Tag: debate

Gamma spin in action

Here is how Dave Futrelle attempted to characterize the abortive debate on women’s suffrage I posted at Alpha Game, which he fled once it became apparent that he couldn’t get away with simply declaring himself the winner and would have to actually make a coherent case in support of female suffrage instead:

The very notion of two dudes earnestly debating female suffrage – in 2014, no less – struck me as beyond absurd, so I sent back what I thought was an appropriately dismissive Tweet.

    @voxday @RedPillPhil @heartiste Yes, women should have voting rights, because they, like men, are human. I win the debate! The end.Thanks!—
    David Futrelle (@DavidFutrelle) July 25, 2014

Apparently Mr. Day saw this tweet as my opening gambit in a debate that was now on, and replied with an attempted gotcha. Against my better judgment, I replied:

    @voxday @RedPillPhil @heartiste No. I vote where I live, in the US.. So are you contending that no women live in the countries they vote in?—
    David Futrelle (@DavidFutrelle) July 25, 2014

He replied, and I sunk deeper into the quicksand of this ridiculous “debate.”

    @voxday @RedPillPhil @heartiste There are a few basic requirements for having the right to vote besides being human but being male isn’t one—
    David Futrelle (@DavidFutrelle) July 26, 2014

At this point I realized I needed to shut this thing down as quickly as possible. So I posted a couple of quick tweets:

David Futrelle
There are a few basic requirements for having the right to vote besides being human but being male isn’t one

David Futrelle
There is no reasonable reason to deny anyone the vote because of gender.

David Futrelle
… and that’s preetty much the end of the argument, despite whatever spurious reason you come up with to deny women the vote. Debate over.

This is classic Gamma behavior. Their fear of failure is so great that in the rare instance they don’t completely avoid conflict, they engage only insofar as they can later claim that they weren’t really trying. They want their audience to believe that, of course, they COULD have roundly defeated their opponent, but they couldn’t bother for [insert excuse here]. Of course, they somehow always find the time to explain their various justifications for not really trying, which often takes longer than simply engaging in the first place would have.

Notice how Futrelle falsely claims I said I defeated him in the debate. That’s absolutely untrue. All I did was expose his inability to hold his own or to make his case on the subject. My only claim was this: “I was able to show Futrelle’s reasoning to be incorrect twice.”  Which was undeniably true. There was no winner of the debate since it never reached a conclusion. Futrelle simply ran away and now he is trying to provide a narrative to justify that abject retreat.

Futrelle’s fellow Gamma male, PZ, who has run away from a few debates himself, was quick to embrace Futrelle’s narrative:

Actually, Day proposed a debate on a subject that was settled in the USA about 95 years ago, and Futrelle laughed dismissively, and Vox Day declared himself the winner.

“Critics such as Futrelle and Scalzi are of low socio-sexual rank, which means that they have the usual gamma male’s distaste for conflict that has a clear winner. The reason is that as long as they can avoid losing, they can still claim victory in their delusional gamma style.”

Wait. But it was Vox Day who threw out a few non sequiturs and declared himself winner…this is confusing.

Again, note that I did absolutely nothing of the sort. It may be helpful to be reminded of the Gamma male’s core mindset, as provided by a self-admitted former Gamma male: “It’s not about being stupid, or even a chubby nerd, it’s about lying to yourself relentlessly about what’s right in front of your eyes.”

That’s how Gammas like Futrelle and Myers can lie so blatantly about me declaring myself the winner when in fact Futrelle was the only one who did so. They relentlessly lie, to others and themselves, because the truth is too painful for them to accept. Notice, too, that only one commenter on PZ’s site points out the obvious; other than him, no one calls them on their observable lies.

Can you even imagine that happening here? On a complete tangent, this pair of comments made me laugh:

daintydougal
rhetoric is no substitute for dialectic rhetoric is no substitute for dialectic… *head kasplodes*

fibinachi
Yeah! I second daintydougal. Out of all that, that’s the one that threw me off the most too. Just wow.

Keep in mind that these are the people who claim to be the intelligent and educated side. Then again, we were warned:

“[B]efore some audiences not even the possession
of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge
implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct.”

How to win a debate every time

David Futrelle demonstrates his mastery of dialectic in a remarkably brief debate with me concerning women’s suffrage on Twitter:

David Futrelle
I’ll take on any “dark enlightenment” bloggers (that’s hard to say w/ a straight face) in a cat pic duel.

Vox Day
Why not take me on in an actual debate. An easy topic like: should women have voting rights?

David Futrelle
Yes, women should have voting rights, because they, like men, are human. I win the debate! The end. Thanks!

Vox Day
Sorry, David, you haven’t won yet. Yes, you are human. Did you vote in the recent EU elections?

David Futrelle
No. I vote where I live, in the US.. So are you contending that no women live in the countries they vote in?

Vox Day
I’m demonstrating to you that merely being human grants no voting rights. Do you concur?

David Futrelle
There are a few basic requirements for having the right to vote besides being human but being male isn’t one

David Futrelle
There is no reasonable reason to deny anyone the vote because of gender.

David Futrelle
… and that’s preetty much the end of the argument, despite whatever spurious reason you come up with to deny women the vote. Debate over.

A performance for the ages! Socrates had nothing on this guy. I had no idea that simply begging the question was sufficient to declare a debate over and announce yourself the winner. But I can see where this tactic would be extremely useful and plan to incorporate it into all my online discourse in the future. I shall be unstoppable! There is more at Alpha Game.

A lesson in rhetoric

In reading the responses to the Anti-Apologetics, SimplyTimothy observed: “Not stated, but now obvious, is that when you decide to bring the
rhetoric it is like bringing a swift kick to the balls to the
arm-wrestling contest. I like how you light the fuse of their ideas,
amplify them, then hand it back to them like a ticking time-bomb – then
you offer them a lit cigarette. It is very civilized of you.”

When writing on such disputative matters, I always attempt to do so with a tea service and one pinky extended. Anyhow, as a few people, mostly Tango, appear to be confused on the difference between a rhetorical response and a dialectical response, (which is legitimately confusing since technically, a rhetorical response IS a dialectical response), I think a brief refresher is worthwhile.

Remember that rhetoric is not limited to the laws of logic. Aristotle wrote: “Rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion
is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been
demonstrated. The orator’s demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of
persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without
distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows
plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be
best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs
from the syllogism of strict logic.”

In other words, when using rhetoric, one has to know when to utilize strict logical syllogisms and when to depart from them. And this totally depends on the audience. For, as I have frequently quoted him before, Aristotle observes: “Before some audiences not even the possession
of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge
implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct.”

In rhetoric, it is perfectly legitimate to engage in all manner of logical fallacies. This is exactly what Peter Boghossian’s Street Epistemologists are taught to do, which is why they advance various arguments that are not only mutually contradictory, but blatantly flawed from a strict logical perspective. They engage in bait-and-switches, false definitions, and appeals to everything from authority to their own incredulity.

Now, because they claim to be faithful devotees of Science and Reason, this is why using scientific consensus and strict logic against them can be useful. But it is not our only weapon; they are woefully unprepared to see any sophisticated rhetoric arrayed against them. As one can see from the specific defenses they are being taught to attack, they are only being prepared for the lowest and crudest levels of rhetoric.

The rhetoric I am teaching you, on the other hand, is a much more sophisticated and deeper approach. Suppose, for example, the Street Epistemologist were to take Tango’s approach, retreat to the dialectic, and point out the difference between Boggie’s construction (1) and my own (2):

1) No faith is needed to POSTULATE that the universe may have always
existed.
2) No faith is needed to POSTULATE that the
universe always existed.

“Postulate (Subject One) versus Postulate (Subject One or Subject
Two). What you postulate is enclosed within the brackets, the subject of
the postulation. There is a world of difference when the subject allows
for alternatives compared to a straight out declaration with no choice.”

While it is true that the subjects postulated are modestly different, the differences are irrelevant and it is a huge mistake for the Street Epistemologist to try this line of retreat because it exposes an even bigger flaw in Boghossian’s attack. The fact is that no faith is needed to POSTULATE ANYTHING because a postulate is, by definition, “a defining”. A postulate, or a positing, is not a conclusion; it is the IF in the IF-THEN statement. The spearpoint of Anti-Apologetic #1 is nothing more than a statement of the obvious given rhetorical effect through specification.

So, it should be obvious that if one goes with a purely dialectical approach here, one gets no additional benefit from the perfectly analogous enthymeme. The postulates may be different, but the important thing to note is that there is no difference between the legitimacy of one postulate and another. Recall that the opponent is not going to be impressed with your dialectical precision; he has already shown that he is willing to say anything so long as it might be persuasive. But by responding in the rhetorical manner, with a slightly modified postulate, one gets the same benefit as well as the additional rhetorical benefit of the stronger statement and opening up the possibility of not one, but two effective new lines of attack if the Street Epistemologist is so foolish as to stubbornly attempt to salvage this particular attack by distinguishing between Postulate 1 and Postulate 2.

I’ve already pointed out the one line of attack that a retreat to a dialectical defense would expose the Street Epistemologist. See if you can correctly identify the second, and even more effective one, it also exposes.

Mailvox: dissecting dialectic

ST asks for criticism concerning his attack on a utilitarian argument in defense of punishing Christians who fail to support gay marriage.

I am debating a “Humian Utilitarian” with the moniker Eric The Red (ETR) over at Doug Wilson’s place. I post there as timothy. Two men there, Katecho and Dan have done the grunt work of identifying the materialism of ETR and I consider him debunked, but ETR is an evasive little bastard.

I would like for him to hang himself with his Utilitarian positions. I am not pleased with my work on this and am asking your help or criticism.

ETR’s position is that human happiness is maximized (pick your flavor of Utilitarianism measurement here–average or greatest–it doesn’t matter which) by celebrating gay marriage. Since a Christian  baker’s refusal to bake a wedding cake for a couple of gay perverts detracts from that happiness, it is right to punish the Christians.

I am going to adopt the Utilitarian viewpoint in my  argument as it is ETR’s viewpoint.

ETR likes to change the subject quite a bit when things get tight, so here is his latest example missive where I think an opening lies:

“Perhaps someone can answer my earlier question:  In light of Uganda, how isn’t is the basest and more repulsive hypocrisy for Christians to  complain about having to bake a cake? Take a look at what your fellow religionists have done to gays over the years; you sure have a low tolerance for what you consider persecution in light of your own abuse of gays over the years.”

Since it is topical, I am focusing on the Ugandan law he mentions and ignoring the other accusations for now.

The text of the Ugandan law is here.

Clause 3 specifies the penalty for the horror of an HIV-positive man buggering a child. It is on this clause that I am building my argument (this decision may be a mistake, but I am rolling with it for now).

The Logical structure I have in mind is a simple Conjunctive

P dot Q
where both P and Q have to be true.
If one is false then the conjunctive is false and the argument fails.
Here is the truth table.
P Q  P dot Q
T T   T
T F   F
F T   F
F F   F

Argument P

  1. A Utilitarian desires the greatest “good” for the greatest number of people.
  2. Without children, there are no people for whom to maximize the greatest good, therefore, the good of the greatest number of people warrants the protection of children.
  3. Clause 3 of the Ugandan law specifically penalizes homosexuals in the case of HIV positive men having sex with children. Thereby increasing the greater good.
  4. Clause 3 of the Ugandan law is valid under Utilitarian principles.
  5. The Utilitarian principle of maximizing the greater good requires stigmatizing homosexual behavior

Argument Q

  1. A Utilitarian desires the greatest “good” for the greatest number of people.
  2. Homosexual marriage increases the greater good. (defined as happines, if I remember the thread correctly)
  3. Actions that increase human happiness are to be encouraged.
  4. Actions that decrease human happiness are to be penalized.
  5. Christians who refuse to bake a wedding cake for homosexuals are at odds with Utilitarian principles
  6. Under Utilitarian principles it is a good to punish those who punish homosexual behavior.

Either P is True or Q is True.
Both cannot be true.
P and Q state the same thing
therefore the Utilitarian argument fails.

My take is that this is overkill. Some will recall that one of the first questions I ask myself in dealing with an interlocutor is whether or not he is intellectually honest. Since ST describes ETR as “an evasive little bastard”, we can safely assume that he is not. And since he is presenting a utilitarian argument in favor of a statistically insignificant minority, we can also observe that he isn’t particularly intelligent either.

Where ST went wrong was in permitting ETR to beg the question. ETR asserted, apropos of nothing, that “human happiness is maximized by
celebrating gay marriage”. I would have attacked that point and demonstrated his argument to be based upon a false foundation rather than taking the much more complicated approach ST adopted.

Also, Argument P is legitimate, but somewhat convoluted. Steps 2 and and 5 are weaker than they could be. If I were to rewrite Argument P, it would be as follows:

Argument P2

  1. A Utilitarian desires the greatest “good” for the greatest number of people.
  2. Actions that increase human happiness are to be encouraged.
  3. It observably makes the majority of Ugandans happy to see homosexuality criminalized.
  4. Under Utilitarian principles it is a good to criminalize homosexual behavior.

This accomplishes the same result and in a much more straightforward action. Better yet, it forces ETR to go back and defend the question that had been successfully begged if he is going to object to it. Of course, the entire argument is stupid on its face; Utilitarianism is nothing more than the democratic fallacy and has been known to be bankrupt for more than a century. The fact is that ETR is not going to be convinced of anything or stop presenting his dialectically false arguments simply because they have been shown to be false and philosophically outdated. His objectives are entirely rhetorical and akin to that of Pajama Boy, which is “to make the opponents feel terrible about themselves”. Now, recall that in most cases, the opponent’s objective is based on his own vulnerabilities. And that points the way to effective victory.

Because the Left is usually limited to the rhetorical level, it is useful to take a two-step approach of first dialectically crushing the opponent’s pseudo-dialectical argument, then to rhetorically rub his intellectual inferiority in his face along with any other obvious psychological weaknesses. (This, by the way, is why the Left is so reliably inept when they attack me; they seldom bother to try to understand their enemy.) However, since the dialectic aspect is only relevant in that it lays the foundation for the subsequent rhetorical assault, it is best to keep it as simple and easy to follow as possible.

Suboptimal rhetoric

In which America is less than entirely astonished to learn that Pajama Boy is a self-described gay-loving “liberal f—“ with no morals, a predilection for attacking others, and a superiority complex:

Ethan Krupp, the little man who played “Pajama Boy” in a widely mocked Obamacare ad, once characterized himself as a “liberal f—.”

Krupp, an Organizing for Action (OFA) content writer who became the face of progressive America while wearing a onesie pajama suit, also remarked that gays “are all liberal f—-” and criticized a “conservative gay prick” on his now-deleted WordPress blog, entitled “Not Being Creative.”

“I am a Liberal F—,” Krupp wrote in one post. “A Liberal F— is not a Democrat, but rather someone who combines political data and theory, extreme leftist views and sarcasm to win any argument while make the opponents feel terrible about themselves. I won every argument but one.”

Sure you did, Pajama Boy. Sure you did. Notice that his approach is entirely rhetorical. The reference to sarcasm and feelings make it clear that he’s not even remotely interested in proper dialectic per se. One hallmark of this sort of individual is that he always thinks he wins an argument because his combination of self-delusion and total lack of regard for objective truth means that he can easily self-define the result of ANY argument as a win.

I seem to recall someone else describing a similarly “successful” rhetorical approach to debate:

“The more I argued with them, the better I came to know their dialectic. First they counted on the stupidity of their adversary, and then, when there was no other way out, they themselves simply played stupid. If all this didn’t help, they pretended not to understand, or, if challenged, they changed the subject in a hurry, quoted platitudes which, if you accepted them, they immediately related to entirely different matters, and then, if again attacked, gave ground and pretended not to know exactly what you were talking about. Whenever you tried to attack one of these apostles, your hand closed on a jelly-like slime which divided up and poured through your fingers, but in the next moment collected again. But if you really struck one of these fellows so telling a blow that, observed by the audience, he couldn’t help but agree, and if you believed that this had taken you at least one step forward, your amazement was great the next day. The Jew had not the slightest recollection of the day before, he rattled off his same old nonsense as though nothing at all had happened, and, if indignantly challenged, affected amazement; he couldn’t remember a thing, except that he had proved the correctness of his assertions the previous day.

“Sometimes I stood there thunderstruck.

“I didn’t know what to be more amazed at: the agility of their tongues or their virtuosity at lying.

“Gradually I began to hate them.”

If the consequences of your self-declared victorious approach to intellectual disputation is to make formerly indifferent people hate and despise you, then perhaps it is time to consider an entirely different rhetorical approach.

Mailvox: improving dialectic

JB asks how he can improve his ability to debate:

Do you have any recommendations on reading material for improving one’s debate skills? I am aware of the most basic premise being the ability to reason, followed by a willingness to suffer defeat in repeated efforts. I am good at debating, but studying what you have posted, as well as other’s responses shows me that there is room for considerable improvement on my part. I am passably familiar with Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and Aristotle; the last of whom is cited considerably often on Vox Populi but I am interested in learning more. What do you feel are the best books to study on this? Can it even be learned through books or does one have to simply fight it out personally and learn by doing?

Given Scalzi’s inept appeals to his degree in alleged rhetoric; possibly this cannot be learned other than by doing. However if there are recommendations that you have for books on rhetoric and debate, I would be interested to hear them. After all, my default setting whenever I am interested in learning more about a subject is to buy multiple books on it; so I am hopeful that you might have some suggestions for reading material.

It’s important to distinguish between learning about something and actually doing it. Although not a basketball fan, I know a fair amount about basketball courtesy of Bill Simmons, a lifelong basketball fanatic. But nothing that I have ever read about basketball has improved my three-point shot.

As Michael Jordan once said after one of his returns from retirement, the best way to get in shape for playing basketball is to play basketball. I run twice per week in the soccer offseason in order to stay in shape, but no matter how good I am about my off-season routine, the first practice of the season is always the most painful.

Reading Cicero and Plato may provide you with some rhetorical and dialectical tools, but having those tools is not the same thing as knowing how and when to use them effectively. Indeed, reading about them while not putting them into actual practice may actually be detrimental to one’s ability to debate; as JB has seen with Mr. Scalzi, it can even contribute to a powerful sense of self-delusion in that regard.

I am a little concerned by JB’s assertion of being “passably familiar” with the four classic figures mentioned. One of the great intellectual diseases of our time is the idea that having heard of something, or knowing a little bit about it, is practically akin to having mastered the subject. So, my first suggestion is that JB actually read the Socratic dialogues, read Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Cicero’s De Inventione. Then read something more modern; here is a nice online guide to The Five Canons of Rhetoric.

This leads to one important guideline: don’t ever claim to know something that you do not, in fact, know better than your opponent expects. A skilled opponent will unmask you faster than you think possible; read my exchange with the atheist Luke for a particularly brutal example of that. On the flip side, I was amused when an online conversation between two evolutionists was brought to my attention, as one was warning the other not to be fooled by my claim to be relatively ignorant about TENS. But I wasn’t playing dumb, the simple fact is that I don’t know biology the way I know economics or the history of video games, so I have to approach the subjects differently.

In my opinion, the best way one can develop one’s debating skills is to practice by regularly taking on the most knowledgeable opponents one can find. Consider, for example, the qualitative difference between my exchanges with Nate, with Dominic, and even with Delavagus with my various run-ins with PZ Myers, McRapey, and Luke. I still disagree with all six of them on the subjects we discussed, but the former three knew what they were talking about while the latter three manifestly did not.

Here is my response to being asked a similar question about 18 months ago, which led to the “Dissecting the Sceptics” series of posts. If JB hasn’t read through it, I would recommend doing so.

“The first question I always ask myself is if the argument is primarily
factual, logical, or rhetorical in nature. The second question I ask
myself is if the author is likely to have any idea what he’s talking
about or not. And the third question is if I regard the author as being
trustworthy or not, or rather, if I believe him to be fundamentally
intellectually honest or not. These three questions determine how
carefully I read through an argument and whether I presume the author is
more likely to make a simple mistake or whether any apparent mistakes
are actually intentional attempts to sneak something past the
insufficiently careful reader in order to make a flawed argument look
convincing.

“The fourth question is what is the author trying to prove? This
question often can’t be answered initially, but I keep it in the back of
my mind for future reference. Once I identify the specific point that
the author is trying to prove, I can track back from it to see if a) his
logic is correct, and b) if that logic is soundly supported. It’s
important to keep in mind that the actual point that the author is
trying to prove is not necessarily the one that he appears to be trying
to prove in the title or introduction.”  

And for those who find McRapey’s argument by appeal to BA in Philosophy of Language from the University of Chicago convincing, it might be educational to read through “Dissecting the Sceptics” andsee what I do to “a Ph.D. student in philosophy at the University of Chicago”.

The slumberer stirs

A few weeks ago, I was sent a copy of the Inflation-Deflation debate in ebook format. Having finished the first QUANTUM MORTIS novel, about which more later today, I thought it might be useful to put the 2011 PZ Myers Memorial Debate on the existence of gods in ebook format as well so I could review it preparatory to an eventual return to it.

I glanced at it on a train the other day, and since I’d almost completely forgotten how it proceeded, – was it really more than two years ago?!? –  I was surprised at how interesting I found it to be.  So yesterday I got in touch Dominic to see if he’d be interesting in continuing the debate and if he had any objections to my publishing it as an ebook once it is complete. He was more than happy to agree to  a return to the engagement, and so we intend to do so before the end of the year.

I am already working on my next installment, to which Dominic will write a response and both will be published here simultaneously. I’d like to know if Alex, Markku, and Scott are willing to return to their respective roles as Agnostic Judge, Christian Judge, and Atheist Judge; also, I’d very much appreciate it if Alex would send me his complete notes as all I’d posted here was his abbreviated summaries.

If you’re not familiar with the debate or, like me, don’t remember exactly how it went, you might like to read through it again in preparation for our return to the lists. So, here are the links as well as how it began with my first entry:

ON THE EXISTENCE OF GODS

In order to make the case that the weight of the available evidence and logic is more supportive of the existence of gods than of their nonexistence, it is necessary to define the two terms. In making my case for the existence of gods, I am relying upon the definitions of “evidence” and “logic” as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary. I am utilizing the term “evidence” in a sense that encompasses all three of the primary definitions provided.

Evidence:
1.Available body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid.
2.Information drawn from personal testimony, a document, or a material object, used to establish facts in a legal investigation or admissible as testimony in a law court.
3.Signs or indications of something.

Logic:
1.reasoning conducted or assessed according to strict principles of validity

There is a vast quantity of extant documentary and testimonial evidence providing indications that gods exist. This evidence dates from the earliest written records to current testimonials from living individuals. While it is true that the quality of this evidence varies considerably, it cannot simply be dismissed out of hand anymore than one can conclude Gaius Julius Caesar did not exist because one cannot see him on television today. Each and every case demands its own careful examination before it can be dismissed, and such examination has never been done in the overwhelming majority of cases.

For example, there are many documented cases of confirmed fraud in published scientific papers. If we apply the same reasoning to published scientific papers that some wish to apply to documentary evidence of gods, we have no choice but to conclude that all science is fraudulent. But this is absurd, as we know that at least some science is not fraudulent. Therefore, if one is willing to accept the validity of published scientific papers that one has not been able to verify are not fraudulent, one must similarly accept the validity of documentary evidence for the existence of gods that one has not examined and determined to merit dismissal for one reason or another.

Introduction 1 and Introduction 2

Round One Vox and Dominic’s Reply

Round One Dominic and Vox’s Reply

Round One Judges

Round Two

Round Two Judges

Round Three

Round Three Judges

The Moral Landscape revisited

A number of you have sent me this public challenge by Sam Harris:

It has been nearly three years since The Moral Landscape was
first published in English, and in that time it has been attacked by
readers and nonreaders alike. Many seem to have judged from the
resulting cacophony that the book’s central thesis was easily refuted.
However, I have yet to encounter a substantial criticism that I feel was
not adequately answered in the book itself (and in subsequent talks).

So I would like to issue a public challenge. Anyone who believes that
my case for a scientific understanding of morality is mistaken is
invited to prove it in 1,000 words or less. (You must address the
central argument of the book—not peripheral issues.) The best response
will be published on this website, and its author will receive $2,000.
If any essay actually persuades me, however, its author will receive
$20,000,* and I will publicly recant my view.

Submissions will be accepted here the week of February 2-9, 2014.

Needless to say, I will be submitting an entry. I’ve read the book and I’m very familiar with his approach. Sam Harris makes a regular habit of claiming he has answered his critics by way of anticipating them; he did the same in The End of Faith.  Let’s just say I don’t anticipate any trouble convincing anyone else that his thesis has been refuted, although convincing Mr. Harris himself may be considerably more difficult, especially considering the way he tried to weasel out of his perfectly straightforward statement on his belief in the ethical nature of killing people who subscribe to propositions considered to be sufficiently dangerous.

For those who are interested, here were my initial impressions after reading The Moral Landscape; my subsequent review of it, published on WorldNetDaily in November 2010, was as follows:

The Moral Landscape
Vox Day reviews Sam Harris’ case for using science to define morality

Sam Harris’ first two books were commercial successes and
intellectual failures. Riddled with basic factual and logical errors,
“The End of Faith” and “Letter to a Christian Nation” served as little
more than godless red meat snapped up by unthinking atheists around the
English-speaking world. His third book, “The Moral Landscape,” is also a
challenge to established wisdom, but it is a much more sober, serious
and interesting book than its predecessors.

The basis for the book is Harris’ own neuroscience experiments, in
which he tested his hypothesis that when hooked up to an fMRI scanner,
the human brain would produce an observable difference in its activity
when contemplating non-religious beliefs than when considering religious
beliefs. As it happens, the hypothesis was found to be incorrect, as
the same responses were elicited from both the believing group and the
non-believing group for religious and nonreligious stimuli alike. (Full
disclosure: I was one of the Christians asked by Mr. Harris to review
the religious stimuli to ensure their theological verisimilitude. In my
opinion, the questions utilized were both reasonable and fair.)

In “The Moral Landscape,” Sam Harris courageously attempts to address
the Problem of Morality that has plagued atheist philosophers since
Jean Meslier failed to realize the obvious consequences of his
declaration that every rational man could imagine better moral precepts
than Christianity possessed. As Harris notes, in the absence of a
morality derived from a religion, scientists and other secularists have
concluded that all morals are relative and there is therefore no
objective basis for preferring the moral precepts asserted by one
individual to those put forth by another, regardless of how monstrous
they might appear to a third party. This is why, aside from few
irrelevant rhetorical flourishes and one inexplicable personal jihad,
Harris’ arguments in the book are predominantly directed against his
fellow non-believers rather than theistic targets.

To his credit, Harris explicitly recognizes that he is making a
philosophical case, not a scientific one. This is a significant
improvement upon the first wave of New Atheist books, including Harris’
own pair, in which the various authors presented their intrinsically
philosophical cases in pseudo-scientific guise. However, there are three
argumentative flaws that pervade the book. Unfortunately, Harris
appears to have adopted Richard Dawkins’ favorite device of presenting a
bait-and-switch definition in lieu of a logically substantive argument.
He repeatedly utilizes the following technique:

1) Admittedly, X is not Y.

2) But can’t we say that X could be considered Z?

3) And Z is Y.

4) Therefore, X can be Y.

For example, in an attempt to get around Hume’s is/ought dichotomy,
Harris readily admits that “good” in the sense of “morally correct” is
not objectively definable and that what one individual perceives as good
can differ substantially from that which another person declares to be
“good.” So, he suggests the substitution of “well-being” for “good”
because there are numerous measures of “well-being,” such as life
expectancy, GDP per capita and daily caloric intake, that can be reduced
to numbers and are therefore measurable. After all, everyone
understands what it means to be in good health despite the fact that
“health” is not perfectly defined in an objective and scientific manner.
Right?

However, even if we set aside the obvious fact that the proposed
measures of well-being are of dubious utility – life expectancy does not
account for quality of life, GDP does not account for debt and more
calories are not always desirable – the problem is that Harris simply
ignores the way in which his case falls completely apart when it is
answered in the negative. No, we cannot simply accept that “moral” can
reasonably be considered “well-being” because it is not true to say that
which is “of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles or rules
of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong” is more
than remotely synonymous with “that which fosters well-being in one or
more human beings.”

Harris’ second habitual flaw is one that was seen in his previous
books. That is to act as if admitting that a problem with his reasoning
exists is somehow tantamount to resolving the problem in his favor. He
appears to grasp that his philosophical consequentialism suffers from
the same democratic problem that caused philosophers to abandon
Benthamite utilitarianism as a prospective substitute for morality –
nine out of 10 individuals agree that gang rape enhances their
well-being – but he simply chooses to ignore the problem. In the notes,
he justifies this gaping hole in his argument by declaring that the
conceptual developments that have taken place since John Stuart Mill
died in 1873 “are generally of interest only to academic philosophers.”
That’s likely true, but it doesn’t excuse such a blatant evasion of a
known criticism nor does it help the self-confessed consequentialist
deal with the potentially nightmarish consequences of utilitarian
totalitarianism.

The third pervasive flaw is what after three books has become
recognizable as Harris’ customary intellectual carelessness. Time and
time again, he makes statements of fact that are easily disproved by the
first page of a Google search. For example, in an attempt to explain
that all opinions need not be equally respected and that not all
competing responses to moral dilemmas are equally valid, he brings up
the subject of corporal punishment:

“There are, for instance, twenty-one U.S. states that
still allow corporal punishment in their schools. … However, if we are
actually concerned about human well-being, and would treat children in
such a way as to promote it, we wonder whether it is generally wise to
subject little boys and girls to pain, terror, and public humiliation as
a means of encouraging their cognitive and emotional development. Is
there any doubt that this question has an answer? Is there any doubt
that it matters that we get it right? In fact, all the research
indicates that corporal punishment is a disastrous practice, leading to
more violence and social pathology – and, perversely, to greater support
for corporal punishment.”

– Sam Harris, “The Moral Landscape”

But “all the research” shows nothing of the kind. Sweden’s rate of
child abuse increased nearly 500 percent after spanking ban was
instituted in 1979 and is significantly higher than that of the United
States. In Trinidad, a paper titled “Benchmarking Violence and
Delinquency in the Secondary School: Towards a Culture of Peace and
Civility” concluded that a ban on corporal punishment in school had led
to indiscipline and even physical attacks on teachers. Dr. Robert E.
Larzelere of Oklahoma State has even published annotated studies
showing that what little scientific evidence has been produced to
support anti-spanking bans is not sound. One need not have a position on
corporal punishment to recognize that Harris did not, in fact, actually
look into the relevant research he cites so blithely.

This failure to
correctly establish a factual premise and build from it is found
throughout the book; Harris makes a habit of beginning with a conclusion
and belatedly attempting to support it with a statement of fact that is
often dubious and occasionally downright in error.

Still, Sam Harris is to be lauded for taking the moral bull by the
horns and bravely attempting to make the case for the possibility of a
secular and scientific morality. “The Moral Landscape” raises some
interesting questions and provides the reader with more than a little
material for thought. On the downside, Harris’ repeated attacks on Dr.
Francis Collins are unseemly as well as irrelevant to his topic; one
wonders what his editor was thinking to permit such a lengthy tangent
that is more indicative of a Victor Hugo novel than a serious scientific
work. And in the end, the reader is forced to conclude the argument for
a science-based morality presented in “The Moral Landscape” is even
more demonstrably incorrect than was the scientific hypothesis that
served as the original inspiration for the book.

Out-credentialing the credentializers

I’ve noted that the Left makes a regular fetish of academic credentials because so many of their arguments rest upon nothing more than naked appeals to authority.  As we’ve seen again and again, even leftists without any significant credentials attempt to use appeals to nonexistent authorities to avoid having their arguments exposed via debate, i.e. the “you and/or your ideas are not even worthy” excuse.

I always find that excuse to be interesting in light of how my ideas are so often deemed eminently worthy of their attentions so long as they are able to remain on the attack. It is only when my critics unexpectedly find themselves forced to defend their own positions that my ideas mysteriously cease to be worthy of consideration.

In fact, if one stops and thinks through the logical implications, if my ideas merit substantial criticism while theirs do not, that means it is their ideas that are, in their own estimation, the unworthy ones.

Our resident female physics PhD often enjoys ambushing the unwary credentializer with her indubitably superior academic credentials.  I suspect she might relate to this anecdote, which I’ve dredged from the comments because it merits reading:

Garuda: “I just love how confused they get when not only does their credential
trump-card NOT work to cow their opponent, but is itself trumped by a
higher-value credential delivered by an aggressive debater.“

TJIC: “Best
example of this I ever saw: law professor and free market guru David
Friedman was talking about climate change in his blog. (He wasn’t
convinced by some detail of the orthodoxy.)

“A drive-by commentor
unloaded some Cathedral snark on him, appealing to the god SCIENCE. It
went something like “I don’t know why I should care about the opinion of
a mere law professor. I took some physics courses in college and I can
tell you that XYZ.”

“David replied calmly: ‘Well, I teach law in a law school, but I’m self-taught in that field. My PhD is in physics.'”

Trusting to your academic credentials is like placing faith in your IQ.  No matter how lofty they are, there is always someone out there with the means to trump you.  That’s why it is much better to hone your abilities to present effective arguments and utilize them instead; the correct and effective use of facts and reason will defeat even the most impressive academic credentials and the highest IQ when those things are mustered in defense of that which is demonstrably untrue.

As Aristotle did before him, in his Defense of the Divine Revelation against the Objections of the Freethinkers the brilliant mathematician Leonhard Euler observed that there are people who are simply incapable of being reached by reason:

“The freethinkers have yet to produce any objections that have not long been refuted most thoroughly. But since they are not motivated by the love of truth, and since they have an entirely different point of view, we should not be surprised that the best refutations count for nothing and that the weakest and most ridiculous reasoning, which has so often been shown to be baseless, is continuously repeated. If these people maintained the slightest rigor, the slightest taste for the truth, it would be quite easy to steer them away from their errors; but their tendency towards stubbornness makes this completely impossible.”

It makes no difference if one calls them rabbits, r-selected, freethinkers, scientists, credentialists, or “people whom one cannot instruct”.  What they are, in their core, are lovers of lies. They are haters of truth and they can never be convinced by any knowledge or logical argument because they will literally be damned before they will dare to question, let alone abandon, the dogma instilled in them by their warren.

The fact that Man’s greatest geniuses anticipated them and described them with utter contempt doesn’t even give them a moment’s pause is no surprise, but rather, a confirmation of the predictive model.

Inflation vs Deflation XII

Nate closes out the Great Inflation Debate with his final entry:

So at long last we understand how hyper-inflation works.  It is caused
by hyper-velocity.  Meaning folks are spending their money as soon as
they get it.  I’m not going to go much into the differences in Weimar
and today… because honestly the differences are actually smaller than
Vox indicates.  See we have the worlds leading reserve currency.  
Companies and governments have enormous amounts of cash on hand ready to
dump.  As I showed previously… the Fed has no idea how much cash is
actually out there in the international market.  We know that there is
roughly 2 trillion in corporate cash reserves in the domestic market…
but we’re told its actually as much as 5 or 6 trillion in the
international market.. and that’s on the low end.  Kids… that isn’t
even counting what the governments around the world are hoarding.
 Remember one of the benefits of being the foremost reserve currency is
that oil is priced in dollars…  so to buy oil you first have to buy
dollars. That’s important  Its a big deal.  So there is a lot of demand
for dollars out there.  And a lot of dollars hoarded up.

And thus we see that the engine is certainly sufficient to put the
train in motion.  In fact there is probably enough cash out there to
blow it to hell and gone.  No.. its not like Weimar.  Its different.
 Its very different.  But history doesn’t repeat.  It rhymes.

A common, but often ignored, phenomenon is that even during
hyper-inflation the central bankers think that there isn’t enough money
to go around.  Why?  Because I have explained it is velocity driving the
problem.  Not an increased supply in money.  Remember that central
bankers are all worshipers of John Maynard Keynes.  Damn his eyes.  So
they see complex economic situations as simplistic equations that can be
manipulated with god-like precision.  They have equations that they
really believe accurately can describe something as complex as an
economy.  To much X?  Add a little Y.  To much V?  take away some Q.  I
know this sounds insane… because well… it is… insane.
 Keynesianism is far more idiotic than you probably think it is.

I leave it to the readers to decide which case they found more convincing. Of course, time will be the only meaningful judge, as for all we know, the current state of monetary disinflation could, at least in principle, continue until the sun grows cold.  In this regard, I somewhat disagree with Nate, in that if hyperinflation doesn’t at least begin to appear by 2016, I don’t think it would be necessary for him to concede. In any event, as one reader commented, there are no winners in this debate, everyone, including Ben Bernanke and Goldman Sachs, looks to lose out in some way.  It is better to be a shopkeeper in peacetime than a king in chaos; those whose times are ignored by the historians because “nothing happened” are the fortunate ones.

It might be interesting, however, to learn if your views were modified at all as a result of the debate.  By which I mean if you were formerly inclined to expect deflation but now consider hyperinflation more likely, or vice-versa.

Nate is putting the debate into epub format which will be cleaned up a little for typos and then made available as a free ebook for future reference.