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From the transcript of the Darkstream:

I’m going to talk about Civil War 2.0 and I’m going to talk about the book Ages of Discord by Peter Turchin and what it has to do with the situation that the United States is presently facing. Now this is not a book that I would recommend to everyone, although it’s an important book, unless you’re someone who regularly reads history for fun, unless you’ve got an IQ in the 120 and up range,  this isn’t going to be the book for you. It’s an academic book it’s written in a very academic research style. The author, Peter Turchin, is very intelligent, but he is also very caught up in the mainstream narrative and so you need to be aware of that and not get too carried away by it. You know, not take it as gospel truth.

The way that it’s interesting, what’s interesting about it,  is that it gives you some new tools with which you can analyze the current situation. The thing that I thought was particularly striking about it, and what I’d liked about it, is that Turchin makes a real effort to put things in a proper historical context. He doesn’t just come up with a thesis and apply it solely, or even primarily, to the situation right now, but he also applies it to other historical situations. I believe he had a recent blog post, the one that I linked to today, where he talks about how he applied his calculations to thirty different historical situations, and that is taking a really intelligent approach to it. Instead of just saying, “well I think X is going to happen” and taking shots in the dark, what he did was he looked at the thirty historical situations and then measured their outcomes, and what he came up with should be disturbing to those who think that things are always going to work out just fine is that in ninety percent of the high-stress societal crises there was what he considers to be a negative outcome.

So what he is projecting, using his own metrics, his own tools, is a situation that he considers to be mid to high-level severity, and that ranges from serious societal disruption to full-blown civil war. Now I personally don’t subscribe to the full-blown civil war theory simply because there are no two obvious sides. I think that we’re much more likely to see a breakup and a collapse of the central government as well as the basic societal narrative rather than two discrete sides like we had with the North and the South during the U.S. Civil War of 1861-1865, but what’s particularly interesting about Turchin’s work is that it’s based on the concept of measuring societal stress.

The level of stress in the United States in 2016 was roughly comparable to the level of societal stress seen in 1860, and that’s very, very consistent with observations that you’ve seen from other students of history and military history, where it’s been said everything that’s happening in the United States – I
woud actually push that further and I would say everything that’s happening across the West – is essentially positioning for civil war.

An interesting experiment in applying WAR to war. Which is to say, Wins Above Replacement:

Among all generals, Napoleon had the highest WAR (16.679) by a large margin. In fact, the next highest performer, Julius Caesar (7.445 WAR), had less than half the WAR accumulated by Napoleon across his battles. Napoleon benefited from the large number of battles in which he led forces. Among his 43 listed battles, he won 38 and lost only 5. Napoleon overcame difficult odds in 17 of his victories, and commanded at a disadvantage in all 5 of his losses. No other general came close to Napoleon in total battles. While Napoleon commanded forces in 43 battles, the next most prolific general was Robert E. Lee, with 27 battles (the average battle count was 1.5). Napoleon’s large battle count allowed him more opportunities to demonstrate his tactical prowess. Alexander the Great, despite winning all 9 of his battles, accumulated fewer WAR largely because of his shorter and less prolific career.

However, outside of Napoleon’s outlying success, the generals’ WARs largely adhere to a normal distribution. This suggests his success is attributable to command talent, rather than an anomaly in the model’s findings. In fact, Napoleon’s total WAR was nearly 23 standard deviations above the mean WAR accumulated by generals in the dataset.

There were also generals that had surprisingly low total WAR despite a reputation as master tacticians. Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate States Army, finished with a negative WAR (-1.89), suggesting an average general would have had more success than Lee leading the Confederacy’s armies. Lee was saddled with considerable disadvantages, including a large deficit in the size of his military and available resources. Still, his reputation as an adept tactician is likely undeserved, and his WAR supports the historians who have criticized his overall strategy and handling of key battles, such as ordering the disastrous ‘Pickett’s Charge’ on the last day of the Battle of Gettysburg. In the words of University of South Carolina professor Thomas Connely, “One ponders whether the South may not have fared better had it possessed no Robert E. Lee.”

German field marshal Erwin Rommel, nicknamed the ‘Desert Fox’ for his successes in North Africa during World War II, also performed poorly in this model, finishing with -1.953 WAR. This finding disputes the praise Rommel has received as a tactician from modern generals, including Norman Schwarzkopf and Ariel Sharon. However, like Lee, Rommel has been the subject of considerable historical debate. In particular, critics have attributed much of his reputation as a tactical genius to both German and Allied propaganda. British generals reportedly exaggerated Rommel’s tactical abilities in order to minimize disapproval regarding their defeats.

Modern generals performed relatively poorly in the model. American general George S. Patton, described by historian Terry Brighton as “among the greatest generals of [World War II],” accumulated only .9 WAR. The failure of modern generals to perform well in WAR may be attributable to changes in warfare which have prevented individual generals from participating in a large number of battles.

Among post-World War II generals, Israeli commanders stood out. Israeli military leader Moshe Dayan finished with 2.109 WAR (60th overall), an impressive amount for a modern general but relatively modest compared to pre-20th Century tacticians. Similarly, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon accumulated 2.171 WAR (58th overall) for his battlefield successes in the Suez Crisis, Six-Day War, and Yom Kippur War.

It’s more an entertaining experiment than a serious statistical analysis, but I suspect the incredible tactical success it assigns to Napoleon is much more reflective of the French general’s strategic brilliance than anything else. In like manner, the Israeli generals appear to be overrated due to the low quality of their opposition; if I recall correctly, it was Dayan himself who said that the key to his military success was the fact that he was fighting Arabs.

Napoleon, on the other hand, fought the military creme de la creme of Europe, was often outnumbered, and usually won anyhow. But when you analyse his career, it tends to be his strategic actions that are the more striking and decisive.

It sounds as if the new Austrian government may be following the lead of the God-Emperor in rooting out the anti-democratic Deep State:

The raids came without warning, surprising even the intelligence operatives whose job is to never be caught off guard.

On the morning of Feb. 28, police stormed offices of Austria’s main domestic intelligence agency and carted off some of the nation’s most sensitive secrets in open crates and plastic bags. Top spy service officials working from home that day were greeted by officers threatening to break down their doors.

The extraordinary decision to target the agency responsible for defending the country from a multitude of threats, including right-wing extremism, had been made by the service’s new bosses: members of the far-right Freedom Party.

The reason? Defending the totalitarian North Korean regime from an Austrian espionage operation, among others cited in the search warrant. Critics saw absurd pretext for a politically motivated stab at an independent institution that could threaten the party’s agenda.

More than five months later, the impact continues to ripple across this central European nation of 9 million – and far beyond. In a country whose geopolitical positioning between East and West has long made it a nest of spies – “a playground for all nations” in the words of one Austrian intelligence veteran – the hometown service has been left in disarray.

“It’s paralysis,” the veteran said. “How could you work in such an environment?”

Intelligence services across the West, meanwhile, have looked on in dismay – and have chosen to protect their own secrets by freezing Austria out.

And yet, it looks rather like the duly-elected Austrian government is working with both the U.S. white hats as well as Russia. Is anyone really surprised that the enemies of the people are siding with a shadowy, unaccountable intelligence agency rather than a popular government freely elected by the people?

From a comment on a Darkstream:

“Having a clean room doesn’t matter when Alaric the Goth is sacking your city.”

But, “the most important thing we can do is pray.”

Said totally unironically.

There is nothing at all ironic about the juxtaposition of those two statements. I advised the commenter to read how Fabius Maximus defeated the brilliant Carthaginian general Hannibal, and what his very first priority was when given command of the Roman legions.

From Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, Book 22

Q. Fabius Maximus was now Dictator for the second time. On the very day of his entrance upon office he summoned a meeting of the senate, and commenced by discussing matters of religion. He made it quite clear to the senators that C. Flaminius’ fault lay much more in his neglect of the auspices and of his religious duties than in bad generalship and foolhardiness. The gods themselves, he maintained, must be consulted as to the necessary measures to avert their displeasure, and he succeeded in getting a decree passed that the decemvirs should be ordered to consult the Sibylline Books, a course which is only adopted when the most alarming portents have been reported. 

After inspecting the Books of Fate they informed the senate that the vow which had been made to Mars in view of that war had not been duly discharged, and that it must be discharged afresh and on a much greater scale. The Great Games must be vowed to Jupiter, a temple to Venus Erycina and one to Mens; a lectisternium must be held and solemn intercessions made; a Sacred Spring must also be vowed. All these things must be done if the war was to be a successful one and the republic remain in the same position in which it was at the beginning of the war. As Fabius would be wholly occupied with the necessary arrangements for the war, the senate with the full approval of the pontifical college ordered the praetor, M. Aemilius, to take care that all these orders were carried out in good time. 

After the various obligations towards the gods had thus been discharged, the Dictator referred to the senate the question of the policy to be adopted with regard to the war, with what legions and how many the senators thought he ought to meet their victorious enemy… 


From Plutarch, Fabius

The first solemn action of his dictatorship was very fitly a religious one: an admonition to the people, that their late overthrow had not befallen them through want of courage in their soldiers, but through the neglect of divine ceremonies in the general. He therefore exhorted them not to fear the enemy, but by extraordinary honour to propitiate the gods. This he did, not to fill their minds with superstition, but by religious feeling to raise their courage, and lessen their fear of the enemy by inspiring the belief that Heaven was on their side. With this view, the secret prophecies called the Sibylline Books were consulted; sundry predictions found in them were said to refer to the fortunes and events of the time; but none except the consulter was informed. Presenting himself to the people, the dictator made a vow before them to offer in sacrifice the whole product of the next season, all Italy over, of the cows, goats, swine, sheep, both in the mountains and the plains; and to celebrate musical festivities with an expenditure of the precise sum of 333 sestertia and 333 denarii, with one-third of a denarius over. The sum total of which is, in our money, 83,583 drachmas and 2 obols. What the mystery might be in that exact number is not easy to determine, unless it were in honour of the perfection of the number three, as being the first of odd numbers, the first that contains in itself multiplication, with all other properties whatsoever belonging to numbers in general. 

In this manner Fabius, having given the people better heart for the future, by making them believe that the gods took their side, for his own part placed his whole confidence in himself, believing that the gods bestowed victory and good fortune by the instrumentality of valour and of prudence; and thus prepared he set forth to oppose Hannibal, not with intention to fight him, but with the purpose of wearing out and wasting the vigour of his arms by lapse of time, of meeting his want of resources by superior means, by large numbers the smallness of his forces. With this design, he always encamped on the highest grounds, where the enemy’s horse could have no access to him. Still he kept pace with them; when they marched he followed them; when they encamped he did the same, but at such a distance as not to be compelled to an engagement and always keeping upon the hills, free from the insults of their horse; by which means he gave them no rest, but kept them in a continual alarm.