Israel is pursuing an essentially non-military strategy of attacking the enemy’s leadership rather than attempting to defeat them on the battlefield:
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has claimed it eliminated Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of the Hezbollah paramilitary group, in a strike on Beirut, Lebanon. In a statement on Saturday, the IDF confirmed media reports that the top official was killed in the bombing of an underground compound belonging to the militant group in the Dahiyeh suburb of the Lebanese capital. “Hassan Nasrallah will no longer be able to terrorize the world,” it added.
According to the IDF, Nasrallah “was responsible for the murder of many Israeli civilians and soldiers” as well as numerous other “terrorist activities.” “The IDF will continue operating against anyone who promotes and engages in terrorism against the State of Israel and its people,” the statement warned.
Hezbollah has confirmed the death of Nasrallah.
The reason most military strategists don’t recommend utilizing this strategy is that it usually doesn’t work very well outside of circumstances where the king, or khan, exerts sole control over the military and its use. Russia, for example, could have easily eliminated the Kiev regime’s leadership in a similar fashion, but has elected not to do so. China could do the same to the leadership of its estranged island province, if any such leadership were to exist.
I should probably explain that’s a bit of a diplomacy joke. You see, China’s foreign ministry recently informed reporters that the new Japanese head of the LDP could not have visited “the leader of Taiwan” as he was reported to have done in the past because “Taiwan is a province of China and there is no ‘leader of Taiwan.'” This is why I don’t do stand-up; I’d have to schedule an additional half-hour to explain why the jokes would have been funny if the audience had only possessed the information required to appreciate them.
The problem is that one has no guarantee that whatever leadership succeeds the previous leadership is not guaranteed to be less capable, or less inclined to escalate the conflict. Of course, if Israel’s goal is to escalate the conflict, as I suspect it is, then it had nothing to lose by removing Nasrallah from the equation since he was both a) capable and b) maintaining a disciplined strategy of attrition through restraint. A younger, less patient replacement who is more enthusiastic about engaging in direct war might be the best result that Israel could reasonably hope to accomplish.
That is why I think it’s too soon to have any opinion, one way or the other, about the wisdom of pursuing this Head of the Snake strategy in these particular circumstances. Sometimes, it’s impossible to know if a given course is the ideal one until a time well after the fact.