An American military analyst shared his professional opinion about the challenge facing the Israeli military, as the Netanyahu regime appears to be writing checks the IDF knows it can’t cash:
Israel’s professional military is what has generated its tactical dominance — operationally and strategically, its position is deteriorating faster than almost anyone predicted, evidently excluding me, and the General who was in charge of training the IDF’s generals.
The IDF’s general officer corps is currently openly fretting about a potential war with both Egypt and Turkiye — they didn’t consider either scenario even a remote possibility 2 years ago, with the only people who frequently pointed out the possibility of war with Egypt being old Shin Bet Egypt hands that’ve scrupulously documented the Egyptian military’s build-up.
To be clear, the IDF’s generals concluded that they’d functionally lost the Gaza war like 4 months after it started. They’re not stupid. A major contributing factor to this strategic miscarriage is the IDF’s conscription policy, which has cultivated a general sentiment of martial invincibility that really is not grounded in material reality. That’s enabled the Israeli government’s designated wingnuts to push through flamboyantly strategically self-defeating regional policies because their support base has a “we can take them” attitude rooted in their temporary service, despite Israel not having fought anyone even approaching peer status in 50 years.
I shouldn’t even have to expound upon the IDF’s conscripts’ bad battlefield performance, and their high casualty rates when they actually see combat. The professional Israeli Army has borne the brunt of the actual fighting, and even they’ve been experiencing manpower shortages for over a year now — largely from casualties absorbed.
Now, I don’t put much stock in American military analysts anymore, much less European military analysts, since most of them have been so observably wrong with regards to both the Ukrainian and the Taiwan situation. But, in the case, the analyst correctly predicted the same thing that students of Martin van Creveld also knew, which is that a Gaza operation would most likely cause the serious deterioration of both the IDF’s military capabilities as well as its strategic position in the region.
Goliath can’t find David for an extended period of time without degrading its morale, its morals, and its military capabilities. It’s the same reason police make terrible combat soldiers. Becoming accustomed to outnumbering and outgunning the opponent by a significant margin is not conducive to developing the skills, mindset, and practices required to defeat a genuine peer; there is a reason why the oddsmakers favor college football teams who test themselves with formidable opponents early in the season over those who schedule cupcakes.
Imagine if Notre Dame played nothing but high school teams all season, then went up against Ohio State. That’s pretty much what the IDF has done for the last 50 years. Although its special operations have been wildly successful with the support of the USA in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, none of these geostrategic accomplishments – and the unseating of the Assad regime in Syria was particularly impressive – actually have anything to do with genuine military combat. And I see no signs that the IDF has begun to start even trying to apply the lessons of the new generation of infantry warfare developed in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine.
This may explain why the Netanyahu regime recently backed down from its intentions to announce the annexation of the West Bank. The ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians from Greater Israel is obviously its goal, but saner heads in Israel understand that openly pursuing that objective will likely trigger a war it is unlikely to win.