From the speech entitled Financial Reform: Post Crisis? by Thomas Hoenig, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
In the United States, we observe with each crisis and market collapse that policymakers consistently intervene to protect an ever broader group of creditors and investors from loss. This includes the LDC debt crisis, the failure of Continental Illinois, and the thrift industry and stock market collapses of the 1980s. These previous public interventions, though, pale in comparison to what was done recently. Market participants and large financial institutions have little reason to doubt that they will be bailed out again.
Let me offer just one staggering example. When Gramm-Leach-Bliley was passed in 1999, the five largest U.S. banking organizations controlled $2.3 trillion in assets, or about 38 percent of all banking industry assets. Currently, Bank of America by itself and in spite of its need for government support during the crisis has the same level of assets – $2.3 trillion – as the top five did in 1999 and the top five now have 52 percent of all banking industry assets. What clearer sign could we find that market discipline no longer exists?
Past actions and this growth have given our largest organizations significant competitive advantages over other financial institutions. For example, creditors and uninsured depositors at too-big-to-fail organizations believe that there is almost no chance that they will have to take a loss. This idea is formally acknowledged by the credit rating agencies when they give these organizations separate “support” and “standalone” ratings, which explicitly factor in the government support they likely will receive. The difference in these two ratings thus provides one measure of the funding advantages that too-big-to-fail organizations have over others.
Haldane estimated that this funding advantage amounted to about $250 billion in 2009 for 28 of the largest banks in the world. At the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, we estimated the ratings and funding advantage for the five largest U.S. banking organizations during this crisis. In June 2009, these organizations had senior, long-term bank debt that was rated four notches higher on average than it would have been based on just the actual condition of the banks, with one bank given an eight notch upgrade for being too big to fail. Looking at the yield curve, this four-notch advantage translates into more than a 160 basis point savings for debt with two years to maturity and over 360 basis points at seven years to maturity.
In a competitive marketplace, where just a few basis points make a difference, these funding advantages are huge and represent a highly distorting influence within financial markets. I’ll name three. They don’t have to sell creditors on the strength of their condition. They have significant advantages in competing for funds. And, they have significant incentives to take on more risk, hold less capital, and book more assets.
Of course, the salient fact that Hoenig leaves out of the equation is that between 40 and 45% of those trillions in big bank assets are worthless, according to my calculations. Which is why more government support will almost certainly be required in order to keep the “too big to fail” banks from failing.