Advantage: China

Extrapolating from a 2015 US think tank report, China has now almost certainly surpassed parity with US air and sea forces in the South China Sea and now possesses a military advantage in the region. While the most recent reports are moderately more favorable to the US military, they are based in part on weapons systems and stocks that are not even available to the US forces yet, so for the purposes of comparing the capabilities of the two sides, it is more reasonable to extrapolate from the past analyses than utilize the current one.

Also, neither the past nor the present analysis takes into account the possibility of the US military being simultaneously involved in a war with Russia, which is currently the case. The point here is not to determine whether this is likely to be a positive development or a negative one for any particular party, but rather, to ascertain what the actual military situation happens to be at what is an obvious historical nexus.

Remember, it doesn’t matter what you think of the CCP, Clown World, Old Glory, or the US Marines, or what you want to believe. The material facts, and the military capabilities, are what they actually are.

Over the past two decades, China’s People’s Liberation Army has transformed itself from a large but antiquated force into a capable, modern military. Its technology and operational proficiency still lag behind those of the United States, but it has rapidly narrowed the gap. Moreover, China enjoys the advantage of proximity in most plausible conflict scenarios, and geographical advantage would likely neutralize many U.S. military strengths. A sound understanding of regional military issues — including forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power — will be essential for establishing appropriate U.S. political and military policies in Asia. This RAND study analyzes the development of respective Chinese and U.S. military capabilities in ten categories of military operations across two scenarios, one centered on Taiwan and one on the Spratly Islands. The analysis is presented in ten scorecards that assess military capabilities as they have evolved over four snapshot years: 1996, 2003, 2010, and 2017. The results show that China is not close to catching up to the United States in terms of aggregate capabilities, but also that it does not need to catch up to challenge the United States on its immediate periphery. Furthermore, although China’s ability to project power to more distant locations remains limited, its reach is growing, and in the future U.S. military dominance is likely to be challenged at greater distances from China’s coast. To maintain robust defense and deterrence capabilities in an era of fiscal constraints, the United States will need to ensure that its own operational concepts, procurement, and diplomacy anticipate future developments in Chinese military capabilities.

The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, RAND, 2015