VII. The Counterfeit and the Real
The deepest irony of the Enlightenment’s triumph is that its self-proclaimed weapons of reason, mathematics, and empirical evidence were all counterfeits, while the tradition possessed the genuine articles but failed to deploy them effectively.
The Enlightenment claimed reason but practiced rhetoric. Its arguments were not demonstrations but performances, designed to persuade rather than prove. When the arguments were examined carefully, as Hume examined causation, as Kant examined pure reason, and as the positivists examined verification, they dissolved under it. The Enlightenment’s elevation of human reason was a promise that could never be fulfilled.
The Enlightenment claimed to be mathematically sound but refrained from actually doing the calculations. When the calculations were finally done, whether it be Gorman on demand curves, the Wistar mathematicians on mutation rates, or the various genomic analyses of the twenty-first century, they uniformly refuted the Enlightenment’s claims. The mathematics was available all along but the Enlightenment simply never submitted to its discipline despite the public posturing of the empiricists.
The Enlightenment claimed empirical evidence while immunizing its core axioms from empirical testing. The social contract is not an empirical claim; it is a philosophical posture. The invisible hand is not a testable hypothesis, it is a literary metaphor. The perfectibility of man is not an objective subject to falsification, it is a groundless faith. Whenever empirical evidence contradicted Enlightenment expectations, as it has, repeatedly, across every domain, the evidence was either reinterpreted or ignored. Enlightenment empiricism was selective, avoided, and ultimately proved to be fraudulent.
The tradition, by contrast, had the real currency. Its logical tools were genuine; its openness to evidence was principled; its capacity for mathematical reasoning had been demonstrated over centuries. But the tradition did not mint this currency for public circulation. It kept its intellectual gold in the vault while the Enlightenment flooded the market with counterfeits. By the time the fakes were exposed, the Enlightenment had already bought up everything that mattered.
However, the situation today is not the situation in which the eighteenth-century intellectuals found themselves facing. The Enlightenment’s institutional monopoly, while formidable, is observably cracking. The prestige of its credentials is declining with every passing year. The failures documented in Part One are increasingly visible to ordinary observers as well as to specialists. The rhetoric of “science says” and “experts agree” and “studies show” no longer commands belief because far too many lies have been told in the name of science.
More importantly, the empirical data now exists to anchor the critical arguments that were previously abstract. The human and chimpanzee genomes have been mapped; the calculations can be done; the impossibility of Neo-Darwinism can be demonstrated and mathematically proved, not merely asserted. The economic data of three decades of free trade is available, the predictions can be checked and the failures can be confirmed. The democratic outcomes of two centuries of representative government can be examined; the gap between promise and performance can be measured.
The tradition’s arguments were always sound. What was lacking was the empirical anchor that would make them irrefutable and the rhetorical strategy that would make them heard. The empirical anchor now exists. The rhetorical landscape has shifted. The opportunity is real and the time is now.