Author: VD

It’s illuminating to see what small readerships are possessed by the most popular economics blogs. Because I read Mike Shedlock and Calculated Risk, I always assumed that a number of the long list of blogs on their blogrolls were similarly well patronized. But apparently that’s not so much the case, although the omission of sites like Karl Denninger’s Market Ticker indicates that around half of the bigger fish are missing from this survey. But if EconDirectory’s list of top economics blogs is to be trusted, then this would appear to be the 11th most trafficked economics-related blog, in between #10 VoxEU’s 12,405 daily pageviews and #11 TaxProfs 8,041. It’s the same when it comes to visits, although if one adds the 1,400 feed readers – this is one of the few blogs to provide full-text feeds that negate the need to come here to read the posts – that would bump VP up to #9.

This is both scary and heartening. It’s scary, because if even the most popular econ blog only attracts 56k daily readers, it’s not hard to understand the level of economic ignorance on the part of the elite and the electorate alike. And it’s heartening, because this indicates it is feasible to reach a substantial percentage of the people who are sufficiently interested in the subject to follow it.

While we’re on the subject, it’s interesting to note that the Wall Street Journal has finally begun to wake up to the intellectual bankruptcy of the Neo-Keynesian response to the initial stages of the Great Depression 2.0:

Today’s G-20 meeting has been advertised as a showdown between the U.S. and Europe over more spending “stimulus,” and so it is. But the larger story is the end of the neo-Keynesian economic moment, and perhaps the start of a healthier policy turn. For going on three years, the developed world’s economic policy has been dominated by the revival of the old idea that vast amounts of public spending could prevent deflation, cure a recession, and ignite a new era of government-led prosperity. It hasn’t turned out that way….

Like many bad ideas, the current Keynesian revival began under George W. Bush. Larry Summers, then a private economist, told Congress that a “timely, targeted and temporary” spending program of $150 billion was urgently needed to boost consumer “demand.” Democrats who had retaken Congress adopted the idea—they love an excuse to spend—and the politically tapped-out Mr. Bush went along with $168 billion in spending and one-time tax rebates.

The cash did produce a statistical blip in GDP growth in mid-2008, but it didn’t stop the financial panic and second phase of recession. So enter Stimulus II, with Mr. Summers again leading the intellectual charge, this time as President Obama’s adviser and this time suggesting upwards of $500 billion. When Congress was done two months later, in February 2009, the amount was $862 billion. A pair of White House economists famously promised that this spending would keep the unemployment rate below 8%. Seventeen months later, and despite historically easy monetary policy for that entire period, the jobless rate is still 9.7%….

The response at the White House and among Congressional leaders has been . . . Stimulus III. While talking about the need for “fiscal discipline” some time in the future, President Obama wants more spending today to again boost “demand.” Thirty months after Mr. Summers won his first victory, we are back at the same policy stand.

RGD readers may recall that I predicted not only the failure of Stimulus II, but the failures of Stimuli III and IV as well. I expect they’ll finally give up on the fruitless endeavor sometime between V and VII. The problem, which even the new-found Neo-Keynesian skeptics don’t understand, is that these failed stimulus packages not only haven’t worked, but they are going to exacerbate the next phase of the contraction that is even now gathering steam. Although they appear to have a glimmer of concern in that regard; consider how the WSJ is ineptly attempting to construct an ex post facto cover for its backside.

“With the economy in recession in 2008 and 2009, we argued that some stimulus was justified and an increase in the deficit was understandable and inevitable. However, we also argued that permanent tax cuts aimed at marginal individual and corporate tax rates would have done far more to revive animal spirits, and in our view would have led to a far more robust recovery.”

In other words, the WSJ still subscribes to the very economic idiocy they are describing as a dead end. It’s not that the magical incantation doesn’t work, it merely wasn’t chanted in precisely the correct manner prescribed in the Keynesian grimoire. This means that we can confidently expect the decision-making elite to continue digging and making the hole deeper as the situation worsens. Note that the average weekly leading indicators are now at -6.9, a decline last seen in July 2008.

This is neither the first nor fourth time that Greece has faced a serious default situation. But, as Michael Pettis of China Financial Markets explains, because so many different things have happened before, the question is less whether history will prove a guide to the future, but rather which historical example will prove to be the relevant one:

The economic recovery in the countries hit by crisis will not begin until they are recognized as insolvent and receive debt forgiveness from their creditors. Preceding every sovereign default is the fiction that the creditor country is simply facing a short-term financing problem, and that with a lot of discipline and a little bit of good will it will be able to work its way out of the crisis. During this period a number of restructuring “solutions” are proposed – all of which involve increasing debt, and often in the most financially destabilising way – which inevitably make the final resolution of the crisis much more difficult and which sharply raise financial distress costs. The most notorious recent example of these terrible “solutions” was Argentina’s disastrous debt swap in 2001, in which it dramatically increased the country’s total obligations while it desperately tried to maintain the fiction that it could somehow grow its way out of its impossible debt burden.

Greece, and probably two or three other countries, simply cannot repay their outstanding debt amounts. Ultimately they are going to default, and then in the restructuring process they will receive enough debt forgiveness that allows them to return to a sound footing and with a reasonable repayment prospect. But as long as they maintain the pretence that they can and will repay the full outstanding amount, and struggle with the burden, the resulting distortions in the economy will mean that businesses will disinvest and the country will not grow.

Historical precedence makes it clear that as long as the sovereign borrower is forced to struggle with an unrepayable debt burden, it will not grow. Eventually, as has happened in nearly every previous case, creditors and borrowers will acknowledge reality and will work out a debt forgiveness plan that will allow the economy to return to growth. Until then, expect weak growth, high unemployment, and constant battles over debt.

Although most US-based economists are convinced that the special status of the dollar somehow renders the USA impervious to economic laws, the danger of US debt default is nearly as great as it is in Europe. The fact that the defaults are likely to begin in the next two years with the state and local governments does not mean that they are going to end there. However, a partial default would be much more likely than a general one, with the USA defaulting on the third of its debt that is presently held by China coming as a prelude to war between the waning superpower and its self-appointed would-be successor.

Major economic and historical transition points are almost always accompanied by large-scale war. I see no reason to believe that this will not be the case again in this repetition of the cycle.