An Analysis of a US-China Naval War
The balance of naval power in the 21st century increasingly hinges on industrial capacity rather than technological superiority alone. Today’s comparison between Chinese and American shipbuilding capabilities reveals a strategic reality reminiscent of the industrial imbalances that defined naval warfare in World War II. China’s shipbuilding capacity is estimated to be 230 times greater than that of the United States, with Chinese shipyards having a manufacturing capacity of roughly 23.25 million tons compared to less than 100,000 tons for U.S. shipyards. This disparity represents one of the most significant shifts in global naval industrial power since the rise of American maritime dominance in the 20th century.
This analysis examines three critical dimensions: the current state of Chinese versus American shipbuilding capacity, the historical lessons from the U.S.-Japan naval competition during World War II, and the potential implications for modern naval warfare scenarios. The findings suggest that while technological advantages and operational expertise remain important, the sheer scale of China’s industrial capacity provides strategic advantages in any prolonged naval conflict, fundamentally altering the calculus of maritime deterrence and warfare.
Part I: Contemporary Shipbuilding Capacity Comparison
China’s Maritime Industrial Revolution
China dominates the global shipbuilding industry, producing over 70% of new orders in 2024, with seven of the world’s top ten shipbuilders being Chinese companies. This transformation represents what analysts describe as the most significant shift in maritime industrial power since the decline of European shipbuilding in the mid-20th century.
As part of its “military-civil fusion” strategy, China is tapping into the dual-use resources of its commercial shipbuilding empire to support its ongoing naval modernization. The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), the world’s largest shipbuilder, exemplifies this integration. In 2024 alone, one Chinese shipbuilder constructed more commercial vessels by tonnage than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry has built since the end of World War II.
China’s shipbuilding supremacy extends across multiple vessel categories:
Commercial Dominance: China secured 388 bulk carrier orders in 2024, accounting for 75% of global activity, and captured 74% of the global tanker market with 322 vessel orders. In container vessels, Chinese dominance is even more pronounced, with 259 vessels representing 81% of global activity.
High-Value Markets: Perhaps most significantly for naval implications, China overtook South Korea in the LPG carrier sector, securing 62 LPG carrier orders compared to South Korea’s 59, giving China a 48% market share. This represents a breakthrough into traditionally sophisticated shipbuilding markets previously dominated by South Korean and Japanese yards.
Infrastructure and Scale: China has “dozens” of commercial shipyards larger and more productive than the largest U.S. shipyards. China’s total shipbuilding capacity increased by 12% to 47.8 million deadweight tons in 2024, with most Chinese shipyards fully booked for the next three to four years.
American Shipbuilding Decline
The United States presents a stark contrast to China’s expansion. The United States has a relatively insignificant capacity at 0.13 percent of global shipbuilding output, compared to China’s 46.59 percent. This represents a dramatic fall from American maritime industrial leadership.
Historical Context: America reached the pinnacle of its shipbuilding history during WWII and continued to serve as the world’s leading shipbuilder for decades thereafter. But competition from subsidized foreign shipyards quickly eroded that lead, especially after U.S. shipbuilding subsidies expired in 1981.
Current Infrastructure: The United States currently boasts the same number of private shipyards capable of producing new warships as it did in 1933: just seven. In addition, the Navy’s four public yards are no longer available for new construction like the ten public yards were in 1933.
Production Rates: From 2012 to 2021, the U.S. fleet added an average of 10.1 new ships a year—even fewer than the inadequate 12.7 production rate before World War I. Although the Fiscal Year 2025 budget requested an increase in shipbuilding to $32.4 billion, the U.S. Navy requested only six new ships, instead of the seven ships projected, remaining below the 10 to 11 new ships needed each year over the next 35 years.
Capacity Constraints: Despite nearly doubling its shipbuilding budget over the last 2 decades, the U.S. Navy hasn’t increased its number of ships. The Virginia-class submarine program exemplifies these challenges: in June 2024, the program’s rate of production was at about 60% of its annual goal—putting it years behind schedule, with much of this delay resting on the shipbuilder’s capacity to meet construction deadlines due to workforce shortages.
Strategic Implications of the Capacity Gap
The shipbuilding disparity carries profound implications beyond simple vessel counts. China’s massive shipbuilding industry would provide a strategic advantage in a war that stretches beyond a few weeks, allowing it to repair damaged vessels or construct replacements much faster than the United States, which continues to face a significant maintenance backlog and would probably be unable to quickly construct many new ships or to repair damaged fighting ships in a great power conflict.
This industrial capacity translates into fleet expansion rates that favor China. The U.S. Defense Department estimated China’s naval fleet would grow from 395 ships in 2025 to 435 by the end of the decade, while the U.S. Navy’s fleet was projected to decrease to 285 ships by 2025 and slightly rebound to 290 by 2030.
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