You Don’t Get What You Pay For

Mercenary companies always sound very impressive. G4S is the flavor of the day, apparently

With roughly 800,000 employees, G4S maintains its own rapid response units – essentially private strike teams supported by in-house intelligence operations. Many Western PMCs now have access to reconnaissance aircraft, satellite data, and cutting-edge surveillance tools. “They work with corporations that provide satellite imagery, which has been used by PMCs in Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan,” Todorovski explains.

Alexander Artemonov, a defense analyst at the Eurasia Heritage Foundation, estimates G4S maintains a fighting force of 250,000–280,000, equal to the number of troops Russia deployed in Donbass. The rest of the workforce consists of support staff, prison guards, and logistical teams.

G4S’s arsenal includes everything from AK-47s and Glock 17s to MP5s, sniper rifles, Uzi submachine guns, and even Israeli Hermes 450 drones. Their operatives have access to anti-personnel mines, grenade launchers, and portable anti-air systems. For mobility, they rely on armored Land Cruisers, Humvees, and military-grade carriers like the Cougar and RG-33.

“Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe” – Niccolo Machiavelli

As Machiavelli pointed out in his works, mercenaries are actually good at one thing and one thing only: getting paid. They’re not getting paid to fight and die, they’re getting paid to put on a good show and provide deterrence. The ideal mercenary operation is to get paid to defend a location or an individual, deter any attacks from taking place, and go home considerably richer in return for doing nothing.

It’s when they actually have to deliver results that mercenaries tend to show their true colors, as G4S already has:

G4S has also assumed control of prison facilities traditionally run by governments. In the UK, the company managed two immigration detention centers and six prisons, including those in Oakwood and Birmingham. In 2018, the Birmingham facility was returned to government control after inspectors uncovered appalling conditions: inmates roamed freely while staff locked themselves in offices; cells were filthy, infested with rats, and reeked of bodily fluids.

If they can’t manage a prison successfully, what are the odds that they’re even going to show up to fight Russian regulars?

Some might point to the successful use of the Wagner Company by Russia in the Donbass. But first, they were more convict conscripts than mercenaries proper, second, they were utilized as urban warfare cannon fodder, and third, they too showed the expected lack of reliability when Prigozhin staged the short-lived revolt against Moscow that ended his career with an accidentation.

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