Explaining debt-deflation

This article should help explain why “printing” money is not necessarily inflationary in a monetary system where most of the money is created through fractional-reserve lending:

The following chart shows that bank reserves held at the Fed have increased 100-fold over the past 14 months — from around $10B in August of 2008 to around $1000B ($1T) today. It is important to understand that while this explosion in the reserves of US depository institutions has rightfully prompted much discussion and consternation, it hasn’t directly added to the total supply of US dollars (bank reserves are not counted in monetary aggregates such as M1, M2, M3, MZM and TMS). The reason that bank reserves aren’t added to the money supply is that they do not constitute money available to be spent within the economy; rather, they constitute money that could be loaned into the economy or used to support additional bank lending in the future.

If even bank reserves can’t be counted as money, it should be obvious that mere Federal Reserve printed notes can’t be counted either. The money has to go into the system before it can be spent; this is why increased bank reserves are considered to be deflationary. This does not mean, however, that the Fed can simply force the banks to force lending, as some have suggested. Mike Shedlock explains why:

1) Lending comes first and what little reserves there are (if any) come later.
2) There really are no excess reserves.
3) Not only are there no excess reserves, there are essentially no reserves to speak of at all. Indeed, bank reserves are completely “fictional”.
4) Banks are capital constrained not reserve constrained.
5) Banks aren’t lending because there are few credit worthy borrowers worth the risk.


Krugman defends

Or, at least, tries to defend himself.

Oy. Rajiv Sethi tries to make sense of the arguments of Bryan Caplan and Tyler Cowen. So I went and looked — and what’s immediately clear is that Caplan, at least, is simply assuming that a rise or fall in nominal wages is equivalent to a rise or fall in real wages.

This was exactly Keynes’s starting point: as he said, by taking it for granted that the bargain over nominal wages sets real wages for the economy as a whole, classical economists had “slipt into an illicit assumption.”

And look: if you work through my little AD/AS exercise it should be immediately clear that in the case I was concerned with, changes in W lead to equal changes in P, so that real wages don’t change. Simple microeconomic logic doesn’t help here at all.

The problem with Dr. Krugman’s defense here is that a) microecnomic logic is not relevant, and b) he has committed his own illicit assumption, for as he stated: “in liquidity trap conditions, the interest rate isn’t affected at the margin by either the supply or the demand for money – it’s hard up against the zero bound.”

But this means that even if one accepts his AS-AD model, it is obvious that he was incorrect to state that economy in the 1930s was hard up against the zero bound. As proof of this, he cites historical interest rates on 3-month Treasury bills as being 0.14%, and forgets that present interest rates on 3-month T-bills are around 0.005%. Moreover, his own calls for quantitative easing indicate that the zero bound cannot be the firm barrier that his model requires them to be.

On a less theoretical level, it is simply not credible to assert that a lower minimum wage is going to magically cause the Fed to raise interest rates. Japan’s highest minimum wage is lower than the U.S. federal minimum and this has obviously not caused Japanese interest rates to increase in 20 years.


Correcting Krugman

I completely understand if some people think I’m attacking strawmen rather than Krugman’s actual arguments. Except I’d create more convincing strawmen:

It seems that more and more Serious People (and Fox News) are rallying around the idea that if Obama really wants to create jobs, he should cut the minimum wage.

So let me repeat a point I made a number of times back when the usual suspects were declaring that FDR prolonged the Depression by raising wages: the belief that lower wages would raise overall employment rests on a fallacy of composition. In reality, reducing wages would at best do nothing for employment; more likely it would actually be contractionary.

Here’s how the fallacy works: if some subset of the work force accepts lower wages, it can gain jobs. If workers in the widget industry take a pay cut, this will lead to lower prices of widgets relative to other things, so people will buy more widgets, hence more employment.

But if everyone takes a pay cut, that logic no longer applies. The only way a general cut in wages can increase employment is if it leads people to buy more across the board. And why should it do that?

First, a reduction in the minimum wage doesn’t mean that EVERYONE’S PAY is going to get cut. There aren’t a lot of surgeons and computer programmers who are suddenly going to face competition from those whose labor is worth less than 7.25 per hour. Second, there are two ways that a general cut in wages could lead people to buy more in the aggregate. If labor costs are reduced, then the price of consumer goods are reduced. The Law of Supply and Demand states that there will be more demand for those lower-priced consumer goods… as well as more demand for the lower-priced labor. Also, it is an established fact that higher-income people save a greater portion of their income and spend less of it than lower-income people. Therefore, creating a larger pool of people making less money on average is going to cause people to buy more across the board.

Please note that I do not agree with the Keynesian aggregate perspective nor do I believe it is the responsibility of government to micromanage the economy, I am merely showing that Krugman is incorrect even from his chosen perspective.

Now, Krugman attempts to evade the obvious criticism in his subsequent post by stating: “the whole point is that reducing all money wages doesn’t necessarily reduce real wages. And for what it’s worth, the little AS-AD analysis I linked to is Econ 101, at least if you use a good textbook.”

This argument against reducing the minimum wage boils down to the possibility that cutting the minimum wage will cause interest rates to rise. That is simply not credible in the current monetary policy environment, as the 20-year example of Japan should suffice to demonstrate. Krugman rests his case on asking us to “suppose that the AD curve is vertical“, but a request for a supposition is a very long way from demonstrating that the AD curve actually is vertical. And even if Krugman’s simplified model had been correct, once one considers the fact that the U.S. Treasury auctioned 3-month bills at 0.005 percent in December 2008, it becomes obvious that America was not liquidity trapped at 0.14 percent in the mid-1930s as Krugman imagines, but actually had room for expansion by an order of magnitude… 28x to be precise.


Deficits: the Keynesian perspective

This is a very informative piece by Paul Krugman which accurately describes how the Keynesians regard budget deficits. I’d intended to post on it prior to the spending/income equivalency discussion, but as it happens, the two are tangentially related so this will make for a nice step into the deeper examination of why Keynesians place such importance on what I assert to be a false simplicity that is the result of them practicing the Ricardian Vice:

Broadly speaking, there are two ways you can get into severe deficits: fundamental irresponsibility, or temporary emergencies. There’s a world of difference between the two.

Consider first the classic temporary emergency — a big war. It’s normal and natural to respond to such an emergency by issuing a lot of debt, then gradually reducing that debt after the emergency is over. And the operative word is “gradually”: it would have been incredibly difficult for the United States to pay off its World War II debt in ten years, which Jim apparently thinks is the right way to view debts incurred more recently; but it was no big deal to stabilize the nominal debt, which is roughly what happened, and as a result gradually reduce debt as a percentage of GDP.

Consider, on the other hand, a government that is running big deficits even though there isn’t an emergency. That’s much more worrisome, because you have to wonder what will change to stop the soaring debt. In such a situation, markets are much more likely to conclude that any given debt is so large that it creates a serious risk of default.

Now, back in 2003 I got very alarmed about the US deficit — wrongly, it turned out — not so much because of its size as because of its origin. We had an administration that was behaving in a deeply irresponsible way. Not only was it cutting taxes in the face of a war, which had never happened before, plus starting up a huge unfunded drug benefit, but it was also clearly following a starve-the-beast budget strategy: tax cuts to reduce the revenue base and force later spending cuts to be determined. In effect, it was a strategy designed to produce a fiscal crisis, so as to provide a reason to dismantle the welfare state. And so I thought the crisis would come.

In fact, it never did. Bond markets figured that America was still America, and that responsibility would eventually return; it’s still not clear whether they were right, but the housing boom also led to a revenue boom, whittling down those Bush deficits.

Compare and contrast the current situation.

Most though not all of our current budget deficit can be viewed as the result of a temporary emergency. Revenue has plunged in the face of the crisis, while there has been an increase in spending largely due to stimulus and bailouts. None of this can be seen as a case of irresponsible policy, nor as a permanent change in policy. It’s more like the financial equivalent of a war — which is why the WWII example is relevant.

So the debt question is what happens when things return to normal: will we be at a level of indebtedness that can’t be handled once the crisis is past?

And the answer is that it depends on the politics. If we have a reasonably responsible government a decade from now, and the bond market believes that we have such a government, the debt burden will be well within the range that can be managed with only modest sacrifice.

Krugman’s reference to the “classic temporary emergency” is a reference to Samuelson’s explanation of the difference between internal and external debt in Chapter 18 of Economics, entitled Fiscal Policy and Full Employment Without Inflation. In creating his example, Samuelson concocts a scenario which posits a) present day munitions are necessary (true), b) there is no outside nation to lend goods (unlikely), c) Congress is unwilling to raise taxes enough to balance the budget (usually true), d) price-control and rationing laws are necessary (irrelevant, as Samuelson himself points out). And Samuelson makes an unintentionally important point when he mentions, offhand, that “Fortunately, the United States has come out of the most costly war in all history with little impairment of capital equipment and internal debt.”

(Sorry, had to do an interview there.)

Now, Krugman begins by posting a somewhat misleading distinction. There is no reason why a temporary emergency cannot be the result of fundamental irresponsibility. In fact, since the present political system is now built on the concept of the permanent campaign and the permanent crisis, one can quite reasonably ask if the idea of a “temporary emergency” is an oxymoron when modern government is taken into account. But if, for the sake of argument, we accept the distinction, it is fairly reasonable to subsequently accept the idea that a big war in which the survival of the nation is at stake would a) trump budgetary concerns, and b) not represent a permanent outlay.

However, it has to be kept in mind that this cannot be applied to all wars or all emergencies. The war has to pose a real threat to the nation’s survival, since losing the war renders future interest payments irrelevant. There is no point in going into massive debt for war if you’re going to have to pay it off regardless of the outcome; losing the war has to represent a worse fate than going into debt. Therefore, the equation varies depending upon whether you are being attacked by killer cannibals from Papua New Guinea or Victoria’s Secret Army. The war has to be short-term, and it also has to favor the odds of not destroying your capital base. Needless to say, this pretty much eliminates every shooting war in which the USA has engaged since, well, WWII.

The next problematic point made by Krugman is that the present crisis is NOT the result of irresponsible policy and that it is temporary. This is, to put it bluntly, incorrect and arguably insane. Numerous books, including RGD, have been written to explain how the present crisis is the direct and predictable result of irresponsible monetary and fiscal policies. Moreover, since total credit market debt grew from $37.8 trillion in 2004 to $52.9 trillion in 2009, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the crisis is temporary either; it will likely take decades of debt-deleveraging and economic contraction to reduce debt/GDP from its present 3.7 to the sustainable long term level of 1.5.

Finally, the Bush tax cuts were not “a strategy designed to produce a fiscal crisis, so as to provide a reason to dismantle the welfare state”. Bush actually expanded Federal entitlements and never made any effort to reduce, let alone dismantle, the welfare state. The tax cuts were actually straight out of the Keynesian playbook, being an expansionary contracyclical policy enacted during the economic slowdown of 2000-2001. Krugman not only fails to support his case here, but provides an argument that is ludicrously easy to disprove.

Therefore, it is downright laughable to attempt to claim that the $450 billion deficit in 2003 was more troublesome than is the $1.8 trillion deficit in 2009. The economic crisis is not the financial equivalent of war because it does not threaten the nation’s survival, it obviously does not represent a fate worse than debt, it is not temporary, and it is the result of fundamentally irresponsible policies.


Hoover lives!

“The banks also received their share of Hoover’s ire for their unwillingness to expand in those troubled times. The New York Times reported on May 20 that Hoover was “disturbed at the apparent lack of cooperation of the commercial banks of the country in the credit expansion drive.” In short, the “banks have not passed the benefits of these relief measures on to their customers.” The anger of the inflationist authorities at the caution of the banks was typified by the arrogant statement of RFC chairman, Atlee Pomerene: “Now . . . and I measure my words, the bank that is 75 percent liquid or more and refuses to make loans when proper security is offered, under present circumstances, is a parasite on the community.”
– Murray Rothbard, America’s Great Depression, Chapter 11

“My main message in today’s meeting was very simple: that America’s banks received extraordinary assistance from American taxpayers to rebuild their industry and now that they’re back on their feet, we expect an extraordinary commitment from them to help rebuild our economy.”
– Barack Obama, 2009

Plus ca change…. Credit Doug French of the Mises Institute for noticing this play from a 1930s playbook.


The key to full grokking

This statement by Frederic Bastiat is all you really need to know in order to understand the current political economy:

When plunder becomes a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal system that authorizes it and a moral code that glorifies it.

It’s always interesting how reading the great minds of the past reveals how little changes in human society. But how surprising to see such a quote appear in the New York Times, even from an outsider!


Addressing an RGD “review”

Jonathan Birge commits several errors in what he attempts to pass off as a “review” of The Return of the Great Depression, but they all stem from a single source. This is his inability to understand Paul Krugman’s purpose in writing the “Hangover” essay or connect that purpose to Krugman’s statement that total income is equal to total spending. This failure is the foundation of his bizarre attack on both my character and RGD; as he writes: “I’m simply pointing out that if Vox can’t even understand what Krugman is talking about, on simple matters like this, how can one trust his dismissal of Krugman? One can be right for the wrong reasons, and if Vox is right about Krugman being an idiot, it’s certainly not because Vox grasps what Krugman is trying to say.”

So, Jonathan’s “review” can be summarized as three basic claims:

1. Paul Krugman had no substantive reason to declare that total spending equals total income.
2. I misread what Krugman had written when he declared total spending equals total income.
3. This single “misreading” justifies the complete dismissal of RGD.

I will now proceed to demonstrate the falsity of all three of these claims. When I read his review, it was immediately obvious to me that Jonathan did not understand what Krugman was saying about income and spending, much less why he said it, but Jonathan helpfully proceeded to admit as much in his subsequent comments. “Krugman wasn’t making a big point: he was saying that whenever you get a dollar, some other entity gave it to you and had to consider that spending…. Why the hell Krugman brings it up is beyond me.” And yet, even when his erroneous assumptions were pointed out to him, Jonathan insisted that this supposedly inexplicable statement of Krugman’s was not merely true, but a downright tautology “because it’s simply a statement that when money changes hands, it’s a debit for somebody and a credit for someone else. Debt doesn’t change this, and time-preference isn’t even germane to the debate. The fact that Vox brings up time-preference proves he had no idea what Krugman was trying to say.”

This is incorrect on several levels. Unlike Jonathan, I not only understand what Krugman was saying, I also understand why he was saying it. Far from being an irrelevant tautology, Krugman’s statement that total spending necessarily equals total income is the basis of his erroneous argument against the Austrian concept of the business cycle. It is so important, in fact, that it was the only part of the essay that I deemed necessary to quote directly and in full. Although Krugman has since modified the position he took in his 1998 essay and admitted that perhaps investment bubbles do lead to economic contractions after all, the entire point of the essay was to prove that the Austrian school theory is wrong and that recessions are not a consequence of economic booms. Hence the title “The Hangover Theory”.

But before I explain why the assertion that total spending equals total income was both a) integral to Krugman’s case and b) incorrect, it’s worth pointing out that Krugman doesn’t even believe that the assertion is intrinsically true, let alone tautologically obvious as Jonathan insists. When asked in October if the dichotomy between statistical reports of rising consumer spending and higher unemployment numbers contradicted “the economic maxim that expenditures are equal to income” Krugman replied: “That ‘economic maxim’ is deeply misleading. Consumers can and do spend either more or less than their income. And even for the economy as a whole, in the short run income adjusts to match spending, not the other way around.”

Krugman admits what I originally stated: total spending does NOT necessarily equal total income. It cannot, obviously, since income has to adjust in order to match spending. Now, why does income have to adjust to spending and why doesn’t it work the other way around? We can only surmise that there must be some additional factor that would allow spending to take place without income… whatever could that be? Finally, why would Krugman declare something that he later states to be misleading? In this case, it is not an example of his occasional inconsistency or because he changed his mind since 1998, but because he needed to make the income-spending equivalence in order to attack a specific point of Austrian business cycle theory. While Krugman doesn’t know much about Austrian theory and mistakes malinvestment for “overinvestment” in “investment goods” (capital goods is the Austrian term), he knows just enough about it to understand that the Austrians place great theoretical importance on the shift from investment in the production of consumer goods to investment in the production of capital goods. However, because he has not actually read much, if any, Austrian theory, he does not understand the mechanism of that shift, which in its conventional formulation is the result of expanded bank credit producing false signals that encourage businesses to invest in producing higher-order capital goods rather than lower-order consumer goods. Since he doesn’t understand the mechanism, he wrongly concludes that a converse shift in investment from consumer goods to capital goods will have an equal but inverse effect as the shift from capital goods to consumer goods. If the former can cause a recession, he decides, then the latter should too.

This is why he wrote: “So if people decide to spend less on investment goods, doesn’t that mean that they must be deciding to spend more on consumption goods—implying that an investment slump should always be accompanied by a corresponding consumption boom?” This is a major sticking point for Krugman; earlier this year he wrote: “you ask why, say, a housing boom — which requires shifting resources into housing — doesn’t produce the same kind of unemployment as a housing bust that shifts resources out of housing.” He derives this false equivalence from the very statement for which Jonathan sees no point, the statement that is the foundation of his argument against Austrian business cycle theory.

“Here’s the problem: As a matter of simple arithmetic, total spending in the economy is necessarily equal to total income (every sale is also a purchase, and vice versa). So if people decide to spend less on investment goods….”

It should now be clear that Jonathan is incorrect, that Krugman’s statement is not a tautology and that Krugman was using it to make a big point, the central point of his argument. It should also be clear that I understand what Krugman is saying and why he is saying it. But, even if I didn’t misread Krugman, did I make a mistake in referring to individual decisions about equities and cars? Was it an error to highlight the facts that not every dollar of income must be spent today, and not every dollar that is spent today is earned? No, of course not. Here is why.

Let’s start with Jonathan’s assertion about the first point. “In no case would the actions of a single person possibly illuminate or refute the point Krugman was making (which is that each transaction requires two parties where each take the opposite side of the trade).” But, as I’ve already demonstrated, Jonathan failed to understand the point Krugman was using that statement to make. The actions of single person serve very well to illuminate the fact a failure to invest in capital goods does not require an investment in consumer goods, for the obvious reason that what is being considered is the sum total of all the actions of individuals. Krugman himself refers to precisely such individual actions when he writes that “if people decide to spend less on investment goods, doesn’t that mean that they must be deciding to spend more on consumption goods…?” These are individual decisions, nor can Jonathan claim they are not thanks to Krugman’s more recent distinction between “consumers” who can and do spend either more or less than their income and “the economy as a whole.” While there are a few areas that Keynesian theory insists on making a distinction between that which benefits an individual and that which benefits the aggregate, such as Keynes’s Paradox of Thrift, that does not apply to this example where the individual’s investment decisions will have a directly quantifiable effect on the aggregate.

Now to my two statements about the observable facts that puncture Krugman’s dilemma. Because Jonathan did not read the book, he is unaware that a great deal of attention is given to the nature of money, central banking and the fractional-reserve system. By his own admission, he does not understand how a modern monetary system works; he says: “I don’t know how the accounting works for things like Fed operations….” More importantly, his subsequent comments reveal that he doesn’t even know what money in a modern economy actually is, as after being given a hint of the magnitude of his error by Steveo, he attempts to equivocate by creating a false distinction between bank-created debt and money.

that makes it sound like banks can print money, which they can’t. they issue debt that, in our system of fractional reserve banking, is legally declared equivalent to money. when a bank issues a loan, the bank is not spending money any more than you’re getting income when using your credit card.

Had Jonathan actually read RGD, he would know that in the U.S. and most modern financial systems, money is debt, which is why the politicians around the world are so desperate to force the banks to increase their lending. This is the heart of the very important debate over inflation vs debt-deflation that has been going on for the past five years between economists who foresaw the crisis and actually understand what is taking place right now. But for the purposes of this explanation, it is sufficient to point out that when a bank issues a loan, it is not spending money, it is creating money. In fact, this fractional reserve-created money is by far the larger portion of the money supply; Jonathan’s knowledge doesn’t even rise to the level of Wikipedia, which states: “The different forms of money in government money supply statistics arise from the practice of fractional-reserve banking. Whenever a bank gives out a loan in a fractional-reserve banking system, a new sum of money is created. This new type of money is what makes up the non-M0 components in the M1-M3 statistics… central bank money is M0 while the commercial bank money is divided up into the M1-M3 components”

Now, where does M1-M3 come from? From savings deposited in the banks, or in other words, “every dollar of income that is not spent today.” So, far from being equal to income, spending in a fractional-reserve system is always a multiple of income, the process which Paul Samuelson laid out in detail in the table entitled Multiple Expansion of Bank Deposits through the Banking System in his influential textbook. Jonathan’s mistake here is to assume that the mere fact of money changing hands causes it to be regarded as both income and spending. He writes: “You don’t need to know much about economics to grasp the simple idea that every buy involves a sell. It’s as simple as that. Your income is somebody else’s expenditure.”

Therein lies his fundamental mistake. Every buy does involve a sell and your income may be somebody else’s expenditure, but that does not mean your income is somebody else’s expenditure derived from their own income. In claiming that spending equals income, Jonathan has erroneously assumed a closed loop. If a company borrows money from a bank in order to pay me for my services, its expenditure was not derived from its income and only a fraction of it was derived from anyone else’s income. Spending can come from income, but it does not have to do so. And, as I have shown in past posts, the larger part of the growth in aggregate spending has come from this very bank-created non-income that Jonathan claims does not exist.

Perhaps it might have been easier on economic novices like Jonathan had I troubled to go into detail explaining that the existence of savings in a fractional-reserve banking system is sufficient to explode the false equivalency of spending and income. Perhaps it was too much to expect that the average reader would be able to correctly grasp the consequential implications of a failure to spend 100 percent of one’s income. Nevertheless, my failure to spell things out for the reader does not change the accuracy of my observation that unless every dollar of income is spent rather than saved, deposited, and loaned out, total spending will never equal total income in a modern economy with fractional-reserve banking. Nor would additional explanation alter in the slightest the correctness of my statement that not every dollar that is spent today has been earned. Because debt is not income and some spending is funded by debt, total spending does not equal total income, but rather, exceeds it. This is, of course, the very first thing I pointed out in addressing Krugman’s fallacious attack on the business cycle.

So, Jonathan’s first two points fail, which thereby causes his third point to fail as well. It makes no sense to dismiss a book for a nonexistent error and the only misreading of Krugman that took place was Jonathan’s. These were not his only errors, but this demonstration of the falsehood of his three primary claims will suffice to prove that his “review” of RGD is flawed to the point of utter irrelevance. And I will also take strong exception to his assertion that an error, even an egregious error, renders the entirety of a book useless. For example, if we were to accept Jonathan’s specious logic, we would have to conclude that Paul Krugman’s most recent book, The Return of Depression Economics, should be junked due to Krugman’s statement that “about half the banks in the United States failed” in 1931. The correct number was about 11 percent. Contra Jonathan, I assert that ignoring Krugman’s book would be a mistake and that despite his failure to account for debt or time preferences, Krugman is not an idiot, but is merely crippled by his past success, his stubborn dedication to an erroneous and outmoded economic model, and his willful refusal to consider other, more reliable economic theories.

As to the questions, credit yourself if you spotted Jonathan’s errors:

5 points: I did not interpret Krugman’s income-spending equivalence “to mean that every dollar of one’s income one must spend.”

10 points: Krugman’s income-spending equivalence was not an obvious tautology. Nor was it a pointless statement.

25 points: Fractional-reserve banking.

It is not my habit to copy and paste complete texts from other sites, but since Jonathan elected to question my “balls” for merely quoting the most relevant part and providing a direct link to it, here it is in its entirety:

Vox Day, for those who don’t know, is a libertarian Christian blogger, known more for his penchant for hyperbole than reasoned argument. However, he’s intelligent and well-read enough that it takes a little while to realize that he’s all bluster and little substance, and this, coupled with his supreme confidence in his own intelligence, has resulted in him attracting a moderately large legion of sycophantic followers to his website. No doubt it is such people who have given glowing reviews to this book.

However, anybody with a capacity for independent thought ned only peruse a few sample pages from this book to see what a charlatan Vox is, at least when it comes to economics. His prose is so self-consciously academic, that it almost lulls one into complacently following along. But where he is right, he is regurgitating the work of others. Where he strays from this, however, close inspection reveals profound mistakes. Styling himself an Austrian economist, a reading of his criticism against Krugman makes it clear that Vox is well out of his depth, so embarrassingly so that one need read no further. On pages 163-164, he make an ludicrous strawman rebuttal of an argument of Krugman’s. To be specific, he misreads Krugman’s statement that all income is spending (and vice versa) to mean that every dollar of one’s income one must spend. He then spends the next several paragraphs ackwardly informing us of the obvious, such as that when one doesn’t buy a factory, that doesn’t mean they must buy something else. I almost feel bad for Vox, as he gloats in his victory over an argument nobody would ever be dumb enough to make. (And I would think nobody would be dumb enough to think somebody with a Nobel Prize would make it, either.) He accuses Krugman of not understanding simple things like time-preference or the effects of debt, of essentially being a base moron.

Of course, what Krugman means is that one person’s income must come from somebody else’s spending, an obvious tautology. Sadly, I don’t think Vox was trying to pull anything. I think Vox really believes he understands this stuff enough to write about it, when it’s seems all he knows how to do is reference other works in a pseudo-academic tone and parrot the names of concepts he’s read.

It takes some serious guts to write a book insulting a Nobel Prize winning economist when you never worked a day as an economist, but if this book makes one thing clear (and it would be the only accomplishment of this book) it would be that Vox Day is a pathological narcissist. In fact, I’m sure if Vox ever comes across this review, he’ll make equally shoddy strawman arguments against it, skewer it to the front page of his website, and sooth his ego with the reassurances of those who are greater fools than he.

(For the record, I’m not defending Krugman or Keynesian economics. I’m a libertarian myself, and subscribe to Austrian economics to the limited extent I understand it. I actually came to this book thinking I’d like it and learn a lot from it. Unfortunately, I’m compelled to review it poorly. I’ve never written a review on a book I didn’t read completely, but sometimes it’s justified when the author makes such egregious errors in the first chapter one peruses. You don’t need to finish an entire turd sandwich to know the last bite is going to taste as bad as the first.)


A note to Paul Krugman

Paul Krugman writes on his blog:

Hmm. I’m fairly accustomed to having speaking events disrupted by Larouchies (when I was in Cambridge a while back we had a guy yelling about banana fungus, among other things, who had to be shouted down by the audience).

But last night at Baruch the problem was Austrian economics/Ron Paul people who just wouldn’t stop talking.

On the whole, I might prefer the banana fungus.

I wrote the following reply and much to my surprise, it passed NYT moderation:

Dr. Krugman, I own all your books and have quite enjoyed several of them, particularly “The Accidental Theorist”. You are an engaging writer and have done some fascinating and genuinely ground-breaking work in the area of currency attacks.

Unfortunately, you literally do not know what you are talking about whenever you attempt to discuss Austrian economics. In your 1998 Slate essay entitled “The Hangover Theory”, it is perfectly clear that you have never read any Austrian economic theory because you are demonstrably unfamiliar with both the relevant economists and Austrian terminology. (For example, Schumpeter was an Austrian national and an economist, but he was not an Austrian economist.) What you have been criticizing and belittling is nothing more a strawman of your own concoction.

When even The Economist is describing the global financial crisis and the developing Great Depression 2.0 as a failure of academic economics, it should be clear to everyone that your appeal to academic authority is nonsensical. Your refusal to learn from the school of Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, Mises, Hayek, and Rothbard is precisely why your policy prescriptions for the Japanese and U.S. economies have reliably failed for more than ten years.

The biggest problem is your theory-based inability to understand that debt not only matters, it is the single most important variable in the modern economic equation. The fact that Keynes left it out of his general theory and Samuelson subsequently left it out of his practical application has badly crippled your ability to understand the present situation. It does not behoove an intellectual to dismiss what he does not know, so therefore I encourage you to give Austrian business cycle theory a sincere shot before casually dismissing it again.

UPDATE: We have our first one-star Amazon review by someone who admits he didn’t read the book! It took longer than I thought, but one Jonathan Birge has produced a beauty that really has to be read to be believed. The astounding thing is that the guy read my criticism of Krugman’s critique of what he imagines Austrian economics might be, and somehow managed to reach this conclusion:

Styling himself an Austrian economist, a reading of his criticism against Krugman makes it clear that Vox is well out of his depth, so embarrassingly so that one need read no further. On pages 163-164, he make an ludicrous strawman rebuttal of an argument of Krugman’s. To be specific, he misreads Krugman’s statement that all income is spending (and vice versa) to mean that every dollar of one’s income one must spend. He then spends the next several paragraphs ackwardly informing us of the obvious, such as that when one doesn’t buy a factory, that doesn’t mean they must buy something else. I almost feel bad for Vox, as he gloats in his victory over an argument nobody would ever be dumb enough to make. (And I would think nobody would be dumb enough to think somebody with a Nobel Prize would make it, either.) He accuses Krugman of not understanding simple things like time-preference or the effects of debt, of essentially being a base moron.

Of course, what Krugman means is that one person’s income must come from somebody else’s spending, an obvious tautology. Sadly, I don’t think Vox was trying to pull anything. I think Vox really believes he understands this stuff enough to write about it, when it’s seems all he knows how to do is reference other works in a pseudo-academic tone and parrot the names of concepts he’s read….

(For the record, I’m not defending Krugman or Keynesian economics. I’m a libertarian myself, and subscribe to Austrian economics to the limited extent I understand it. I actually came to this book thinking I’d like it and learn a lot from it. Unfortunately, I’m compelled to review it poorly. I’ve never written a review on a book I didn’t read completely, but sometimes it’s justified when the author makes such egregious errors in the first chapter one peruses. You don’t need to finish an entire turd sandwich to know the last bite is going to taste as bad as the first.)

By “limited” Jonathan clearly means “not even a little”. Now, Five points if you can spot what the kid got hopelessly wrong about what I wrote. Ten points if you can spot what he got completely wrong about what Krugman wrote. And twenty-five points if you can spot what major aspect of a modern economy, besides debt and time-preferences, Krugman revealed his theoretical model is not taking into account.


The time-preferences of criticism

Swamp Rat is more than a little impatient:

I know you’re not an ordinary boob, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that you’re not a boob. I’m willing to concede the possibility that I don’t understand your criticism. Perhaps you can spell it out for me and those like me more clearly.

The vast majority of people either do not grasp the concept of CA or reject it as counter-intuitive, but all schools of economic thought (save Marxian) embrace it. That doesn’t mean it’s valid of course, but you need to do more than express vague doubts if you want to be taken seriously by anyone outside of your fan club.

Specifically where do these economists go wrong and why do you think so?

It’s true that the vast majority of people don’t understand Comparative Advantage, but that’s mostly because so few people have ever read Ricardo. I have to point out how tiresome and ridiculous it is when people nonsensically assert that relatively simple and straightforward concepts, such as science, evolution by natural selection, or comparative advantage, are somehow beyond the capacity of anyone known to possess both the relevant information and the sufficient intelligence to understand them due to some ineffable magic qualities that no one is ever able to identify. Now, I suppose it is theoretically possible that I don’t understand Ricardo despite having proved my grasp of Smith, Marx, Keynes, Friedman, Mises, and Hayek beyond any reasonable doubt, but I doubt even my most vehement critics would consider it to be likely.

That being said, I don’t expect anyone to take my criticism of Comparative Advantage seriously at this point, due to the fact that I have not yet articulated it in any substantive manner. I know Swamp Rat can’t possibly understand it because he doesn’t know what it is. I am quite confident that he will understand it when I publish it; whether he agrees or not will depend upon how convincing a case I am able to present. The extent of what I have only described as my “increasing skepticism” and “budding criticism” of free trade is a single column in which I described some of growing doubts about a concept I have never seriously questioned in 25 years of reading about economics. (It’s in the archives, written sometime last year.)

In the meantime, there is no shortage of economic data to demonstrate that free trade is not strongly correlated with either economic growth or higher incomes for U.S. workers. (It has clearly benefited Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese workers, but therein lies one seed of my criticism.) The U.S. indubitably engages in freer trade now than it did in the 1960s, and yet GDP growth rates are lower and average wages have been declining since 1973. There are certainly other factors involved, but the obvious indication is that whatever the positive aspects of CA might be, they are being observably outweighed by these other factors. I had hoped to write a fourth appendix addressing Ricardo’s theory in RGD, but I simply ran out of time. As I’m still in the process of working through some of the problems, it may be a little while before I’m able to post a substantive criticism here. But as many of my critics have learned, the fact that I am not ready to present a case should never be confused with the idea that I don’t have a strong one or notion that what I will eventually present is going to be largely the same as the cases that have been made previously by others.

Speaking of economics, here is a link to yesterday’s interview with Mike McSorley, in which CA may or may not have come up. I’m sorry that I’m not sure, but to be honest, with all these interviews, I’m finding it difficult to keep straight with whom I discussed what. I’m a little disappointed that I didn’t realize the new third-quarter total credit market debt number was released by the Fed yesterday. At $52617.3 billion, it shows that total credit has been essentially flat since Q4 2008; it’s down half a percent in 2009.

This means that the debt-deleveraging process has barely gotten started despite the 8-percent decline in bank credit. This puts total Debt/GDP at 369 percent, as the latest GDP revision has current dollar GDP at $14,266.3 billion


Yes, the books are that cooked

You may recall that I warned you to expect further revisions to the third quarter GDP numbers. Japan’s massive reduction of reported growth won’t be the last:

Japan’s Government today hit the Tokyo market with a “ridiculous” revision of its previous estimates for third-quarter gross domestic product (GDP), effectively admitting that the country’s economic rebound may have been only a mirage. The new figures revealed a misreading of corporate investment, which, it now emerges, shrank rather than grew between July and September. There was a similar confusion over deflation, with new numbers showing that the GDP deflator fell 0.5 per cent in the quarter, rather than rising 0.2 per cent as previously reported.

As a result, GDP rose by 1.3 per cent in the third quarter, compared with the previous estimate of 4.8 per cent.

In fact, I won’t be the least bit surprised if the numbers eventually turn negative over time. Remember, GDP is simply an abstract estimate, and as such, it is less important than unemployment. Although you’d be forgiven for thinking otherwise courtesy of the statistical obsessions of modern Keynesians, Keynes’s master work was not actually the general theory of GDP, CPI, and the targeted discount rate. There has not been any economic growth; since GDP measures government spending, all of the “growth” that has been reported is nothing more than the stimulus spending. In fact, if you compare the amount of the spending to the amount of the reported growth, you’ll soon see that a) the numbers don’t add up, and, b) if they did add up, (i.e. if the entire amount of government spending was included in the GDP equations), then the economy is contracting much faster than would seem possible.