardo’s theory in RGD, but I simply ran out of time. As I’m still in the process of working through some of the problems, it may be a little while before I’m able to post a substantive criticism here. But as many of my critics have learned, the fact that I am not ready to present a case should never be confused with the idea that I don’t have a strong one or notion that what I will eventually present is going to be largely the same as the cases that have been made previously by others.

Speaking of economics, here is a link to yesterday’s interview with Mike McSorley, in which CA may or may not have come up. I’m sorry that I’m not sure, but to be honest, with all these interviews, I’m finding it difficult to keep straight with whom I discussed what. I’m a little disappointed that I didn’t realize the new third-quarter total credit market debt number was released by the Fed yesterday. At $52617.3 billion, it shows that total credit has been essentially flat since Q4 2008; it’s down half a percent in 2009.

This means that the debt-deleveraging process has barely gotten started despite the 8-percent decline in bank credit. This puts total Debt/GDP at 369 percent, as the latest GDP revision has current dollar GDP at $14,266.3 billion


Yes, the books are that cooked

You may recall that I warned you to expect further revisions to the third quarter GDP numbers. Japan’s massive reduction of reported growth won’t be the last:

Japan’s Government today hit the Tokyo market with a “ridiculous” revision of its previous estimates for third-quarter gross domestic product (GDP), effectively admitting that the country’s economic rebound may have been only a mirage. The new figures revealed a misreading of corporate investment, which, it now emerges, shrank rather than grew between July and September. There was a similar confusion over deflation, with new numbers showing that the GDP deflator fell 0.5 per cent in the quarter, rather than rising 0.2 per cent as previously reported.

As a result, GDP rose by 1.3 per cent in the third quarter, compared with the previous estimate of 4.8 per cent.

In fact, I won’t be the least bit surprised if the numbers eventually turn negative over time. Remember, GDP is simply an abstract estimate, and as such, it is less important than unemployment. Although you’d be forgiven for thinking otherwise courtesy of the statistical obsessions of modern Keynesians, Keynes’s master work was not actually the general theory of GDP, CPI, and the targeted discount rate. There has not been any economic growth; since GDP measures government spending, all of the “growth” that has been reported is nothing more than the stimulus spending. In fact, if you compare the amount of the spending to the amount of the reported growth, you’ll soon see that a) the numbers don’t add up, and, b) if they did add up, (i.e. if the entire amount of government spending was included in the GDP equations), then the economy is contracting much faster than would seem possible.


Easy read

Voodoojock reviews RGD on Amazon:

The first thing that stands out about this book is the delivery. It’s fluid, conversational, and devoid of economic jargon that permeates most books on the subject. The book also exhibits none of the haughty arrogance displayed in books more suited for overworked graduate students of economics than public consumption. The graphs illustrate and illuminate rather than confound and confuse. There are ample anecdotes used to illustrate Day’s points. Having read von Mises’ “Theory of Money and Credit”, “The Anti-Capitalist Mentality”, “Socialism”, and Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, “Return of the Great Depression” is about as easy to read and understand as Hazlitt’s “Economics in One Lesson”.

As far as the book’s content goes, it’s thoroughly researched and uses cites numerous sources to illustrate his points. Though Day is a student of the Austrian School of economics, the manner in which he methodically examines the historical events and the personalities involved displays no trace of any personal bias.

In tangentially related news, Ben Bernanke decides that perhaps it is possible for a central bank to do what his predecessor declared impossible after all by detecting a financial bubble in the process of expanding.

“On the heels of a burst housing-and-credit bubble, Mr. Bernanke now calls financial booms “perhaps the most difficult problem for monetary policy this decade.” With Asian property prices soaring and gold prices busting records almost daily, the debate comes at a critical time. Mr. Bernanke wants to use his powers as a bank regulator to stamp out bubbles, but the Senate Banking Committee, which will grill him later this week, is considering stripping the Fed of its regulatory power.”

This is extraordinarily disingenuous rhetoric from the Fed chairman. Mr. Bernanke can stamp out the bubbles without having any regulatory power over the banks at all. Raise interest rates, reduce the money supply and the bubbles will pop in minutes, if not seconds.


Recovery!

The 0.2% decline in U3 unemployment isn’t necessarily the good thing it is commonly assumed to be:

Mara Proctor used to design limestone hearths and columns for luxury homes near Kansas City, drawing on her college education and six years of training. These days, she’s leading customers around a store that sells sculptured snowmen and Santa figurines. It isn’t by choice. Until a few weeks ago, Proctor was among the record 5.9 million Americans who have been jobless for at least six months. Now she belongs to a subset of that group: Out-of-work professionals and managers, engineers and teachers who have turned, in desperation, to holiday-season jobs as sales clerks.

Retailers report a surge in applications this year from professionals who had never applied for such jobs before.

As Pat Buchanan points out, it is insane to import 1.5 million immigrants when tens of millions of citizens are already out of work. Or rather, it is insane to do so if you have any interest at all in the well-being of the citizenry. On the other hand, since education is deemed to be so important, it’s obviously beneficial to the buyers of sculptured snowmen to have such a highly trained saleswoman at their service.

This is also the result of the higher education bubble. I don’t remember who said it, but he was correct in pointing out that expanding higher education to the masses doesn’t mean that you won’t have sales clerks any more, it simply means that you’ll have sales clerks with PhDs. As always, it’s about the supply and demand, and impoverished immigrants will always win out over middle class Americans for the simple reason that they will accept a lower wage. One thing the Ricardians always fail to recognize is that the benefit to the overall economic system from free trade does NOT accrue to those parties who were previously at an overwhelming advantage.


Sander’s sensible move

This is one of the few times you will ever see me speak well of a socialist politician’s actions:

U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders said on Wednesday that he was placing a hold on Ben Bernanke’s nomination for a second term as Federal Reserve chairman, a move that could slow the confirmation process. If the hold is not withdrawn, the move by Sanders, an independent from Vermont, means that Senate leaders will not be able to bring up the nomination for a vote by unanimous consent. Instead, they may need to garner 60 votes in order to consider the nomination.

There is no question that Bernanke should not be reconfirmed. He is a charlatan cut from precisely the same cloth as the fraudulent Climategate “scientists”, who are claiming to be saving the world from global warming in much the same way that Bernanke claims to have saved the USA from a second Great Depression. He didn’t, he hasn’t, he has only made the situation much worse through his bankers-first policies of extend and pretend.

Mike Shedlock presents a dialogue that is a great case against Bernanke:

Bernanke: For many Americans, the financial crisis, and the recession it spawned, have been devastating — jobs, homes, savings lost. Understandably, many people are calling for change.

Mish: Ben, the reason people are calling for a change is that you and the Fed wrecked the economy. You did not see a housing bubble, nor did you foresee a recession. I would also like to point out your selective memory loss about your role in bailouts.

Bernanke: Yet change needs to be about creating a system that works better, not just differently. As a nation, our challenge is to design a system of financial oversight that will embody the lessons of the past two years and provide a robust framework for preventing future crises and the economic damage they cause.

Mish: No Ben, we need a system that works differently. You have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that you and the Fed are incompetent and cannot be trusted. Ben, here is a compilation of your own statements made from 2005-2007 proving you have no idea what you are talking about.

Understand that the Federal Reserve system is going to collapse at some point regardless of what action is taken by the Congress. But Fed’s end will be much less catastrophic to the U.S. economy if it is intentionally and deliberately shut down as happened with each of the three previous American central banks than if it is left alone to collapse under the weight of its horrific economic contradictions. Denying a second term to Bernanke would be small first step towards winding down the current monetary system and replacing it with something more stable.

And when even something as flimsy and rife for abuse as a pure paper government currency is more stable, you know the present system can’t possibly survive.


WND column

The Dire Sign of Dubai

In 2007, the international financial elite knew very well that there were serious problems with the world’s largest banks. Perfectly good loans were being called, long-standing corporate relationships were being cast aside for short-term benefit and there was a palpable perception of something wicked on its way. While news of the so-called credit crunch was duly reported by all the major newspapers, few outside the financial world had any idea that consequences such as the meltdown of 2008 were rapidly approaching.

But if you knew what to look for, it was fairly obvious that something big and ugly was developing, which was why I wrote that “the United States was fast approaching an interesting juncture” in my WND column published March 24, 2008. In a similar manner, what appears to be the minor matter of a Dubai-based corporation requesting a six-month moratorium on its debt payments looks very much like a warning that the next stage in the global financial crisis will be upon us soon.

UPDATE – Karl Denninger notes the irony of an Arab government being more free market-oriented than the USA:

Dubai’s government said it hasn’t guaranteed the debt of Dubai World, the state-controlled holding company struggling with $59 billion in liabilities, and that creditors must help it restructure.

“The company received financing based on its project schedule, not a government guarantee,” Abdulrahman Al Saleh, director general of the emirate’s Department of Finance, said in an interview with Dubai TV, when asked whether the government was backing the debt. “Lenders should bear part of the responsibility.”


Dubai and debt-deleveraging

I expect the fears of a Dubai World default to be the first indication of many debt-deflationary shocks to come. The reason for what would appear to be a big overreaction to what is a relatively small problem is that everyone who is anyone in the financial world is thinking that if the legendary sovereign fund of Dubai can’t afford to service its debts, then who possibly can?

On Wednesday, Dubai World, the government investment company behind some of the emirate’s most ambitious projects, said it was seeking to delay repayment on a tranche of its debt.

The company has $60bn (£35.9bn) of liabilities from its various companies including Nakheel, the property firm behind the Palm Jumeirah, the world’s biggest artificial island, and the Nakheel Tower, the world’s tallest building at 1km high. It also owns DP World, the ports operator that bought P&O Ferries. Nakheel is due to make a $3.52bn Islamic bond repayment, plus charges, on December 14. The company also unveiled a restructuring programme, to be headed by Aidan Birkett, Deloitte’s managing partner for corporate finance.

Traders feared that the request for a six-month standstill was a sign that the Dubai Government was struggling with its other debts – and that the full impact of the financial crisis globally may not yet be over.

As I wrote at the beginning of RGD, it is not over. It has only begun. It may be worthwhile to remember that Austria’s Creditanstalt bank didn’t declare bankruptcy until May 1931, 19 months after Black Tuesday. It has been less than 14 months since the U.S. Congress created the Office of Financial Stability in order to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program.


“Mandatory reading”

Steveo reviews RGD on Amazon:

Nagging doubts about the economy? You can either trust those same bought & paid for priestly economists that the government trots out every day or you can read Vox Day’s book, “The Return of the Great Depression” and find out what’s in store.

On a tangential note, the FDIC is now reporting what I was saying six months ago. The DIF is insolvent and the reserve ratio is officially negative. Based on their third-quarter figures, actual losses are still exceeding estimated losses, but by a ratio closer to 1.5 than the 1.95 reported in 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. I suspect the reason for this declining ratio is not due to the assets of the banks that failed in the third quarter being in better shape, but because the recognition of actual losses to the FDIC are being delayed through the increasing use of loss-share agreements with the banks taking over the assets of the failed banks.