Tag: economics

I have no serious academic credentials and I see little value in them, given the vast quantities of demonstrable nonsense produced on a regular basis by the credentialed. Which tends to make this particular syllabus rather amusing:

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

I. Course Overview

This course examines the relations between international politics and international economics. It provides an overview of the main international political economy approaches. We begin with a theoretical introduction to political economy in the first part of the course, then we explore the evolution of the international economic system and its political implications. A particular focus is devoted to the so-called ‘globalization debate’ and its evaluation, with a specific focus on trade and finance issues, as well as development and inequality. Also part of the course is dedicated to the interaction of economic issues and security.

The following books are required for the class and are available for purchase at the bookstore:

* Gilpin, Robert. 2002. The Challenge of Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press.
▪ Day, Vox. 2009. The Return of the Great Depression. WND Books.
▪ Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2007. In Defense of Globalization. Oxford University Press.
▪ Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2003 (2nd Edition). Globalization and its Discontents. Norton

I suppose I should be pleased, but mostly I just hope the professor doesn’t find himself in too much trouble.

A professional energy analyst shares his professional perspective, which is an excerpt from a note he sends to their clients:

Have you seen the report today? All the media sees out of this is that the economy is expanding. Two minutes of gazing at the stats shows the opposite. Manufacturing should rally from September through February as part of the seasonal cycle. To have December choke is a very negative indicator.

Here’s an excerpt of my daily note to clients: Our longer-term bearish outlook on industrial natural gas demand continues after the Federal Reserve release today of industrial capacity utilization. The number rose from 71.5 in November (revised down) to 72. The optimists out there will tell you that 72% is the highest in a year. We’ll tell you that seasonality plays a part in that, manufacturing usually increases through February’s end. We’re also quick to point out that we were at 72.7 in December a year ago… and the economy was abysmal a year ago — we’re currently trailing even that. Even more disappointing is the fact that some industrial plants have permanently shuttered. That creates a smaller denominator in the capacity calculation and an appearance of greater growth than was really there. A 7% annualized growth rate for Q409? That’s great. But annual output dropped 9.7%, the worst slide since 1946 when the WWII defense machine relaxed.

The real kicker to the report comes from the Fed itself: Industrial production increased 0.6 percent in December. The gain primarily resulted from an increase of 5.9 percent in electric and gas utilities due to unseasonably cold weather. Manufacturing production edged down 0.1 percent, while the output of mines rose 0.2 percent. That’s right. They’re telling you that manufacturing was down, but the number went up on utility output of energy. What does the media take away from this? An actual headline: “Industrial output rises for 6th month in a row.” That is a fact. A fact that smells like horse manure when you consider the implications on present industrial natural gas consumption.

Being a complete amateur when it comes to this sort of sector analysis, I find it very interesting that the professional opinion happens to coincide rather closely with my take on the overall economy. The numbers just seem to keep getting curiouser and curiouser….

The Market Ticker suspects shenanigans beyond the usual chicanery:

On January 5th the durables report for November was ‘released’. It showed a 0.2% increase. I didn’t write on it at the time, as it didn’t appear to be particularly consequential. The report, of course, came in the middle of the first-week January market rally. But now, in the dark of night, the number has been revised – to a decrease of 0.7%. The reason is a claimed “statistical error.” This, by the way, should have been obvious from the retail sales report, which I did write on.

Here’s the ugly – the Census’ link to the report is now listed as missing (that is, intentionally removed!) and what’s worse the link they refer you to, the “Historical M3 Releases” does not have the corrected November data – it only has releases through October on it.

That is, November’s report has disappeared.

I demonstrated the fictitious nature of government statistics in the chapter of RGD entitled “No One Knows Anything”. I suppose it’s easier to simply not bother making anything up, though. Since so few people even understand what the numbers are supposed to represent, why not just periodically shout “The Dow is at 12,000 and all is well!”

It would probably be more convincing anyhow.

“3. The Federal budget deficit for 2010 will exceed the projected $1.17 trillion.”
– December 28, 2009

It’s nine months too soon to declare victory, of course, but that prediction isn’t looking too bad as of January 13th.

The December figures bring to $388.5 billion the deficit for the first three months of Washington’s 2010 fiscal year. That’s on top of a staggering $1.4 trillion budget shortfall for fiscal 2009, more than three times the size of the deficit that the government ran in 2008.

In other words, the federal deficit is on a pace to hit $1.554 trillion in FY2010. Which is remarkably strange considering that we’re now six months into an economic recovery featuring 3.5 2.8 2.2% GDP growth. Say, doesn’t the GDP formula include government spending….

The Market Ticker notes that consumer confidence is sinking:

There’s no good news embedded in here. Personal finances and the buying climate dropped by amounts matching their largest one-week change ever, possibly spurred by people getting their credit-card statements from Christmas (or simply reflecting on what they spent – and determining it was too much.)

Only nine percent rate the economy positively.

Shockingly, the news of the Federal Reserve printing massive profits for itself and bankers paying themselves huge bonuses hasn’t convinced people fearing for their jobs and cutting back on their expenses that all is well. And the whole “stock market advance as leading indicator” isn’t exactly the most convincing argument on offer in light of the fact that everyone can still remember what all the cheerleaders were saying when the Dow was over 14,000.

UPDATE – Speaking of animal spirits, Beau offers his services: “Against the backdrop of economic Götterdämmerung, I have some cheerful news that might pick up some animal spirits. beau.matchmakingservice -at- yahoo.com is ready to assist ilk wishing to discreetly make their intentions known to other ilk. Some of the more prolific posters certainly need no introductions, but in uncertain times animal spirits could perhaps use a boost. beau.matchmakingservice is available for regulars, irregulars and lurking ilk.”

Breeding Ilk… that’s all the world needs now.

Imagine that:

Paul Krugman has weighed in to an ongoing debate sparked by Jonathan Chait’s criticism of a passage in my essay “Keeping America’s Edge.” I believe that I have responded to Mr. Chait’s assertions comprehensively. Unlike Chait, Professor Krugman has argued that I have presented incorrect data.

Krugman says this:

But I went back to Manzi’s source of data, and it turns out that it’s even worse than that. If you use the broad definition of Europe, which includes the USSR, it did indeed have 40 percent of world output in the early 1970s. But that share has not fallen to 25 percent — it’s still above 30 percent.

His assertion is flatly false.

First, Krugman has incorrectly identified my source of data. I have never corresponded with Krugman concerning data sources and analysis for the passage in question (unlike Chait, who was careful to contact me prior to publishing his blog post, and to whom I sent data sources and calculation details), so I cannot know on what basis Krugman asserts that the dataset to which he links is my “source of data.” It is not. As per the blog post in which I reviewed multiple data sources for the analysis in question, I averaged multiple sources of data. Krugman has selected only one of these sources, presented it as if it were my sole source, and therefore (obviously) failed to replicate the published result. The error is his.

Second, Krugman incorrectly interpreted the economic dataset that he did identify.

I know I’m shocked that A NOBEL-WINNING ECONOMIST could get it so wrong. And speaking of errors and Krugman, a recent reviewer of RGD managed to impressively cock things up in “correcting” my explanation of the loan multiplier in a fractional reserve system. Amusingly, he seizes upon this “error”, combined with the fact that I dared to criticize A NOBEL-WINNING ECONOMIST, to claim that the book “Should Never Have Been Published”. While I have to take responsibility for failing to distinguish between “the bank” and “the banking system”, our intrepid reviewer nevertheless managed to completely miss both the obvious context (the fractional reserve system) as well as the point (the increase in the money supply created by the loans). I’ll explain this in more detail later this week for the six regulars who are actually interested in this sort of thing as well as any anklebiters who would like to revel in the possibility that I am wrong about something, but if you’d like to verify this for yourself, I would encourage you to plug a 0.75% reserve ratio into the table in the Wikpedia example – note that I was completely unaware of this table until about two weeks ago – and compare it to the Loan Multiplier of 133.33x to determine for yourself whether Mr. Eskildson’s “correction” is on target or not.

It should be noted, that this method only provides an estimate for the amount of interest collected over the course of the year, since this completely depends upon the number of loan-and-deposit cycles that occur over the course of the year as well as the three caveats mentioned in the book. Using the 10x example from Wikipedia would mean that $4.80 in annual interest is collected, which is neither the maximum $6.67 mentioned in RGD nor the $0.0599 which the reviewer claims is the correct amount.

In which Ben Bernanke throws Barney Frank under the bus. Even if you’re not an economist, Ben Bernanke’s attempt to excuse the Federal Reserve for any responsibility in creating the housing bubble really has to be read to be believed. Here’s the one of the more damning paragraphs in the 36-page PDF:

First, the cumulative increase in housing prices shown in Slide 5 is quite large. Can accommodative monetary policies during this period reasonably account for the magnitude of the increase in house prices that we observed? If not, what does account for it? Second, house prices rose significantly during this period in many industrialized countries, not just in the United States. If monetary policy was an important source of house price appreciation in the United States, it seems reasonable to expect that, in an international comparison, countries with easier monetary policies should have been more likely to have significant rises in house prices as well. Is that the case?

With respect to the magnitude of house-price increases: Economists who have investigated the issue have generally found that, based on historical relationships, only a small portion of the increase in house prices earlier this decade can be attributed to the stance of U.S. monetary policy. This conclusion has been reached using both econometric models and purely statistical analyses that make no use of economic theory.

This is extraordinarily deceptive on several levels. Bernanke is first leaving out the fact that regulation of the banks is the specific responsibility of the Federal Reserve and is an inherent part of monetary policy given the fact that most of the money in the system is created by bank loans under the fractional-reserve system. He is, of course, limiting his implicit definition of “monetary policy” to interest rate targets, which is acceptable in general economic discussions but not in a specific one of this sort.

Second, it should be no surprise that Bernanke feels justified by the use of econometric models based on the Taylor Rule because the Taylor Rule is the very rule that was used to justify the Fed’s actions in the first place. As Mike Shedlock shows using Case-Shiller housing prices in the place of Owner-Equivalent Rent to calculate CPI-U, the Taylor Rule is fundamentally flawed because it is based on CPI-U. In RGD, I demonstrate a few of the many ways CPI-U considerably underestimates the real rate of price changes; the fact that it doesn’t even take real housing prices into account renders it entirely useless as a basis for defending the Federal Reserve’s actions or comparing the U.S. housing market with international housing markets.

No doubt there will be a lot of detailed critiques of this paper in the coming month. I may even write one myself. But in summary, “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble” is a shameless and deceptive attempt by a failed economist to justify his spectacular failure by using the very models that failed him in the first place.

I recognized the housing bubble in 2002; that is a matter of public record. Bernanke, on the other hand, was still denying it existed in October 2005, less than a year prior to its 2006 peak! “House prices have risen by nearly 25 percent over the past two years. Although speculative activity has increased in some areas, at a national level these price increases largely reflect strong economic fundamentals, including robust growth in jobs and incomes, low mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit the expansion of housing supply in some areas.”

Calculated Risk points out two more things that Bernanke conveniently avoided mentioning:

“Bernanke used data from other countries to suggest monetary policy was not a huge contributor to the bubble … however, Bernanke didn’t discuss if non-traditional mortgage products contributed to housing bubbles in other countries. This would seem like a key missing part of the speech.

Bernanke didn’t discuss how the current regulatory structure missed this “protracted deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards” (even though many people were pointing it out in real time). And Bernanke didn’t discuss specifically how the new regulatory structure would catch this deterioration in standards.”

The truth is that the Fed knew about the “protracted deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards” prior to the start: “Even before economic prophets of doom such as Marc Faber, Nouriel Roubini, and Peter Schiff became famous for their correct warnings of imminent crisis, Edward Gramlich, a governor at the Federal Reserve, told Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan that making home mortgages available to low income borrowers would lead to widespread loan defaults having extremely negative effects on the national economy. This extraordinarily specific warning was given in 2000, amidst the wreckage of the dot-com bomb and before the housing bubble even began. Those possessed of a mordant sense of humor may appreciate how Greenspan rejected Gramlich’s recommendation to audit consumer finance companies on the basis of his fear that it might undermine the availability of subprime credit.”
– Vox Day, The Return of the Great Depression, x.

A total of 157.5 million persons worked at some point during 2008, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. The proportion of workers who worked full time, year round in 2008 was 65.6 percent, down from 68.4 percent in 2007. The number of persons who experienced some unemployment in
2008 increased by 6.1 million to 21.2 million. This sharp increase reflects weak labor market conditions due to a recession that began in December 2007.

I found that last sentence to be interesting. Here are the latest GDP numbers from Q407 to Q308: 2.1, -0.7, 1.5, 2.7. Now, if the recession began before Q408, while the average quarterly GDP was 1.4 percent, how does 2.2 percent GDP growth indicate economic recovery? Especially when it is known that between two-thirds and three-fourths of that “growth” was related to the Cash for Clunkers program.

“We are seeing early evidence of that recovery: Real gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States rose an estimated 3-1/2 percent at an annual rate in the third quarter, following four consecutive quarters of decline. Most forecasters anticipate another moderate gain in the fourth quarter…. My own view is that the recent pickup reflects more than purely temporary factors and that continued growth next year is likely…. As the recovery becomes established, however, payrolls should begin to grow again, at a pace that increases over time.”
– Ben Bernanke, November 16, 2009

“Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman said he sees about a one-third chance the U.S. economy will slide into a recession during the second half of the year as fiscal and monetary stimulus fade. ‘It is not a low probability event, 30 to 40 percent chance,’ Krugman said today in an interview in Atlanta, where he was attending an economics conference. Survey of Economists Krugman’s forecast is more pessimistic than the median estimate of 58 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News in early December, which called for a 2.6 percent expansion this year following a 2.5 percent contraction in 2009.
– Paul Krugman, January 4, 2009

“I think the U.S. will avoid a double dip recession, and 2010 GDP growth will be in the 2% to 3% range.”
– Calculated Risk, January 1, 2010

“Based on my reading, here is what I conclude the consensus views are as we head into 2010: Muted recovery, but positive growth, for sure! No risk of a ‘double dip’…. So here we are with a glorious opportunity to reintroduce Bob Farrell’s Rule 8: “When all forecasts and experts agree, something else is going to happen.”
– David Rosenberg, December 17, 2009

“Yun predicted that home prices will rise by 4 percent, while home resales, which are expected to reach 5 million this year, will surpass that level in 2010, hitting 5.7 million. Average mortgage rates will average roughly 5.7 percent, he said.”
Lawrence Yun, National Association of Realtors, November 13, 2009

“The U.S. economy next year will turn in its best performance since 2004 as spending perks up and companies increase investment and hiring, says Dean Maki, the most-accurate forecaster in a Bloomberg News survey. The world’s largest economy will expand 3.5 percent in 2010, according to Maki, the chief U.S. economist at Barclays Capital Inc. in New York.”
– Dean Maki, Barclays Capital, December 28, 2009

“Jan Hatzius, chief U.S. economist at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. in New York, who was No. 1 among forecasters of GDP during the 12 months through June 2009. Hatzius, 41, estimates the economy will expand 2.4 percent in 2010…. Hatzius and the economists at Goldman Sachs project the unemployment rate will average 10.3 percent next year, compared with a median estimate of 10 percent for 58 responses in this month’s survey.
-Jan Hatzius, Goldman Sachs, December 28, 2009

“Neal Soss, 60, chief economist at Credit Suisse in New York projects the economy will grow 3.3 percent next year.”
– Neal Soss, Credit Suisse, December 28, 2009

“John Lonski, 58, chief economist at Moody’s Capital Markets Group in New York, was No. 3. He sees a 2.7 percent expansion.”
– John Lonski, Moody’s Capital Markets Group, December 28, 2009

“Robert MacIntosh, chief economist at Boston-based Eaton Vance Management forecasting growth of 3.5 percent, and that the jobless rate will average 9.5 percent.”
– Robert Macintosh, Eaton Vance Management, December 28, 2009

“Roubini sees a greater chance of a U-shaped economic recovery in developed economies, with a 20 percent to 25 percent chance of a double-dip.”
– Nouriel Roubini, October 11, 2009

Here are seven predictions concerning economic-related events I expect to see by December 31, 2010:

1. The BLS will report U-3 unemployment to be in excess of 11 percent. The actual number of unemployed workers will be much higher.
2. The BEA will report real GDP to be less than 12,973 in billions of chained 2005 dollars.  A “double-dip recession” will be the official description, but rumors of a “second great depression” will be increasingly heard as the evidence mounts that a single large scale economic event is taking place.
3. The Federal budget deficit for 2010 will exceed the projected $1.17 trillion.
4. More than 200 banks will be seized by the FDIC. Their deposits will represent more than two percent of all U.S. bank deposits.  (Specific calculation: 305 banks and 5.2% of total deposits.)
5. Commercial bank loans and leases (TOTLL) will fall below $6.3 trillion.
6. All sectors credit market debt outstanding, which is published in the Fed’s quarterly Z1 Flow of Funds Accounts, will fall below $52 trillion.  This will mostly be the result of continued deleveraging by the financial sector, and to a lesser extent, the housing sector, which between them will decline by more than $1 trillion.
7. The national median existing-home price will not rise 4% from $172,600 to $179,500 as predicted by NAR’s lead economist Lawrence Yun, but will fall below 165k instead.  And if there is the sort of crash that is implied by the preparations for SuperTARP, existing home prices will collapse below $140k.

I also expect an increase in Sitemeter-recorded visits to the blog to increase from 1,942,640 in 2009, (161,887 per month) to 2,250,000, primarily as a result of an increased interest in economic matters. The 1.9 million visits, (3,115,071 page views), was up 19.6% from the visits 1,566,254 in 2008. I still find it astonishing that so many people continue to be interested in my various thoughts and opinions, but thank you for stopping by and please feel free to do so throughout the year.